Russia remains Belarus’s key foreign policy partner. However, its attempts to subjugate the country to its dominance are met with noticeable rejection by Belarusians. Only about a third of the population supports deepening integration projects with Russia. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine does not find broad support among Belarusians.
Despite the contradictory relationship with the EU, most Belarusians want to restore ties with Europe as a space of democratic values, economic opportunities, and cultural attraction. However, sanctions, information isolation, and the propaganda rhetoric of the authorities make the image of the EU in the eyes of many Belarusians blurred, distant, and partly mythologized.
The role of counterbalance to Russian influence, which the EU has played for two decades through civil society support programs, educational exchanges, and economic cooperation, has been taken over by China in recent years. Beijing is actively expanding its presence: from infrastructure mega-projects under the Belt and Road Initiative to the supply of technology, loans, and diplomatic support for the regime. China positions itself not as an ideological competitor, but as a pragmatic partner offering stability without political conditions – and this message resonates as the European vector remains blocked.
Foreign policy orientations
In this context, it is logical that Belarusians see Russia (64%) and China (64%) as the main partners for economic cooperation, followed by the European Union (38%, -5pp over the last year) and Kazakhstan (38%). Over the past 2 years, the proportion of those who consider it necessary to develop economic cooperation with the U.S. has also increased slightly (33%, +7pp).
In general, Belarusians have a positive attitude towards Russia (62%), China (60%) and Kazakhstan (50%). However, it should be noted that there are some negative assessments: while there are practically none in relation to China and Kazakhstan, this indicator stands at 14% for Russia. Attitudes towards European countries and the U.S. are generally neutral-positive: none of them elicit any noticeable negativity.
NATO (34%), Ukraine (28%), Poland (21%), and Russia (18%) are most often mentioned as threats to Belarus.[1] Particular attention should be paid to the sharp decline in the perception of the U.S. as a threat (14%, -10pp), which contradicts the general trend. Such a change is most likely explained by a noticeable shift in American policy after Donald Trump’s inauguration in January 2025. The Trump administration went from tough isolation to a strategy of careful dialogue with Minsk, positioning Belarus, among other things, as a potential buffer in negotiations on Ukraine and Russia. The negotiation track with Moscow, where Minsk acted as an informal mediator, from the summit of Trump and Putin in Alaska in August to communication through Belarusian channels, a series of visits by U.S. special envoys, which led to the release of a number of political prisoners, Trump’s call to Lukashenka, the first in history between the leaders of the two countries, where he publicly called the Belarusian ruler “highly respected” and discussed further plans with the subsequent lifting of sanctions on the national Belavia airline, the appointment of John Coale as special envoy to Belarus – all this not only weakened the image of the U.S. as an “enemy,” but also revived hopes for the normalization of relations.
Belarusians consistently consider independence without orientation towards others to be the main vector of foreign policy (40% of respondents). In addition, about a third of residents (36%) believe that Russia should be the main orientation when choosing a direction (this indicator has grown by +6pp compared to November 2023), 15% – towards Europe, and another 7% – towards China. Foreign policy orientations have a number of age-related characteristics. Traditionally, orientation towards Russia increases with the age of respondents (from 27% to 42%), the same trend is observed for orientation towards Europe (from 6% to 19%). Thus, young people are much more likely to deviate from the stereotypical perception that Belarus’s geopolitical choice lies between Russia and Europe: they are more likely to emphasize the importance of orientation towards China and, to some extent, the U.S.
Foreign policy orientations mediate perceptions of the nature of other states’ influence on Belarus. Most respondents note the influence of Russia (73%) and, to some extent, China (24%). EU countries and the U.S. are not currently perceived by Belarusians as having a significant political influence on Belarus.
Belarus-Russia relations and attitudes towards the war
Belarusian-Russian relations remain a central element of the official foreign policy course. The Belarusian government views Russia as a source of additional political legitimacy and support, as well as a key market for Belarusian products, an investor in the economy, and a supplier of cheap energy resources. In turn, Russia is interested in developing integration projects with Belarus within the framework of the Union State project and positions Belarus as a showcase for its geopolitical influence and a military-strategic springboard for exerting pressure on the EU countries and Ukraine. Russian integration projects with Belarus have experienced a renaissance after Belarus’s forced turn towards Russia in 2020, as well as against the background of increased sanctions pressure on Belarus after its participation in the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Nevertheless, there is a growing demand in Belarusian society for the preservation of independence and equal relations with its eastern neighbor.
