The April 2026 prisoner exchange offers a clear view of how the Belarusian regime manages information: restraint for Western audiences, incitement for domestic ones. The pattern is structural rather than tied to Poczobut personally, and functions as a standing tool of narrative control.
SUMMARY:
- Minsk paired calibrated official restraint toward Poland with an incitement campaign aimed at the domestic audience.
- Lukashenko made no public statement on the exchange. State media used measured language and framed the release as an act of clemency.
- Regime channels and deputies stripped Poczobut of his Belarusian identity, calling him a Polish agent, allowing the exchange to be presented as an expulsion instead of a concession.
- A parallel campaign discredited Poland’s leadership and denied Warsaw and Brussels credit for the outcome, insisting instead on Minsk’s exclusive agency.
- State media present the exchange as proof that Minsk can broker East-West dialogue. Evidence of genuine normalisation with Poland remains limited and largely tactical.
Context. On 28 April 2026, a «5 for 5» prisoner exchange was carried out at the Pererov–Białowieża border crossing, coordinated across seven countries: Belarus, Poland, the United States, Russia, Moldova, Romania, and Kazakhstan. Among those released was Andrzej Poczobut, a Polish-Belarusian journalist and activist of the Polish minority in Belarus, sentenced to eight years in an enhanced-security penal colony for inciting actions harmful to national security (Art. 361) and incitement to hatred (Art. 130). He had been held since spring 2021 and placed on the terrorist list in autumn 2022. Poland invested significant diplomatic capital in securing his release. During Lukashenko’s working visit to Vitebsk in October 2025, he confirmed an understanding with Poland on exchanging detained intelligence personnel[1]. Poland responded by reopening the Bobrowniki and Kuźnica crossings, closed respectively over Poczobut’s sentencing and the migration crisis. Talks stalled at the end of 2025, partly over balloon-borne tobacco contraband crossing from Belarus into Lithuania, prompting Poland to step back. The process ran for nearly a year in total.
Official Minsk’s Cautious Rhetoric. The first reaction appeared almost immediately across state media (news.by, belta.by, minskctv.by, ont.by), which republished near-identical copy from centrally distributed talking points. Lukashenko made no public statement. The exchange was run under KGB supervision on his instruction, with Poland represented by the ABW. State media described Poczobut as «detained,» «convicted,» and «serving a sentence for a series of grave crimes,» downplaying his role and avoiding language that might provoke Warsaw[2]. His release was framed as an act of humanity and goodwill by Lukashenko, prompted, according to state media, by a personal appeal from Poczobut’s mother and from Angelika Borys[3]. Negotiations were presented as effective and constructive despite disagreements, with morally charged formulas such as «Belarus knows how to forgive» reinforcing the image of compromise and good neighbourliness[4]. Lukashenko’s silence followed a familiar pattern: managed ambiguity at the top, coordinated messaging in official media, and confrontational narratives pushed through informal channels.
Incitement of Hatred Against Poczobut and Polish Elites. The restrained official line for external audiences coexisted with a much sharper campaign for domestic ones. Security-linked Telegram channels and regime-affiliated propagandists targeted Poczobut personally and Polish political elites more broadly, a division of labour that gives the top plausible deniability while sustaining mobilisation lower down.
The first narrative stripped Poczobut of his Belarusian identity. Channels seized on U.S. Special Envoy Cole’s reference to releasing «two Poles» to argue the case had nothing to do with political persecution[5]. He was called a «Polish agent,» a «neo-Nazi,» and an organiser of criminal unrest. Propagandist Dzermant described him as «a convinced enemy of the Belarusian state» who «glorifies AK bandits»[6]; Deputy Shpakouski called him «a convinced extremist, a Polish chauvinist, and an agent of influence»[7]; Deputy Hihin blamed the crisis on chauvinistic Polish ruling circles seeking unilateral concessions through pressure[8].
A second line worked to discredit Poland itself. Security-affiliated channels circulated claims that Polish pensioners had frozen to death and that Polish taxpayers were funding Poczobut’s medical care, portraying Poland as mismanaged rather than a credible partner[9]. Regime channels also downplayed the event’s significance, alleging Warsaw had earlier been offered Poczobut’s release without conditions and refused, and calling Polish celebration hollow and opportunistic. When Tusk met Poczobut in person, propagandists accused him of exploiting the moment and demanded he thank Trump instead, denying Poland credit and crediting Washington over Warsaw or Brussels.
Running through the campaign was insistence on Minsk’s exclusive agency: official and semi-official commentary rejected any suggestion that external pressure shaped Lukashenko’s decision, reinforcing his image as sole arbiter and denying Polish and European actors legitimacy in this and future cases[10]. The regime’s visible irritation that Polish elites had not thanked Lukashenko directly points to how much the performance of sovereignty mattered to the operation. The combination of hate speech, disinformation, and sovereignty rhetoric suggests that the concession was tactical and left the regime’s broader course unchanged.
The Beginning of Normalising Belarus–Poland Relations? State media use narratives of normalisation as a political tool, helping the regime gain leverage in its relations with Poland and strengthen its image at home as an indispensable regional actor. Several outlets present the exchange as part of a broader bid to position Minsk as an effective East-West mediator, with an eye on facilitating Russia-Ukraine dialogue[11]. The exchange let Minsk demonstrate it can strike deals while remaining structurally dependent on Russia, whose positions continue to shape Lukashenko’s decisions.
