

**THE CRIME
OF INCITEMENT TO GENOCIDE OF UKRAINIANS
IN RUSSIAN AND BELARUSIAN PROPAGANDA**

Documentation, analysis and recommendations

September 2025

The crime of incitement to genocide of Ukrainians in Russian and Belarusian propaganda. Documentation, analysis and recommendations

© iSANS, September 2025

About iSANS

iSANS is an international expert initiative aimed at identifying, analysing, and countering hybrid threats to democracy, the rule of law, and sovereignty of states in Western, Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia. The initiative's priority is to defend international legal framework and democratic order against purposeful attempts to undermine, compartmentalise and destroy it by states and political forces disrespectful of universal democratic and human rights values. iSANS is a practical initiative seeking to counter threats and find solutions to the problems detected. For publications and additional information, please visit <https://isans.org/>.

Research team

Authors:

Andrey Kalikh, Senior Analyst, iSANS

Yuri Dzhibladze, Head of the Human Rights and Rule of Law Unit, iSANS

Researchers:

Viktoriya Sakharova, Natalia Petrova, Adam Yurchanka

Contributors, advisors on legal matters:

Dr. Gleb Bogush, Research fellow at the Institute of International Peace and Security Law, University of Cologne

Dr. Andrei Richter, Professor Researcher, Comenius University in Bratislava



CONTENTS

Executive summary	1
Introduction	
Goals of the research	4
Why addressing the problem of incitement to genocide is important	4
Role of propaganda in the commission of the crime of genocide	5
Research methodology	8
Challenges in defining a “protected group”	10
Part 1. Accountability: legal norms and mechanisms	
International legal definition and characteristics of the crime of incitement to genocide	14
Case studies establishing precedent	16
International responsibility of states	17
International individual criminal responsibility	21
Accountability for "hate speech" and other types of hostile expressions which do not represent incitement to genocide	23
Part 2. Ideological foundations of genocide	
Denial of the concept of Ukraine as an independent and sovereign state. Incitement to the eradication of Ukraine	29
Examples of public calls for the eradication of Ukraine	35
Part 3. Hate speech against Ukrainians	
Concept of “Five Ds +”	43
Examples of dehumanisation	44
Examples of demonisation	45
Examples of delegitimisation	48
Examples of glorification of terror	54
Part 4. Incitement to genocide of Ukrainians	
Incitement to the eradication of Ukrainians	56
Incitement to the infliction of unbearable conditions of life	60
Incitement to the forced transfer and assimilation of Ukrainian children	63
Conclusions	68
Recommendations	74
Endnotes	77

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

iSANS is an international expert initiative aimed at identifying, analysing, and countering hybrid threats to democracy, the rule of law, and sovereignty of states in Western, Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia. Documenting and analysing anti-Ukrainian and anti-Western statements in Belarusian and Russian propaganda is one of the key activities of iSANS.

The research done by iSANS on the incitement to genocide of Ukrainians in Russian and Belarusian propaganda, the results of which are presented in this report, builds on our work during the first pilot research in 2023. The new study aimed at examining a wider range of sources and providing an expert opinion on under what conditions, on the basis of which norms of international law, and through what mechanisms states and individuals responsible for the incitement to genocide of Ukrainians can be brought to justice.

In the course of the research, we came to the following conclusions:

- The data we have collected indicates that in preparation for a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russian and Belarusian propaganda launched an extensive information campaign, creating a terrifying image of Ukraine, claiming that Ukraine is a state hostile to Russia, and denying it legitimacy and sovereignty. Numerous statements demonised and discredited the Ukrainian leadership and ordinary Ukrainians, accusing them of Nazism and of committing war crimes against and genocide of the residents of eastern Ukraine who should be “liberated” by Russia. Through these and similar narratives, propaganda sought to rationalise and justify the impending invasion.
- This propaganda campaign, which is still ongoing, denies the existence of Ukrainians as an independent people, their national identity, agency, and the right for a statehood. Actions of Ukrainians in defence of these principles are described as carrying a threat to Russia.
- Top officials of the Russian state are setting the tone for this anti-Ukrainian propaganda campaign. This fact, as well as the instructions given by the authorities to the state media, indicate the existence of a state policy in Russia directed against the existence of Ukraine as an independent state and denying the existence of Ukrainians as an independent national group.
- The anti-Ukrainian state policy of Russia, formulated at the highest level, created fertile ground for the emergence of more radical statements. A massive propaganda machine has fuelled hostility towards Ukrainians by broadcasting hate speech on a daily basis. Propagandists have dehumanised and delegitimised the entire national group of Ukrainians, comparing them to “Nazis”, “Satanists”, likening them to diseases and catastrophes, calling them

“worms”, “inhumans”, etc. We note the evolution of propaganda from the denial of Ukrainian statehood to spreading of hatred towards Ukrainians as such, from which incitement to genocide inevitably grows.

- After the initial setbacks and the retreat of the Russian army at the beginning of the invasion, as well as the emergence in the media of the first evidence of horrific crimes committed by Russian soldiers on the occupied territories, propagandists stopped hiding behind the words “denazification” and “liberation” and shifted to an openly genocidal language, calling for more civilian casualties and the killing of those who do not see themselves as part of the “Russian world.” The creation of a general background of hatred gave rise to a further escalation of public rhetoric.
- Among the entire array of anti-Ukrainian propaganda statements, calls for the extermination of Ukrainians – the whole national group or a certain part of it, the “incorrigibles”, stand out clearly. The share of such “incorrigibles” in the total population of Ukraine who should be eliminated varies in the appeals of propagandists, but in any case, such statements refer to millions of people.
- Direct and public incitement to genocide is a crime in accordance with the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. We argue that the direct and public calls for the extermination of all or part of Ukrainians that we have documented contain obvious signs of violation of these norms and can be used as evidence of the crime of incitement to genocide in international and national courts.
- Along with direct incitement for the destruction of all or part of Ukrainians, we have recorded systematic calls for the creation of unbearable conditions of life for the civilian population of Ukraine through missile attacks on energy and other civilian infrastructure facilities and the destruction of peaceful cities. According to Art. II(c) of the Genocide Convention and Art. 6(c) of the Rome Statute, deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part also constitutes a crime of genocide. Therefore, calls for the creation of unbearable conditions of life, if they were made with intent to destroy the group in whole or in part, may be also classified as incitement to genocide.
- We have also documented numerous calls for deportation, “re-education” (“Russification”), assimilation and ideological indoctrination of Ukrainian children, as well as examples of justification of these actions. According to Article II(e) of the Genocide Convention and Art. 6(e) of the Rome Statute, the forced transfer of children from one human group to another is a crime of genocide. Therefore, calls for the involuntary displacement of Ukrainian

children to Russia and Belarus, if they were made with intent to destroy the group in whole or in part, may also be regarded as incitement to genocide.

- A legal obligation of states to prevent and punish genocide, enshrined in the Genocide Convention, include their obligation to prevent and punish incitement to genocide. The international legal responsibility of states for genocide is considered by the International Court of Justice during the trials of interstate disputes on the violation of obligations under the Genocide Convention.
- Several mechanisms exist for criminalising individuals for inciting to genocide. The main one is the International Criminal Court (ICC). The ICC is already investigating the situation in Ukraine, covering possible charges of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. The ICC may bring charges of incitement to genocide, but so far it has not brought them. As a step that would help encourage an ICC investigation into incitement to genocide, an additional referral of the situation in Ukraine to the ICC Prosecutor by the States parties to the Rome Statute is being discussed, with a call for attention to incitement to genocide in connection with availability of new information.
- States, on whose territory or regarding whose population the crime of incitement to genocide was allegedly committed, can bring individuals to criminal responsibility for inciting to genocide, if this crime is included in their criminal code. This applies first and foremost to Ukraine itself.
- Many states have the ability to prosecute crimes against international law, including incitement to genocide, committed in other countries, using the principle of universal jurisdiction. The exercise of universal jurisdiction often faces institutional, resource, political and legal obstacles. Many of these difficulties can be overcome with political will.
- We hope that the evidence collected in the framework of this research will be included in the evidence base of international and national courts and help hold Russian and Belarusian political figures and propagandists accountable for their crimes of inciting to genocide of Ukrainians as well as bring to justice the states of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus for their violation of the Genocide Convention.

INTRODUCTION

Goals of the research

The main objective of this study is to identify, from the entire range of anti-Ukrainian rhetoric of Russian and Belarusian propaganda, statements containing “direct and public incitement to commit genocide” of Ukrainians in accordance with the elements of the crime described in Article III(c) of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (hereinafter referred to as the Convention)¹ and Article 25(3)(e) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,² as well as to analyse and classify these statements.

Other goals of the study include:

1. Draw the international community’s attention to the scale and gravity of the crime of incitement to genocide of Ukrainians committed by Russian and Belarusian officials and propagandists, which facilitate the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity by Russian servicemen and may provoke the commission of acts of genocide. These incitements also lead to the justification of such crimes in the eyes of the Russian and Belarusian public, a lack of indignation and protests against them and the aggression against Ukraine in general.
2. Outline the main legal avenues of holding the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus legally accountable for their alleged violation of the Genocide Convention, and holding individuals – Russian and Belarusian propagandists, media managers and public officials – criminally liable for their alleged involvement in inciting to genocide.

Why addressing the problem of incitement to genocide is important

iSANS began analysing anti-Ukrainian and anti-Western rhetoric in state media in Belarus and Russia long before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.³ Since spring 2022, iSANS has been analysing propaganda storylines aimed at justifying and rationalising the aggressive war against Ukraine.⁴ Since the beginning of the large-scale invasion, our work has also included monitoring military activity in Belarus, documenting evidence of the Lukashenka regime's complicity in aggression against Ukraine, and analysing threats to regional security.

The emergence of shocking reports of mass crimes against the civilian population in Ukraine, including violence, torture, murder, and destruction of civilian infrastructure, by Russian military personnel since the beginning of the war has produced a new demand for documenting incitement to genocide in statements by Russian and Belarusian propaganda.

In May 2023, the first (pilot) iSANS report, “Incitement to Genocide against Ukrainians in Belarusian and Russian Propaganda,”⁵ was published. Its purpose was to identify statements containing signs of this crime that were made in preparing for aggression and in the first year of Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine. The first study achieved its goal, with us identifying and describing not only the most prevalent types of statements – including denial of the existence of the state of Ukraine and Ukrainians as a separate national group and hostile and hateful statements against Ukrainians – but also direct and public incitement to the extermination of Ukrainians, falling under the definition of criminal acts prohibited by the Convention and the Rome Statute.

For many years, Russian and Belarusian state or state-controlled media have been conducting a campaign of hatred against Ukraine and the Ukrainian people. These media outlets together have an enormous audience of tens of millions of people in Russia, Belarus and other countries, as well as an extensive network of means of delivering information to audiences, including electronic and print media, newsletters, Telegram channels and social media accounts.

Propagandists have demonised and “dehumanised” Ukrainians, for example, by accusing of Nazism those Ukrainians who refuse to reject their Ukrainian identity and insist on sovereignty and independence of their country. This fabrication, as well as deliberate demonisation and dehumanisation of Ukrainians is done in order to justify the targeting and murder of civilian Ukrainian population by Russian soldiers during Russia’s invasion.

Propagandists include not only those who implement directly a propaganda campaign (e.g., employees of propaganda media – national television channels, “journalists,” commentators, political talk show hosts and so-called “experts” invited to these talk shows), but also those who set an ideological course. These include public officials, political and public figures and ideologues and, above all, the authoritarian leaders of Russia and Belarus – Vladimir Putin and Aliaksandr Lukashenka.

The efforts of lawyers, researchers, and non-governmental organisations in different countries aimed at bringing to justice propagandists who incite to the commission of crimes, including the crime of genocide, require support in the form of documentation, classification and analysis of such statements. Such work will serve to create an evidence base that could be used to deliver justice in courts.

Role of propaganda in the commission of the crime of genocide

In Article II of the Convention and in Article 6 of the Rome Statute, genocide is defined as follows:

“acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group,” which include the following:

- (a) Killing members of the group;
- (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
- (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
- (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
- (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

According to the Article III of the Convention, the following acts shall be punishable:

- (a) Genocide;
- (b) Conspiracy to commit genocide;
- (c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
- (d) Attempt to commit genocide;
- (e) Complicity in genocide.⁶

Therefore, incitement to commit any of the criminal acts indicated in Article II constitute incitement to genocide.

Similarly, Art. 25(3)(e) of the Rome Statute states that “a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if that person: ... directly and publicly incites others to commit genocide.”⁷

Genocide is a manifestation of mass, collective criminality, requiring the assessing and accepting by a large number of perpetrators of the task of destroying an entire national, ethnic, racial or religious group, or part thereof. Therefore, all known cases of genocide were accompanied by massive and aggressive propaganda. Propaganda is needed to dehumanise the victims and normalise mass violence towards civilian population to give a soldier the confidence that his violence and injustice towards the victim are not only justified, but also encouraged by the state. Even when genocidal propaganda is not realised in acts of genocide, it usually leads to the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity and generally contributes to instances of cruelty in armed conflicts. The study of propaganda narratives is of fundamental importance for the legal classification of crimes, specifically for establishing genocidal intent, establishing the causes of crimes committed and preventing new crimes.

The jurisprudence of international tribunals has been based on the exceptional importance of propaganda in the committing of genocide and other international crimes, including the persecution and mass extermination of Jews by the Nazi regime in Germany and the occupied territories; the killing of Serbs, Croats and Bosnian Muslims in the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia; the genocide of the Tutsi in Rwanda; and ethnic violence in Kenya and Côte d'Ivoire. International tribunals have not considered propaganda as a universal explanation for crimes, but have established a clear link between propaganda and crimes.

The International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg convicted propagandist Julius Streicher of inciting to crimes against humanity – the persecution and extermination of Jews. The Nazi leaders who stood trial in Nuremberg were not charged with genocide because this term was not described in international documents and was not part of the agreement establishing the International Military Tribunal. However, later, after the adoption in 1946 of UN GA resolution 96(I) which for the first time recognised genocide as a crime under international law, and the adoption of the Genocide Convention in 1948, the policy of Holocaust (extermination of Jews) was defined as an act of genocide in court verdicts in further trials in Nuremberg as well as in Poland and is widely accepted as such in legal and academic literature.⁸

The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia described propaganda as one of the main driving forces of interethnic conflict, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.⁹ The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda considered propaganda as incitement to genocide that directly influenced the commission of acts of genocide and established a causal link between the calls for killings in the media and the acts of genocide.¹⁰

The Convention defines “direct and public incitement to commit genocide” as a separate punishable act, along with genocide itself, conspiracy to commit it, attempted genocide and complicity in genocide (Article III). According to the notions of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, the crime of direct and public incitement to commit genocide is an inchoate offence, punishable even if no act of genocide has resulted therefrom.¹¹ This follows from the fact that incitement is a special model of crime (*sui generis*), liability for which occurs independently, and in international criminal law this is provided only for the crime of genocide (for example, in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court¹²).

Incitement to commit genocide can lead not only to the commission of acts of genocide, but also to other crimes, including war crimes and crimes against humanity. Anna Neistat, head of the legal department of the Clooney Foundation for Justice, spoke about the foundation’s investigation into crimes in Ukraine: “*We question our witnesses in great detail not only about what happened to their homes and relatives, but also about what Russian soldiers said when they entered their homes, what their commanders told the soldiers when they sent them to Ukraine. And there are cases when they simply repeat word for word what they heard on Russian television and explain with these words the violent actions that they then committed.*”¹³

Similarly, propaganda impacts the minds of the Russian public, justifying crimes of the Russian military against Ukrainians. Intercepted phone calls of Russian soldiers to their families and friends where soldiers talk about war crimes committed by them, including the murder of civilians or imprisoned soldiers and are comforted by their relatives with words that mirror the justification of the grave atrocities against

Ukrainians on Russian TV and radio, demonstrate the tremendous and horrible effect the anti-Ukrainian propaganda has on the mindset of the Russian society.¹⁴

In the course of the study, we also documented two other types of statements that may likewise be considered incitement to genocide, particularly if the author of the statement had an intent to incite to the destruction of Ukrainians as a national group in whole or in part.

These are statements inciting to the destruction of civilian infrastructure, which leads to the creation of unbearable conditions of life (which, according to the definition of Article II(c) of the Convention, is an element of genocide that involves “[d]eliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part”), as well as statements justifying or inciting to the involuntary deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia and Belarus and the need for their adoption into Russian families, “re-education,” assimilation, or Russification. According to Article II(e) of the Convention, “[f]orcibly transferring children of the group to another group” is one of the elements of genocide.

We also deemed it necessary to include in the report examples and analysis of hate speech and eliminationist rhetoric¹⁵ against Ukrainians as a national group which do not constitute direct incitement. To facilitate the task of describing and classifying such a language, we used a scheme developed by the Jerusalem Center for the Prevention of Genocide. This classification includes the following types of “genocidal language” in relation to the group selected as a target of genocide: dehumanisation, demonisation, delegitimation, disinformation, denial of the commission of crimes, threats, and glorification of terror. Statements of “hate speech” do not constitute a criminal act of incitement to genocide, but they create the basis for a propaganda campaign of hatred against a particular people (group) and can become the basis for more radical statements containing incitement to genocide. (See more about this in the chapter “Ideological foundations of genocide”).

We separately highlight ideological statements that contain a denial of the idea of Ukraine as an independent state and call for the destruction of the state of Ukraine. Despite the fact that this rhetoric also does not constitute incitement to genocide, it nevertheless underlies Russian state policy towards Ukraine and creates the basis for the emergence of hate speech towards Ukrainians and, in the most radical instances, incitement to genocide.

Research methodology

iSANS has documented statements aimed at inciting hatred against Ukrainians and calling for their extermination since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

In the periods from 2023 to May 2025, iSANS research group conducted intensive monitoring of pro-government media in Russia and Belarus, as well as Telegram channels, personal pages on social networks, videos on YouTube and other video hosting sites to identify statements by political and public figures and propagandists that may contain signs of incitement to the crime of genocide of Ukrainians or other eliminationist rhetoric. The main criterion for selection was the conformity of statements to the legal definition of incitement to genocide as defined by the Convention and the Rome Statute. Another criterion was the public significance of the statements, determined by the media's audience reach and the influence of the individuals making the statements.

Statements made between 2021 and May 2025 constitute the basis of analysis in this report. In the course of studying the ideological concepts that form the basis of anti-Ukrainian state policy, we turned to older statements. The earliest recorded statement dates back to year 2000.

During the first monitoring period (February–April 2023), the selection of quotes was conducted mainly through media monitoring, tracking statements by key propaganda figures, and watching selected pro-government television talk shows.

During the second monitoring period (February 2024 – May 2025), the task of searching for and selecting statements was significantly accelerated by partially automating the process. To study television broadcasts, we used speech recognition AI-based application Aiko on the Whisper platform from OpenAI, and GAMMA, an automated information-gathering system that collects data from various sources, including websites, Telegram channels, and video hostings, developed by iSANS.

As a result, the monitoring group managed to analyse more than three hundred hours of video recording and preliminarily select about 900 messages in state media, Telegram channels, and social networks. Due to the impressive volume of material, when citing in the report, we are forced to limit ourselves to only the most impactful, characteristic, and resonant statements to avoid duplicating similar storylines.

For example, the report did not include numerous statements by so called 'Z-channels' in the Telegram network with the exception of a small number of those most indicative. The Latin letter Z which is the identification symbol for the Russian troops involved in the invasion of Ukraine, became at the same time a symbol of the Russian invasion. Under the term 'Z-channels', hundreds of personal online channels of the non-state "war correspondents", pro-war activists, volunteers, Russian military servicemen taking part in the invasion are meant. These channels reach millions of readers in total. In general, these statements, full of hatred and truly genocidal appeals, convey little additional content, since they follow in the wake of guidelines set by state ideologists. At the same time, the audience reach of Z-channels is not as large as that of national TV channels. Nevertheless, we included some examples of this type that have gained the most notoriety. The online-diaries of "war

correspondents” might serve as independent (uncensored) sources of information about the war against Ukraine, in which even criticism of the military command is allowed; something that is impossible to imagine in official state-controlled media.

At the same time, in terms of inciting to genocide, we consider the statements of propagandists and hosts of the Russian federal media who are integrated into the state ideological system of primary importance.

We emphasise that we selected calls inciting to destroy Ukrainians as representatives of a national group and not servicemen of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and generals who are combatants, or the political leadership of Ukraine.

In total, the report includes 174 of the most illustrative quotes. Of them, around 50 statements are cited as examples of alleged incitement to genocide of Ukrainians as a national group. Other quotes included in the report are examples of denial of the existence and calls for the eradication of the state Ukraine as well as various types of hate speech against Ukrainians.

Significantly fewer statements by Belarusian propagandists were identified during the study than by Russian propagandists. We explain this by several factors. First, propagandists of the Lukashenka regime in their anti-Ukrainian statements mainly follow in the wake of the Kremlin’s ideological directions and more often than not simply repeat the main narratives of their Moscow colleagues.

Second, Lukashenka’s propaganda efforts require a more nuanced approach. On the one hand, propaganda is important for them to defend the regime’s complicity in the Russian aggression at the beginning of the full-scale invasion and its continued support thereafter. On the other hand, it has to explain why the Belarusian Armed Forces are not directly involved in the invasion and to present Lukashenka as a “peacekeeper” and guarantor of stability, protecting the country from direct involvement in the hostilities.

Challenges in defining a “protected group”

In preparation for the study, a discussion arose in the research group over who, in the case of Ukraine, could be defined as a group protected by the Genocide Convention (“a national, ethnic, racial or religious group”; thereafter – “protected group”). The disputes mainly revolved around the concepts of “Ukrainian people,” “the people of Ukraine” and “Ukrainians.”

The issue of identifying a protected group is not a purely academic one. It is of fundamental importance for determining the methodology of data collection, the legal framework for their analysis, and the collection of evidence for possible prosecution. Identifying a “protected group” is essential for claiming that the crime of genocide – or incitement to genocide – has taken place. The core of the legal

definition of genocide revolves around the notion of the intent to destroy a specific group as such, in whole or in part. These groups are defined in the Genocide Convention as national, ethnic, racial, or religious. Importantly, the Convention does not include here political groups. Therefore, establishing the fact of existence of such a group and the criminal intent to target it for destruction is crucial for proving a genocide. The words “as such” in the definition of the Convention emphasise that the group is targeted because of its identity, not because its individual members are targeted for other reasons.

Determining whether this or that a group falls under these categories can involve both objective factors (like shared language, culture, religion, or history) and subjective ones (how the group members perceive themselves and how they are perceived by others, including the bearers of genocidal intent). International courts analyse each case based on the specific context, considering relevant social, political, and cultural factors. They have also examined cases where perpetrators used derogatory terms to identify a group and label it as a target.

Following discussions with specialists in international criminal law, we concluded that the most correct name for this target group is “Ukrainians” as a national group. We rely on both objective and subjective criteria.

First, one and the same community living on a particular territory may possess the features of various protected groups (especially national, ethnic, and linguistic but often also religious). In Ukraine, there is a great diversity of linguistic, ethnic, religious, cultural and other differences reflected in regional characteristics. This makes it difficult to describe the entire protected group as an “ethnic” or a “religious” group.

At the same time, we consider self-identification of people as “Ukrainians” to be a fundamental factor. The vast majority of Ukraine’s residents consider themselves representatives of the “Ukrainian nation,” despite the ethnic, linguistic and religious differences. This is a question not only of having citizenship of the state of Ukraine, but also of belonging to an actively forming, especially during ordeals since the start of the Russian aggression, “civic nation.” For example, according to a 2024 study, 78 percent of the country's residents consider Ukrainian their native language. In 2017, this number was 10 percent lower.¹⁶

Equally important for identifying incitement to genocide is the subjective identification of the target group by the bearers of the genocide intentions. The common perception of people living in Ukraine by Russian (and Belarusian) imperial ideologists and propagandists is that they are either part of the “triune Slavic nation” or of the “one Russian people”, and a certain part are those who persist in their Ukrainianism, are “infected with the Nazism bacillus”, and do not recognise themselves as Russians.

On the one hand, propaganda follows the ideological texts of its leader. In Putin's famous article "On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians," discussed below, he writes asserts that Ukrainians are part of "one divided people", Russian. Thus, the independence of the Ukrainian people as a separate national group is denied. This thesis has been repeated many times by Putin as well as by other Russian political figures and propagandists. It has become the basis of Russia's state ideology in relation to Ukraine.

At the same time, Ukrainophobia – hostile attitude to Ukraine, the Ukrainian ethnic group as such and its culture – is clearly visible in Russian and Belarusian propaganda statements. The denial of the existence of a separate national group of "Ukrainians" at the level of state policy and statements that Russian troops have come to save the residents of Ukraine from the "Nazis" quite logically coexist with the misanthropic ideas of Russian propagandists that if the residents of Ukraine do not accept the notion of "one people", refuse to consider themselves an integral part of the Russian people, do not want to be "Russified," and still stubbornly continue to consider themselves Ukrainians, they must be "denazified" and "de-Ukrainised."

In the view of imperial ideologists, "Nazified" residents of Ukraine are those who consider themselves Ukrainians. For example, pro-Kremlin publicist Timofey Sergeytsev in his well-known article "What Russia Should Do with Ukraine," published in April 2022 by the leading state news agency RIA Novosti, writes about the need to conduct "a set of measures in relation to the Nazified mass of the population" and talks about "re-education, which is achieved through ideological repression (suppression)."¹⁷ Such pronouncements are not direct incitement to genocide, but mean that the insubordinate part of residents of Ukraine must be compelled (obviously through force and coercion) to recognise the new realities, renounce their Ukrainian identity and become Russians.