In general, the war has intensified various scenarios of attitudes of Belarusians towards Russia: on the one hand, it has brought markets and politics closer together against the background of sanctions, and on the other hand, it has strengthened distant or even negative attitudes among the population. As already mentioned, the proportion of those oriented towards Russia in foreign policy increased by 6pp, while the proportion of those who see the building of relations between the countries on the principle of an equal union with the creation of supranational bodies increased by 5pp (29%). At the same time, support for Belarus joining Russia as a federal subject remains insignificant – 3%. The position “Difficult to say” (21%, +7pp) is growing on questions about the form of Belarusian-Russian relations. Since the annexation of Crimea in 2014, the share of support for integration with Russia has significantly decreased (55%, -19pp). Historical and cultural commonality remains the most significant factor in integration. However, its importance is also significantly decreasing, and it is gradually being replaced by dry economic and political pragmatism.
When characterizing the specifics of Belarusian-Russian relations, we should mention the issue of participation in military aggression on the territory of Ukraine. In the broad public perception, Belarusians remain true to themselves – oriented towards peace, dialogue, and the avoidance of violence both within the country and beyond its borders.
The peacefulness and non-aggressiveness characteristic of the mass consciousness act as a kind of counterweight to the militarization of public discourse and allow the country to maintain an internal distance from the logic of war imposed by Russia. Only 27% of respondents express support for the actions of Russian troops in Ukraine, and this figure has not changed significantly over the past three years, while more than two-thirds (69%) support the start of the negotiation process.
The factor of the Russia-Ukraine war continues to have a significant impact on public sentiment in Belarus. For part of the population, it has become a reason to remain loyal to the authorities, who attribute to themselves the merit of Belarus’s “non-participation” in the hostilities and position this as a manifestation of a peaceful foreign policy. 57%[2] agree with the statement that there is no war in Belarus thanks to the actions of A. Lukashenka, while 12% disagree.
Belarus-Europe relations
Belarusian-European relations are experiencing significant difficulties. After the presidential election in August 2020 and the mass protests that followed, the European Union countries did not recognize the legitimacy of Aliaksandr Lukashenka and expressed their support for the opposition represented by Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya. Here, we can additionally refer to previously unpublished data from sociological monitoring and post-election research by the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Belarus, which record a unique shift in public opinion in Belarus in 2020.[3]
In response to the violent suppression of protests and repression against civil society and independent media, the European Union imposed sanctions on Belarus, gradually expanding them in subsequent years. The Belarusian authorities did not take steps to de-escalate the situation and lift the sanctions. On the contrary, they intensified internal repression and provoked a migration crisis on the border with Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia in 2021. After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Belarus’s participation in the aggression (providing territory for Russian troops and missile strikes in the early stages of the war) led to further toughening of sanctions, which were synchronized with restrictions against Russia. The EU suspended cooperation on a number of infrastructure and humanitarian programs, further reducing the presence of European institutions in Belarus and worsening communication between the parties.
This latent tension significantly complicates the perception of Belarusian-European relations. A third of respondents found it difficult to say what the future of Belarusian-European relations should be. Nevertheless, 11% believe that Belarus should strive to join the European Union, another 10% are in favor of internal reforms to develop closer ties with the EU, and 34% support the expansion of economic cooperation. Only 11% of respondents believe that Belarus should avoid relations with the EU.
Thus, despite political cooling and limited contacts at the institutional level, the European vector remains attractive to part of Belarusian society. This indicates that the idea of cooperation with the EU remains a symbol of modernization, economic development, and political predictability for a significant part of Belarusian society.
The Belarusian population wants to see a revision/reset of relations with the European Union. More than half of respondents believe that the Belarusian authorities should take steps to normalize relations with the EU and lift sanctions. Only 16% believe that, to a certain extent, nothing should be done, and only 5% of them emphasize that no efforts should be made at all. The most anticipated steps include: amnesty for all political prisoners (38%), amnesty for political prisoners who have repented (28%), lifting the extremist status of independent media (34%), and ending support for Russian aggression against Ukraine (32%).
These responses demonstrate that for Belarusians, foreign policy normalization is directly linked to domestic reforms and the humanization of state policy. The demand for improved relations with the European Union is not simply a desire for economic benefits, but also an expression of the need for international recognition, predictability, and respect for basic human rights.
Belarus-China relations
Belarusian-Chinese relations have been developing over the past two decades and have been built around China’s Belt and Road Initiative, within which Belarus was seen as an important logistical and industrial partner at the crossroads of East and West. After 2020, and especially after the start of Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2022, this track took on new strategic significance.
