The tense international context adds new challenges to the existing collective security system of the West. One of these challenges is the alleged deployment of Russian nuclear weapons in Belarus. Although there is still no evidence of the actual presence of nuclear weapons on the territory of Belarus, this issue is regularly raised by official Minsk and the Kremlin.
At the end of 2024, a new element was added to this discourse – the deployment of the Oreshnik hypersonic missile system. Both topics relate to the elements of the Kremlin’s strategic deterrence, and therefore have a direct relevance to regional security and international arms control mechanisms.
This report contains an update on observations of the discourse of official Minsk on the topics of the deployment of nuclear weapons and the Oreshnik hypersonic system. We have examined statements made by Aliaksandr Lukashenka and other officials. In a number of cases, we refer not to official press services, but to independent media, as they provide more accurate quotes from speakers.
Part 1: From tactical nuclear weapons to hypersonic weapons
The launch of the campaign to deploy the Oreshnik hypersonic system in Belarus in autumn 2024 was not a spontaneous decision, but rather the practical implementation of the Kremlin’s plans, announced several months earlier.
Back in July 2024, in response to U.S. plans to deploy long-range missile systems in Germany by 2026, Vladimir Putin announced Russia’s readiness to take “mirror measures” for their deployment. The Kremlin’s only ally to whom it could supply such weapons was official Minsk.
The existence of joint plans for hypersonic weapons is also evidenced by the fact that Lukashenka spoke about the need to control hypersonic weapons in his speech at the Eurasian Security Conference at the end of October 2024.
Then, on November 21, 2024, Russia struck the Ukrainian Yuzhmash plant in Dnipro with the Oreshnik hypersonic missile system. And on November 28, at the CSTO summit in Astana, Aliaksandr Lukashenka hinted to journalists at the possible deployment of the system in Belarus:
“I joked with the big brother [Russian President Vladimir Putin] and said, ‘The deployment sites are ready. When?’ – We’ll think about it [Putin replied].”
The decision itself was announced at a meeting of the Supreme State Council of the Union State (SSC) in Minsk on December 6, 2024. Against the background of the signing of the Security Guarantees Treaty, which formalized Russia’s “nuclear umbrella” over Belarus, Aliaksandr Lukashenka requested the deployment of the latest Oreshnik hypersonic missile system.
“Please do not consider this presumptuous, but I would like to publicly request that the new weapons systems, and primarily Oreshnik, be deployed on the territory of Belarus. This would significantly reassure certain parties who are already prepared to wage war against Belarus. […] We have (and I am not joking) specific sites where we can deploy these weapons. There is only one condition: the targets for these weapons will be determined by the military and political leadership of Belarus. In the meantime, you will train us to use these weapons, if this is done, so that specialists from the Russian Federation can service and launch Oreshnik warheads at specific targets.”
The threats posed by Western European countries, as well as Poland and Lithuania, were cited as justification. “We consider this to be an even greater danger than that posed by war-torn Ukraine, which is only 15 kilometers away, a stone’s throw from the border. Not only Polish and Lithuanian troops are being deployed there, but NATO troops, including those from Germany, are also being drawn there. We are very alarmed by this. It is already a threat to our joint group.”
Special emphasis was placed on the fact that this weapon has no radioactive impact and does not contaminate the area or objects.
“We are being criticized: nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons – deployed and so on. These are not nuclear weapons, but they are very effective. As you said, under certain conditions, they are comparable to nuclear weapons in terms of the damage they cause, but without any contagion that would lead to the contamination of the territory of the targets being struck.”
Vladimir Putin confirmed his readiness to deploy the systems, describing them as high-precision weapons comparable to nuclear weapons in destructive power but without the radiation consequences. He also outlined the approximate timeline:
“I think this will become possible in the second half of next year: as serial production of such systems increases in Russia and as these missile systems enter service with Russian strategic forces. These systems will enter service with the Strategic Missile Forces of Russia, and at the same time we will begin to deploy them on the territory of Belarus. And, of course, there are a number of technical issues that need to be resolved by specialists, namely determining the minimum range, taking into account the security priorities of the Republic of Belarus.”
An important point is that, based on Putin’s quote, the sites for the system had already been preliminarily analyzed by the time of the public announcement.
“Specialists will have to work on this, but I think that such opportunities exist. Considering that this will require minimal costs: Belarus still has certain infrastructure capabilities from the Soviet Union. Therefore, the deployment of such systems in Belarus will involve minimal costs for infrastructure preparation. And, of course, despite the fact that they will be part of the Strategic Missile Forces of Russia, the military-political leadership of the Republic of Belarus will undoubtedly remain responsible for determining targets on the territory of a potential adversary.”