From this idea, it logically follows that if the "wrong," "Nazified" Ukrainians persist, Russia has no choice but to destroy them. Calls for the "denazification" of Ukrainians (not state institutions, but specifically Ukrainian residents) are easily transformed in propaganda statements into direct calls for the destruction of people, namely "incorrect Ukrainians," based on their self-determination as members of an independent national group and their refusal to merge with another national group, Russians.

Some Russian propagandists of a lower status who nevertheless have huge audiences discard abstract articulations of "denazification" and take their statements further, asserting directly that Ukrainians (or part of them) must be destroyed if they cannot be "cured" of Nazism and "Ukrainianism." The subsequent sections of this report contain examples of such statements.

How many "bad Ukrainians" exist (and therefore must be destroyed) in the minds of Russian propagandists? They started by calling the participants of the Azov and

Aidar volunteer battalions Nazis, then they referred to the political leadership of Ukraine as Nazis (the notion repeatedly used by the Russian political leaders), and then they talked about the need to destroy two or five million of “incorrigible Ukrainians,” 10 percent of the population, etc.

The main thing in understanding the motives of the bearers of genocidal intent is their attitude towards the question of how to differentiate between “good” and “bad” Ukrainians. This is a very subjective idea, most likely based on how the targets of their genocidal intent (members of the protected group) behave. In the case of Ukraine, these ideas can be based on the following: if the residents of Ukraine declare that they are Ukrainians, do not want to live under Russian occupation, speak out in defence of the independence of Ukraine, speak Ukrainian language, sing Ukrainian songs, wear Ukrainian symbols, read Internet resources banned by the occupying authorities, do not want to receive Russian passports, refuse to cooperate with the Russian authorities, etc., they are defined as “wrong” and become the most obvious candidates for re-education by force and, if necessary, extermination.

Part 1. ACCOUNTABILITY: LEGAL NORMS AND MECHANISMS

International legal definition and characteristics of the crime of incitement to genocide

Direct and public incitement to commit genocide is a crime under international criminal law. They are criminalised under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide¹⁸ and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.¹⁹

According to the UN International Law Commission, the provisions prohibiting genocide are a norm of customary international law.²⁰ Back in 1951, the UN International Court of Justice concluded that the principles of the Convention are binding on all states “even without any conventional obligation,” i.e. irrespective of participation in the Convention.²¹ Russia and Belarus are among states parties to this Convention.

Since the International Criminal Court began its work in 2002, it has been able to prosecute individuals for the crime of genocide and incitement to genocide. We recall that the Rome Statute in Article 6 defines genocide as follows:

“acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

- a) killing members of the group;
- b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
- c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
- d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
- e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.”

Article 25(3)(e) of the Statute provides for criminal liability and punishment if a person “directly and publicly incites others to commit genocide.” There is a genetic link between this norm and the provisions of the Convention. The Statute implements the Convention in the field of international criminal justice. When trying genocide cases, the Court will refer to the practice of other criminal tribunals and the International Court of Justice that have applied the Genocide Convention.

Russia and Belarus do not recognise the jurisdiction of the ICC. However, both Russian and Belarusian citizens are criminally liable under the ICC’s jurisdiction when the acts of incitement to genocide target Ukrainian population within the geographic boundaries of Ukraine. Ukraine recognised the jurisdiction of the ICC on its territory since 21 November 2013. In accordance with the ruling of the Pre-Trial Chamber on the Myanmar/Bangladesh case dated 2018, the Court ruled that in order

to recognise territorial jurisdiction, it is sufficient for at least one element of the crime to take place on the territory of the relevant state.²²

The ICC has been conducting preliminary investigation for war crimes and crimes against humanity in Donbas and Crimea. On 11 December 2020, ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda found that “there is a reasonable basis at this time to believe that a broad range of conduct constituting war crimes and crimes against humanity within the jurisdiction of the Court have been committed in the context of the situation in Ukraine” and that “cases that would likely arise from an investigation into the situation in Ukraine would be admissible.” A new investigation after the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine was initiated by ICC Prosecutor Karim Khan on 2 March 2022, based on the referral of the situation in Ukraine by 43 States parties to the ICC pursuant to Article 14 of the Rome Statute.

Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute, other actors, including non-governmental organisations, may submit communications to the ICC Prosecutor requesting to initiate an investigation into a situation in a state. However, unlike referrals by States parties to the Statute, the Prosecutor may, but is not obliged to respond to NGO communications and may decide not to initiate an investigation on his own initiative based on information received from them. Formally, the Prosecutor has no obligation to provide a response to such communications. At the same time, such communications may play a significant role, drawing public attention to the problem of incitement to genocide, providing evidence of crimes committed, highlighting the situation of impunity and the need for a response from the ICC. Communications by NGOs should include possibilities for their alternative use – in particular, the data presented in them contribute to establishing the existence of state policy necessary to qualify crimes against humanity.

Opinions of inter-governmental organisations and findings of their expert bodies can be instrumental in achieving justice. The Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, established by the UN Human Rights Council after the beginning of the full-scale invasion, drew attention to the genocidal rhetoric of Russian propaganda in its report in March 2024 and indicated the possibility of qualifying it under the Rome Statute.²³ The July 2024 OSCE Parliamentary Assembly resolution indicated that public statements by Russian officials are part of a substantial and growing body of evidence indicating genocidal intentions on the part of Russia, along with documented war crimes and possible crimes against humanity.²⁴

Additional referrals, submissions and communications with new information from different parties – state, interstate and non-governmental actors – will help to integrate the issue of incitement to genocide into the ICC’s ongoing investigation of crimes committed in Ukraine during Russia’s aggression.

Case studies establishing precedent

Article 25(3)(e) of the Rome Statute restricts criminalisation of propaganda to that which directly incites to the crime of genocide. At the same time, this reference effectively obliterates the essential distinction between incitement and direct inducement by the fact that the “directness” of the incitement implies that specific appeals to the audience are made as part of a genocidal plan.

The central term “incitement” has received relatively little attention in international judicial practice and legal literature. This has sometimes been limited to the fact that any “appeal” is incitement to genocide.²⁵ In addition to that, the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda has repeatedly noted that “the crime is considered completed as soon as the discourse in question is uttered.”²⁶

Thus, when analysing statements, the personality and position of the author of the statement, the audience, and the context are of great importance. It is necessary to take into account the main reason for the punishability of public incitement to genocide, in particular, the danger arising from the fact that such utterances address an indefinite, unidentified number of individuals, whose reactions are beyond the control of the person making such utterances.

The rhetoric used in incitement to genocide can be either explicit or allegorical. In the second case, it appeals to understandable recipients and unambiguously perceived images, representing, in fact, a coded message. For example, during the Rwandan genocide, propagandists called Tutsis “cockroaches” and mass killings “work.” One of the most notorious Russian propagandists, Vladimir Soloviev, describing the Russian so-called “special military operation” in Ukraine during his talk-show on the state TV-channel *Rossiya 1*, said the following:

“When a doctor expels worms from a cat, for the doctor it is a special operation, for the worms it is a war, and for the cat it is cleaning.”²⁷
(19.07.2022)

Incitement to genocide becomes “public”, when these statements are made at public events or is transmitted by mass media and thus is made available to an undefined number of people. In the Kalimanzira case (22 June 2009, para. 515), the Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda cited a number of examples, concluding that “incitement is ‘public’ when conducted through speeches, shouting or threats uttered in public places or at public gatherings, or through the sale or dissemination, offer for sale or display of written material or printed matter in public places or at public gatherings” or by the public display of posters or placards, or by any other means of audiovisual communication.²⁸ Making appeals with incitement to genocide to an undefined audience is particularly dangerous because the author may start a chain of events that he or she cannot control, unlike utterances in private conversation or correspondence. It is this

increased danger that justifies the configuration of “incitement to commit genocide” as a separate offense, regardless of whether the crime of genocide is subsequently committed.

According to the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice, an inference of genocidal intent must be the “only reasonable inference” from the available evidence.²⁹ Appeals defined as incitement to genocide must be made with genocidal intent (intent to destroy, in whole or in part, the targeted group). This is an extremely high evidentiary standard, and this requirement creates certain difficulties in proving this crime. In other words, if there is a reasonable explanation for the intent of such acts that does not involve the destruction of a protected group, genocidal intent is not considered to have been established. In the only case of establishing state responsibility for genocide (*Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro*, 2007), the International Court of Justice relied on the practice of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, which tried Serbian leaders under the rules of criminal procedure (i.e. had previously proved the commission of the crime of genocide as such beyond reasonable doubt).

As stated above, even if incitement to genocide does not lead to acts of genocide (“successful” realisation of genocidal intent), such propaganda provokes the commission of other international crimes against members of the targeted group – war crimes and crimes against humanity.

International responsibility of states

The concept of genocide is a criminal law concept, and the responsibility of the state emerges only in case of commission of the crime of genocide by individuals and the establishment of a link between the state and these individuals. In practice, the possibility of realisation of state responsibility for genocide is possible when the International Court of Justice (ICJ) exercises its jurisdiction during the trials of interstate disputes on the violation of obligations under the Genocide Convention.

Traditionally, states have been held liable only for breach of their obligations to prevent and punish genocide. However, in the ruling in the case of *Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro* (2007), the ICJ concluded that a state can be held liable not only for breach of obligations to prevent and punish genocide, but also directly for committing acts of genocide through its agents.³⁰ Although the ICJ has not yet ruled on a violation of the Convention based on this principle, it is possible in at least two ongoing trials (*Gambia v. Myanmar* and *South Africa v. Israel*). The State of Serbia and Montenegro was then found responsible only for the breach of the obligation to prevent acts of genocide by Bosnian Serbs and to punish those responsible for failure to cooperate with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.

Thus, so far, no state has been held responsible directly for the commission of genocide.

The obligations of states to prevent and punish the crime of genocide extend to incitement to genocide. So far, claims related to incitement to genocide have not played any role in the completed disputes on breach of the Genocide Convention in the proceedings at the International Court of Justice. In the cases of *Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro* (2007) and *Croatia v. Serbia* (2017), these claims were generally rejected, although incitement to genocide was mentioned in Bosnia's claim against Serbia and Serbia's counterclaims against Croatia, respectively.

Currently, in the two cases based on the Convention before the Court, the plaintiff's claims are based on allegations of public incitement to genocide. In *Gambia v. Myanmar* case, related to the alleged genocide of the Rohingya people, Gambia's claim is based largely on statements by Myanmar officials and state hate propaganda against the Rohingya – insulting, dehumanising, racist rhetoric.

It is characterised by the denial by the Burmese authorities of the very existence of this people and the labelling of the Rohingya as “illegal Bengali migrants.” Hate propaganda against the Rohingya as a state-organised campaign was characterised in the report of the UN Fact-Finding Mission. The Gambia holds Myanmar responsible both for incitement by its officials and for failing to prevent and punish this incitement.³¹ The case is currently under consideration on the merits.

Allegations of incitement to genocide of the Palestinian population of Gaza by Israeli officials are part of South Africa's recent lawsuit against Israel.³² The ICJ, in its decree on provisional measures, cited statements by a number of Israeli officials, in particular Defence Minister Gallant, President Herzog, Minister Katz and others, to substantiate the validity of the threat to the rights of Palestinians not to be subject to genocide.³³ The Court also cited the opinion of 37 UN special rapporteurs, independent experts, and members of working groups who, in their statement, called the rhetoric of the Israeli authorities “genocidal.”³⁴

Unfortunately, despite the horrific terrorist acts of 7 October 2023, and previous crimes against the residents of Israel, filing such lawsuits with the International Court of Justice on the responsibility of the unrecognised State of Palestine for a breach of the Genocide Convention as a result of the criminal actions of the leaders of terrorist groups based on its territory (Hamas and others), including genocidal incitement to the destruction of the inhabitants of Israel or a significant number of them (not just the state of Israel), is not possible at the moment. This is primarily due to the fact that Palestine is not a UN-recognised state yet, despite its status as a UN observer state and the recognition of its independence by most UN member states (but not by all members of the Security Council, which is a condition for UN recognition in general). Palestine currently lacks the attributes necessary for a full-fledged state, such as a

clearly defined territory and a government controlling it effectively. Under these circumstances, Palestine cannot be a defendant in international courts. In the future, if an internationally recognised government effectively controls the entire territory of Palestine and the state of Palestine is recognised as a member of the UN, Palestine's ratification of the Genocide Convention will not be a mandatory condition for other countries to file a lawsuit with the International Court of Justice against Palestine for breach of the Convention because, as noted above, the principles of the Convention are binding on all states regardless of their participation in the Convention.

Filing a lawsuit for breach of the Convention would probably now be possible against certain other Middle Eastern states (e.g., Iran, Syria, Lebanon) for the numerous and systematic incitement by their leaders or leaders of groups within their territory (e.g., Hezbollah) to commit genocide of Israelis, or for the state's failure to prevent or punish such crimes. To date, this possibility has not been realised.

There are three possibilities with regard to holding a state accountable for genocidal rhetoric, including Russia and Belarus.

First, it is the responsibility of the state for breach of the Convention in the form of implementation of incitement to genocide, if it was uttered by public officials. It should be taken into account that the "direct" responsibility of the state for incitement to extermination of Ukrainians is possible only for the acts of a limited number of officials, who are themselves state bodies. For example, members of parliament are not such individuals. While there is no doubt about the role of state leaders, such as Russian President Vladimir Putin, the role of Dmitry Medvedev, the former Russian President who is now Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council, is more controversial. Medvedev's statements are cited in this report as examples of incitement to destruction of Ukraine and genocide of Ukrainians. His current status may be seen as suggesting "direct" responsibility if not on the grounds that he is himself an organ of the state, then at least on the grounds that he acts at the direction and under control of Vladimir Putin as his direct superior who appointed him. No such statements inciting to genocide of Ukrainians by Belarusian civil servants "who are themselves state bodies" have been recorded so far.

In general, establishing state responsibility directly for incitement to genocide in the absence of already issued international criminal judgments against the individuals who uttered such incitement would be extremely problematic. This is not always possible in the context of interstate judicial proceedings.

Secondly, there is state responsibility for incitement to genocide if it was uttered by media personnel at the direction or under control of state authorities (which is easier to prove in case of state media).³⁵ The very fact of adherence to the position of the state during the implementation of propaganda does not necessarily mean the establishment of state responsibility in every case. It is necessary to prove that the

state exercised control and gave relevant instructions. In order to establish the facts and state responsibility, it is important to prove that it is a matter of state policy and is not limited to individual propagandists. The fulfilment of this condition will have to be proved in case of filing an interstate lawsuit against Russia or Belarus.

Third, it is possible to hold the state accountable for breaching its obligations to prevent and punish incitement to genocide. This direction looks more promising, since the complete inaction of the Russian state in preventing this rhetoric and total impunity for such utterances are obvious.

It is necessary to realistically assess the prospects of any state party to the Convention filing an interstate lawsuit with the ICJ against the Russian Federation or the Republic of Belarus for incitement to genocide or inaction to prevent and punish it.

Russia, as well as Belarus, recognises the competence of the ICJ regarding disputes on the interpretation and application of the Convention. The obligations under the Convention are obligations *erga omnes partes*, i.e. all parties to the Convention have a legal interest. This means that any state party to the Convention may file a lawsuit with the International Court of Justice, including on breach of obligations under the Convention by Russia or Belarus. Nevertheless, before filing an appeal to the ICJ, an international legal dispute must exist between the states, which is a prerequisite for recognising the case admissible. Therefore, an application to the Court would not come as an absolute surprise to Russia or Belarus. However, in case of receipt of a diplomatic note on the initiation of an interstate dispute, the defendant state cannot denounce the norm of the Convention on the recognition of the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. Here it should be taken into account that a number of states have already declared genocide in Ukraine through political declarations.

At the same time, it is now clear that states are generally cautious about filing interstate lawsuits for incitement to genocide, not willing to carry reputational risks due to the unclear prospects of such cases in the International Court of Justice, especially in the absence of recognition of the commission of genocide as such in a particular situation by international courts. In addition, apparently, assessing the prospects of a possible case against Russia on its responsibility for incitement to genocide of Ukrainians, states are likely to feel additional scepticism in conditions when Ukraine itself does not file a lawsuit against Russia with this Court for such an alleged violation. Logically, claims related to incitement to genocide are likely to be part of a lawsuit related to other breaches of the Genocide Convention, namely the realisation of genocide as such. The claims in such a lawsuit would also be a means of proving genocidal intent, which is important for considering liability for incitement.

The legal consequences in case the International Court of Justice recognises the responsibility of Russia or Belarus for breach of the Convention consist in the

obligation to execute the Court's decision. Measures of responsibility can be expressed both in the obligation to recognise responsibility for breach of the Convention as such and in specific consequences in the form of financial liability.

International individual criminal responsibility

Individual criminal responsibility for genocide and incitement to genocide is realised at both the international and national levels.

According to Article IV of the Convention, persons committing genocide or any other acts enumerated in Article III shall be punished whether they are rulers, public officials or private individuals.

At the international level, the mechanisms for establishing individual criminal responsibility for genocide and incitement to genocide are international courts, including special tribunals for crimes committed in a particular state and the International Criminal Court.

The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia considered propaganda to be an important factor in interethnic violence. In the verdict in the case of Radoslav Brdjanin, one of the Bosnian Serb leaders accused of organising a hate campaign against non-Serb groups, the tribunal described propaganda as one of the main drivers of interethnic conflicts, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.³⁶ Brdjanin was convicted of persecution as a crime against humanity, but was not accused of incitement to genocide.

The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda has played a particularly important role in the issue of accountability for incitement to genocide. Its Statute replicates the norms of the Genocide Convention, including with regard to liability for "direct and public incitement to genocide."³⁷ The Tribunal considered propaganda as incitement to genocide that directly influenced the commission of acts of genocide of the Tutsi people. In particular, the verdict in the Kayishema and Ruzindana case stated that as a result of the propaganda, "the killings started off like a little spark and then spread."³⁸ The charges in a number of cases, most notably in the so-called "media trial" of Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM) and the Kangura newspaper, were based on statements by officials in the media calling for mass murder. The verdict in this case established a causal link between incitement to genocide disseminated by the media and acts of genocide.

In 2022, the trial of 89-year-old Félicien Kabuga, the founder and chief sponsor of RTLM, who had been a fugitive from justice for more than 25 years and lived under an assumed name in France until he was tracked down and caught in 2020, began at the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals in The Hague. In May 2023, one of the few remaining wanted leaders of the Rwandan genocide, former police officer Fulgence Kayishema, was arrested in South Africa. Prior to this, the

International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda had convicted more than 60 key leaders of genocide of the Tutsi people, including propagandists.

At the moment, the only case in the practice of the International Criminal Court involving the crime of genocide is that of Omar Al-Bashir (the charge was included in the second arrest warrant; in the first trial in 2009, a majority of judges dismissed the charge).

To date, the ICC has not tried any cases involving incitement to genocide.

In case an ICC investigation into incitement to genocide of Ukrainians is initiated, an important question is whether the ICC has territorial jurisdiction in this case. We recall that Ukraine recognised the jurisdiction of the ICC over international crimes on its territory in 2013, while Russia is not a party to the ICC. Given that incitement was most often committed not on the territory of Ukraine, but on the territory of Russia or Belarus, the question of territorial jurisdiction is bound to arise.

Another way of bringing a person to individual criminal responsibility for incitement to genocide is for such cases to be considered not by international courts, but by national law enforcement agencies of various states. States, on whose territory or regarding whose population the crime of incitement to genocide was allegedly committed, can bring individuals to criminal responsibility for inciting to genocide, if this crime is included in their criminal code.

This applies first and foremost to Ukraine itself. Article 442 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine provides for liability for “public incitement to genocide, as well as the production of materials with incitement to genocide for the purpose of their dissemination or dissemination of such materials.”

Speaking of actions by Ukrainian justice system in respect of incitement to genocide by Russian actors, we are aware of two verdicts in February 2023 and August 2024, delivered by Ukrainian courts *in absentia* against former Russian TV presenter Anton Krasovsky, based, *inter alia*, on the criminal prohibition of “public calls to genocide and dissemination of such calls (paragraph 2, Article 442 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine).³⁹ In a separate case, in April 2024, the Security Service of Ukraine served a notice of suspicion on the editor-in-chief of propagandistic TV channel RT Margarita Simonyan, also *in absentia*. Simonyan was charged with violation of several articles of the Criminal Code, including part 2 of Article 442 (public calls for genocide); part 2 of Article 110 (encroachment on the territorial integrity and inviolability of Ukraine); Article 436 (propaganda of war), and part 3 of Article 436-2 (justification, recognition as lawful, denial of the armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, glorification of its participants). According to the investigation, among the newly documented crimes of the accused there are public calls for the mass murder of Ukrainian children in December 2023.⁴⁰

Many other states have this opportunity due to the principle of universal jurisdiction enshrined in their legislation, which allows for the prosecution for crimes against international law committed on the territory of other states. This is possible if the legislation of those states explicitly establishes that they can prosecute for genocide (including incitement to genocide). The legal basis for criminal responsibility and punishment in all cases are the norms of national law, while jurisdiction itself is based on the norms of international law, including the Genocide Convention.

However, application of the principle of universal jurisdiction is a right, not an obligation, and the exercise of such jurisdiction is often subject to institutional, resource, political and legal constraints,⁴¹ the key of which, in some states, is the need for the defendant to be present on the territory of the state.

According to experts, in particular Anna Neistat, Legal Director of the Docket Project at the Clooney Foundation for Justice, given challenges in prosecuting individuals for incitement to genocide in the ICC and national courts, the possibility of prosecution for propaganda of aggressive war, punishable under the criminal law in several European states, is promising for immediate accountability.^{42, 43}

Accountability for “hate speech” and other types of hostile expressions which do not represent incitement to genocide

This study focuses, first and foremost, on identifying, analysing and classifying statements in the Russian and Belarussian propaganda that contain incitement to genocide against Ukrainians. At the same time, a large number of anti-Ukrainian propagandistic statements do not amount to incitement to genocide as such but can be qualified as “hate speech”. It is important to bear in mind that hate speech often serves as a basis for further radicalisation of public expressions and may eventually lead to the emergence of more extreme statements inciting to genocide. However, accountability for hate speech is less developed in international law, and bringing its perpetrators to justice is challenging, although not entirely impossible. Prohibition of hate speech by placing restrictions on operations of media outlets is practiced by states with caution, keeping in mind the need to provide protection to the right to freedom of expression.

“Hate speech” should be always distinguished from incitement to genocide, which is a different and clearly defined legal concept, as discussed above.

When dealing with “hate speech”, the starting point in international law is Article 20 (2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which says: “Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.”⁴⁴

The second paragraph of Article 20 is intrinsically interconnected with the first, which bans propaganda for a war of aggression. Propaganda for war is in fact a more

developed form of incitement to violence based on advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred. Such incitement to violence, based on national, racial or religious hatred, often leads to propaganda for war and to wars as such. *Travaux préparatoires* of Article 20⁴⁵ allow to claim that the first paragraph of Article 20 meant direct incitement to war while the second paragraph – antecedent propaganda for war. Moreover, some states insisted on keeping the second paragraph because a mere prohibition of propaganda for war would not be in itself effective for securing a lasting peace and preventing conflicts.⁴⁶

There are definitional problems with the notion of “hatred,” a crucial term to understand Article 20 (2): “There is no universally accepted definition of the expression ‘hate speech,’” the ECtHR observes.⁴⁷ Experts explain that existing formulas are circular, as they define “hatred” through “hate” and “hate” through “hatred.”⁴⁸ Indeed, even the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers’ Recommendation No. (97) 20 on “hate speech” describes the term as “covering all forms of expression which spread, incite, promote or justify racial hatred, xenophobia, anti-Semitism or other forms of hatred based on intolerance, including: intolerance expressed by aggressive nationalism and ethnocentrism, discrimination and hostility against minorities, migrants and people of immigrant origin.”⁴⁹ This Recommendation is widely criticised for lack of clarity of boundaries of the notion.⁵⁰

There is also a lack of distinct definitions of “incitement” in international law, or interrelation between “incitement” and a wider term of “advocacy of hatred”. There are fewer problems in its judicial interpretation, at least on the national level, as the term seems to be part and parcel of national criminal law in relation to incitement to lawlessness. In the *Roj TV* case, the European Court of Justice (ECJ), following the opinion of the Advocate-General, interpreted the words “incitation” and “hatred” as referring to (1) an action intended to direct specific behaviour and (2) a feeling of animosity or rejection with regard to a group of persons: thus, the concept “incitement to hatred” “is designed to forestall any ideology which fails to respect human values, in particular initiatives which attempt to justify violence... against a particular group of persons.”⁵¹ “Incitement to hatred, observed the Advocate-General of the ECJ, actually means seeking to create a feeling of animosity towards or rejection of another person, which leads to the person who experiences that feeling no longer being able to live harmoniously, and therefore in understanding, with that other person”.⁵²

This decision of the ECJ served as a basis for the 2015 European Commission Decision issued in response to the notification by Lithuania of certain alleged infringements of Article 6 of the Audiovisual Media Services Directive in programs of *RTR Planeta*, a Russian-language channel retransmitted in Lithuania via cable and satellite.⁵³ In particular, it reviewed the arguments of the Lithuanian authorities that the content of the broadcaster’s programs instigated discord and a military climate and referred to demonisation and scapegoating with reference to the situation in Ukraine. Reportedly, they were aimed at creating tensions and violence between Russians,

Russian-speaking Ukrainians and the broader Ukrainian population. Meanwhile, Lithuania has a sizable Russian-speaking minority which appeared to be the addressee of *RTR Planeta*. Some of the statements could also be considered as inciting tensions and violence between the Russians and the Ukrainians but also against the EU and NATO States. The programs could therefore be considered to foster a feeling of animosity or rejection. The Lithuanian authorities also found that the statements made in these programs can be considered as incitement to hatred, since they involve express language that can be considered on the one hand as an action intended to direct specific behaviour and, on the other hand, as creating a feeling of animosity or rejection with regard to a group of persons.