Whereas previously the Belarusian authorities used the “European direction” as a means of balance against Russian influence, after the political isolation of Minsk and EU sanctions, this balancing role has de facto shifted to China. Beijing has come to be seen as a source of potential economic support, investment, and foreign policy legitimacy.
The positive perception of China in Belarusian society is largely shaped by the practical presence of Chinese goods and technologies. Chinese cars, household appliances, and everyday goods have partially replaced Western brands that have left the market, reinforcing the sense of the “real” benefits of cooperation.
According to the fourth wave of the monitoring, the vast majority of respondents assess the development of Belarusian-Chinese relations positively (54%) or neutrally (26%). At the same time, the proportion of those who perceive China negatively remains insignificant.
Belarusians perceive the Chinese direction primarily through the prism of economic opportunities. According to the respondents, the key benefits of cooperation with China include: attracting Chinese investment (57%), opportunities to export Belarusian goods to the Chinese market (48%), access to cheap consumer goods from China (45%), and access to modern digital technologies and equipment (38%).
At the same time, a significant proportion of respondents do not see any serious threats to the development of the partnership (42%). However, some respondents express caution: they point to a possible decline in the competitiveness of Belarusian goods (27%), the risk of economic dependence on China (27%), and concerns about a potential influx of migrants from China (16%).
Thus, the Chinese vector is perceived by Belarusians primarily in pragmatic and utilitarian terms. It contains no ideological strain and is not viewed as a threat to the country’s political sovereignty, which distinguishes it from both the Russian and European vectors.
General conclusions
The results of the public opinion monitoring studies by iSANS show that Belarusian society is gradually reevaluating its foreign policy orientations and forming a more pragmatic and independent view of international relations.
Russia remains Belarus’s main foreign policy partner, but its role is increasingly perceived through the prism of dependence and risks, rather than as an unconditional guarantee of security or economic development. Support for integration projects with Russia is limited, and the idea of joining Russia finds virtually no support in society. At the same time, Belarusians remain peaceful and express their rejection of military aggression against Ukraine, which indicates a steadfast orientation towards non-violent and peaceful forms of foreign policy.
Relations with the European Union remain formally frozen, but the European vector has not lost its appeal. For a significant part of the population, the EU continues to be associated with opportunities for modernization, legal stability, and economic growth. The demand for a reset in relations with Europe is accompanied by an awareness of the need for internal reforms and the humanization of the political system.
The Chinese track, on the contrary, is perceived pragmatically and without ideological strain. Belarus sees it as a source of investment, technology, and alternative markets, but does not view China as a political model or strategic patron. Thus, the Chinese direction becomes a tool for adapting to international isolation, rather than a replacement for the European or Russian vectors.
In general, Belarusian society is demonstrating growing rationalism, moderation, and a tendency to balance. The majority of the country’s residents support the course of foreign policy independence and the preservation of independence, preferring partnership rather than “vassal” relations with other states. This trend can be seen as a sign of the gradual maturing of public consciousness, in which the values of peacefulness, sovereignty, and responsible patriotism are being strengthened.
About the methodology
The article reviews five waves of public opinion studies conducted by iSANS:
Wave 1 – November 2023. 1300 respondents.
Wave 2 – April 2024. 1305 respondents.
Wave 3 – November 2024. 1208 respondents.
Wave 4 – March 2025. 1290 respondents.
Wave 5 – September 2025. 1496 respondents.
The survey was conducted using internet interviews (CAWI). The sample corresponds to the structure of urban residents in Belarus aged 18-65 and is adjusted by gender, age, and region of residence. Values may not add up to 100% due to rounding.
[1] Note the methodological complexity of assessing the dynamics of these sentiments: in the fifth wave of the survey, the option “Difficult to say” was excluded from the list of possible answers, which probably affected the redistribution of opinions – agreement with other positions increased, and this was even more noticeable in the choice of the position “None of the countries pose a threat” (33%, +13pp).
[2] iSANS. May 2025. N=1170. CAWI
[3] Data by the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Belarus (2020) – a representative study based on face-to-face interviews conducted among the adult population of Belarus. A representative random nationwide territorial sample was used, with quota verification at the final stage (size – 1,451 respondents). The sampling was conducted in all regions of Belarus, ensuring proportional representation of the main socio-demographic characteristics of the general population (gender, age, education). The sample is representative of the seven regions of the republic (six regions and Minsk city) and areas of residence.