Propagandists Khorovets and Stroganov argued further dialogue would benefit «everyone except the current Polish leadership,» suggesting restored cross-border trade could revive financial flows in Poland’s border regions[12]. The democratic opposition was deliberately excluded from the exchange’s preparation, a condition the regime presents as key to further dialogue and bilateral normalisation[13].
State-affiliated channels have read signals from Poland and Lithuania as a possible start of normalisation: «Pul Pervogo» cited Polish expert circles, including the Jagiellonian Club, which advocates a more pragmatic Eastern policy combining pressure and dialogue[14]. Polish Foreign Minister Sikorski said Poczobut’s release was a signal for the EU to commit further to amnesty and European security in Belarus, while stressing Poland’s interest in good-neighbourly relations with a sovereign and peaceful Belarus. Lithuanian PM Ruginienė and Polish PM Tusk reportedly were expected to discuss expanding political dialogue with Minsk at a June meeting[15]. Pro-regime sources voice doubt about the durability of any thaw, pointing to Poland’s dependence on Washington and possible shifts after U.S. Congressional elections[16].
Conclusion. Minsk’s reaction to Poczobut’s release was shaped by two audiences at once: restraint for external consumption and confrontation at home. Domestic messaging moved through state media, regime-linked parliamentarians, and security-related Telegram channels. It combined identity-stripping narratives, disinformation about conditions in Poland, and direct criticism of the Polish leadership.
The framing of Poczobut was deliberate. Calling him a foreign agent allowed the authorities to signal to domestic audiences that no concessions had been made under Western pressure. The exchange was presented as removing an outsider, without acknowledging negotiation, in line with a broader communication pattern where sovereignty claims are reinforced internally while pragmatic engagement is projected outward.
Lukashenko’s silence preserved room for manoeuvre in future negotiations. The case carried both practical and symbolic weight for Minsk, tied to external recognition of political authority and decision-making autonomy. Narratives of a thaw in Belarus–Poland relations continue to circulate, while engagement remains largely instrumental. The Poczobut case reflects this logic and highlights the propaganda architecture that any durable engagement strategy will need to take into account.
- [1]Mlyn.by. Who really won from the 5-for-5 exchange: a political analyst on the roles of the US, Russia and Belarus. 28 April 2026. Available at: https://mlyn.by/28042026/kto-realno-vyigral-ot-obmena-5-na-5-politolog-razobral-rol-ssha-rossii-i-belarusi/
- [2]News.by. The 5-for-5 detainee exchange is taking place on the Belarus-Poland border. Available at: https://news.by/news/obshchestvo/obmen-zaderzhannymi-po-formule-5kh5-provoditsya-na-granitse-belarusi-i-polshi
- [3]Belta.by. The 5-for-5 detainee exchange is taking place on the Belarus-Poland border. Available at: https://belta.by/politics/view/obmen-zaderzhannymi-po-formule-pjat-na-pjat-provoditsja-na-granitse-belarusi-i-polshi-777771-2026/
- [4]News.by. The 5-for-5 detainee exchange is taking place on the Belarus-Poland border. Available at: https://news.by/news/obshchestvo/obmen-zaderzhannymi-po-formule-5kh5-provoditsya-na-granitse-belarusi-i-polshi
- [5]Telegram channel Zheltye Slivy. Post on Cole’s reference to «two Poles». 28 April 2026. Available at: https://t.me/zheltye_slivy_belarus/75133
- [6]Alexander Dzermant. Telegram post. Available at: https://t.me/dzermant/13551
- [7]Alexander Shpakouski. Telegram post. Available at: https://t.me/shpakouski/8071
- [8]Vadim Gigin. Telegram post. Available at: https://t.me/gigin_vadim/10577
- [9]Telegram channel Zheltye Slivy. Claims on conditions in Poland. 28 April 2026. Available at: https://t.me/zheltye_slivy_belarus/75140
- [10]Mlyn.by. «Polish theatre»: hypocrisy, or santo subito for a convicted criminal? 30 April 2026. Available at: https://mlyn.by/30042026/polskij-spektakl-liczemeriya-ili-santo-subito-dlya-osuzhdyonnogo-prestupnika/
- [11]Telegram channel belarus_vpo. Available at: https://t.me/belarus_vpo/84599
- [12]News.by. What kind of 5-for-5 exchange is this: a gesture of goodwill, or another cunning move by Lukashenko? Available at: https://news.by/news/politika/che-za-obmen-5-na-5-eto-zhest-dobroy-voli-ili-ocherednoy-khitriy-khod-lukashenko
- [13]Telegram channel Zheltye Slivy. Available at: https://t.me/zheltye_slivy_Belarus/75137
- [14]Telegram channel Pul Pervogo. On positions of the Jagiellonian Club (Klub Jagielloński). Available at: https://t.me/pul_1/21057
- [15]Belta.by. Lithuania and Poland plan to discuss raising the level of political dialogue with Belarus. Available at: https://belta.by/world/view/litva-i-polsha-planirujut-obsudit-vozmozhnost-povysit-uroven-politicheskogo-dialoga-s-belarusjju-778140-2026/
- [16]News.by. What kind of 5-for-5 exchange is this: a gesture of goodwill, or another cunning move by Lukashenko? Available at: https://news.by/news/politika/che-za-obmen-5-na-5-eto-zhest-dobroy-voli-ili-ocherednoy-khitriy-khod-lukashenko