The European Commission decided that Lithuania has sufficiently demonstrated that there have indeed been infringements of manifest, serious and grave character of the prohibition of incitement to hatred in the television broadcast of *RTR Planeta*, and the measures taken by Lithuania were found not discriminatory and rather proportionate to the objective of ensuring that audiovisual media programs should not contain any incitement to hatred based on race and/or nationality.⁵⁴

Of great relevance for defining “hate speech” is the “Rabat Plan of Action on the prohibition of advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence”, released by the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in 2012. The Rabat Plan of Action represents an effort in clarifying governments’ obligations to prohibit incitement to hatred, while providing coherent protection to the rights to freedom of expression and freedom of religion. In its turn, the Rabat Plan of Action when dealing with terminology refers to the Camden Principles on Freedom of Expression and Equality (Camden Principles), drafted by an international civil society organisation ARTICLE 19.⁵⁵ Under “hatred” and “hostility” the Camden Principles understand “intense and irrational emotions of opprobrium, enmity and detestation towards the target group”.⁵⁶

When free expression (guaranteed in Art. 19 of the ICCPR) is restricted because of “hate speech,” the legitimate aims for restrictions invoked most often are “the rights of others”, “protecting national security”, “maintaining public order and safety” and “preventing crime”.⁵⁷ The restrictions may though be imposed only under particular clear conditions. According to the case law of the ECtHR, criminal penalties for speech, including “hate speech”, would not violate the rights to free expression (Art. 10 of the ECHR) only if the “hate speech” incites “to violence against an individual or a public official or a sector of the population”.⁵⁸

These conditions were defined in more detail in the “Johannesburg Principles on National Security, Freedom of Expression and Access to Information”.⁵⁹ According to the document, the Government should first demonstrate that the expression is intended to incite imminent violence, that it is likely to incite such violence and that

there is a direct and immediate connection between the expression and the likelihood or occurrence of such violence (principle 6).⁶⁰

On the contrary, the peaceful exercise of the right to freedom of expression shall neither be considered a threat to national security, nor punishable if, for example, the speech “constitutes criticism of, or insult to, the nation, the state or its symbols, the government, its agencies, or public officials, or a foreign nation, state or its symbols, government, agencies or public officials” (principle 7).

In view of the above, public “hate speech” which does not contain calls for violence or discrimination, does not lead to threats to human rights and protected public interests and therefore does not constitute a crime, is to be dealt by civil law (defamation), administrative law (hooliganism), codes of public officials, media self-regulation, media pluralism, and media literacy. As disgusting and disturbing as it may be, it is protected from criminal liability by freedom of expression norms.

From this overview of legal norms and available instruments, it appears that bringing someone to account at the international level for “hate speech” statements is practically impossible – or at least extremely challenging. First, it concerns international legal responsibility of states. There is no international convention prohibiting “hate speech”, which is different from the prohibition of “direct and public incitement to commit genocide”, enshrined in Art. III(c) of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.

Therefore, concerned states cannot initiate interstate disputes against other states concerning the use of “hate speech” and bring them to International Court of Justice.

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in its Article 20(2), only prescribes states to adopt national legislation prohibiting “advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence”, as discussed above. However, there is no accountability mechanism for violation of this obligation; the Human Rights Committee in its concluding observations and recommendations after reviewing periodic reports by states, may only note problems in implementation and call for ending violations. Even that is not easy, given reservations on the implementation of the provision of this article, adopted by a number of states at the time of ratification of the Covenant. Importantly, there is no responsibility of states enshrined in the Covenant for “hate speech” statements made by its official representatives or private individuals with the state’s connivance.

Therefore, there are no international norms and effective instruments to bring states to account for “hate speech”.

States aiming to combat “hate speech” distributed by foreign media on its territory and targeting its population, may use its national legislation on freedom of the

media and freedom of expression, as well as anti-extremism and related laws and regulations, and impose fines, prohibit or block distribution or broadcasting of such media on its territory. In the case of EU member states, when taking such actions, they should also comply with directives of EU institutions on media freedom such as in the case of Lithuania referred to above. In any case, these instruments fall short of ensuring accountability of states.

Bringing individuals to criminal liability for “hate speech” at the international level is equally difficult if at all possible. “Hate speech” as such is not part of the four “most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole” which are within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court in accordance with the Rome Statute, namely the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression. The Rome Statute prohibits incitement to genocide but not “hate speech” or incitement to war.

However, a coalition of international and Ukrainian human rights organisations, led by the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) has recently undertaken a bold attempt to prove that the scale and systematic nature of hate speech directed at the population of Ukraine in the statements of Russian officials and propagandists, taken together with the existence of a state policy of the Russian Federation in this area make it possible to qualify hate speech against Ukrainians as a crime against humanity. In June 2024, the coalition members submitted a communication⁶¹ to the Prosecutor of the ICC pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute, providing analysis of hundreds of hateful statements documented in the course of their research, and requested the Prosecutor to open an investigation with a view of bringing to international criminal responsibility five prominent Russian public figures as direct perpetrators of persecution, who have played the leading role in the dissemination of discriminatory hate speech targeting Ukrainians on the basis of their political views.

The arguments of the authors of the Communication make sense when they categorise actions by Russian officials and propagandists as a crime against humanity of persecution prohibited under Art. 7(1)(h) of the Rome Statute. Authors of the communication insist that hate speech acts by Russian propagandists targeted at Ukrainians amount to a severe deprivation of human rights, undermining the rights of Ukrainians to security, self-determination and human dignity, thus meeting the Rome Statute criteria. The NGO coalition also claims that the crimes discussed in the communication meet the criteria of gravity and “severity” of violation of human rights standards. According to the Rome Statute, when a connection of the crime of persecution with any other crime against humanity listed in the same article of the Statute is established, which appears quite easy to prove in the case of Russian aggression against Ukraine, the crime falls within the jurisdiction of the Court. It is very interesting to see whether the ICC Prosecutor accepts these arguments.

Domestic law in many countries penalises “hate speech” in a sufficiently detailed and practically applicable way. These norms of the national criminal law generally aim to protect political stability, public security, physical and emotional security of social groups, and, finally, such fundamental values as equality and non-discrimination.⁶²

Cases of charges brought by the Ukrainian law enforcement against Russian propagandists for incitement to genocide (and conviction in absentia in at least two known cases) may serve as a model for persecution for “hate speech” against Ukrainians, not qualified as incitement to genocide.

However, it is doubtful that the Ukrainian justice system will pursue a lot of cases on “hate speech”, given huge number of such statements by Russian and Belarusian officials and propagandists, difficulty with obtaining the suspects, limited resources of Ukrainian prosecution and courts, and the priority given by Ukraine to prosecuting thousands of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by the Russian troops.

There is also an ongoing process of putting Russian citizens on trial in Moldova for “incitement to manifestation of hatred or violence, expressed in public appeals in the social media”. A working group was established there by the Prosecutor-General.⁶³

Bringing perpetrators to account for the crime of “hate speech” committed on territory of other states, applying the universal jurisdiction principle, appears to be impossible. The reason for this is that the crimes which can be prosecuted in the framework of universal jurisdiction, as listed in relevant national Criminal Codes, usually include four international crimes of atrocity, taken from the Rome Statute, plus, in some states, torture and enforced disappearances as stand-alone international crimes outside of the crimes against humanity, as well as incitement to aggressive war, high seas piracy and some other grave crimes. However, “hate speech” is not listed. This is not surprising, given the controversy of its clash with freedom of expression and its relative lesser gravity compared to the crimes listed.

PART 2. IDEOLOGICAL FOUNDATION OF AND JUSTIFICATION FOR GENOCIDE

Denial of the concept of Ukraine as an independent and sovereign state. Incitement to the eradication of Ukraine

As stated above, the goal of this study is to specify incitement to eradication of Ukrainian civilians (as a national group), not of the state of Ukraine, as calls for the destruction of a state do not constitute incitement for acts of genocide from the perspective of the Genocide Convention and the Rome Statute. In other words, it is possible to commit genocide against a human group but not against a state. Accordingly, calls for the destruction of the state of Ukraine cannot be qualified as the crime of incitement to genocide.

Nevertheless, it is important to analyse the role of such calls in the evolution of hatred against Ukrainians and the further emergence of hate speech and ultimately of incitement to genocide. Calls for the destruction of the state of Ukraine, along with public statements denying the very idea of Ukraine's existence as an independent and sovereign state, occupy an important place in justifying violence against and murder of Ukrainians.

First, propagandists and politicians often make statements unreservedly about the destruction of Ukraine together with its population, e.g., "liquidate it, and that's it," "close the 'Ukraine' project," "don't stand on ceremony" etc., which serves to justify violence and leads to war crimes committed against civilians. Secondly, the claims that Ukraine is a "sub-state," a "Nazi" or "satanic" state that poses a threat to Russia, are made to make it easier for the Russian population to accept the need for an aggressive war, attacks on civilian targets, and the destruction of peaceful cities in Ukraine, and for Russian servicemen to overcome moral barriers to violence and murder, including of civilians. It is important to note that calls for the destruction of Ukraine through military action can be qualified as "propaganda of an aggressive war." It is considered a crime in the criminal codes of some countries, but propaganda of an aggressive war is not included in the list of international crimes in the Genocide Convention and the Rome Statute or any other international treaty.

The claim that the former Soviet republics do not have full sovereignty and are still part of Moscow's "sphere of influence" has been made in one form or another throughout post-Soviet history, with only limited sovereignty of the "socialist camp" countries being recognised in Soviet times. Russia's imperial ambitions continued after the collapse of the Soviet Union and were not overcome even in the relatively democratic period of the 1990s.

Active imperial revenge in Russia began with Vladimir Putin's rise to power in 2000, when he set a goal for the first years of his presidency to suppress national liberation movements within the country (primarily in the Caucasus) and restore control over the post-Soviet space. This gave rise to the emergence of many neo-imperial,

“patriotic” and nationalist organisations and movements, as well as a rapid growth in the number of imperial statements made, including those that were anti-Ukrainian.

At this time, publications appeared that questioned Ukrainian sovereignty and identity. Back in 2000, one of the ideologists of neo-imperialism, pro-government philosopher Alexander Dugin wrote:

“Ukraine as a state makes no geopolitical sense. It has neither a special cultural message of universal significance, nor geographical uniqueness, nor ethnic exclusivity.” (2000)⁶⁴

In 2004, the first democratic Maidan, or Orange Revolution, was victorious in Ukraine. This resulted in the first serious crisis in relations between Ukraine and Russia, which at that time was gradually turning towards an authoritarian path of development. Russian national media unleashed an anti-Ukrainian campaign. For example, in December 2004, the newspaper *Izvestia* published, without any commentary or explanation, a selection of letters from readers filled with rejections of democratic changes in Ukraine and statements refuting Ukrainian independence. Here is one of the letters:

“It is enough to observe closely what is happening in Ukraine to understand it, even without knowing the history. The Ukrainian nation does not exist. Everything, from language, the nature of activities, and, most importantly, the mentality and self-identification, is different for those living in the east and the west [of Ukraine]. And if in the west 90% of the population votes for one candidate and in the east 90% for another, then it is clear that they must have different presidents.”⁶⁵
(23.12.2004)

The most dramatic surge in neo-imperial rhetoric occurred during Russia’s aggression against Georgia in 2008. Dmitry Medvedev, then the Russian president and considered “liberal,” declared that the post-Soviet region was a “zone of privileged interests” for Russia.⁶⁶

In April 2008, Putin told the U.S. President George W. Bush:

“You don’t understand, George, that Ukraine is not even a state. What is Ukraine? Part of its territories is Eastern Europe, but the greater part is a gift from us.”⁶⁷

Putin already then, during this conversation, threatened that if Ukraine is accepted into NATO, Russia will begin to tear away Crimea and Donbass.⁶⁸

Long before the full-scale invasion, Kremlin ideologists began promoting the narrative that “Ukraine does not exist” and that today’s “Ukraine is merely a project”. Vladislav Surkov, a former adviser to Putin and the author of the so-called concept of the ‘sovereign democracy’ said in an interview to Kommersant in 2020:

“There is no Ukraine. There is ‘Ukrainianism’ — a specific mental disorder. Chaos instead of a state. There’s borscht, Bandera, and the bandura. But there is no nation. There is the brochure ‘Independent Ukraine’, but there is no Ukraine. The only question is: does Ukraine no longer exist, or does it not yet exist?”⁶⁹ (26.02.2020)

“The only effective method on the Ukrainian front is to enforce fraternal relations through the use of force”, added Surkov.

In May 2023, Bill Clinton, the 42nd President of the United States, told the *Financial Times* about a conversation he had with Putin in 2011, in which Putin told him that he disagreed with the treaty Clinton had signed with Boris Yeltsin, under which Russia agreed to respect Ukraine’s territorial sovereignty in exchange for Kyiv giving up its nuclear weapons. “I knew from that day forward, it was just a matter of time,” said Clinton.⁷⁰

Former Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili wrote about this in a column for *The Times* in December 2023 from prison. Saakashvili wrote there that Putin had made it clear to him 20 years earlier that he intended to seize Ukraine. The article says that the West ignored Putin’s aggressive territorial ambitions, although it had been repeatedly warned about this, including by Saakashvili himself. “Everything he is doing now, he told me more or less clearly at our first meeting. When I warned the West about Putin, I was ignored as an unstable, embittered madman,” Saakashvili says.⁷¹

As *The Times* writes, Saakashvili is not the only one who has accused the West of simply ignoring expansionist sentiments expressed by the Russian elite after the war with Georgia and seeking a return to previous relations with energy-rich Russia as soon as possible.

From the very beginning of Putin’s rule, Russian propaganda outlets began to popularise the myth of “historical injustice.” Supposedly, the former Soviet republics took away “historically Russian lands” from Russia after the collapse of the USSR. After Ukraine, this topic was most actively developed in relation to Kazakhstan. The main disseminator of this narrative was Putin himself.⁷²

This also includes a deliberately biased, revisionist historical policy that discredits national liberation movements in Eastern Europe, including Ukraine and the Baltic countries, and aggressive use and consolidation of Soviet myths about World War II through criminal and other legislation and other means. These notions successfully

complemented the resentment cultivated by Putin and his propagandists, based on regularly repeated assertions that in the 1990s the West took advantage of Russia's weakness and tried to bring it to its knees, and that "great Russia" is a fortress surrounded by enemies, from which everyone wants to tear off "the fattest piece." After many years of such indoctrination, the authoritarian regimes in Russia and Belarus, which had become completely dependent on its Eastern neighbour, no longer had to put much effort into preparing society for war. The seeds of discord and hatred fell on well-fertilised soil.

Following the annexation of Crimea and the occupation of part of Donbas in 2014, pro-Kremlin propaganda no longer hid the fact that Russia's end goal was complete control over Ukraine. In 2017, one of the most prominent pro-Kremlin publicists, Zakhar Prilepin, said the following in an interview with the newspaper Komsomolskaya Pravda:

"Kyiv is the final goal [*of Russian aggression*]. We will not hide it... Kyiv is a Russian city. A Russian Ukrainian city... All of Ukraine is the goal. There can be no other goal."⁷³ (12.02.2017)

In 2018, Mikhail Leontyev, a presenter for the propaganda station Channel One and press secretary for the Rosneft corporation, said in an interview with Vesti FM radio:

"We need to finish this Ukraine. It's a stinking beast. It's a resuscitation of Nazism on Russian soil."⁷⁴ (21.09.2018)

Over the next several years, propaganda outlets poured streams of hatred and dirt on Ukraine, disseminated fake news, staged provocations and each time claimed that Ukraine was Russia's enemy.

A new resurgence began in the spring of 2021. In April, an article by publicist Timofey Sergeytsev entitled "What Kind of Ukraine We Don't Need" appeared on the website of the main news agency RIA Novosti, where he wrote:

"Ukraine, whose existence is still allowable, must definitely become neutral and federal" and "the outbreak of a large-scale military conflict is increasingly likely."⁷⁵ (10.04.2021)

The context for the appearance of this article was the first serious build-up (up to 100,000 servicemen) of Russian troops on the border of Ukraine in April 2021.

The signal after which it became clear to many that Putin was preparing for something more than local actions in Donbass was his lengthy article "On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians," published in July 2021 on the Kremlin website in Russian and Ukrainian.⁷⁶ This article was full of Ukrainophobic sentiments. The feigned peaceful tone towards Ukrainians⁷⁷ alternated by a denial of Ukrainian

identity⁷⁸ and narratives about a “humiliated” Russia which was “deceived” by the former Soviet republics after their secession from the USSR.⁷⁹ The article contained threats against certain forces trying to make Ukraine an “anti-Russia.” According to the publication *Verstka*, there were several drafts of the article. In one of them, Putin directly threatened to start a military operation, but this line was not included in the final version.⁸⁰ The expert community perceived the article as a justification for a future invasion.

These ideas were later expanded by the Russian President in a much more blunt and outspoken statement in connection with Russia’s recognition of the independence of the so-called “LPR” and “DPR” on 21 February 2022, on the eve of the full-scale invasion. This document again repeated that “modern Ukraine was created entirely by Russia” at the expense of “its historical territories,” but the threats were now quite unambiguous. (“Do you want decommunization?... We are ready to show you what real decommunization means for Ukraine,” etc.).⁸¹

Putin has repeated these views publicly several times after the start of the full-scale invasion. At a meeting of the Valdai Discussion Club in October 2022, he stated:

“Frankly speaking, the sole real serious guarantor of Ukrainian statehood, sovereignty and territorial integrity could only be Russia, which created today’s Ukraine.”⁸² (27.10.2022)

The American Institute for the Study of War wrote at the time that “Putin continues to reject Ukrainian sovereignty in a way that is fundamentally incompatible with serious negotiations.”⁸³

The Kremlin circle’s historians – e.g., Vladimir Medinsky, aide to the Russian president, chairman of the Russian Military Historical Society (RMHS) and one of Putin’s main ideologists – also worked out historical justifications for the destruction of Ukraine. Two days before the full-scale invasion, he remarked the following in an interview with the state agency TASS:

“The modern state that we are accustomed to calling Ukraine is a historical phantom, tailored by specific tactical decisions of specific politicians under specific circumstances... And the so-called history of Ukraine is not simply inextricably linked with the thousand-year history of Rus/Russia/USSR – it is Russian history itself.”⁸⁴ (22.02.2022)

In the second month of the war, RIA Novosti published a new article by Sergeytsev entitled “What Russia Should Do with Ukraine,” which could well be called a “genocide manifesto.” The article was the first to use the word “de-Ukrainization” to describe this policy. Sergeytsev wrote:

“Denazification will inevitably also be de-Ukrainization – a rejection of the large-scale artificial inflation of the ethnic component of self-identification of the population of the territories of historical Little Russia and New Russia, which was started by the Soviet authorities.”⁸⁵ (03.04.2022)

The article’s “innovation” was also in the fact that Sergeytsev was the first to formulate the idea of collective guilt of Ukrainians:

“Denazification is necessary when a significant part of the people – most likely the majority – is overcome and drawn into the Nazi regime’s politics. That is, when the hypothesis “the people are good and the government is bad” does not work. <...> Denazification is a set of measures in relation to the Nazified mass of the population. <...> Further denazification of this mass of the population consists of re-education, which is achieved through ideological repression (suppression). <...> In addition to the top authorities, a significant part of the mass of the people – passive Nazis and accomplices of Nazism – are also guilty.”⁸⁶ (03.04.2022)

However, even Sergeytsev’s articles look pale against the background of the texts of another political observer in RIA Novosti, Victoria Nikiforova. Here are several short excerpts from her article “What Russia is Fighting for in Ukraine”:

“Russia is bringing its civilization to the territory of the former Ukraine. It is very different from what Ukrainians have become accustomed to in their home country over the past thirty years. In Russia, prisoners are not tortured. Our soldiers do not kill their own citizens and then make installations out of their corpses for the amusement of Western journalists. We do not lie. This, by the way, is the ‘weakness’ of our military propaganda. We know how to expose fake news, but creating it is impossible and repulsive... We have freedom of thought and freedom of speech that is, by the way, completely unattainable for Western countries, and to which Ukrainians pray so fervently. In Russia, people who think differently are not imprisoned, tortured, or killed. We do not divide people into higher and lower races, we do not consider any nation responsible for everything and do not poison its representatives to death. We do not forbid anyone to speak their native language. We do not teach our children to kill. This is disgusting, dear Ukrainians. The Kalibrs and Iskanders [*missiles*] convey to you today precisely this simple idea.”⁸⁷ (06.04.2022)

These articles by Sergeytsev and Nikiforova were published literally a few days after the news regarding the monstrous war crimes of the Russian military – the mass murder of civilians in the city of Bucha. These publications continue to be freely

available on the website of the biggest federal agency, from which all the main propaganda media outlets get their news.

The term “denazification” in relation to Ukraine began to be used long before this, but it is not known who was the first to use it. Back in 2018, propagandist and employee of the pro-war TV channel *Soloviev LIVE* Armen Gasparyan published a book titled “Denazification of Ukraine. A Country of Unlearned Lessons,” which said:

“...Ukraine has never been independent. It has always been part of Russia, the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union... Then you started killing Russians just because they dared to defend their Russian origin. What should be done about it?” (2018)⁸⁸

Examples of public calls for the eradication of Ukraine

Dmitry Medvedev, Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council, former President of Russia (2008-2012):

“Why Ukraine is dangerous for its residents [...] The existence of an independent [Ukrainian] state on historical Russian territories will now be a permanent pretext for resuming military action. Whoever is at the helm of the cancerous neoplasm called Ukraine will not add legitimacy to its rule or legal validity to the ‘country’ itself. And, therefore, the likelihood of a new battle will persist indefinitely. [...] That is why the existence of Ukraine is fatal for Ukrainians. They are practical people, ultimately. No matter how much they now wish death to Russians. No matter how much they hate the Russian leadership. No matter how much they strive to join the mythical European Union and NATO. Choosing between eternal war and inevitable death and life, the absolute majority of Ukrainians (well, except for a minimal number of scumbag nationalists) will ultimately choose life. They will understand that life in a large common state, which they do not really like now, is better than death. Their death and the death of their loved ones. And the sooner Ukrainians realise this, the better.”⁸⁹ (17.01.2022)

“Why will Ukraine disappear? Because no one needs it. [...] A sub-Ukraine is not a country at all. [...] The pieces of Russia called Ukraine within the 1991 borders are simply a misunderstanding caused by the collapse of the USSR. And that is why we do not need a sub-Ukraine. [...] No one on the planet needs such a Ukraine. That is why it will not exist.”⁹⁰ (08.04.2023)

“The only way out is to construct our own, Russian formula [of peace] that is calm and realistic. One that is humane for everyone. What kind is this? For example, this: 1. Recognition by the former (hereinafter – f.)

