Key points
- The Zapad-2025 joint strategic drills, the active phase of which took place on September 12-16, became a key event in the combat training of Belarus and Russia in 2025.
- The format of the maneuvers was adjusted: due to the war in Ukraine and Russia’s limited resources, the main role was assigned to the Belarusian army, while the Russian side’s participation was limited. In practice, up to 7,000 military personnel were involved in Belarus, of which about 1,000 were from the Russian Armed Forces. According to official statements from Moscow, a total of about 100,000 military personnel from both countries took part in the joint strategic drills.
- The territory covered by the drills in Belarus included training grounds in Minsk region (Barysauski, Liasishcha, and Svetlaya Roshcha), as well as virtually the entire network of military airfields. In addition to the training grounds, areas where fortified zones had been set up were also actively used.
- Two composite battalions, aviation and airborne units represented the Russian Armed Forces in Belarus, with officers and contract soldiers having combat experience in Ukraine. Belarus deployed a wide range of units, including the Ground Forces, Air Force, Air Defense Forces, and others. Conscripts were drafted from the reserves to participate in the drills.
- Despite the official “defensive rhetoric,” the scenario of the drills included offensive elements: counterattacks, assaults on settlements, and clearing territories of sabotage and reconnaissance groups and illegal armed formations. Drones, including FPV drones, high-precision munitions, EW equipment, and new forms of tactical operations based on the experience of the war in Ukraine were actively used.

Locations of the Zapad-2025 drills
- During the joint strategic drills, the headquarters worked on planning the use of TNW and the Oreshnik missile system. No practical actions with munitions were carried out.
- The drills were accompanied by an active information campaign. Belarus and Russia changed their approaches to positioning them: from exaggeration in 2024 to demonstrating a “reduced scale” in spring 2025 and subsequent toughening of rhetoric. Separate provocations, such as a video showing Iskander systems on a road in Kaliningrad region, became part of informational influence operations. Ukraine, in turn, used alarmist statements about the scale of the maneuvers to mobilize support, although the predictions did not come true.
- On the eve of the active phase (on the night of September 9-10), over 20 Russian UAVs crossed the Polish border, some of them from the territory of Belarus. It looked like a planned operation by Russia to test NATO’s air defense system, which was on high alert. The Belarusian side notified its neighbors about the approaching UAVs, thereby distancing itself from the provocation.
- In general, Zapad-2025 served as a tool for demonstrating the military integration of Russia and Belarus, but showed Moscow’s limited capabilities compared to previous years. Belarus gained the opportunity to study the advanced combat experience of the Russian Armed Forces and to comprehensively apply new technologies of warfare. The inclusion of issues related to the use of TNW in the drills and the conduct of operations with elements of information pressure increased military-political tension and instability in the region.
- Currently, the scenario of a complete withdrawal of Russian troops from Belarus after the drills is being confirmed.
Contents
2. Locations of the joint strategic drills in Belarus
3. Contingent of the Russian Armed Forces involved in the joint strategic drills on the territory of Belarus
4. Units of the Belarusian Armed Forces and the Ministry of Emergency Situations involved in the joint strategic drills
5. Concept and general characteristics of the main episodes of the joint strategic drills
6. Elements and episodes practiced by units of the Belarusian and Russian Armed Forces during the joint strategic drills
6.1 Actions of units of the Northwestern Operational Command
6.2 Actions of units of the Western Operational Command
6.3 Actions of the Air Force, Air Defense Forces, and Russian Aerospace Forces
6.4 Actions of units of the Russian Armed Forces in Belarus
6.5 Actions of units of the Belarusian Armed Forces in Russia
7. Factor of nuclear weapons and the Oreshnik missile system in the joint strategic drills
8. Informational support for the joint strategic drills
9. Russian UAV incursions into Poland on September 9-10 and the context of the joint strategic drills.
If you would like to receive the full version of the report, please contact us at info@isans.org
Материал доступен на русском языке: Совместные стратегические учения «Запад-2025» в Беларуси: масштаб, замысел и основные эпизоды






