Red lines in Belarusian propaganda 

Andrey Kalikh, iSANS analyst    ×   
25 June 2026
Red lines in Belarusian propaganda
Photo: AFP/Getty Images/S. Gapon

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INTRODUCTION

“Ukrainians, you have proven that you are worthy of statehood – genuine, real sovereignty. Not puppet or token sovereignty, but real sovereignty. And that is only possible alongside Russia and Belarus. No one will take you into Europe and no one will give you any money.”

Grigory Azarenok, Belarusian propagandist (2026)

As one political science article puts it,  “red line” is a metaphorical boundary in politics and diplomacy, established to prevent events or phenomena deemed unacceptable.[1] Typically, the drawing of red lines is accompanied by the promise of inevitable punishment if they are crossed (violated). Essentially, a red line is a threat or an ultimatum.

However, there are situations where ultimatums are unnecessary and those who need to be restrained restrict themselves and draw their own red lines, for example, in authoritarian states that demand loyalty and compliance from society in exchange for ensuring social prosperity and order. If the media assumes such an obligation, then it is considered self-censorship.

The red lines of Belarusian propaganda are precisely such a case. The media that have remained in the country after the suppression of the mass protests of 2020 are completely dependent on the state. Their content is depoliticized to the greatest extent possible, entertaining audiences, glorifying the achievements of Belarus and its ruler Alexander Lukashenka, and criticizing the West. Any criticism is prohibited.

In turn, the Belarusian regime is dependent on Russia and is forced not only to fulfill the requests of its “big brother,” as Lukashenka calls Putin, but also to rebroadcast the Kremlin’s propaganda messages, for example, regarding Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.

February 2026 marked four years since the start of Russia’s war against Ukraine, conceived as a blitzkrieg. Propaganda played a key role in whipping up war hysteria in Russia. Over the course of several years, the Kremlin built a whole system of inciting hatred in the media. They have directly participated, and continue to participate, in the war against Ukraine through the information means. It is safe to say that armed aggression would not have been possible without the toxic and effective influence of propaganda on society, which incited hatred against Ukraine and called for the extermination of its people.[2]

Since the victory of the Revolution of Dignity in Ukraine in 2014, the main thrust of Kremlin propaganda has been directed at combating the “Ukrainian contagion” – discrediting the Euromaidan and suppressing protest sentiments within Russia – combatting the domestic opposition, and mobilizing Russian society around Putin, the annexation of Crimea, and patriotism.

This rhetoric reached its peak in the second half of 2021, when it became clear that the Kremlin was preparing for something more than a localized operation in eastern Ukraine. A “hysterical” level of public sentiment was artificially maintained, and a sense of “historical injustice” was driven up.

Parallel to these processes, the destruction of Russian civil society and the last free media was taking place. Independent organizations, publications, and journalists were declared “foreign agents” and forced out of the country, with many journalists subjected to persecution and repression. With the onset of the full-scale invasion, control over the media and restrictions on freedom of speech in Russia reached unprecedented levels. Legislation was subjected to large-scale changes, criminalizing criticism of the government, dissemination of information about the war, and actions interpreted as support for the enemy. Punishments were introduced for “fake news” regarding the army (Article 207.3 of the Criminal Code), “discrediting” the army (Article 280.3 of the Criminal Code, Article 20.3.3 of the Code of Administrative Offenses), and calls for sanctions (Article 284.2 of the Criminal Code). According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, as of January 2026, 27 journalists were behind bars in Russia and 25 in Belarus.[3]

Along with Russian propagandists, their Belarusian counterparts participated in preparing for aggression and promoting anti-Ukrainian narratives. Lukashenka’s propaganda fully aligned itself and synchronized with Russia’s in its main themes and actively supports the war. However, in interpreting events unfolding in Ukraine, Belarusian-controlled media outlets have developed their own narratives that distinguish them from Russian propaganda.

While Russian propaganda is fully involved in the war alongside the army and military-political leadership, using its media as a weapon against Ukraine, Belarusian media – despite their obvious support from Russia – do not consider this war “theirs.” They are forced to justify and rationalize the war for their audiences, but they do not want Belarus and its army to be drawn into it.

Over the past two years, Lukashenka – and, following him, regime commentators – has increasingly made statements that could be interpreted as calls for peace talks. At times, his statements allow for notes of compassion or tempering, conciliatory, even friendly tones toward Ukrainians. These statements run counter to Moscow’s propaganda, which categorically calls for the occupation or destruction of Ukraine. It is important to emphasize that these “peacekeeping” tones are by no means dominant. They remain an exception in the flood of disinformation and propaganda against Ukraine.