'Ukraine' of defeat in the military part of the conflict. Complete and unconditional capitulation of f. 'Ukraine' in the form of the neo-Nazi clique in Kyiv. Demilitarisation of f. 'Ukraine' and a ban on the creation of paramilitary formations on its territories in the future. [...] 6. Official recognition by the interim parliament of f. 'Ukraine' that its entire territory is the territory of the Russian Federation. Adoption of an act on the reunification of the territories of f. 'Ukraine' with Russia."⁹¹ (14.03.2024)

"We must do everything to ensure that Ukraine's 'irreversible path' to NATO ends either with the disappearance of Ukraine or the disappearance of NATO. Or better both."⁹² (11.07.2024)

Eduard Bagirov, writer:

"While following the feeds, I suddenly discovered that approximately 99 percent of today's khokhols, for some inexplicable reason, are absolutely convinced that Ukrainians lived on the territory of Kyivan Rus."⁹³ (27.02.2022)

Anton Krasovsky, at that time director of Russian-language broadcasting for the RT television channel (formerly Russia Today):

"Fuck, this country shouldn't exist, and we'll do everything to make sure it doesn't. And I fucking told you, we'll burn your constitution right on Khreshchatyk. I'll personally fucking be present at the burning of your shitty so-called constitution right on Maidan Square."⁹⁴ (29.03.2022)

"How much more time will pass until all this ends? [...] Until there will be no more Ukraine, and only our land, populated by our Russian people, will remain."⁹⁵ (25.02.2023)

Dmitry Puchkov, publicist:

"I fully agree that Ukraine must be demilitarised like a rabid hyena and denazified. Just like a rabid hyena, specially bred near the border of Russia. President Zelensky is not needed for anything more than to sign the capitulation."⁹⁶ (28.02.2022)

Margarita Simonyan, RT editor-in-chief:

"Ukraine is not a small country at all. By European standards, it is huge, and by the standards of a country like Liechtenstein, it is indecently

huge. It should be reduced a bit, which is what we are successfully doing.”⁹⁷ (30.11.2022)

Yulia Vityazyeva, Z-blogger, then an employee of the pro-war channel “Soloviev LIVE”:

“Ukraine should simply cease to exist. In its current form, Ukraine should cease to exist. Because I believe that this is an artificially created state. There is no such thing as a Ukrainian. There are Little Russians. There are Rusyns, there are Russians, Jews, Moldovans. Well, everyone who lived on this land [of Ukraine].”⁹⁸ (26.11.2022)

“I am afraid that the same fate is in store for Ukraine as for Mariupol... The fate of Ukraine does not concern anyone, and the fate of the people living there concerns only us – Russia; us – Russians, who are doing everything to minimise losses and evacuate as much as possible, to save as much of the civilian population as possible. [...] I do not feel any empathy for Ukraine. When someone tells us what the structure of Ukraine will be after our victory, I can say ‘none.’ Ukraine as a state in its current form must cease to exist. Completely and entirely. There should be no talk of any statehood there.”⁹⁹ (01.07.2024)

Olga Kormukhina, singer:

“I don’t want to offend Ukrainians, but the name ‘Ukraine’ was invented not by Russians, but by Poles. ‘The outskirts of Russia’ is Ukraine. And if a name was invented for a state that doesn’t exist, then such a nation doesn’t exist. [...] No matter how hard I try, I can’t hate Ukrainians. I just can’t. How can you hate yourself? It’s us. It’s just us who gave free rein to the worst in ourselves.”¹⁰⁰ (12.05.2023)

Sergei Karaganov, Russian political scientist and head of the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy, in the article “The use of nuclear weapons can save humanity from a global catastrophe”:

“A preventive nuclear strike on Europe is needed so that the West would simply ‘back off’ and not prevent Russia and the world from moving forward. We need to restore faith in hell to those who have lost it. [...] Ukraine will cease to exist as an anti-Russian state, and the West will retreat.”¹⁰¹ (13.06.2023)

Dmitry Vinnik, Doctor of Philosophy, Professor at the Financial University under the Government of the Russia:

“The State of Ukraine has gone over to the side of our geopolitical opponents, to the side of NATO, has sworn allegiance to it, and has

done so with delight and enthusiasm. The State of Ukraine has betrayed its faith, has given its own and our temples to heretics and apostates, has worshipped Mammon, has resurrected pagan demon-cannibals, has let sodomites into its home to raise its children. What does this mean? This means that the State of Ukraine must be destroyed.”¹⁰² (27.02.2024)

Andrey Perla, political journalist for ultraconservative television channel Tsargrad:

“A reminder: There should be no independent, or sovereign, Ukraine. Russia will border Poland.”¹⁰³ (24.08.2023)

“Nothing must survive there. Everything on the right bank of the Dnieper must be destroyed all the way to the Polish border. [...] It’s time to understand that we are being confronted by a terrorist state. There is only one way to deal with a terrorist state, to destroy it completely.”¹⁰⁴ (30.12.2023)

“The image of victory must include the storming and destruction of Kyiv, and capitulation and liquidation of the state of Ukraine, along with a program for the return of people, cities and the entire country to normal Russian life. Calculated for at least a generation.”¹⁰⁵ (05.01.2024)

“There is no one to talk about peace with. Ukraine will have to be destroyed.”¹⁰⁶ (21.05.2024)

Konstantin Malofeev, founder of the ultra-conservative television channel Tsargrad:

“The goal [of the ‘special military operation’] must be the complete destruction of this neo-Nazi and anti-Christian pseudo-state entity. The real Ukraine is an integral part of Russia.”¹⁰⁷ (11.08.2022)

“Novorossiya is Russia. Malorossiya is Russia. All of Ukraine is Russia. And it will be liberated. The whole world must be liberated from the dictate of Western Sodom.”¹⁰⁸ (30.09.2022)

“There is only one way to deal with a terrorist state: to destroy it completely. [...] We must give the civilian population 48 hours to leave the cities and respond with the full force of our weapons. Stop playing a give-and-take with them.”¹⁰⁹ (30.12.2023)

Alexander Kazakov, Advisor to the leader of the “A Just Russia – For Truth” faction in the Russian State Duma:

“We are currently fighting an unfinished war which we inherited from our grandfathers. And I categorically do not want my grandchildren to have to finish fighting this war again. The issue must be resolved at least for a couple of centuries. And here the only solution is the disappearance of ‘Ukraine’ from the political map of the world. Everything must be Russia.”¹¹⁰ (16.01.2023)

Alexander Dugin, Kremlin ideologist and pro-government “philosopher”:

“Ukraine will either be part of the great Eurasian Empire, or it will not exist at all.”¹¹¹ (31.03.2023)

“At the end of May, Russia will finally recognise the Kyiv junta as a terrorist organisation. It would also be worth revoking the recognition of sovereignty of Ukraine as a whole and declare the Old Lands the territory of Great Russia. No recognised authority, no state. To save Ukraine means to return it to the Empire.”¹¹² (25.03.2024)

“The success of the SVO [special military operation] must be seen through the cessation of the existence of Ukraine as an independent subject. This would be the real and complete success. Ukraine in the state in which it has existed for the last 30 years could not help but turn into a Nazi hive of sadists, terrorists and vipers. This means that such a political entity has no right to historical existence.”¹¹³ (30.05.2024)

Ilya Remeslo, publicist:

“Let’s be honest – there are no ‘pro-Russian’ Ukrainians, at least among Ukrainian politicians. Ukrainianism is anti-Russia a priori and forever. And a pro-Russian Ukraine as a state is surreal. A good Ukraine is a Ukraine that will not exist.”¹¹⁴ (17.03.2022)

Dmitry Rogozin, member of the Federation Council of the Russian Federation, representative of the occupied Zaporizhia region of Ukraine (since 2023), former head of the state corporation Roscosmos (2018–2022):

“What has grown in place of Ukraine is an existential threat to the Russian people, Russian history, Russian language and Russian civilization. If we do not put an end to them, [...] we will have to die, but at an even greater cost to our grandchildren. So let us put an end to this. Once and for all.”¹¹⁵ (16.06.2022)

Vitaly Milonov, deputy of the Russian State Duma: [against the background of a photograph of a rocket flying in the sky]:

“Doves of peace and spiritual cleansing from the fascist scum are flying to Ukraine. Sorry, not to Ukraine, but to the part of Russia temporarily occupied by these faggots.”¹¹⁶ (19.10.2022)

Sergei Mardan, journalist for Komsomolskaya Pravda radio:

“It is time to clearly formulate that Russia’s goal is to destroy the Ukrainian state as such. Its symbols must be banned, its toponymy burned out, the memory of its ‘heroes’ destroyed and the history erased of this political freak born in 1991, that grew strong and grew into a ghoul by 2014.”¹¹⁷ (27.03.2022)

“This formation, which appeared in 1991 on the world map under the name of ‘the state of Ukraine,’ is the very chimera that must be erased from the world map.”¹¹⁸ (28.03.2023)

Alexander Shpakovsky, Belarusian pro-Kremlin “expert”:

“The current Ukrainian regime is an instrument of Western aggression and poses a threat to the security of the Union State. Therefore, the goal is to dismantle this regime, return Ukraine to the traditional orbit of Russian civilization, and carry out a large-scale denazification of this country’s society.”¹¹⁹ (31.05.2021)

“At the present stage, the very existence of the state of Ukraine poses a threat to the national security of Belarus. [...] The overthrow of the Zelensky regime and the return of Ukraine to the traditional orbit of the East Slavic civilization is the most important issue for the survival of the Belarusian state model.”¹²⁰ (26.07.2022)

“The brutalisation of Ukrainian society, the starting points of which were the first and, especially, the second Maidan, has reached its apogee. The ugly brainchild of the Belovezh Accords must be destroyed.”¹²¹ (17.08.2022)

Andrei Tkachev, priest of the Russian Orthodox Church:

“It is senseless, Ukraine. And in its senselessness, it is dangerous to everyone in general, just like the once exploded Chernobyl.”¹²² (18.04.2022)

“Now it is our turn to burn out the Nazi plague with a hot iron. The best guarantee that it will never crawl out of its hiding places again is the liquidation of the Ukrainian statehood that gave birth to Nazism.”¹²³ (28.10.2022)

Andrey Gurulev, deputy of the Russian State Duma:

“We need to close the issue with Ukraine tightly. And today we need to admit that as regards denazification-demilitarisation, we need to close the ‘Ukraine’ project today, forever. That’s it. Ukraine was and is no more. It is a Russian territory.”¹²⁴ (13.02.2023)

Boris Korchevnikov, host and CEO of the Orthodox television channel Spas:

“The Ukraine project began to die when a half-naked slut chopped down a cross on the Maidan in 2012. [...] That slut – the state of Ukraine – will end up even worse. It will be eaten alive by worms. They are already eating it. It is already a corpse.”¹²⁵ (31.03.2023)

Petr Tolstoy, deputy of the Russian State Duma:

“We must go to the end until we completely destroy the Nazi ulcer, and the international terrorist organisation called ‘Ukraine’ ceases to exist.”¹²⁶ (02.04.2023)

Telegram-channel ZAPISKI VETERANA:

“If a cancerous tumour has affected an organ, it must be operated on immediately, and if necessary, the organ should be removed if other methods no longer help. All of Ukraine is one big cancerous tumour on the body of Russia. We will operate. The operation will be difficult. But we must take the risk, because the life of all of Russia depends on the outcome.”¹²⁷ (13.10.2024)

Vika Tsyganova, singer:

“Ukraine as a state has never existed and never will. And every small separated fragment will always come to fascism. People will be protected only in the bosom of the empire. And everything else leads to fascism.”¹²⁸ (27.10.2023)

Ivan Okhlobystin, actor:

“Ukraine should not exist, but that does not mean that we should destroy Ukrainians. It is a logical part of us. I have a friend, an Englishman, who says, “I cannot tell a Russian from a Ukrainian. How are they different?” I say: “In no way at all. Ukrainians are the same as Russians, only Nazis.”¹²⁹ (17.07.2024)

Earlier, at the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Okhlobystin said that “such a historical case as Ukraine should disappear”¹³⁰ and called the “special military operation” against Ukraine a “holy war.”¹³¹ (25.02.2022) For supporting the Russian invasion and spreading propaganda, Okhlobystin is under sanctions from Ukraine, Canada and 27 EU countries.

Dmitri Medvedev, Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council, former President of Russia (2008-2012):

“Today, Ukraine faces a choice — to be with Russia or to disappear from the map of the world entirely. They must quell the pride of 'otherness', renounce their opposition to the pan-Russian project, and cast out the demons of political Ukrainianism. If so-called Ukraine continues to follow an aggressive Russophobic course, it will disappear from the map of the world forever”.¹³² (13.12.2024)

PART 3. HATE SPEECH AGAINST UKRAINIANS

Concept of the “Five Ds+”

In our research, in the part where we analyse “hate speech” against Ukrainians, we used the framework of elements of “genocidal language” in relation to a protected group proposed in 2018 by the Jerusalem Center for the Prevention of Genocide.¹³³ It consists of the so called “Five Ds+”: dehumanisation, demonisation, delegitimisation, disinformation, denial, threats, and glorification of terror.¹³⁴ We will try to formulate the meaning of each term for the purposes of this study:

1) *Dehumanisation* – the endowing of a human group with “non-human” properties, for example, comparing it to animals, insects, and diseases. Dehumanisation is used by aggressors to evoke a feeling of disgust, contempt, and fear towards the protected group. The method was widely used during the genocide of the Tutsi in Rwanda in 1994 by propagandists of the Free Radio and Television of the Thousand Hills, who called for the murder of Tutsis and called them “cockroaches” that must be “exterminated.” German Nazi propagandists called Jews “parasites” and “pests.”

2) *Demonisation* – a) accusing the protected group of all sins, shifting the blame and responsibility for one’s own crimes and the failures of the perpetrator and/or their group onto it; b) for the purposes of this study, provoking a feeling of fear towards the protected group by endowing it with mystical, monstrous properties, for example, likening its representatives to zombies, vampires, “dark forces,” or Satan.

3) *Delegitimisation* – a) denying the existence, national identity, language, culture, autonomy, or history of a protected group; b) accusing a protected group of committing crimes (and using these claims to justify one’s own crimes).

4) *Disinformation* – the presentation of false or incomplete information with the purpose of denigrating a protected group.

5) *Denial* – the rejection of historical facts or tragedies in the history of a protected group (for example, the denial of the Holodomor in the history of Ukraine) and the right to remember victims in the past.

6) *Threats* – statements of intent to inflict terrible strikes on a protected group or to commit other hostile acts.

7) *Glorification of terror* – a) encouraging and using known perpetrators of genocidal violence as role models, such as memorialising “fallen heroes,” b) approving violence, murder, and other cruel acts against civilians, detainees, and prisoners of war.

Experts of the Jerusalem Center for the Prevention of Genocide examined the connection between what they call “genocidal language” and war crimes. They concluded that, if not addressed, such language leads to genocide.¹³⁵ We do not fully agree with the general term used by the Jerusalem Center, as the use of the word “genocidal” in relation to “hate speech” can lead to a confusion of concepts and even to an erroneous approach in the actions of investigative and judicial authorities. In strictly legal terms, hate speech does not constitute an international crime prohibited by the Convention and the Rome Statute, or direct incitement to genocide. Unless there is a direct call to kill members of a human group in order to destroy it in whole or in part, to create intolerable living conditions for them or to forcibly transfer children of this group to another group with the same intent of destroying a group, it is not possible to qualify such speech as incitement to genocide. However, we appreciate the classification proposed by the Jerusalem Center as applicable to the analysis of hate speech and agree with its conclusion that such “genocidal speech” may “set the stage” for an ideological justification for genocide and for direct and public incitement to its implementation against a protected group.

To a greater or lesser extent, all seven elements of the “5 D+” are represented in the anti-Ukrainian rhetoric of Russian and Belarusian propaganda. However, we decided to limit ourselves to a detailed coverage of only four of them. In order to identify the ideological preparation for acts of genocide of Ukrainians, in our opinion, it is enough to illustrate the first three “Ds,” as well as point 7 (“glorification of terror”).

Examples of dehumanisation

Alexander Zhuchkovsky, activist of the Russian Imperial Movement and “war correspondent”:

“The goal of any military propaganda, specifically, is to dehumanise the image of the enemy (although the Ukrainians have long since dehumanised themselves). And this is logical and correct, since we are not fighting with people, but with enemies. (It is difficult to kill a person, but an enemy is easy and honourable.) Not with people, but with zombies. Not with people, but with Ukrainians.”¹³⁶ (12.11.2016)

Andrei Mukovozchik, Belarusian propagandist, journalist for the newspaper “SB. Belarus Today”:

“UkrainoNazi must be eradicated like cockroaches – once and for all.”¹³⁷
(06.03.2022)

Vladimir Soloviev, host of the program “Evening with Vladimir Soloviev” on the Russia-1 television channel (in discussing the “special military operation”):

“When a doctor expels worms from a cat, for the doctor it is a special operation, for the worms it is a war, and for the cat it is cleaning.”¹³⁸
(19.07.2022)

Shukhrat Adilov, Russian mercenary, in an interview with the newspaper Kaluzhskaya Nedelya:

“One thing I can say for sure: we are fighting with non-humans. If they are not stopped, they will come to our home and kill our children, and those who survive will be turned into drug addicts and perverts.”¹³⁹
(21.09.2022)

Sergei Mardan, journalist for Komsomolskaya Pravda radio:

“No one feels sorry for them. No one at all. This is who the Russian army is fighting – ghouls. The living dead that have risen.”¹⁴⁰ (28.03.2023)

Andrei Gurulev, Russian State Duma member:

“We are told that Russians are fighting Russians — this is a lie! Russians are fighting against non-Russian aliens, those who have betrayed their homeland and their faith.”¹⁴¹ (24.01.2025)

Examples of demonisation

Grigory Azarenok, Belarusian propagandist, television presenter for channel STV, speaking about Ukraine:

“The state is a beast. It has glorified and praised the basest human feelings. It has encouraged murder, cultivated mockery, and was built only on the basis of hatred for Muscovites, “Colorados,”¹⁴² “separatists,” or anyone.”¹⁴³ (23.03.2022)

“Ukraine is a satanic state. Christ will defeat the devil.”¹⁴⁴ (24.03.2022)

Margarita Simonyan, RT editor-in-chief:

“To our horror, to our regret and to our general silent amazement, a significant part of Ukraine, of the Ukrainian people – certainly not all, and I hope not even the majority, but a significant part – were seized by this madness of Nazism.”¹⁴⁵ (26.03.2022)

Sergei Aksyonov, “head” of the annexed Crimea:

“We understand that with this regime we are dealing not only with an anti-Russian, but also with an anti-Christian force. Simply put, with Satanists.”¹⁴⁶ (18.04.2022)

Ramzan Kadyrov, head of Chechnya:

“In the few months of the SVO in Ukraine, we have witnessed the worst manifestations of Satanism come to the surface – rabid fascism, absolute atheism, black cynicism and aggressive LGBT propaganda.”¹⁴⁷ (01.08.2022)

“There is no doubt that as soon as we show weakness in Ukraine, hordes of the devil’s servants will already be here.”¹⁴⁸ (08.10.2022)

“...Yes, the Ukrainian population is dying. But they should be offended that they are dying in vain for the West’s right to hold rainbow parades in front of children, and not for their national values. Sodom and Gomorrah were punished by the Almighty. And today this sword of sacred punishment is in the hands of Russia!” (01.07.2023)¹⁴⁹

Alexey Pavlov, Assistant Secretary of the Russian Security Council:

“I believe that with the continuation of the special military operation, it is becoming increasingly urgent to carry out the de-Satanisation of Ukraine, or, as the head of the Chechen Republic, Ramzan Kadyrov, aptly put it, its ‘complete de-Shaitanisation.’”¹⁵⁰ (25.10.2022)

Dmitry Medvedev, Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council, former President of Russia (2008-2012):

(in his congratulatory message on the National Unity Day):

“We listen to the words of the Creator in our hearts and obey them. These words give us a sacred purpose. The purpose is to stop the supreme ruler of hell, no matter what name he uses – Satan, Lucifer or Iblis. For his purpose is destruction. Our purpose is life.”¹⁵¹ (04.11.2022)

“Here, various cockroaches that have bred in the Kyiv insectarium are constantly threatening to ‘return Crimea.’ Well, the goals are clear: to encourage the tame insects to wonder around and show the owner of the insectarium that they are still very capable of running like cockroaches after a piece of food.”¹⁵² (23.11.2022)

Vladimir Soloviev, host of the program “Evening with Vladimir Soloviev” on the television channel Russia-1:

“In general, if you think about it, what is happening is Satanism. Pure demons, you can't say it any other way... If we are dealing with the servants of the Prince of Darkness, if we are dealing with the Satanic principle, what kind of negotiations and with whom are we speaking? What kind of negotiations can there be with Satan? They have been lying all the time. This is the basis of the Western Satanic civilization.”¹⁵³ (16.12.2022)

Alexander Samsonov, journalist for the publication Military Review:

“If we take Tolkien's universe and images, then the Ukrainians, who have forgotten that they are Russian, are 'orcs' – corrupted, darkened elves.”¹⁵⁴ (17.03.2023)

Vladlen Tatarsky, propagandist, “military correspondent”:

“Ukraine is a demonic state... We must put an end to this state sooner or later... This must be our policy.”¹⁵⁵ (01.04.2023)

Andrey Perla, political journalist for ultraconservative television channel Tsargrad:

“Ukraine refused to observe the truce on Christmas, because Ukraine is fighting against God. That's right. Against God. There are Christians and Jews in the world who don't want to understand this. But who is their doctor?”¹⁵⁶ (30.12.2023)

(following mutual New Year's rocket attacks):

“As long as we attack only military targets, they treat us like this. To stop them from treating us like this, we must stop considering them human. Non-humans are not taken prisoner, non-humans do not have 'civilians' – this is the decision that must be made.”¹⁵⁷ (30.12.2023)

“You don't treat non-humans like people and you don't follow the laws of war with non-humans. You just kill non-humans. To save people's lives. To save our cities. There should be no safe place or undestroyed 'infrastructure' from the right bank of the Dnieper to the Polish border.”¹⁵⁸ (30.12.2023)

“There are a lot of people (or rather non-people) and places that we really don't want to see in Russia. We don't need Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, or Kropyvnytskyi. And what we don't consider ours, we shouldn't protect.”¹⁵⁹ (30.12.2023)

(following the shelling of the OKHMATDIT children's hospital in Kyiv by Russian missiles):

“Such enemies cannot be considered people. We must realise, in a simple and terrifying way, that there are no people on the other side. Not a single person. Our missiles do not kill people. Not a single person. There are no people there. If we do not accept this as a given, if we do not keep ourselves from considering them people, feeling sorry for them, protecting them, then we will weaken ourselves. We will limit our ability to save our children. We will make our path to Victory more difficult. [...] Your humble servant has repeated it more than once (and I am not the only one who says and thinks so): the only way to deal with terror is to exterminate the terrorists and instil terror in the society that gives birth to terrorists. If the goal of the SVO [special military operation] is to ensure Russia’s security and to denazify and demilitarise Ukraine, then the path to this goal is as follows: the surviving Nazis and all their relatives must flee in panic to the West. Beyond the Polish border. From under fire. From the ruins of their cities and homes. So, it’s simple and scary, but there’s no need to justify ending up in a children’s hospital. You have to say, do you want this to stop? Give in. Capitulate. And then we might spare you.”¹⁶⁰ (08.07.2024)

Vladimir Shamanov, deputy of the State Duma of the Russian Federation

(from his speech at the round table “Counteracting the spread of Satanism and other destructive phenomena,” section on “Satanism as the leading ideology of the enemy. Experience of strengthening destructive aspects in Ukrainian society”):

“Today, events are taking place in Ukraine where their own armed forces and air force are bombing the people who live in Donbass. This is a degree of Satanism. But in fact, this is madness against their own people. These figures are capable of taking the most extreme measures to achieve their goals.”¹⁶¹ (01.07.2024)

Examples of delegitimation

Vladimir Zhirinovsky, deputy of the Russian State Duma, speaking about Ukrainians:

“Nobody needs you, you are all European trash. You are not needed, you are being cleaned out! [...] You are European manure! You should go away, but not immediately. Decades will pass. There are 30 million of you left now, then twenty, then ten.”¹⁶² (11.11.2019)

Stanislav Yaskevich, Belarusian pro-government blogger (in a post titled “Memo to a Warrior-Liberator,” where one of the points reads as follows):

“There are no ‘Ukrainians’ in nature. They are random historical mutants. Former Russians. Moral freaks, proud of their renunciation of Faith, Blood, and Ancestors.”¹⁶³ (04.02.2022)

Roman Antonovsky, Z-blogger, propagandist:

“Being a Ukrainian should be shameful and painful, whereas being a Russian of Little Russia should be joyful and honourable.”¹⁶⁴ (27.03.2022)

Alexander Shpakovsky, Belarusian pro-Kremlin propagandist:

“People of reproductive age are being destroyed, which, in addition to the million-strong emigration and natural population decline, allows us to view Ukraine as a dubious asset in terms of demographic security of the civilization of the ‘Russian world’. [...] Moreover, the paradox of the situation is that the longer Russia plays it cool, the greater the losses in this war will be. That is, what now looks cruel, from the point of view of the future is justified. Was it possible to avoid the war? No.”¹⁶⁵ (26.04.2022)

Nikita Mikhalkov, film director, television presenter:

“The Ukrainian language has become an image of Russophobia. The phrases we hear in Ukrainian, transcriptions and pronunciations, for us, and for the world in general, and for them themselves, are a formulation of hatred towards Russia.”¹⁶⁶ (26.08.2022)

Sergei Moiseev, head of the organisation Triune Rus’:

“Ukrainianism is a suicidal form of life, a death wish. [...] Either we pull together the Russian lands, unite the Russian people, or our civilization will disappear into oblivion.”¹⁶⁷ (24.11.2022)

Sergei Mardan, journalist for Komsomolskaya Pravda radio:

“Why not set up a small local Zaporizhzhya Gulag, neat and tidy in the steppe for [Ukrainian] teachers [who do not want to teach Russian in schools in the occupied territories] and who have not yet learned to love our beautiful homeland.”¹⁶⁸ (07.08.2022)

“A person who now declares in Crimea that he wants his children to study the Ukrainian language should be immediately taken into custody by the FSB. The choice of language is a political declaration. The person is obviously not loyal to Russia. [...] Formally, it can remain

an optional subject in school, but in reality, children should completely forget the Ukrainian language by the age of 18.”¹⁶⁹ (01.09.2022)

“Ukrainianism as a system must be completely eradicated in the liberated territories. Complete and total de-Ukrainization. Starting with the destruction of signs in the language and ending with the abolition of the language in secondary schools.”¹⁷⁰ (13.12.2022)

Vladlen Tatarsky, propagandist, “war correspondent”:

“A Ukrainian is a sick Russian. He’s like a transvestite, born a man and then something happened to him, he had an operation, he wanted to become a woman. [...] Ukrainianism is a Russian spiritual transvestite who is trying to get into another skin. [...] Therefore, the future of Ukraine and the people who live there are Russians who will return to their normal state.”¹⁷¹ (11.10.2022)

Andrey Medvedev, deputy of the Moscow City Duma, host of the Vesti program on the television channel Russia-1:

“By and large, the Ukrainian nation does not exist. It is a political orientation. To be a ‘Ukrainian,’ you do not even need to speak the Ukrainian language (which is also still being formed). Ukrainians are those who have been convinced that they are special, more European, more racially pure and more acceptable Russians.”¹⁷² (23.11.2022)

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) in its review of Russian military aggression called this statement by Andrey Medvedev “genocidal rhetoric.”¹⁷³

Dmitry Medvedev, Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council, former President of Russia (2008-2012):

“I want to remind them of the indisputable facts:

1. Kyiv is the capital of Ancient Rus.
2. Kyiv is a large Little Russian city within the Russian Empire.
3. Kyiv is a republican capital within the USSR.

And finally, Kyiv is simply a Russian city, where they have always thought and spoken in Russian. So that everything is crystal clear about what needs to be returned and how.”¹⁷⁴ (23.11.2022)

Vladimir Soloviev, television presenter of Russia-1”:

“For example, The Washington Post publishes a lengthy article accusing the Russian authorities of kidnapping. It has a whole set of clichés. [...] The ‘aggressor country’ is doing all this to destroy some

'Ukrainian identity.' Question: can there be even a grain of truth in such articles? Answer: no. Starting with the fact that there is no 'Ukrainian identity.'"¹⁷⁵ (25.12.2022)

Yuri Kot, Dean of the Faculty of Media Communications at the Moscow State Institute of Culture (on air on the television channel Tsargrad):

"Ukrainianism is that very terror, that very devilry, demonism, terrorism, Nazism and everything else. Only in this format can Ukrainianism exist."¹⁷⁶ (10.03.2023)

Sergei Mikheev, "writer," propagandist:

"A political khokhol [*pejorative nickname for a Ukrainian*] is a completely unprincipled, poorly educated, terribly evil, incredibly greedy and vile person."¹⁷⁷ (02.04.2023)

Andrei Bogodel, Dean of the Faculty of Education of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Belarus, on the program "SASS is authorised to declare", channel STV:

"The war will be lost by Ukraine as a sovereign state. [...] Ukraine will still belong to the 'Russian world,' because it is connected to this 'Russian world.'"¹⁷⁸ (03.11.2023)

Vladimir Putin (in an interview to American journalist Tucker Carlson):

"What is happening [in Ukraine] is, to a certain extent, an element of civil war. And everyone in the West thinks that the fighting has forever torn one part of the Russian people apart from the other. No. Reunification will happen. It hasn't gone anywhere."¹⁷⁹ (09.02.2024)

Dmytro Tabachnik, former Minister of Education of Ukraine and since 2023, advisor to the head of the Russian occupation administration of Zaporizhzhia:

"I am deeply convinced that the future of Ukraine is possible only through de-Ukrainization or, if you like, re-Russification of those lands that were forcibly taken away for humanitarian reasons."¹⁸⁰ (30.05.2024)

Alexander Artamonov, journalist for the military television channel Zvezda:

"I have a very low opinion of Ukrainians. I don't see them rebelling and doing anything like that. My attitude towards them is much lower than towards Russians... I maintain that these are second-class people."¹⁸¹ (02.06.2024)

These words from the propagandist caused indignation even among the collaborator from Donetsk, Alexander Semchenko, who on the same broadcast called Artamonov's statements "fascist and unacceptable."

Dmitry Rogozin, member of the Federation Council of the Russian Federation, representative of the occupied Zaporizhia region of Ukraine (since 2023), former head of the state corporation Roscosmos (2018–2022):

"This time we need to burn out all this 'Ukrainianism' as an ideology. Fence off Ukrainians from it. Burn this ideology along with its bastard literature, delusional history, cannibalism of the 'ancient Ukraine,' passion for fascist 'aesthetics' and servility to the West. Burn it so that there is no spirit left. No truces. Any truce, and especially reconciliation, is certain death for our children and grandchildren."¹⁸² (26.06.2024)

Andrey Perla, political journalist for ultraconservative television channel Tsargrad:

Question from a "journalist": "Why study the language of murderers and does this language really exist?" (referring to the Ukrainian language)

Answer: "The thing is that Ukrainian is not a language like all the others. [...] It is a southern Russian dialect. [...] Where did the Ukrainian language come from? In Pushkin's time, there was no Ukrainian. I have never seen a person for whom 'normative' Ukrainian was native. I believe that the Russian state should not facilitate or encourage people who would study an invented, artificial language. [...] Ukrainian was created to divide people into regions and say that these are not Russians, these are Ukrainians, and therefore they are supposedly entitled to a separate national state."¹⁸³ (10.04.2023)

"A Ukrainian in the modern world is a person who has refused to be Russian. And who does he become, having refused the Russian in himself? A nobody. An empty space. Meanwhile, evil is simply the absence of good, emptiness. That is why we say that in this war we are confronting evil. Emptiness. Non-existence."¹⁸⁴ (25.01.2024)

Stanislav Yaskevich, Belarusian pro-government and pro-Russian blogger:

"If you think about it more deeply, it becomes clear that Ukraine and Ukrainians as such are not needed by anyone. They're just a tool or a resource and nothing more. They are needed only by Russia, because we are one people, albeit divided, and Ukrainians are still a genetic resource for the Russian people."¹⁸⁵ (07.02.2024)

From the Order of the XXV World Russian People's Council "The Present and Future of the Russian World":

"After the end of the SVO, the entire territory of modern Ukraine should enter the zone of exclusive influence of Russia. The possibility of the existence on this territory of a Russophobic political regime hostile to Russia and its people, as well as a political regime controlled from an external centre hostile to Russia, should be completely rejected. The reunification of the Russian people should become one of the priority tasks of Russia's foreign policy. Russia should return to the doctrine of the trinity of the Russian people, which has existed for more than three centuries, according to which the Russian people consists of Great Russians, Little Russians and White Russians, who are branches (sub-ethnic group) of one people, and the concept of "Russian" covers all Eastern Slavs – the descendants of historical Rus'."¹⁸⁶ (27.03.2024)

Alexander Zhuchkovsky, activist in the Russian Imperial Movement, "war correspondent":

"The current war is a real continuation of the Great Patriotic War [World War II], where we, in addition to the Germans, Japanese, etc., fought against the Ukrainians. What happened in 2013-14 is a consequence of the failure in the 1940s-50s. We were not able to eliminate all the Ukrainians who fled across Russia. But the problem is that the Soviet government crushed the Banderites with one hand, and with the other, consistently nurtured the Ukrainian nation and Ukrainian separatism. [...] The ideological Ukrainians who were not finished off in the Great Patriotic War received favourable conditions in the Ukrainian SSR and infected a large number of Russians who today hate Russia. The SVO is called upon not only to finish off the Ukrainian nationalists and suppress sympathy for them among the people, but also to abolish and eradicate the Ukrainian idea itself. The state must admit the mistake made by the Soviet government (and declare it) and correct this mistake. Russia should not consider this territory Ukraine and its population Ukrainians. These are the goals of the SVO. When there is no one left there to shoot at Russians, then the Great Patriotic War will end."¹⁸⁷ (09.05.2024)

Dmitry Drobnitsky, political scientist, television channel Russia-1, on the program "Evening with Vladimir Soloviev":

"There is no Ukrainian people. Any historian will tell you!" [...]

“As for recognising the existence of the Ukrainian people, this is the biggest mistake that exists in our Soviet history. We forcibly Ukrainized the Russian people who were there.”¹⁸⁸ (09.06.2024)

Examples of glorification of terror

One of the forms of glorification of terror is the demonstrative encouragement by the authorities of those who commit this terror. On 18 April 2022, Vladimir Putin's decree on the awarding of the 64th Separate Motorised Rifle Brigade of the Russian Ground Forces with the honorary title of “Guards” was published on the Kremlin's website. The document states that the title was awarded “for mass heroism and bravery, fortitude and courage demonstrated by the brigade personnel in combat operations to defend the Fatherland and state interests in armed conflicts.”¹⁸⁹ According to the Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, it was the 64th Brigade that was involved in the mass murder and torture of civilians in the city of Bucha.¹⁹⁰ The commander of the 64th Brigade, Colonel Azatbek Omurbekov, was awarded the Order “For Courage and Heroism” by Putin and took part in the military parade on the occasion of Victory Day in Khabarovsk on 9 May 2023.¹⁹¹

Russian and Belarusian propagandists have repeatedly expressed their approval and even admiration for violence, murders and other cruel actions against the peaceful population of Ukraine, thereby glorifying terror. Here are a few examples.

Stanislav Yaskevich, Belarusian pro-government and pro-Russian blogger:

“Today, envoys of denazification are flying over the entire territory of the former Ukraine. As a result of precise hits on infrastructure facilities that should not be working under the terrorist regime of Kyiv [...] all of Moldova was left without electricity.”¹⁹² (05.12.2022)

Sergei Mardan, journalist for Komsomolskaya Pravda radio:

“By turning off the lights in Ukraine, Russia is forming a conditioned reflex in the khokhols: ‘The lights went out, which means I did something wrong. What should I do to turn the lights back on?’ But all they need to do is stop singing Bandera songs, tearing down Pushkin monuments and learn history. [...] The main thing to understand is that the lights go out not because of the Kalibrs, but because of the chaos in their heads and their actions.”¹⁹³ (06.12.2022)

Evgeniy Rasskazov (Topaz), a militant of the far-right group Rusich, which is fighting in Ukraine, from the YouTube channel CZAR.CHAT:

“When a man goes to war, it’s a sexual desire. It’s like wanting to f.ck. It’s like wanting a woman. When you kill a piglet – everyone understands who I’m calling a piglet [a Ukrainian] – you savour the fact that his wife is left a widow. You savour how they cry as a family, how he will come home in a coffin. And you get an erection! Well, you get one, right?”¹⁹⁴ (15.08.2022)

PART 4. INCITEMENT TO GENOCIDE OF UKRAINIANS

Calls for the eradication of Ukrainians

As with other genocides in history, “pure” examples of direct public calls for the extermination of Ukrainians as a protected group under the Convention are rare. However, calls for the murder and extermination of all or part of the Ukrainian people stand out from the general flow of hatred.

The first surge of genocidal statements occurred during the seizure of Crimea and the beginning of the open armed conflict in the eastern Donbas.

Alexander Dugin, philosopher and chief ideologist of the “Russian world,” speaking about the clashes in Odessa on 2 May 2014:

“What we see on May 2nd is already outside of all bounds. And I think – kill, kill, kill. There should be no more talk. As a professor, this is what I think.”¹⁹⁵ (07.05.2014)

Alexander Zhuchkovsky, activist in the Russian Imperial Movement and “war correspondent”:

“Ukraine, the Ukrainian people, and the Ukrainian language were specially, consciously and purposefully created by Russia’s geopolitical opponents to split the Russian people and weaken and dismember Russia. In order to unite the Russian people and reassemble and strengthen Russia, Ukraine and the Ukrainians must be destroyed.”¹⁹⁶ (12.11.2016)

A new increase in genocidal statements was recorded in preparation for the full-scale invasion of Ukraine; that is, starting in the fall of 2021. If at the beginning of the aggression, Russian and Belarusian propagandists were still repeating the mantra about the “brotherly people” and “liberation from fascism,” then after reports of mass killings in Bucha, Irpin, Izyum and other cities, the masks of the “liberators” were finally discarded and propaganda outlets began to openly call for civilian casualties.

Olga Skabeeva, television presenter, the talk show “60 Minutes,” channel Russia-1:

“Beat, Khoklov, save Russia!” [recited on a national station, Skabeeva laughingly voiced and repeated several times a pun using the surname of a Russian football player (Khoklov) and a pejorative nickname for Ukrainians, which sounds like a call to kill Ukrainians]¹⁹⁷ (03.09.2021)

Alexei Zhuravlev, deputy of the Russian State Duma:

“Two million [irredeemable] Ukrainians must be denazified, that is, destroyed.”¹⁹⁸ (01.06.2022)

Sergei Mardan, columnist for Komsomolskaya Pravda radio:

“I don’t care what they [drones] are called, the beautiful Arabic word ‘shahid’ or the beautiful Russian word ‘geranium.’ As long as it flies and falls on the heads of the khokhols.”¹⁹⁹ (07.08.2022)

Vladlen Tatarsky, “war correspondent” (at the ceremony of incorporating the occupied regions into the Russian Federation in the Kremlin with Putin’s participation):

“We will defeat everyone, kill everyone, rob everyone we need. Everything will be as we like! Let’s do it, with God!”²⁰⁰ (30.09.2022)

“I feel that people do not understand that enemies must be killed, that everything that they have taken from us must be taken back. That is, this must be done decisively and irrevocably, without looking back at any kind of [...] useless international law or anything else.”²⁰¹ (24.10.2022)

Anton Krasovsky, at that time director of Russian-language broadcasting for the RT television channel (formerly Russia Today):

(Reacting to the shelling of Belgorod):

“Guys, it’s obvious that you need to pull yourselves together. Pull yourselves together. Stop thinking about ‘brothers.’ They are not our brothers. I grew up there, I speak from experience. Kill them! Come on! Enough!”²⁰² (14.04.2022)

(Speaking about Ukrainian children who claim that Ukraine is occupied by Russia):

“And such people need to be drowned. These children need to be drowned. Once a person has said that the Muscovites have occupied, you immediately throw him into a river with a raging current... Or batter him into a pine-log house [typical traditional home in Transcarpathia] and burn him down.”²⁰³ (24.10.2022)

With Akim Apachev, a musician-collaborator:

Krasovsky: “You said 10 percent [of Ukrainians] need to be killed.

Apachev: “We need to kill all the bearers of the Ukrainian idea. [...] There is no such population there now. I think not so many, another 50,000 need to be killed, and that’s it.”²⁰⁴ (12.05.2023)

On 13 February 2023, former RT media manager Anton Krasovsky was sentenced *in absentia* by a Kyiv court to five years in prison for public incitement to genocide of Ukrainians and dissemination of such calls (part 2 of Article 442 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine), as well as for public calls for the overthrow of the constitutional order and dissemination of such calls in the media (part 3 of Article 109 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine). The basis for the court's verdict on incitement to genocide was the propagandist's statement in 2022 in comments on his personal Telegram channel calling for the killing of "brothers" (Ukrainians).²⁰⁵ On 13 August 2024, Krasovsky was sentenced *in absentia* for the second time in Ukraine for public incitement to genocide, this time for a call to drown and burn Ukrainian children made in October 2022. Based on the combination of the two sentences, the court imposed the final punishment for the crime committed in the form of imprisonment for a term of five years with confiscation of property.²⁰⁶

Yuri Terekh, columnist for the Belarusian newspaper "SB. Belarus Today":

"Until the Ukrainian issue is finally solved, terrorist attacks will continue... The fewer tools Ukraine has to influence the situation inside the country, the more often they will resort to terrorism... Does anyone there need my condolences? No, they definitely don't. Therefore, I will only voice my wish... Just kill everyone involved."²⁰⁷ (21.08.2022)

Igor Mangushev, mercenary, public figure:

"Our war is a war with an idea. With the idea of Ukraine as an anti-Russian state. We are fighting with an idea, so all bearers of this idea must be destroyed... Ukraine must be de-Ukrainized." [During this speech in a Moscow club, Mangushev held in his hands the skull of what he said was a Ukrainian soldier killed in Mariupol.]²⁰⁸ (30.08.2022)

Pavel Gubarev, Russian mercenary, former "people's governor" of Donetsk:

"Ukrainians are Russian people possessed by a demon... We are not going to kill them, we want to change their minds. But if you do not want us to convince you, we will kill you. As many as it takes. We will kill a million, five million, even everyone, until you understand that you are possessed and need treatment."²⁰⁹ (11.10.2022)

Kirill Benediktov, "publicist":

"This monster [Ukraine] can only be defeated in the same way that Hitler was once defeated. That is, by destroying the army, without much pity for the civilian population."²¹⁰ (04.04.2023)

Margarita Simonyan, RT editor-in-chief:

“This Banderism is not seven or eight years old... This is, in fact, has been around since the time of Bandera. I remember my mother telling me that it is scary to speak Russian in Poland, but scarier in Western Ukraine. 1992. A year after the Soviet Union collapsed. Under Stalin, they [Ukrainians] were imprisoned by the thousands, in bunches. Under Khrushchev, all those same thousands and bunches were released, right? Who did they turn out to be? They turned out to be the those that had not been finished off. So, this is not seven or eight years. This is the result of the fact that these remnants had children, they had grandchildren, and at one time they were left as remnants, so this time they will have to be finished off.”²¹¹ (23.12.2023)

In April 2024, the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) reported that it had notified Margarita Simonyan of “suspicion” of inciting to genocide for the above statement, as well as for propaganda of war.²¹² A year earlier, the SBU had charged Simonyan with infringing on Ukraine’s territorial integrity in other statements.²¹³

Andrey Perla, columnist for the Tsargrad television channel:

It must be said out loud that the best method of denazification is to exterminate the Nazis. The Bandera population has the right to live only in Canada.”²¹⁴ (05.01.2024)

Alexander Kots, military correspondent for the Komsomolskaya Pravda newspaper:

“When civilians in Russian cities die, it’s terrorism. And when a tragedy happens on the other side of the front [i.e., in Ukraine], no matter how heartless it sounds, it’s a consequence of the fight against terrorism. And the faster we crush it, the faster the tragedies will end for us and for them.”²¹⁵ (23.01.2024)

Dmitry Puchkov, publicist:

“I feel the same way about Ukrainians as they do about me. I think that all this Nazi scum should be shot without any pity, and that it is useless to educate them. And the fact that they are buried on an industrial scale is good for them and for us too.”²¹⁶ (03.04.2024)

Dmitry Vinnik, propagandist, in the newspaper Zavtra:

“In any case, the fate of Ukraine and its singing people is truly terrible. Many hundreds of thousands have already died, but it is already clear that this is only the beginning of even more monstrous events. This recently beautiful country, now an absurd, unfinished state, will drown in its own blood, and only a miracle can stop this tragedy. That is why

we must bomb Kyiv and finish off the state administration.”²¹⁷
(26.06.2024)

Dmitry Medvedev, Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council, former President of Russia (2008-2012):

“There can be no mercy here. There is no room for kindness here. Just kill!... No need to pity them, no need! No one! Did they pardon anyone? Only total executions. No choice. No words about mercy. No humanity. No pardon. They have no right to life. Execute, execute and execute. This is the right of war for the enemy!”²¹⁸ (16.07.2024)

Incitement to the infliction of unbearable conditions of life

According to Article II(c) of the Convention, the deliberate infliction on a group of conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part constitutes the crime of genocide. Therefore, incitement to the bombing of civilian objects and the destruction of civilian infrastructure with the aim of causing suffering and intolerable living conditions to the civilian population are also punishable criminal acts and constitute incitement to genocide.

Since the very beginning of the aggression, Russia has been mercilessly shelling residential buildings in Ukrainian cities and villages with missiles, bombs and artillery. As a result of deliberate missile strikes on power plants, power lines, dams, gas stations, boiler houses and other vital facilities, dozens of cities and villages in Ukraine have been left without light, heat, gas and water. Residents of battered cities without electricity are experiencing severe hardship, suffering from cold and hunger.

One of the most outrageous examples is the destruction of the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant dam on 6 June 2023. As a result, dozens of settlements and villages downstream along the Dnipro River were flooded, and the reservoir that had been used for irrigating agricultural lands was drained. This caused numerous casualties, famine, and, overall, a humanitarian catastrophe in the region. In addition, in the following days, the Russian army carried out artillery shelling of the flooded settlements, including the city of Kherson. According to BBC journalists who came under fire, the strikes targeted evacuation gathering points, most of which were occupied by women, children, and the elderly, as well as numerous animals.²¹⁹ According to experts, those responsible for this multifaceted catastrophe may face prosecution under various international criminal law provisions, including the war crime of excessive damage to the environment, attacking civilian objects, destroying the enemy's property, intentionally using starvation of civilians as a method of warfare, or even a crime against humanity of forcible displacement.²²⁰

In general, pro-Kremlin propaganda gloated and demanded even more attacks on the civilian population, while placing responsibility for their crimes on Ukrainians themselves.

Ilya Yansen, media expert, mercenary:

“We need terror the likes of which the world has never seen... And Ukraine should at this moment be ablaze and howling with the wail of hundreds and thousands of widows behind them. Everything that is not yet burning must burn. Everything that is still whole must be destroyed.”²²¹ (02.04.2023)

Andrey Gurulev, Russian State Duma member:

“We need to figure out how to cut off Ukraine's heating, electricity, and water supply. We can do it and we need to say so. If you want to use Western weapons, then be prepared for collapse.”²²² (04.07.2022)

“The absence of electricity means the absence of water, refrigerators, sewage, and after a week in the absence of electricity, the city of Kyiv will be covered in shit, with a clear threat of an epidemic. [...] That is, we immediately predict a flow of refugees towards the western border, right? This is also the collapse of the country, and all this is quite effective. Therefore, I assume that this should be continued, as it will have a very good effect.”²²³ (20.10.2022)

“If we take a target, for example, one city, region or something else. It needs to be cleaned out so that there is simply nothing left there. If we say that it is Kyiv... Kyiv is the mother of Russian cities. Yes, it is the mother of Russian cities, but if it is necessary that Kyiv be reduced to ruins and our flag stand on top of these ruins, I think we need to come to this.”²²⁴ (23.02.2023)

Margarita Simonyan and Vladimir Soloviev, on the program "Sunday Evening with Vladimir Soloviev", television channel Russia-1:

Simonyan: “And in Ukraine, the one that remains, unliberated, is there no civilian infrastructure? Are there no power lines, nuclear power plants, nodes, a lot of different infrastructure that could disable the functioning of this hostile state. Very quickly, easily and for a long time [...]. [...] Why aren't we doing this?”

Soloviev: “I've been calling for this for a long time. In my opinion, it's time to get tough, it's just time to get tough.”²²⁵ (11.09.2022)

Alexander Shpakovsky, Belarusian pro-government and pro-Kremlin “expert”:

“Ukraine’s critical infrastructure should have been destroyed on the first day of the special operation. Striking at substations, railway communications, and bridges. [...] Now, the main thing is to continue.”²²⁶ (12.09.2022)

Olga Bondareva, Belarusian pro-government and pro-Russian activist:

“I perceive this like with the Great Patriotic War. In order to save our lands, we have been forced to bomb our city, occupied by the Nazis. [...] Kyiv must be bombed. There is no need to dehumanise them, even if we are not soldiers. But we are not khokhols.”²²⁷ (10.10.2022)

Vladlen Tatarsky, Z-blogger:

“Even in defence, we need to destroy infrastructure – if hospitals don’t work, more khokhols will die on operating tables.”²²⁸ (13.09.2022)

Boris Chernyshov, Deputy Chairman of the Russian State Duma:

“They [residents of Ukraine] will sit without gas, without electricity, without anything, because if the Kyiv regime has chosen the path of war criminals, they should freeze and rot there. When infrastructure facilities are hit every day, when the civilian population [...] has unbearable living conditions in the winter, of course, ambulances aren’t moving and old people and children die.”²²⁹ (18.11.2022)

Andrey Perla, columnist for the Tsargrad television channel:

“Ours are hitting infrastructure facilities while they are aiming at people. And they cry when they sit without electricity. I think it’s time for us to be more ruthless. You can’t be kinder to your enemy if your enemy is inhuman.”²³⁰ (13.12.2022)

Sergei Mardan, columnist for Komsomolskaya Pravda radio:

“The fact that the residents of Ukrainian cities feel normal is not due to their air defence, but to our shortcomings. [...] The principle of ‘Ukraine must suffer’ remains unchanged. [...] The people must endure all the horrors of being deprived of light, heat, cakes and the internet. Therefore, missile strikes will continue until Ukrainian heads are fully enlightened and realise that peace is coming from the East, and that from the West there are only Leopards and Himarses.”²³¹ (15.01.2023)

Olga Skabeeva, television presenter for the channel Russia-1:

“We are, of course, not the aggressors, but we are pleased to watch how, for the third night in a row, we have been striking, as we were told, retaliatory strikes at Odessa.”²³² (23.07.2023)

Alexander Sytin, Centre for Political Research of Northern and Eastern European Countries, “Meeting Place,” channel NTV:

“Kharkov needs to be bombed. The will of this people needs to be broken over the knee, if we’ve already taken this on.”²³³ (04.04.2024)

Yulia Vityazyeva, host of the YouTube channel Soloviev Live:

“If only ruins remain from the Kharkiv and Sumy regions, it is not our fault.”²³⁴ (09.06.2024)

Vladimir Soloviev, television presenter for the channel Russia-1:

“Erase them from the face of the earth! Give them three days to leave the cities. Or overthrow your government! If the residents of Ivano-Frankivsk and Sumy Oblast want to die for the illegitimate Nazi, the absolutely spent Zelensky [...]”²³⁵ (29.06.2024)

Incitement to the forced transfer and assimilation of Ukrainian children

According to Article II(e) of the Genocide Convention and Art. 6(e) of the Rome Statute, the forced transfer of children from one human group to another is a crime of genocide. Therefore, justification of the involuntary transfer of Ukrainian children from the occupied territories to Russia and Belarus and their adoption/adaptation in Russian families and incitement to this are criminally punishable acts. Under international law, these statements must contain intent to destroy the group in whole or in part.

In this study, we focus on propaganda statements and incitement to genocide, so there is no opportunity or need to describe the topic of the involuntary displacement of Ukrainian children in more detail. Quite a bit has been written about this crime. Let us only note that on 27 April 2023, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe recognised that the fact of deportation to the territory of Russia, forced displacement, “re-education” and “Russification” of Ukrainian children contains signs of a violation of Article II of the Genocide Convention.²³⁶ In turn, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, in its resolution in July 2024, recognised the actions of Russia against Ukraine and its people meets several and, possibly, all definitions of genocide contained in Article II of the Genocide Convention,²³⁷ specifically emphasising the forced displacement of Ukrainian children among them.²³⁸ Parliamentary bodies in some countries have also recognised Russian actions in Ukraine as genocide. Although these are resolutions of political bodies and not court

decisions, they are important for drawing attention to the possible commission of the crime of genocide and provide additional arguments.

In March 2023, the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian Commissioner for Children's Rights Maria Lvova-Belova on charges of illegally deporting children from the occupied territories of Ukraine to Russia during Russia's invasion of Ukraine, qualifying these actions as war crimes, not genocide.

Furthermore, it is not the transfer of children per se that constitutes genocide, but the transfer made as part of the realisation of the intent to destroy a group in whole or in part. In the absence of convincing evidence of the general context of genocidal actions, the separate qualification of deportations as genocide does not look obvious and promising, especially when requiring extremely high evidentiary standards. The ICC Prosecutor is probably proceeding with the utmost minimisation of procedural risks, as is evident in his analysis of other situations, whether accepted or rejected.