Lukashenka’s calls for an end to the war do not mean he supports Ukraine, most of all because they are addressed exclusively to Ukraine. He has yet to make a single demand directed at the true instigator of the war – Vladimir Putin.

Lukashenka openly sides with Russia, pressuring the Ukrainian leadership to end its resistance and sign a peace agreement on Moscow’s terms. Lukashenka uses disinformation, manipulation, and fake news as a means of coercion, as will be clearly illustrated by examples in the following sections.

Below, the differences in approaches to covering the war against Ukraine in Russian and Belarusian propaganda are examined. These approaches represent different ideologies in the following substantive areas: attitudes to peace negotiations, to Ukraine, and to the Ukrainian people.

  1. Attitudes to negotiations: “war of annihilation” vs. “room for negotiation”

— Russian propaganda: 1 – calls for occupation, destruction, murder, attacks on civilian cities, lack of empathy, gloating over civilian casualties, glorification of terror, justification of war crimes. 2 – no peace talks (until February 2025)[4]; negotiations possible on Moscow’s terms (from February 2025).

— Belarusian propaganda: 1 – participation in discrediting Ukraine together with Russian media, promoting anti-Ukrainian narratives and Kremlin disinformation. 2 – tempering, conciliatory statements, calls for an end to the war and peace talks. Minsk is offered as a venue for negotiations.

  1. Attitudes to Ukraine: “anti-Russia” vs. “neighboring country”

— Russian propaganda: a “non-existent state,” a threat to Russia, a puppet in the hands of the West. Ukraine’s future is one of being subordinate to Russia, deprived of independence and statehood.

— Belarusian propaganda: Ukraine is a neighboring, friendly, kindred country, captured by Nazis. The West is to blame for the war, pitting Slavic countries against each other.

  1. Attitudes toward Ukrainians: “Russian world” vs. “Slavic family of three nations”

— Russian propaganda: Ukrainians are part of the Russian people and lack their own identity and statehood. Those who persist in their Ukrainian identity and do not recognize themselves as Russian are “infected with the Nazi germ.”

— Belarusian propaganda: Ukrainians are part of a triune family of fraternal Slavic peoples (together with Russians and Belarusians).

For the purposes of this study, propaganda is defined as state information policy aimed not at objectively informing the public with a variety of perspectives, but at instilling false and one-sided perceptions in the audience, prompting reactions and actions that serve the immediate interests of the political regime. Propagandists can easily abandon their own narratives if they suddenly begin to conflict with the changing needs of the government and instead promote those previously considered harmful or even hostile.

Propaganda is a key component, a weapon, and an instrument of the state ideological machine. Without propaganda, the waging of an aggressive war and even the regime itself are impossible. The main generator of pro-Kremlin ideological lines in Belarus is, above all, Alexander Lukashenka.

Belarusian propaganda narratives

iSANS identifies four main groups of propaganda narratives:

— Internal Belarusian – necessary for Lukashenka’s continued rule and which reinforces his image as the country’s only possible leader and as the center of unification and social cohesion. This group also asserts the claim that Belarus cannot exist without a union with Russia.

— Anti-opposition – aims to discredit, weaken, and divide the democratic protest movement and Belarusian democratic forces. The KGB and other Belarusian security agencies often use propagandists as a tool in their information operations against the democratic forces.

— Anti-Ukrainian – aims to create a negative image of Ukraine and its leadership, and to justify Russia’s military aggression. Generally, Belarusian propaganda follows the Kremlin’s ideological principles, which deny Ukraine’s independence, territorial integrity, sovereignty, and its right to exist, and serves as a relay for these principles to Belarusian audiences.

— Anti-Western – built on the image of a hostile “collective West” that dreams of conquering, dividing, or weakening Belarus and undermining its alliance with Russia. Before Donald Trump’s election, the United States was at the center of anti-Western propaganda, but since his election rhetoric toward the U.S. has softened. In the second half of 2025 and early 2026, the greatest attacks were directed at “Europe” as a whole, along with European international organizations, including the European Union, the Council of Europe, the OSCE, and individual European countries, primarily the United Kingdom, Poland, and the Baltic states.

 

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Материал доступен на русском языке: Красные линии беларусской пропаганды: о чем могут и не могут говорить провластные беларусские паблики в Telegram и других социальных сетях

25.06.2026