In addition, the ICC Elements of Crimes contain an additional contextual element with respect to the crime of genocide, which must also be established: "The conduct took place in the context of a manifest pattern of similar conduct directed against that group or was conduct that could itself effect such destruction."²³⁹

As for the possible argument that "noble" motivation alone cannot absolutely exclude the qualification of such actions as criminal or even genocidal (the motives may be different), it generally reduces the chances of establishing genocidal intent.

Nevertheless, incitement to the deportation of Ukrainian children may well be considered as incitement to the realisation of genocide, if it is proved that they were committed within the framework of genocidal intent, i.e. the realisation of the criminal intent of complete or partial destruction of a group. The forms of genocide can be different – in order to destroy a group, it is not necessary to destroy it physically; it is possible to achieve its disappearance through assimilation, when its members stop perceiving themselves and calling themselves representatives of a protected group (in this case, Ukrainians) and begin to consider themselves part of another group.

Following are some examples from propaganda sources of justification and incitement to the implementation of the criminal practice of forcibly moving Ukrainian children to the Russian or the Belarusian territory and "Russifying" them.

Alexander Shpakovsky, Belarusian pro-government and pro-Russian "expert":

"Recently, the President [Alexander Lukashenka] signed a decree on the rehabilitation of children from Syria and Uzbekistan in Belarus. I am convinced that this norm should be extended to children from the war-

affected areas of Donbass. And it does not matter at all that these children are under the jurisdiction of unrecognised republics. First, mercy has no boundaries, and second, we should pay less attention to the puppet government of Ukraine.”²⁴⁰ (17.08.2021)

Anton Krasovsky, at that time director of Russian-language broadcasting for the television channel RT:

“This is liberated Volnovakha [a city in Ukraine under temporary Russian occupation]. Russian children are going back to school, they will finish this school year. [...] They will not have to be ashamed of being Russian. No one will be able to brainwash them and fill them with self-hatred anymore. These are our children.”²⁴¹ (11.04.2022)

“Here a discussion has unfolded about whether the tear of a Russian child is worth the tear of a Ukrainian child. And everyone is afraid to admit that our child is more precious to us. Because he is ours. When we get these lands back, and [Ukrainian] children become Russian, then we will protect them.”²⁴² (18.07.2022)

Zakhar Prilepin, propagandist:

“The children of Donbass. They are the ones who are being fought over. [...] Our intelligentsia will say, so what, is this a reason, is this why they started all this? Only this would be enough. Just this.”²⁴³ (11.05.2022)

“Putin signed a decree on the simplified granting of Russian citizenship to orphans from the DPR, LPR and Ukraine. This. Is. A. Very. Necessary. Decree.”²⁴⁴ (30.05.2022)

“Stremousov²⁴⁵ said that all children in the region born after 24 February will automatically become citizens of Russia. Wonderful. More Russian children! More Russian, Little Russian, Tatar, Greek and all other children in Russia.”²⁴⁶ (16.06.2022)

Maria Lvova-Belova, Russia's Commissioner for Children's Rights:

“We also discussed the living conditions of children evacuated from the DPR, LPR and Ukraine. [...] I have called on my colleagues to be bolder and more persistent when it comes to protecting the rights of our young citizens.”²⁴⁷ (26.07.2022)

Andrey Kartapolov, Chairman of the State Duma Defence Committee:

"We need now, if we want these territories to be with us, to have a future as a part of Russia, to deal, first of all, with the children. [...] Probably, in our cadet schools – Suvorov, Nakhimov – we could conduct additional recruitment and take these kids there. [...] We must do this, because then people will believe that Russia is serious – that it is for a long time and forever."²⁴⁸ (01.08.2022)

Anna Dolgareva, Z-poetess (interview with RIA FAN agency):

Host: "Is denazification possible? Is there any way to change the consciousness of these people [Ukrainians]?"

Dolgareva: "Igor Mangushev, my friend and captain of the LNR [...] always said that denazification is only possible physically and we just need to destroy those who fight us and raise their children in the Russian spirit."²⁴⁹ (15.02.2023)

Margarita Simonyan, RT editor-in-chief:

"How cool. Maternity benefits in the new [Russian-occupied] regions now applies to children born since 2007. Because they have always been ours."²⁵⁰ (21.02.2023)

Konstantin Malofeev, founder of the Tsargrad television channel:

"We are all obligated to provide unlimited opportunities for teenagers from lands that have returned to their native harbour. We will help not only Donbass, but also all the cities liberated from the fascist scum. Children who spoke Russian at home and dreamed of reunification with Russia will return home after their studies and will become a real Russian elite."²⁵¹ (09.03.2022)

"Children's homes in Ukraine have not been renovated since Soviet times. The children need the bare necessities. There is a shortage of personnel. At the same time, compassionate [*Russian*] families are ready to adopt orphans. [...] The demons are furious about this: people should hate, not love. This is not why the West unleashed this war. They wanted us to hate each other. But instead, kind Russian mothers and fathers adopt Ukrainian children and love them as their own. That's why they are furious."²⁵² (18.03.2023)

Leonid Slutsky, deputy in Russia's State Duma:

"The Children's Ombudsman and the Russian authorities managed to save a huge number of [Ukrainian] children, many of whom lost their

homes, parents or were wounded during shelling by Ukrainian neo-Nazis. And now they have a future in their own country, in Russia."²⁵³ (17.03.2023)

Valery Chumakov, journalist, executive secretary of the Russian-Belarusian journal Union State:

"In total, Russia evacuated more than six thousand orphans from the combat zone. This was humane, they saved them. But in ICC terminology this was being 'illegally deported.'"²⁵⁴ (22.03.2023)

Sergei Mardan, columnist for Komsomolskaya Pravda radio:

"These children who have been brainwashed from the moment of birth, making them 'Ukrainians,' need to be skilfully and systematically re-educated. Children need to be raised as normal Russian people and Russian citizens, and not fed with a longing for a 'lost Ukrainian paradise' at public expense. [...] Any family in Russia that will demand now Ukrainian language lessons for their children is a cell of the 'Ukrainian ISIS.'"²⁵⁵ (30.03.2023)

Maryana Naumova, military correspondent for Channel One:

"Okay, these [Ukrainian civilians killed during the war] have families. There are hundreds of thousands, millions of children who died at the hands of our army. And if these children remain under the control of the current Ukrainian regime, if NATO and all sorts of Western advisers operate there, then in a few years new people who are genetically predisposed to violence will be raised. Therefore, what has been started must be completed and we must work with [Ukrainian] children for many years by offering them some perks and opportunities for development in the Russian world – reprogram them, so to speak."²⁵⁶ (15.10.2023)

CONCLUSIONS

The citations gathered in this study and their analysis demonstrate a clear intention of the Russian and Belarussian propaganda to incite and induce the members of the Russian armed forces to commit mass and grave crimes against civilian population of Ukraine aimed at its partial or complete elimination. The latter constitutes a crime of genocide. As shown above, according to the Genocide Convention and the Rome Statute, public and direct incitement to commit such crimes is itself a separate international crime of incitement to genocide, regardless of whether genocide was actually committed.

In preparation for the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russian and synchronised with it Belarussian propaganda continually insisted that there is no Ukraine and that Ukrainians are “Russians who were convinced that they are special Russians.”

Within the framework of these imperial ideas, any attempts by Ukrainians to defend their agency and the independence of their actions along with their national identity and their right to self-determination are described by Russian and Belarussian politicians and propagandists as posing a threat to Russia. The essence of this paradigm is that if Ukraine is “controlled” by the West, this poses an existential threat to Russia, Belarus and their “union state.” These conspiracy theories became the ideological justification for Russia’s full-scale Russian aggression against Ukraine with the complicity of the Lukashenka regime.

In fact, the Kremlin’s stated key goal of attacking Ukraine – “denazification” – is a casuistic term that essentially camouflages the real aspirations of the Russian leadership, namely “de-Ukrainization,” the destruction of Ukrainian national identity and statehood, and the establishment of the Russian control over the country and the people living there. The other declared goals, such as the demilitarisation of Ukraine and its refusal to join NATO, are a disguise of this primary imperial plan.

The top officials of the Russian state have set the tone of the anti-Ukrainian propaganda campaign from the very beginning. Programmatic articles and speeches broadcast on television and the internet by the leaders of the Russian state, starting with the country’s president, have repeatedly affirmed and promoted the above-described views over the course of several years. They continue to actively do so now, when more than three years have passed since the beginning of the full-scale invasion.

This indicates the presence of a clearly defined state policy directed against the existence of Ukraine as an independent state while denying the existence of Ukrainians as an independent ethnic group (a national group as defined by international law). These statements, which are clearly unacceptable from the point of view of universal values and principles of international relations, are not criminal in themselves or punishable under international law, including the Genocide

Convention. However, we see the evolution of propaganda from the denial of Ukrainian statehood and of the existence of Ukrainian people to the incitement of hatred towards Ukrainians, from which incitement to genocide inevitably grows.

The anti-Ukrainian state policy formulated at the highest level accompanied by systematic statements by state leaders created fertile ground for the emergence of more radical and aggressive statements in Russia and Belarus. Before the invasion and during the large-scale aggression, a massive propaganda machine incited hostility towards Ukrainians among millions of Russians, Belarusians and other multi-million audiences, broadcasting hate speech on television and the internet on a daily basis. Propagandists compared an entire national group (Ukrainians) to “Nazis,” “Satanists,” “worms,” “non-humans,” and attempted to denigrate, dehumanise and discredit them.

Such hate speech is repulsive, but it is also not an international crime, though it can be punishable under national legislation if it contains direct incitement to discrimination, violence and aggressive war. However, a group of Ukrainian and international human rights organisations has recently attempted to prove that, taken together, the scale and systematic nature of hate speech directed at the civilian population of Ukraine in the statements of Russian officials and propagandists and the existence of a state policy of the Russian Federation in this area make it possible to qualify hate speech against Ukrainians as a crime against humanity of persecution and to bring to international criminal responsibility the most influential authors of such statements and those who gave them the state’s instructions and provided resources.

With the emergence of the first shocking evidence of mass extrajudicial executions, torture and war crimes against the civilian population, of torturous detention conditions of Ukrainian civilians and prisoners of war held in Russian custody, propagandists have ceased to hide behind words about “denazification” and “liberation of Ukraine captured by the Nazis” and have switched to open genocidal language, demanding more civilian casualties, destruction of peaceful Ukrainian cities and the murder of those who do not recognise themselves as part of the “Russian world.”

The evolution of propaganda and creation of the general background of hatred towards Ukrainians gives rise to a further escalation of public rhetoric, where individual hate speech is difficult to distinguish from incitement to genocide. Of course, this inevitably provokes committing of war crimes, including those with genocidal intent, and ultimately may create conditions for committing acts of genocide. Given the key role of propaganda in the functioning of the Russian regime and the colossal scale of its propaganda machine, it seems clear that many statements inciting to genocide may have had a direct impact on audiences and may indeed have led to the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity as well as the possible crime of genocide.

We see that among the entire array of anti-Ukrainian propaganda statements, quite clearly stand out calls inciting to the destruction of Ukrainians or a certain part of them, the “irredeemable”. That is, those who, according to Russian and Belarusian propaganda, do not want to renounce their Ukrainian identity and who have not “been cured of the Nazi bacillus.” The proportion of such “irredeemable” from the entire population of Ukraine who will need to be destroyed is indicated in the calls of propagandists in different ways, but in any case, such statements refer to millions of people.

The Genocide Convention and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court define genocide as “acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group”. In turn, direct and public incitement to commit genocide is a stand-alone crime under Article III(c) of the Convention and Article 25(3)(e) of the Statute.

The direct and public calls for the extermination of all or part of Ukrainians documented in this study contain obvious signs of violation of these norms and can be used as evidence of a crime in international courts. Under international law, these statements must contain an intent to destroy a group in whole or in part.

In order to be certain of the accuracy of legal evidence and not to engage in a broad interpretation of the legal norm, in this case it is worth talking about incitement to actions to *partially* destroy Ukrainians as a national group.

Along with direct calls for the extermination of all or part of Ukrainians, we have recorded numerous and systematic calls to create unbearable living conditions for the civilian population of Ukraine through missile attacks on energy and other civilian infrastructure and the destruction of peaceful cities. Calls for such strikes also constitute, in our view, incitement to genocide, provided that they are calculated to bring about physical destruction of the group in whole or in part, as defined in the Genocide Convention and the Rome Statute.

We have also documented examples of incitement to and approval, justification and defence of Russia’s and Belarus’ right to involuntary displacement (deportation), “re-education,” ideological indoctrination, and assimilation of Ukrainian children on the territory of these countries. According to the Genocide Convention and the Statute, “forcibly transferring children of the group to another group” is an act of genocide. Accordingly, incitement to the involuntary displacement of children can be considered incitement to genocide, again, provided that they contain intent to destroy the group in whole or in part.

Incitement to commit genocide, according to the Genocide Convention and the Rome Statute, is a stand-alone international crime, regardless of whether the act of genocide was committed. Whatever the ICC or the International Court of Justice decide on the issue of recognising the actions of the Russian Federation or

individuals during the invasion of Ukraine as the crime of genocide, the commission of the crime of inciting to genocide will have to be proven separately.

The potential for ensuring accountability of those responsible for incitement to genocide derives from its two types: the international legal responsibility of States for violations of the Convention and the criminal responsibility of individuals for violations of the Rome Statute.

The International Court of Justice is authorised to consider the issue of legal responsibility of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus for violations of the Genocide Convention, including in the form of incitement to genocide, in the event of a lawsuit brought by other countries. Violations on the part of the state may include direct calls for genocide as such, if they were made by high level officials or by employees of state media at the direction or under the control of state authorities. In addition, violations of the state's obligations to prevent and punish calls for genocide may be established. Given the absolute inaction of the Russian and Belarusian states in preventing this rhetoric and the complete impunity for such statements, this direction of prosecution looks the most promising.

At present, it is clear that states are generally cautious about filing interstate lawsuits for incitement to genocide, not willing to carry reputational risks due to the unclear prospects of such cases in the International Court of Justice, especially in the absence of recognition of the commission of genocide as such in a particular situation by international courts. Nevertheless, it is important and necessary to overcome this cautious position and call on states to file lawsuits against Russia and Belarus in the International Court of Justice for violation of the Genocide Convention. This would be an adequate response of the international community to the actions of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus. Russia has not only created an opportunity for incitement to genocide of Ukrainians to emerge, but has actually made it part of its state information policy.

Several mechanisms exist at both the international and national levels to establish the second type of liability for incitement to genocide, namely the criminal liability of individuals who are authors and transmitters of genocidal statements. At the international level, such mechanisms are international courts, including the International Criminal Court.

The ICC is already investigating the situation in Ukraine, based on the referral by 43 States parties to the ICC Prosecutor after the beginning of the large-scale Russian invasion as well as the recognition by Ukraine of the ICC jurisdiction over crimes falling under the jurisdiction of the Court and committed on its territory since 21 November 2013. The scope of the investigation encompasses allegations of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. This means that the ICC could potentially bring charges of incitement to genocide. The ICC has not brought such charges against anyone so far while charges for war crimes have been brought

against six Russian officials and generals, four of whom are also accused of committing crimes against humanity.

There is a discussion about the possible usefulness of an additional referral of the situation in Ukraine to the ICC Prosecutor by States parties to the Rome Statute with a request to focus specifically on incitement to genocide due to the receipt of new information as a step that could prompt the investigation of incitement to genocide within the current ICC investigation.

An additional argument in favour of the Court's intensification of the investigation into the incitement to genocide of Ukrainians may be the fact that the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, established by the UN Human Rights Council after the beginning of the full-scale invasion, drew attention to the genocidal rhetoric of Russian propaganda in its report in March 2024 and indicated the possibility of qualifying it under the Rome Statute.²⁵⁷ It is also important to note that the July 2024 OSCE Parliamentary Assembly resolution indicates that public statements by Russian officials are part of a substantial and growing body of evidence indicating genocidal intentions on the part of Russia, along with documented war crimes and possible crimes against humanity.²⁵⁸

Non-governmental organisations may also submit communications to the ICC Prosecutor, requesting the Court to initiate an investigation into a situation in a state. Although, unlike with referrals by states, the Prosecutor is not obliged to respond to NGO communications, they may play an important role, drawing public attention to the problem of incitement to genocide of Ukrainians, providing evidence of crimes committed, highlighting the situation of impunity and the need for a response from the ICC.

Another way of bringing a person to individual criminal responsibility for incitement to genocide is for such cases to be considered not by international courts, but at the national level in various states, including those on the territory of which or regarding whose population this crime was allegedly committed. First of all, this applies to Ukraine itself. Ukraine has already tried *in absentia* a Russian propagandist on such charges and found him guilty, and charged another one. So far, it concerns three statements inciting to genocide. Given their significant volume in Russian and Belarusian propaganda, the right step seems to be the activation of this work by the Ukrainian justice authorities.

Many states have the possibility to prosecute for crimes against international law committed on the territory of other states, including for incitement to genocide, applying the principle of universal jurisdiction. In the case under consideration, this would be possible if their legislation explicitly states that they can prosecute for genocide (including incitement to genocide).

The exercise of the universal jurisdiction principle is often subject to institutional, resource, political and legal constraints, the key of which, in some states, is the need for the defendant to be present on the territory of the state. However, many of these obstacles can be overcome with political will and the acknowledgment of the fact that the commission of international crimes during the large-scale Russian aggression against Ukraine poses a threat to universal peace, security and well-being, and therefore it is in the national interests of these states to bring the perpetrators to justice.

We hope that the documentation collected in this report will form part of the evidence base of international and domestic courts and help to hold Russian and Belarusian officials and propagandists accountable for their crimes of incitement to genocide of Ukrainians as well as bring to justice the states of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus for their violation of the Genocide Convention as part of a broader process of investigating alleged international crimes committed during aggression against Ukraine by the Putin regime with the complicity of the Lukashenka regime.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the results of documenting, analysing and classifying the statements in Russian and Belarusian propaganda that contain incitement to genocide of Ukrainians as a national group, which we have identified in the course of our research, we offer the following recommendations for actions that can be taken by various actors to bring the perpetrators of such statements to justice and prevent the repetition of these crimes.

1. To the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court: to include the investigation of the alleged crimes of incitement to genocide under the Rome Statute as part of the Court's ongoing investigation of the situation in Ukraine with a view to establishing whether such crimes have been committed, prosecuting those responsible and issuing arrest warrants.
2. To the States parties to the Rome Statute: to submit additional referrals of the situation in Ukraine to the Prosecutor of the ICC pursuant to Article 14 of the Rome Statute, requesting the Prosecutor to include investigation into alleged incitement to genocide of Ukrainians into the ongoing investigation of crimes perpetrated in Ukraine, taking into account new information.
3. To civil society organisations and academic institutions: to continue monitoring, documenting and analysing the statements of Russian and Belarusian propagandists and officials in order to identify incitement to genocide of Ukrainians; if there is convincing evidence, submit communications to the Prosecutor of the ICC pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute with a request to include investigation into alleged incitement to genocide of Ukrainians into the ongoing investigation of crimes perpetrated in Ukraine, taking into account new information.
4. To the States parties to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide: to initiate interstate disputes with the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus on their violation of the Convention, including for incitement to genocide as a result of statements made by their agents, including high level officials and representatives of state media, and for inaction by these states to prevent and punish such statements committed by their agents and private individuals. In case of unsatisfactory resolution of the dispute, file interstate lawsuits against the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus to the International Court of Justice.
5. To the law enforcement agencies of Ukraine: to intensify official investigations and initiate new criminal cases against Russian and Belarusian propagandists and officials inciting to genocide of Ukrainians, bring charges against them, issue arrest warrants, and bring cases to court for prosecution.

6. To the States whose legislation provides for the application of the universal jurisdiction principle to bring to justice those responsible for international crimes committed in other countries: to initiate official investigations against Russian and Belarusian propagandists and officials who incited to genocide of Ukrainians, bring charges against them, issue arrest warrants, and bring cases to court for prosecution.
7. To democratic forces and independent civil society organisations of Russia and Belarus: to include the fight against incitement to genocide in transitional justice programs in the framework of future democratic transit, including official investigations, prosecution of perpetrators, lustration, educational and awareness-raising programs in the framework of overcoming the crimes of the past, etc.
8. To all stakeholders, including the ICJ, the ICC, intergovernmental organisations and governments of concerned states: to cooperate with international and Ukrainian civil society organisations in ensuring accountability for incitement to genocide of Ukrainians, consult with them, use the materials, evidence, analysis and recommendations they provide, and respond to their appeals and publications.

ENDNOTES

- ¹ Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 260 A (III) of 9 December 1948. <https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/convention-prevention-and-punishment-crime-genocide>
- ² Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998. <https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/2024-05/Rome-Statute-eng.pdf>
- ³ See, for example.: Andrei Yeliseyeu. Pro-Kremlin Propaganda in Belarus: Classification of Narratives. iSANS, November 2020, <https://isans.org/propaganda/propaganda-analytics/pro-kremlin-propaganda-in-belarus-classification-of-narratives.html>, as well as other iSANS materials on this subject in sections “Analysis”, <https://isans.org/analysis> and “Publications”, <https://isans.org/publications>.
- ⁴ See: Andrey Kalikh. “From “fortress” rhetoric to the rhetoric of ‘war’. Changes in the main pro-Kremlin propaganda narratives in Belarus before and after the start of Russian aggression against Ukraine”. iSANS, November 2022. https://isans.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/from-fortress-2-rhetoric-to-the-rhetoric-of-war_changes-in-by-propaganda_isans-report_nov2022_eng-1.pdf
- ⁵ Andrey Kalikh. “Incitement to genocide against Ukrainians in Russian and Belarusian propaganda. Pilot report”. iSANS, 30 May 2023. <https://isans.org/human-rights/incitement-to-genocide-against-ukrainians-in-russian-and-belarusian-propaganda.html>
- ⁶ Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Op. cit.
- ⁷ Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Op. cit.
- ⁸ See, for example, Dr. Robert Rozett and Dr. Shmuel Spector, “*Encyclopaedia of the Holocaust*”, Jerusalem Publishing House Ltd, 2000.
- ⁹ “It is the Prosecutor's firm belief that the conflict in the territory of the former Yugoslavia was sparked and fuelled by greedy and power-hungry politicians who used propaganda and nationalistic sentiments to create an atmosphere of fear and terror, which was then used to motivate ordinary citizens to commit atrocious crimes against their neighbours.” UN GA Security Council. “*Seventh annual report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991*”. 7 August 2000. P. 31. https://www.icty.org/x/file/About/Reports%20and%20Publications/AnnualReports/annual_report_2000_en.pdf
- ¹⁰ The Prosecutor v. Callixte KALIMANZIRA judgement. Case No. ICTR-05-88-T. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, UN, 22 June 2009. <https://www.refworld.org/jurisprudence/caselaw/ictr/2009/en/78027>
- ¹¹ International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals. “*Direct and public incitement to commit genocide. Notion to the case Nahimana et al*”. (Media case) (ICTR-99-52), 28 November 2007. <https://cld.irmct.org/notions/show/265/direct-and-public-incitement-to-commit-genocide>
- ¹² Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 25(3)e. Op. cit.
- ¹³ Evgenia Albats. Rossiyskikh propagandistov možhno budet sudit' v mezhdunarodnykh sudakh. The New Times, 19 October 2023. <https://newtimes.ru/articles/detail/245895>
- ¹⁴ See, for example: Erika Kinetz, “‘You’ll die in this pit’: Takeaways from secret recordings of Russian soldiers in Ukraine”. Associated Press, 26 November 2023. <https://apnews.com/article/ukraine-war-russian-soldiers-intercepted-audio-takeaways-10ab4b2f14ed59436523e800dea2e57a; ‘Intercepted’>. Documentary film directed by Oksana Karpovych. <https://lightdox.com/intercepted/>; “‘We kill them all’: Russian soldiers in Ukraine call home”. Associated Press Ukraine, 23 February 2023.

<https://spectrumlocalnews.com/us/national/news/2023/02/23/-we-kill-them-all---russian-soldiers-in-ukraine-call-home>

¹⁵ Eliminationism – an approach to solving political issues by separating or physically eliminating political opponents or groups.

¹⁶ Identity of Ukrainian Citizens: Trends of Change. Razumkov Centre, May 2024.
<https://razumkov.org.ua/napriamky/sotsiologichni-doslidzhennia/identychnist-gromadian-ukrainy-tendentsii-zmin-cherven-2024r>

¹⁷ Timofey Sergeytsev. Chto Rossiya dolzhna sdelat s Ukrainoy. RIA Novosti, 03.04.2022.
<https://ria.ru/20220403/ukraina-1781469605.html>

¹⁸ “The following acts shall be punishable: [...] (c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide”. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Op. cit., Art. III.

¹⁹ “In accordance with this Statute, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if that person [...] (e) In respect of the crime of genocide, directly and publicly incites others to commit genocide.” Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Op. cit., Art. 25(3).

²⁰ Articles 2, 17 of the Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind. 1996.
https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft_articles/7_4_1996.pdf

²¹ Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion, International Court of Justice Reports, 1951. P. 23.
<https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/12/012-19510528-ADV-01-00-EN.pdf>

²² Decision on the “Prosecution’s Request for a Ruling on Jurisdiction under Article 19(3) of the Statute”. International Criminal Court, 6 September 2018. https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/CourtRecords/CR2018_04203.PDF

²³ Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine. 18 March 2024. Par. 98. <https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/g24/037/31/pdf/g2403731.pdf>

²⁴ “...substantial body of evidence of genocidal intent continuing to grow, such as public statements by Russian officials, documented war crimes, and acts that could constitute crimes against humanity, and the Russian forces’ blatant disregard for the distinction between civilians and combatants strongly indicating a deliberate path towards extermination.” Bucharest Declaration and Resolutions adopted by the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly at the Thirty-First Annual Session, Bucharest, 29 June – 3 July 2024. Par. 16, p. 27.
<https://www.oscepa.org/en/documents/annual-sessions/2024-bucharest/declaration-30/5029-bucharest-declaration-eng/file>

²⁵ ICTR Nzabonimana, TC, 31 May (2012), para. 1752.

²⁶ ICTR Nahimana et al., AC, 28 November 2007. Para. 692; ICTR Nahimana et al., AC, 28 November 2007. Para. 723; ICTR Nzabonimana, TC, 31 May 2012. Para. 1752.

²⁷ From: Julia Davis, “More genocidal rhetoric on Russian state TV...”, Twitter, 19.07.2022.
<https://twitter.com/JuliaDavisNews/status/1549381189336711169/>

²⁸ The Prosecutor v. Callixte KALIMANZIRA judgement. Case No. ICTR-05-88-T. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, UN, June 2009.
<https://www.refworld.org/jurisprudence/caselaw/ictr/2009/en/78027>

²⁹ Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), Judgment, International Court of Justice Reports 2015. P. 3, paras. 146–148.

³⁰ Summaries of Judgements, Advisory Opinions and Orders of the International Court of Justice. Pp. 172–190, para. 164. https://legal.un.org/icsjsummaries/documents/english/st_leg_serf1_add3.pdf

³¹ The Gambia v. Myanmar. Application instituting proceedings. International Court of Justice, 11.11.2019. <https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/178/178-20191111-APP-01-00-EN.pdf>

³² South Africa v. Israel. Application instituting proceedings. International Court of Justice, 29.12.2023. <https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/192/192-20231228-app-01-00-en.pdf>

³³ South Africa v. Israel. Order of 26 January 2024. International Court of Justice. Para. 51–55. <https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/192/192-20240126-ord-01-00-en.pdf>

³⁴ “The Court also takes note of a press release of 16 November 2023, issued by 37 Special Rapporteurs, Independent Experts and members of Working Groups part of the Special Procedures of the United Nations Human Rights Council, in which they voiced alarm over “discernibly genocidal and dehumanising rhetoric coming from senior Israeli government officials”. In addition, on 27 October 2023, the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination observed that it was “[h]ighly concerned about the sharp increase in racist hate speech and dehumanisation directed at Palestinians since 7 October”. *Ibid*, p. 158.

³⁵ “The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State under international law if the person or group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of, that State in carrying out the conduct.” Draft articles on responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts, Art. 8. Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session, 2001. P. 26. https://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/reports/a_56_10.pdf

³⁶ Prosecutor v Radoslav Brdjanin. Judgement of 1 September 2004. International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Former Yugoslavia since 1991. https://www.icty.org/x/cases/brdanin/cis/en/cis_brdjanin_en.pdf

³⁷ “Article 2. Genocide: 3. The following acts shall be punishable: [...] (c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide”, Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda. https://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/ictr_EF.pdf

³⁸ “As a result of the diffusion of the anti-Tutsi propaganda, the killings ‘started off like a little spark and then spread’.” Prosecutor v. Clément Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgement (TC), 21 May 1999. Para. 282.

³⁹ Andrei Richter. Ukraine: Russian journalist sentenced for calls to genocide, IRIS 2023-4:1/29. <https://merlin.obs.coe.int/article/9702>

⁴⁰ SSU investigates Russian propagandist Simonyan who called to kill Ukrainian children. Official website of the Security Service of Ukraine, 01.04.2024. <https://ssu.gov.ua/en/novyny/sbu-povidomya-pro-pidozru-rosiiskii-propahandystsi-symonian-yaka-zaklykala-vbyvaty-ukrainskykh-ditei>

⁴¹ See, for example: Natalia Kravchuk, Yuri Dzhibladze. Challenges in the application of the universal jurisdiction principle in respect of cases from Belarus. Case studies from Lithuania, Germany, Poland and Czechia. iSANS, November 2023. <https://isans.org/human-rights/challenges-in-the-application-of-the-universal-jurisdiction-principle-in-respect-of-cases-from-belarus.html>

⁴² See: Danila Galperovich. “Anna Neystat: Fond Kluni dobivayetsya ugovnogo presledovaniya rossiyskikh propagandistov”. The Voice of America, 10 May 2024. <https://www.golosameriki.com/a/anna-neystat-interview/7636139.html>; George Clooney Foundation to seek arrest of Russian propagandists in Europe. Insight News, 4 June 2024. <https://insightnews.media/george-clooney-foundation-to-seek-arrest-of-russian-propagandists-in-europe/>

⁴³ Evgenia Albats. Rossiyskikh propagandistov možno budet sudit' v mezhdunarodnykh sudakh. Op. cit.

⁴⁴ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966, entry into force 23 March 1976. <https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx>

⁴⁵ Travaux préparatoires of article 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. <https://www.ohchr.org/en/freedom-of-expression/travaux-preparatoires-article-20-international-covenant-civil-and-political-rights>

⁴⁶ Michael G. Kearney. *The Prohibition of Propaganda for War in International Law*. Oxford University Press, 2007. P. 128, 131. See more in: *Propaganda and Freedom of the Media*, OSCE, 2015. <https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/b/3/203926.pdf>

⁴⁷ European Court of Human Rights, Factsheet on hate speech, 2013. http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Hate_speech_ENG.pdf

⁴⁸ Mendel, Toby. Does International Law Provide for Consistent Rules on Hate Speech? In: *The Content and Context of Hate Speech: Rethinking Regulation and Responses*. Eds.: M. Herz and P. Molnár. Cambridge University Press, 2012. P. 427.

⁴⁹ Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers' Recommendation No.(97)20 on "hate speech", 30 October 1997. https://www.coe.int/en/web/freedom-expression/committee-of-ministers-adopted-texts/-/asset_publisher/aDXmrol0vvsU/content/recommendation-no-r-97-20-of-the-committee-of-ministers-to-member-states-on-hate-speech-

⁵⁰ Alexander Verkhovsky. *Ugolovnoye pravo stran OBSE protiv prestupleniy nenavisti, vzbuzhdeniya nenavisti i yazyka vrazhdy*. SOVA Center, 2014. P.23.

⁵¹ Joint cases C-244/10 and C-245/10 *Mesopotamia Broadcast and Roj TV v Federal Republic of Germany*, 22 September 2011, ECR I-08777. Para 42 and 41.

⁵² Opinion of Advocate General Bot delivered on 5 May 2011, Joined Cases C-244/10 and C-245/10, *Mesopotamia Broadcast A/S METV and Roj TV A/S vs. Bundesrepublik Deutschland*. <http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=80715&mode=req&pageIndex=1&dir=&occ=first&part=1&text=&doclang=EN&cid=334641>

⁵³ On the compatibility of the measures adopted by Lithuania pursuant to Article 3(2) of Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2010 on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual media services. 10.07.2015. C(2015) 4609 final. <https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/decision-compatibility-eu-law-lithuanian-measures-under-article-32-avmsd>

⁵⁴ Andrei Richter. *Legal needs and a roadmap for the Republic of Moldova to effectively protect its people against propaganda, manipulation, disinformation: A study*. Chisinau, 2024. <https://soros.md/publicatii/legal-needs-and-a-roadmap-for-the-republic-of-moldova-to-effectively-protect-its-people-against-propaganda-manipulation-disinformation>

⁵⁵ Rabat Plan of Action on the prohibition of advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence. Conclusions and recommendations emanating from the four regional expert workshops organised by OHCHR, in 2011, and adopted by experts in Rabat, Morocco, on 5 October 2012, <https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/outcome-documents/rabat-plan-action>. Note here the six factors (p.11) suggested for a criminal persecution for "hate speech". Also note that for assessment of the "hate speech" important is not just the severity of the hatred, but also the intent of the statement or harm advocated, the frequency, quantity and extent of the communication.

⁵⁶ The Camden Principles on Freedom of Expression and Equality. ARTICLE 19 Global Campaign for Free Expression. London, 2009. Principle 12. <https://www.article19.org/data/files/pdfs/standards/the-camden-principles-on-freedom-of-expression-and-equality.pdf>

⁵⁷ For details of the ECtHR case law on “hate speech”, see: Key Theme – Article 10 Hate speech (Last updated: 29.02.2024), Prepared by the Registry of the ECtHR. <https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/hate-speech>

⁵⁸ *Sürek v. Turkey (no. 4)* [GC], 1999, § 57.

⁵⁹ These Principles have been endorsed by Mr. Abid Hussain, the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, in his reports to the 1996, 1998, 1999 and 2001 sessions of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (replaced by the UN Human Rights Council in 2006), and referred to by the Commission in its annual resolutions on freedom of expression since then.

⁶⁰ The Johannesburg Principles on National Security, Freedom of Expression and Access to Information, 1 October 1995. <https://www.refworld.org/docid/4653fa1f2.html>

⁶¹ International Federation for Human Rights, Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group, Center for Civil Liberties. Situation in Ukraine: Hate Speech as the Crime Against Humanity of Persecution. Communication submitted under Article 15 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, June 2024. https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/article_15_communication_on_hate_speech_as_the_crime_against_humanity_of_persecution_in_the_situation_of_ukraine.pdf

⁶² Alexander Verkhovsky. Criminal Law on Hate Crime, Incitement to Hatred and Hate Speech in OSCE Participating States – The Hague: SOVA Center, 2016. P. 84. https://www.nhc.nl/assets/uploads/2017/07/NHC-Criminal-Law_10.pdf

⁶³ Andrei Richter. Legal needs and a roadmap for the Republic of Moldova to effectively protect its people against propaganda, manipulation, disinformation: A Study. Op. cit. P. 77.

⁶⁴ Aleksandr Dugin. Osnovy geopolitiki. Center for Conservative Research, 2000. <http://konservatizm.org/konservatizm/books/130909011417.xhtml>

⁶⁵ Ukrainskoy natsii ne sushchestvuyet. *Izvestiya*, 23.12.2004. <https://iz.ru/news/297957>

⁶⁶ Tatiana Shkel. Dmitriy Medvedev nazval pyat' printsipov vneshney politiki Rossii, *Rossiyskaya gazeta*, 01.09.2008. <https://rg.ru/2008/09/01/principyi.html>

⁶⁷ Cited from: Olga Allenova, Yelena Geda, Vladimir Novikov. Blok NATO razoshelsya na blopkakety. *Kommersant*, 07.04.2008. <https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/877224>

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

⁶⁹ Surkov schitayet neobkhodimym prinuzhdat' Ukrainu k “bratskim otnosheniyam”. *Kommersant*, 26.02.2020. <https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/4268494#id1015701>

⁷⁰ Bill Clinton Saw Vladimir Putin's Ukraine Campaign As “Just A Matter Of Time”. *Financial Times*, 04.05.2023. <https://www.ft.com/content/404af8ef-d073-4edc-ab25-384442864342>

⁷¹ I warned West about Putin, says jailed ex-leader of Georgia. *The Times*, 17.06.2023. <https://www.thetimes.com/world/russia-ukraine-war/article/georgia-ex-president-putin-russia-war-mikheil-saakashvili-interview-2023-lzgjmcjrn>

⁷² Vladimir Putin: “If this or that republic became part of the Soviet Union, but received a huge amount of Russian lands, traditional Russian historical territories in its baggage, and only after that decided to withdraw from this Union – well, at least then it should have left with what it came with. And not drag gifts from the Russian people with it.” Cited from: Putin rasskazal o “mine zamedlennogo deistviya” v sovetskoi konstitutsii. *TASS*, 20.06.2020. <https://tass.ru/politika/8888955>

⁷³ Zakhar Prilepin sobral v DNR svoi batal'on. *Komsomol'skaya Pravda*, 12.02.2017. <https://www.kp.ru/daily/26642.5/3661046/>

-
- ⁷⁴ Vladimir Gladkov, "Pora konchat' etu Ukrainu" – Leont'yev. Politnavigator, 21.09.2018. <https://www.politnavigator.net/pora-konchat-eh-tu-ukrainu-leontev.html>
- ⁷⁵ Timofey Sergeytsev, Kakaya Ukraina nam ne nuzhna. RIA "Novosti". 10.04.2021. <https://ria.ru/20210410/ukraina-1727604795.html>
- ⁷⁶ Vladimir Putin, On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians. Website of the President of Russia, 12.07.2021. <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181>
- ⁷⁷ Putin: "I perceive the wall that has emerged between Russia and Ukraine as a tragedy". Ibid.
- ⁷⁸ Putin: "Ukrainians and Russians are one people, one whole"; "Modern Ukraine is entirely the brainchild of the Soviet era"; "The Great Russian nation is a triune people, consisting of Great Russians, Malorussians and Belarusians". Ibid.
- ⁷⁹ Putin: "Ukraine [...] was created at the expense of historical Russia", "Russia was actually robbed". Ibid.
- ⁸⁰ Iliia Zhegulev, Kak Putin voznenavidel Ukrainu. Verstka, 25.04.2023. <https://verstka.media/kak-putin-pridumal-voynu>
- ⁸¹ Obrashcheniye Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii. Website of the Russian President, 21.02.2022. <http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67828>
- ⁸² Zasedaniye Mezhdunarodnogo diskussionnogo kluba "Valday". Website of the Russian President, 27.10.2022. <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/69695>
- ⁸³ Cited from: ISW: Putin continues to reject idea of Ukrainian sovereignty. Kyiv Independent, 28.10.2022. <https://kyivindependent.com/isw-putin-continues-to-reject-idea-of-ukrainian-sovereignty/>
- ⁸⁴ Medinskiy nazval nyneshnyuyu Ukrainu "istoricheskim fantomom". TASS, 22.02.2022. <https://tass.ru/politika/13803945>
- ⁸⁵ Timofey Sergeytsev, Chto Rossiya dolzhna sdelat s Ukrainoy. RIA "Novosti", 03.04.2022. <https://ria.ru/20220403/ukraina-1781469605.html>
- ⁸⁶ Ibid.
- ⁸⁷ Viktoria Nikiforova. Za chto Rossiya boretsya na Ukraine. RIA "Novosti", 06.04.2022. <https://ria.ru/20220406/ukraina-1781956559.html>
- ⁸⁸ Cited from: Anton Pecherskyi, Shcho ideoloh "denatsyfikatsiyi" Ukrayiny armen gasparyan ukladaye v holovy rosiys'kym shkolyaram". ArmyInform, 01.08.2022. <https://armyinform.com.ua/2022/08/01/shho-ideolog-denacyfikacziyi-ukrayiny-armen-gasparyan-ukladaye-v-golovy-rosijskym-shkolyaram/>
- ⁸⁹ Dmitri Medvedev, Pochemu Ukraina opasna dlya yeyo zhiteley, Telegram channel of Dmitri Medvedev, 17.01.2022. https://t.me/medvedev_telegram/437
- ⁹⁰ Dmitri Medvedev, Pochemu ischeznet Ukraina? Potomu chto ona nikomu ne nuzhna. VK.com, 08.04.2023. https://vk.com/dm?w=wall53083705_54704
- ⁹¹ Dmitri Medvedev, O "formule mira" kiyevskikh natsi, shveytsarskikh "mirnykh konferentsiyakh" i realnoy osnove peregovorov. Telegram channel of Dmitri Medvedev, 14.03.2024. https://t.me/medvedev_telegram/464
- ⁹² Ibid. 11.07.2024. https://t.me/medvedev_telegram/516
- ⁹³ Telegram channel "Eduard Bagirov", 27.02.2022. <https://t.me/bagirov/587>
- ⁹⁴ Cited from the video: "Ocherednoye dokazatelstvo togo, chto okkupanty vedut voynu radi polnogo unichtozheniya Ukrainy". Telegram channel "NEXTA Live", 29.03.2022. https://t.me/nexta_live/23776

-
- ⁹⁵ Telegram channel “Anton Krasovskii | Gay in foster care”, 25.02.2023. <https://t.me/AntonKrasovskii/1529>
- ⁹⁶ Dmitriy Puchkov: Zelenskiy nuzhen rovno dlya odnogo – chtoby podpisivat' kapitulyatsiyu. Radio Komsomol'skaya pravda, 28.02.2022. <https://radiokp.ru/podcast/voyna-i-mir-s-dmitriem-goblinom-puchkovym/571407>
- ⁹⁷ Simonyan raskryla istinnyye namereniya okkupantov. Obozrevatel, 30.11.2022. <https://news.obozrevatel.com/tv/img2364-mp4.htm>
- ⁹⁸ Yuliya Vityazeva: Nashe miloserdiye vosprinimayut kak slabost. Radio Komsomolskaya pravda, 26.11.2022. <https://radiokp.ru/podcast/dialogi/662527>
- ⁹⁹ Denis Kazansky on X, 01.07.2024. https://x.com/den_kazansky/status/1807700232991355028?t=0Y34UjPqp7PH3a8fum_6bA&s=19
- ¹⁰⁰ Igor Kolke, “Olga Kormukhina: Ukraintsy – eto my, kotoryye dali volyu khudshemu v sebe.” Abzats, 12.05.2023. <https://absatz.media/kultura/35805-olga-kormuhina-ukraincy-eto-my-kotorye-dali-volyu-hudshemu-v-sebe>
- ¹⁰¹ Sergey Karaganov, Primeneniye yadernogo oruzhiya mozhet uberech chelovechestvo ot globalnoy katastrofy. Profil, 13.06.2023. <https://profile.ru/politics/primenenie-yadernogo-oruzhiya-mozhet-uberech-chelovechestvo-ot-globalnoj-katastrofy-1338893/>
- ¹⁰² Dmitri Vinnik, Gosudarstvo Ukraina dolzhno byt' unichtozheno, Zavtra, 27.02.2024. https://zavtra.ru/blogs/dva_goda_bol_shoj_vojni
- ¹⁰³ Telegram channel “Governor’s smart Jew. Author channel of Andrey Perla”, 24.08.2023. <https://t.me/governorsjew/7994>
- ¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 30.12.2023. <https://t.me/governorsjew/9177>
- ¹⁰⁵ Ibid., 05.01.2024. <https://t.me/governorsjew/9227>
- ¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 21.05.2024. <https://t.me/governorsjew/10470>
- ¹⁰⁷ Konstantin Malofeyev, Terroristicheskoye gosudarstvo “Ukraina” dolzhno byt' razrusheno. Personal Telegram channel, 11.08.2022. <https://t.me/kvmalofeev/896>
- ¹⁰⁸ Ibid., Chas muzhestva probil, 30.09.2022. <https://t.me/kvmalofeev/1046>
- ¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 30.12.2023. <https://t.me/kvmalofeev/2389>
- ¹¹⁰ Telegram channel KazakoV, 16.01.2023. https://t.me/ale_kazakov/7562
- ¹¹¹ Aleksandr Dugin, “Chto takoye Ukraina?” Personal account in Dzen, 31.03.2023. <https://dzen.ru/b/ZCZox1UqlhHAQCvY>
- ¹¹² Telegram channel AGDchan, 25.03.2024. <https://t.me/Agdchan/14790>
- ¹¹³ Aleksandr Dugin: Vybor v usloviyakh voyny – eto perekhod na storonu protivnika. Pyataya Sluzhba, 31.05.2024. <https://5sluzhba.ru/opinion/aleksandr-dugin-vybor-v-usloviyah-voyny-eto-perekhod-na-storonu-protivnika/>
- ¹¹⁴ Telegram channel “Ilia Remeslo”, 17.03.2022. <https://t.me/remeslaw/2115> (Currently the link is inaccessible since the post was deleted in 2023.)
- ¹¹⁵ Telegram channel “Rogozin”, 16.06.2022. https://t.me/rogozin_do/3065?single. The original message was published on Dmitry Rogozin’s account in X (former Twitter) and subsequently blocked by the platform. Repost is available now in Rogozin’s Telegram channel.
- ¹¹⁶ Telegram channel “Vitalii Milonov”, 19.10.2022. <https://t.me/govoritmilonov/1097>
- ¹¹⁷ Telegram channel “Mardan”, 27.03.2022. <https://t.me/mardanaka/7650>

-
- ¹¹⁸ Cited from: Russian propagandist says Ukraine should be erased off the map. YouTube channel "Russian media monitor", 29 March 2023. <https://youtu.be/G5dyEPK2UIU>
- ¹¹⁹ Telegram channel "Shpakouski. Po sushestvu", 31.05.2021. <https://t.me/shpakouski/781>
- ¹²⁰ Ibid., 26.07.2022. <https://t.me/shpakouski/2170>
- ¹²¹ Ibid., 17.08.2022. <https://t.me/shpakouski/2233>
- ¹²² Telegram channel "Andrey Tkachyov", 05.04.2022. https://t.me/o_andrey_tkachev/2835
- ¹²³ Telegram channel "Aksjonov Z 82", 28.10.2022. <https://t.me/Aksenov82/1643>
- ¹²⁴ Cited from: State Duma member says Ukraine has to be eliminated. YouTube-channel "Russian Media Monitor", 13.02.2023. <https://youtu.be/n6k9A5KzRqA>
- ¹²⁵ Telegram channel "Boris Korchevnikov", 31.03.2023. <https://t.me/boriskorchevnikov/2273>
- ¹²⁶ Telegram channel "Pyotr Tolstoy", 02.04.2023. https://t.me/petr_tolstoy/1729
- ¹²⁷ Telegram channel "Zapiski Veterana". 13.10.2024. https://t.me/notes_veterans/19962
- ¹²⁸ Vika i Vadim Tsyganovy, kotoryye podderzhivayut armiyu Rossii. YouTube channel of Yuri Dud, 27.10.2023. <https://youtu.be/vjmBHn1bUBI?si=2WomidJoKG6k6vrR>. See also here: Znamenitosti o voyne v Ukraine. Database of quotes "Celebrities about the war in Ukraine". <https://human-nonhuman.info/>
- ¹²⁹ Cited from: Telegram channel CHTD. 16.07.2024. <https://t.me/chtddd/76730>
- ¹³⁰ "Okhlobystin: "Takoy istoricheskiy kazus, kak Ukraina, dolzhen ischeznut!". Pravda.ru, 25.02.2022. https://www.pravda.ru/news/politics/1685989-ukraina_dolzha_ischeznut/
- ¹³¹ Cited from: "Ivan Okhlobystin – Goyda", YouTube channel "Memoteka", 05.10.2022. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ygbEqLfKF2Q>
- ¹³² Dmitriy Medvedev. O natsional'noy identichnosti i politicheskom vybore: opyt Rossii i Kitaya. Website of the "Yedinaya Rossiya" political party, 13.12.2024. <https://er.ru/activity/news/o-natsionalnoj-identichnosti-i-politicheskom-vybore-opyt-rossii-i-kitaya-statya-dmitriya-medvedeva>
- ¹³³ Richter Elihu D., Markus Dror Kris, Tait Casey, "Incitement, genocide, genocidal terror, and the upstream role of indoctrination: can epidemiologic models predict and prevent?" Public Health Review, 22 October 2018. <https://publichealthreviews.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s40985-018-0106-7/>
- ¹³⁴ Data displayed in the table: <https://publichealthreviews.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s40985-018-0106-7/tables/1>
- ¹³⁵ Richter Elihu D., Markus Dror Kris, Tait Casey, Op. cit. <https://publichealthreviews.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s40985-018-0106-7/>
- ¹³⁶ Aleksandr Zhuchkovski. Yeshche raz k voprosu ob ukrainsakh i ukrainstve. VK.com, 13.11.2016. https://web.archive.org/web/20161113181401/https://vk.com/wall151630709_62156
- ¹³⁷ Andrey Mukovozchik, Ne boyevyye deystviya razdelyayut ukrainskiy narod, a banderovshchina kak sistema vospitaniya. SB. Belarus Segodnya, 06.03.2022. <https://www.sb.by/articles/ne-boevye-deystviya-razdelyayut-ukrainskiy-narod-a-banderovshchina-kak-sistema-vospitaniya.html>
- ¹³⁸ Cited from: More genocidal rhetoric on Russian state TV. Julia Davis on X, 19.07.2022. <https://twitter.com/JuliaDavisNews/status/1549381189336711169/>
- ¹³⁹ Olga Smykova, Potomu chto Rodina zovyot! Kaluzhskaya Nedelya, 21.09.2022. https://nedelya40.ru/potomu-chto-rodina-zovyot_188489/
- ¹⁴⁰ Yuri Kobzar, "My voyuyem s upyryami": propagandist prizval steret' Ukrainu s karty. UNIAN, 30.03.2023. <https://www.unian.net/russianworld/rossiyskaya-propaganda-otlichalas-novym-zayavleniem-v-duhe-gebbelsa-12198465.html>

¹⁴¹ Cited from: Isterika propagandy iz-za ul'timatuma Trampa Putinu. YouTube channel "Michael Naki", 24.01.2025. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QV8hOfdvTWc&t=489s>

¹⁴² Kolorady (Colorados) is a pejorative nickname of separatists and pro-Russian residents of the Donbass region (Eastern Ukraine) who supported Russian invasion in 2014, and later was often used more broadly in respect of all supporters of the aggression against Ukraine. The origin of the nickname is related to the ribbon of Saint George, a Russian pro-war symbol whose coloring and design (orange and black stripes) are associated for the pro-Ukrainian activists with the colors of the Colorado potato beetle.

¹⁴³ Azaronok: sovremennyy Zapad eto i yes' diviziya SS, eto oni – nadzirateli v Dakhau i Aushvitse. Novosti. YouTube channel "Novosti. Zdes' i seychas", 23.03.2022. <https://youtu.be/YqWvkjR4YW8>

¹⁴⁴ Ukraina – sataninskoye gosudarstvo. Khristos pobedit d'yavola. V "Panoptikume" Azaryonka. Dzen-channel "Bel Narod Onlain", 24.03.2022. <https://dzen.ru/video/watch/62659cdfbede275c8ad5a5aa>

¹⁴⁵ Novyi mirovoy poryadok? Svoya Pravda – NTV, 26.03.2022. <https://www.ntv.ru/peredacha/SvoyaPravda/m78960/o693638/video>

¹⁴⁶ Telegram channel "Aksyonov Z 82", 18.04.2022. <https://t.me/Aksenov82/720>

¹⁴⁷ Telegram channel "Kadyrov_95", 01.08.2022. https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/2644

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., 08.10.2022. https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/2953

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., 07.01.2023. https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/3256

¹⁵⁰ Aleksei Pavlov. Chto varyat v "ved'minom kotle". Na Ukraine nabrali silu neoyazycheskiye kul'ty. Argumenty I Fakty, 25.10.2022. https://aif.ru/society/religion/chto_varyat_v_vedminom_kotle_na_ukraine_nabrali_silu_neoyazychskie_kul'ty

¹⁵¹ Telegram channel "Dmitri Medvedev", 04.11.2022. https://t.me/medvedev_telegram/206

¹⁵² Ibid., 23.11.2022. https://t.me/medvedev_telegram/216

¹⁵³ Cited from: Top Russian propagandist claims that Russia is embroiled in a holy war against Ukraine and the West. YouTube channel "Russian Media Monitor", 18.12.2022. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xhY4-lhUkkl>

¹⁵⁴ Aleksandr Samsonov. Konets proyekta "Ukraina". Voennoe Obozrenie, 17.03.2023. <https://topwar.ru/212932-konec-proekta-ukraina.html>

¹⁵⁵ Telegram channel "Vladlen Tatarsky", 01.04.2023. <https://t.me/vladlentatarsky/20379>

¹⁵⁶ Andrey Perla. Otvet Kieva na rozhdstvenskoe peremirie stal verdiktom: Ukraina voyuyet protiv Boga. Tsargrad, 05.01.2023. https://amp.tsargrad.tv/news/otvet-kieva-na-rozhdstvenskoe-peremirie-stal-verdiktom-ukraina-vojuet-protiv-boga_698473

¹⁵⁷ Telegram channel "Governor's smart Jew. Author's channel of Andrey Perla", 30.12.2023. <https://t.me/governorsjew/9185>

¹⁵⁸ Andrey Perla, Ili my unichtozhayem nelyud' v Kiyeye, ili ne budet Rossii: Glavnyy vyvod posle udara po Belgorodu. Tsargrad TV, 30.12.2023. https://tsargrad.tv/news/ili-my-unichtozhaem-nelyud-v-kieve-ili-ne-budet-rossii-glavnyj-vyvod-posle-udara-po-belgorodu_939298

¹⁵⁹ Telegram channel "Governor's smart Jew. Author's channel of Andrey Perla", 30.12.2023. <https://t.me/governorsjew/9182>

¹⁶⁰ Andrey Perla, Detskaya bol'nitsa v Kiyeye — ne sluchaynost'. Pora eto priznat' i perestat' boyat'sya. Tsargrad TV, 08.07.2024. https://tsargrad.tv/articles/detskaja-bolnica-v-kieve-ne-sluchajnost-pora-jeto-priznat-i-perestat-bojatsja_1025063. After the scandal broke, the article was deleted from the Tsargrad TV website. Cited from: "Detskaya bol'nitsa v Kiyeye — ne sluchaynost'.

Pora perestat' boyat'sya": na sayte telekanala "Tsar'grad" opublikovali tekst, opravdyvayushchii rossiyskiy raketnyy udar po "Okhmatdetu". Ekho, 11.07.2024.

<https://echofm.online/news/detskaya-bolnicza-v-kieve-ne-sluchajnost-pora-perestat-boyatsya-na-sajte-telekanala-czargrad-opublikovali-tekst-opravdyvayushhij-rossijskij-raketnyj-udar-po>

¹⁶¹ Fidel Agumava. "Vrag prikryvayetsya blagimi namereniyami." Deputaty i svyashchenniki boryutsya s satanizmom. Sever Realii, 02.07.2024. <https://www.severreal.org/a/vrag-prikryvaetsya-blagimi-namereniyami-deputaty-i-svyaschenniki-boryutsya-s-satanizmom/33017607.html>

¹⁶² Vladimir Gladkov, Zhirinovskiy nazval Ukrainu "yevropeyskim navozom" i posovetoval smenit' gimn. Politnavigator, 25.11.2019. <https://www.politnavigator.net/zhirinovskijj-nazval-ukrainu-evropejskim-navozom-i-posovetoval-smenit-gimn.html>

¹⁶³ Pamyatka voynu-osvoboditelyu. Telegram channel "Eto drugoe", 04.02.2022. <https://t.me/drugoeeto/1482>

¹⁶⁴ Telegram channel "Syny monarkhii", 27.03.2022. <https://t.me/SonOfMonarchy/5729>

¹⁶⁵ Telegram channel "Shpakouski. Po sushestvu", 26.04.2022. <https://t.me/shpakouski/1889>

¹⁶⁶ Cited from: "Ukrainskiy yazyk stal obrazom rusofobii", – Mikhalkov. Fokus, 26.08.2022. <https://focus.ua/voennye-novosti/526919-ukrainskiy-yazyk-stal-obrazom-rusofobii-mihalkov-video>

¹⁶⁷ Sergei Moiseev. Kherson dolzhen stat' gor'kim urokom. "Pokhabnyy mir" razrushit Rossiyu do osnovaniya. Tsargrad TV, 23.11.2022. https://tsargrad.tv/news/herson-dolzhen-stat-gorkim-urokom-pohabnyj-mir-razrushit-rossiju-do-osnovaniya_670510

¹⁶⁸ V GosSMI RF predlagayut ustroit' GULAG na okkupirovannykh territoriyakh Ukrainy. YouTube-channel "Guildhall", 07.08.2022. <https://youtu.be/luZd6sUWRG4>

¹⁶⁹ Telegram channel "Mardan", 01.09.2022. <https://t.me/mardanaka/10424>

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., 13.12.2022. <https://t.me/mardanaka/12310>

¹⁷¹ Cited from: Julia Davis, Meanwhile in Russia... X, 24.10.2022. <https://twitter.com/JuliaDavisNews/status/1584365167176871936>

¹⁷² Telegram channel "Andrey Medvedev", 23.11.2022. <https://t.me/MedvedevVesti/12173>

¹⁷³ Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 23. Institute for the Study of War, 23.11.2022. <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounders/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-23>

¹⁷⁴ Telegram channel "Dmitri Medvedev", 23.11.2022. https://t.me/medvedev_telegram/216

¹⁷⁵ Telegram channel "Soloviev Live", repost from Telegram channel "Kremlyovskaya Prachka", 25.12.2022. <https://t.me/SolovievLive/147514>

¹⁷⁶ Yuriy Kot: Protiv nashikh detey brosil virus!. Ostayotsya bit' na porazheniye. Tsargrad TV, 10.03.2023. https://tsargrad.tv/articles/jurij-kot-protiv-nashih-detey-brosili-virus-ostajotsja-bit-na-porazhenie_737059

¹⁷⁷ Telegram channel "Golovanov", 02.04.2023. <https://t.me/romagolovanov/10969>

¹⁷⁸ Andrey Bogodel, Ukraina budet prinadlezhat' russkomu miru. Telegram channel "STV | Novosti Belarus", 03.11.2023. <https://t.me/minskctvby/33180>

¹⁷⁹ Vladimir Putin. Interview to Tucker Carlson. Website of the Russian President, 09.02.2024. <http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/73411>

¹⁸⁰ Cited from: Govorit Ukraina. 837-y den' voyny. Pryamoy efir. YouTube channel "FREEDOM", 30.05.2024. https://www.youtube.com/live/K61wPwrip4c?si=fz92E9VakX_hBspz&t=13692

¹⁸¹ Na rosTB propagandist nazval ukraintsev "lyud'mi vtorogo sorta". TSN, 02.06.2024. <https://tsn.ua/ru/video/video-novini/na-rostb-propagandist-nazval-ukraincev-lyudmi-vtorogo-sorta.html>

-
- ¹⁸² Telegram channel “Rogozin”, 26.06.2024. https://t.me/rogozin_do/5976
- ¹⁸³ Telegram channel “Tsargrad TV”, 10.04.2023. <https://t.me/tsargradtv/40274>
- ¹⁸⁴ Andrey Perla, Pochemu russkim zhal'che pogibshikh plennykh veseushnikov, chem "nebrat'yam"? Tsargrad TV, 25.01.2024. https://m.tsargrad.tv/news/pochemu-russkim-zhalche-pogibshih-plennyh-vjesjeushnikov-chem-nebratjam_951760
- ¹⁸⁵ Telegram channel “Eto drugoe”, 07.02.2024. <https://t.me/drugoeeto/15118>
- ¹⁸⁶ Russian Orthodox Church. Nakaz XXV Vsemirnogo russkogo narodnogo sobora “Nastoyashcheye i budushcheye Russkogo mira”. Official website of the Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church, 27.03.2024. <http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/6116189.html>
- ¹⁸⁷ Glavnoye, o chom khochetsya skazat' v Den' Pobedy”. Telegram channel “Aleksandr Zhuchkovski”, 09.05.2024. <https://t.me/juchkovsky/4550>
- ¹⁸⁸ Govorit Ukraina. 837-y den' voyny. Pryamoy efir. YouTube channel “FREEDOM TV”, 09.06.2024. https://www.youtube.com/live/K6lWPwrip4c?si=0hXXHqDD7dF_S3T2&t=36248
- ¹⁸⁹ Putin prisvoil zvaniye “gvardeyskaya” 64-y motostrelkovoy brigade. Izvestia, 18.04.2022. <https://iz.ru/1322460/2022-04-18/putin-prisvoil-zvanie-gvardeiskaia-64-i-motostrelkovoi-brigade>
- ¹⁹⁰ Voennye prestupniki neposredstvenno uchastvuyushie v sovershenii voennykh prestupleniy protiv naroda Ukrainy v g. Bucha – voennosluzhashie 64 otdelnoi motostrelkovoi brigady 35 AO VVO. GUR MOU, 04.04.2022 <https://web.archive.org/web/20220414041857/https://gur.gov.ua/content/voennye-prestupnyky-neposredstvenno-uchastvuiushchye-v-sovershenyy-voennykh-prestupleniy-protiv-naroda-ukrainy-v-h-bucha-voennosluzhashchye-64-otdelnoi-motostrelkovoi-bryhady-35-oa-vvo.html>
- ¹⁹¹ V Rossii v parade prinyal uchastiye polkovnik, prikazyvavshiy rasstrelivat' grazhdanskikh v Buche. FOKUS, 10.05.2023. <https://focus.ua/voennye-novosti/565367-v-rossii-v-parade-prinyal-uchastie-polkovnik-prikazyvavshij-rasstrelivat-grazhdanskikh-v-buche-video>
- ¹⁹² Telegram channel “Eto drugoe”, 05.12.2022. <https://t.me/drugoeeto/5675>
- ¹⁹³ Telegram channel “Mardan”, 06.12.2022. <https://t.me/mardanaka/12174>
- ¹⁹⁴ Yevgeniy “Topaz” Rasskazov (DShRG “Rusich”) rassuzhdayet ob erektsii ot ubiystv. YouTube channel “Antifa Ru”, 02.07.2023. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ct5O9Kswzlc>
- ¹⁹⁵ Aleksandr Dugin: “Ubivat', ubivat' i ubivat'!”. YouTube channel “Randy Mandy”, 17.07.2014. <https://youtu.be/dwgn3JGNrUo>
- ¹⁹⁶ Aleksandr Zhuchkovskiy, Yeshche raz k voprosu ob ukrainsakh i ukrainstve. Op. Cit.
- ¹⁹⁷ Programma “60 minut nenavisti k Ukraine” probila dno: bey kh@khl@v, spasai Rossiyu. YouTube channel “UNIAN”, 24.09.2021. <https://youtu.be/4lZM3Nr1Ob0?t=571>
- ¹⁹⁸ “Dva milliona ukrainsev dolzhny byt' denatsifitsirovany, to yest' unichtozheny” - deputat Gosdumy RF Zhuravlev. Censor.net, 08.05.2022. <https://censor.net/ru/v3339879>
- ¹⁹⁹ Telegram channel “Solovyinyi Pomyot”, 24.10.2022. https://t.me/slvn_pomet/3518
- ²⁰⁰ Cited from: Telegram channel “Nasha Niva”, 30.09.2022. <https://t.me/nashaniva/54536>
- ²⁰¹ Cited from: Julia Davis, Meanwhile in Russia”, X, 24.10.2022. <https://twitter.com/JuliaDavisNews/status/1584365167176871936>
- ²⁰² Telegram channel “Anton Vyacheslavovich”, 14.04.2022. <https://t.me/krasovkin/9128>
- ²⁰³ Yuri Baranyuk, Chem zanimal'sya Anton Krasovskiy, prizyvayet “topit' ukrainskikh detey”. Current Time, 24.10.2022. <https://www.currenttime.tv/a/32098615.html>

-
- ²⁰⁴ Ivanna Shepel. "Nado ubit' vsekh nositeley ukrainskoy idei": v Rossii razmechtalis' ob unichtozhenii 2 mln ukrainsev. Obozrevatel, 12.05.2023. <https://war.obozrevatel.com/nado-ubit-vseh-nositelej-ukrainskoj-idei-v-rossii-razmechtalis-ob-unichtozhenii-2-mln-ukraintsev-video.htm>
- ²⁰⁵ Andrei Richter, Ukraine: Russian journalist sentenced for calls to genocide, IRIS 2023-4:1/29. <https://merlin.obs.coe.int/article/9702>
- ²⁰⁶ Vidomoho rosiys'koho propahandysta – kolyshn'oho dyrektora RT zasudzheno za zaklyky vbyvaty ukrayins'kykh ditey. Official website of the Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine, 13.08.2024. <https://www.gp.gov.ua/ua/posts/vidomogo-rosiiskogo-propagandista-kolisnyogo-direktora-rt-zasudzheno-za-zaklyki-vbivati-ukrayinskix-ditei>
- ²⁰⁷ Telegram-channel "Ludazhory", 21.08.2022. <https://t.me/Ludazhorrr/1522>. (The post is currently inaccessible because the channel was blocked by Telegram in 2023).
- ²⁰⁸ Andrey Tsyganov, Igor Sevryugin. Kto takoy Igor' Mangushev, kotoryy vystupil s cherepom i nazval yego "ostankami" zashchitnika "Azovstali". Current Time, 30.08.2022. <https://www.currenttime.tv/a/ukraine-russia-war-mangushev/32010950.html>
- ²⁰⁹ Pavel Gubarev: Ukraintsy-rusofoby — ruskiye lyudi, v kotorykh vselilsya bes. Telegram channel "Voenkor Kotenok", 11.10.2022. <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/41522>
- ²¹⁰ Telegram channel "Konservator", 04.04.2023. https://t.me/conservator_tv/524
- ²¹¹ Telegram-channel "Margarita Simonyan", 23.12.2023. <https://t.me/margaritasimonyan/13521>
- ²¹² SBU povidomyla pro pidozru rosiys'kiy propahandysttsi Symon'yan, yaka zaklykala vbyvaty ukrayins'kykh ditey. Official website of the Security Service of Ukraine, 01.04.2024. <https://ssu.gov.ua/novyny/sbu-povidomyla-pro-pidozru-rosiiskii-propahandysttsi-symonian-yaka-zaklykala-vbyvaty-ukrainskykh-ditei>
- ²¹³ SBU dobavila statey v delo Margarity Simon'yan — yeye obvinili v pryzyvakh k genotsidu. Telegram channel "BBC News | Russian Service", 01.04.2024. <https://t.me/bbcrossian/63033>
- ²¹⁴ Telegram channel "Governor's smart Jew. Author's channel of Andrey Perla", 05.01.2024. <https://t.me/governorsjew/9227>
- ²¹⁵ Aleksandr Kots, Postradavshiye grazhdanskiye – tragediya, kotoraya zakonchitsya posle nashey pobedy: Chem udary po Khar'kovu i Kiyevu otlichayutsya ot priletov po Donetsku i Belgorodu, Komsomolskaya Pravda, 23.01.2024. <https://www.kp.ru/daily/27557/4882043/>
- ²¹⁶ Cited from: Z-propagandist Dmitriy Puchkov-Goblin zayavil, chto vse ukraintsy — natsisty, poetomu ikh nevozmozno vospityvat', a nado vsekh prosto ubivat. Telegram channel "ChTD", 03.04.2024. <https://t.me/chtddd/73778>
- ²¹⁷ Dmitry Vinnik, Kak reagirovat' na udar po Krymu i Dagestanu? Zavtra.ru, 26.06.2024. https://zavtra.ru/blogs/kak_reagirovat_na_udar_po_krimu_i_dagestanu
- ²¹⁸ Telegram channel "Dmitri Medvedev", 16.07.2024. https://t.me/medvedev_telegram/517
- ²¹⁹ "Vsyudy vybukhalo, lyudy v krovi": Rosiya obstrilyala evakuatsiyu bazu v Khersoni na ochakh u BBC. BBC, 08.12.2023. <https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/news-65838696>
- ²²⁰ Submerged: Study of the Destruction of the Kakhovka Dam and Its Impacts on Ecosystems, Agrarians, Other Civilians, and International Justice. Report by Truth Hounds and Project Expedite Justice, June 2024. P. 229. <https://truth-hounds.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/submerged.pdf>
- ²²¹ Telegram channel "Yansen | Z", 02.04.2023. https://t.me/rus_jansen/2194
- ²²² Telegram channel "Andrey Gurulyov / deputat Gosudarstvennoi Dumy", 04.07.2022. <https://t.me/agurulev/1723>

-
- ²²³ Russian lawmakers advocate freezing and starving Ukrainian civilians, turning them into refugees. YouTube channel “Russian Media Monitor”, 20.10.2022. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=10AiNAsCnkW>
- ²²⁴ Deputat Gosdumy RF Gurulev predlagayet unichtozhit' Kiyev: “Kiyev – mat' gorodov russkikh. Nado chtoby ot nego ostalis' ruiny i stoyal flag RF na etikh ruinakh”. Censor.net, 23.02.2023.. https://censor.net/ru/video_news/3401649/deputat_gosdumy_rf_gurulev_predlagaet_unichtojit_kiev_kiev_mat_gorodov_russkikh_nado_chtoby_ot_nego_ostalis
- ²²⁵ Aleksei Lyutikov, Propagandisty Simon'yan i Solov'yev razmechtalis' ob udarakh po Ukraine i nazvali “prioritetnyye tseli”. Obozrevatel, 12.09.2022. <https://war.obozrevatel.com/propagandisty-simonyan-i-solovev-razmechtalis-ob-udarah-po-ukraine-i-nazvali-prioritetnyie-tseli-video.htm>
- ²²⁶ Telegram channel “Shpakovski. Po sushestvu”, 09.09.2022. <https://t.me/shpakovski/2322>
- ²²⁷ Telegram-channel “#MYBELARUS”, 10.10.2022. <https://t.me/mylandbelarus/50685>
- ²²⁸ Cited from: Telegram channel “Denis Kazanski”, 13.09.2022. <https://t.me/kazansky2017/4120>
- ²²⁹ “Oni budut sidet' i bez gaza, i bez sveta, i bez vsego”. Kuleba prizval mirovoye soobshchestvo zapretit' rossiyskoye televideniye za razzhiganiye genotsida. Gordonua.com, 20.11.2022. <https://gordonua.com/news/war/kuleba-razzhiganie-genocida-na-rossiyskom-gosudarstvennom-televidenii-idet-polnym-hodom-1636997.html>
- ²³⁰ Telegram channel “Governor’s smart Jew. Author’s channel of Andrei Perla”, 13.12.2022. <https://t.me/governorsjew/5623>
- ²³¹ Telegram channel “Mardan”, 15.01.2023. <https://t.me/mardanaka/12773>
- ²³² Olga Skabeeva, Udary vozmezdiya po voyennym ob'yektam i portovoy infrastrukture Ukrainy. Rossiya 1 – Smotrim.ru, 21.07.2023. <https://smotrim.ru/video/2652282>
- ²³³ Aleksandr Sytin, Mesto vstrechi. RuTube channel “NTV”, 04.04.2024. <https://rutube.ru/video/e50e45adf787fcb9da081cfe374fb3ff/?playlist=25164&playlistPage=1>
- ²³⁴ Cited from: Govorit Ukraina. 837-y den' voyny. YouTube channel “FREEDOM”, 09.06.2024. <https://www.youtube.com/live/K61wPwrip4c>
- ²³⁵ “Ili snosite svoyu vlast'!”: Solov'yev v ocherednoy raz prigrozil ukrainsam “steret' s litsa zemli” ikh goroda. TSN, 29.06.2024. <https://tsn.ua/ru/ukrayina/ili-snosite-svoyu-vlast-solovev-v-ocherednoy-raz-prigrozil-ukraincam-steret-s-lica-zemli-ih-goroda-video-2611020.html>
- ²³⁶ Deportations and forcible transfers of Ukrainian children and other civilians to the Russian Federation or to temporarily occupied Ukrainian territories: create conditions for their safe return, stop these crimes and punish the perpetrators. Resolution 2495 (2023) by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, adopted on 27 April 2023. <https://pace.coe.int/en/files/31776/html>
- ²³⁷ Bucharest Declaration and Resolutions adopted by the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly at the Thirty-First Annual Session, Bucharest, 29 June – 3 July 2024. <https://www.oscepa.org/en/documents/annual-sessions/2024-bucharest/declaration-30/5029-bucharest-declaration-eng/file>. Para. 6, p. 1; paras. 15 and 16, p. 27; para. 48, p. 31, para. 5, p. 48.
- ²³⁸ Ibid, para. 169, p. 20; para. 19, p. 27.
- ²³⁹ Elements of Crimes. International Criminal Court, 2013. Pp. 2-3, Art. 6, Genocide. <https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/Publications/Elements-of-Crimes.pdf>
- ²⁴⁰ Telegram channel “Shpakovski. Po sushestvu”, 17.08.2021. <https://t.me/shpakovski/1088>
- ²⁴¹ Telegram channel “Anton Krasovskii | Gay in foster care”, 11.04.2022. <https://t.me/AntonKrasovskii/803>
- ²⁴² Ibid., 18.07.2022. <https://t.me/AntonKrasovskii/1103>

-
- ²⁴³ Telegram channel “Zakhar Prilepin”, 11.05.2022. <https://t.me/zakharprilepin/9927>
- ²⁴⁴ Ibid., 30.05.2022. <https://t.me/zakharprilepin/11120>
- ²⁴⁵ Kirill Stremousov was a collaborator and “deputy head” of pro-Russian administration of (then) occupied Kherson region. Killed in November 2022.
- ²⁴⁶ Telegram channel “Zakhar Prilepin”, 16.06.2022. <https://t.me/zakharprilepin/11922>
- ²⁴⁷ Telegram channel “Maria Lvova-Belova”, 26.07.2022. <https://t.me/malvovabelova/413>
- ²⁴⁸ V Gosdume predlozhili zabirat' ukrainskikh detey v rossiyskiye voyennyye uchilishcha. DS, 02.08.2022. <https://www.dsnews.ua/world/u-derzhdumi-zaproponovali-zabirati-ukrajinskih-ditey-do-rosiyskih-viyskovih-uchilishch-video-02082022-463668>
- ²⁴⁹ X-channel “Anton Geraschchenko”, 16.02.2023.
https://twitter.com/Gerashchenko_en/status/1626266991739666434?s=20
- ²⁵⁰ Telegram channel “Margarita Simonyan”, 21.02.2023. <https://t.me/margaritasimonyan/12684>
- ²⁵¹ V MGIMO besplatno postupyat 15 detey iz Donbassa i s osvobodzhdonnoy Ukrainy. Tsargrad TV, 09.03.2022. https://tsargrad.tv/news/v-mgimo-besplatno-postupjat-15-detej-iz-donbassa-i-osvobodhdjonnoj-ukrainy_508323
- ²⁵² Telegram channel “Konstantin Malofeev”, 18.03.2023. <https://t.me/kvmalofeev/1412>
- ²⁵³ Telegram channel “Slutsky”, 17.03.2023. https://t.me/slutsky_1/1646
- ²⁵⁴ Valeryi Chumakov, Sudite? Da sudimy budete. Soyuznoe Veche, 22.03.2023.
<https://www.souzveche.ru/articles/politics/71424/>
- ²⁵⁵ Telegram channel “Mardan”, 30.03.2023. <https://t.me/mardanaka/13790>
- ²⁵⁶ “Situatsiya, Kak Mezhdue Khamas I Izrailem, Mozhet Povtorit'sya U Nas”: voyenkor Maryana Naumova. YouTube channel “Maryana Naumova”, 15.10.2023.
<https://youtu.be/SaAzX6byWXE?si=mxkDuklisn1fu8m7&t=104>
- ²⁵⁷ Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine. Distributed on 18.03.2024. Par. 98. <https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/g24/037/31/pdf/g2403731.pdf>
- ²⁵⁸ “[...] Substantial body of evidence of genocidal intent continuing to grow, such as public statements by Russian officials, documented war crimes, and acts that could constitute crimes against humanity, and the Russian forces’ blatant disregard for the distinction between civilians and combatants strongly indicating a deliberate path towards extermination.” Bucharest Declaration and Resolutions adopted by the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly at the Thirty-First Annual Session, Bucharest, 29 June – 3 July 2024. Par. 16, p. 27.
<https://www.oscepa.org/en/documents/annual-sessions/2024-bucharest/declaration-30/5029-bucharest-declaration-eng/file>