These issues, according to him, will be discussed in working order. “I can only say right away (specialists understand this well): the shorter the range, the greater the power of the warhead,” Vladimir Putin added.
Thus, Lukashenka’s request to deploy Oreshnik was a public staging to present this decision as an initiative of Minsk. Although, in fact, preparations for such a move had been announced by Russian President Vladimir Putin several months earlier and were used in the context of the Kremlin’s global confrontation with the West (in response to the deployment of American missiles in Germany).
Therefore, the Belarusian side simply adapted to Moscow’s proposed solution, increasing its significance through a proactive stance, as was the case with the initiative to deploy the TNW in Belarus. Putin’s statement that the targets for Oreshnik will be determined by Minsk is a way of creating uncertainty and distributing responsibility in the event of a strike.
Another direction aimed at concealing the imbalance of agency between Moscow and Minsk is the emphasis on the participation of Belarusian enterprises in the production of the missile system. A few days after the announcement, on December 10, 2024, during a trip to Barysau, Lukashenka presented Belarus not simply as the host country, but as a full-fledged participant in production:
“The entire launch system in Oreshnik is Belarusian. Except for the missile. […] Of course, we will build the launch system ourselves. But the Russians will supply us with the missile free of charge.”
In this way, he presented the justification for the deployment of weapons to the Belarusian domestic audience. In addition to the geopolitical response to the actions of the West (“Tomorrow, the Americans and the Germans… will deploy such weapons – medium-range weapons – in Europe. We are doing this as a response”), Belarus was presented as an equal partner, not a satellite following the Kremlin’s instructions.
This justification was used repeatedly in internal discourse going forward. For example, on December 7, 2024, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces Siarhei Lahadzyuk also made a comment pointing to the real reason for the deployment.
“The decision to deploy the Oreshnik system on the territory of the Republic of Belarus was made in response to steps taken by the United States and Germany to deploy medium-range missiles in Europe,” Siarhei Lahadzyuk said.
“We received a task from our Commander-in-Chief: together with Russian specialists, our military-industrial complex will continue to develop this weapon. Active participation in these processes is due to the fact that the level of localization of our enterprises in this system is already very high,” he said.
The thesis about joint control over armaments (including nuclear weapons) was supported by other officials. On December 6, 2024, Aliaksandr Valfovich, State Secretary of the Security Council of Belarus, stated:
“Each president [of Belarus and Russia – ed.] has his own ‘red button,’ his own briefcase and his own nuclear suitcase. […] Only the president of Belarus has the right to use the nuclear weapons deployed in Belarus. And only the president of Russia has the right to use and give orders regarding the weapons located on the territory of Russia.”
This statement is important as it is one of the examples of mirroring Western mechanisms of NATO cooperation (the two-key principle) and giving additional agency to the military-political alliance between Minsk and Moscow. Over the past few years, Lukashenka has repeatedly assured that the decision to use nuclear weapons will only be made jointly. In essence, the Kremlin controls the weapons, while Minsk is responsible for their storage and deployment and, in theory, has the option of refusing to use them.
On December 12, 2024, Chief of the General Staff Pavel Muraveika confirmed that the order regarding Oreshnik had been received and accepted for execution:
“The order is simple: ensure that Oreshnik is deployed on our territory and plan its use wisely.”
It should be noted that the narrative that Oreshnik is not a nuclear weapon presents it as a more humane threat. Since there is no strict control regime for this type of weapon (the INF Treaty was denounced in 2019) and it is not a weapon of mass destruction, it allows for more flexibility in escalating tensions without crossing the red line.
Part 2: Defining the contours and objectives of the operation
After the initial announcement, the emphasis in the rhetoric of official Minsk shifted to justifying the need for this type of weapons for Belarus, as well as inflating its own importance in the deployment issue. In addition, the deployment of Oreshnik played a role in the propaganda campaign for the presidential election in Belarus in January 2025.
On January 26, 2025, while answering questions from journalists after the voting, Aliaksandr Lukashenka voiced his thoughts on the possible location of the deployment for the first time:
“There, closer to Smolensk. That’s what I dream of. And then we’ll see. There has to be a certain distance. It’s bad when your targets are very close. But when they’re very far away, they cannot carry as much payload. That’s why I’m considering somewhere near you [Russia]. Especially since it’s a joint weapon. But I’m not saying it will be near Smolensk. That’s just what I think right now.”
He also shared details about production rates, noting that Russia is unable to produce 10 systems in either two or three years.
“That’s a crazy amount of money, and the Russian industry doesn’t only produce Oreshnik. It won’t be able to. It probably won’t be able to produce that much in two or even three years. I understand that. One Oreshnik system is enough to protect Belarus. But Russia needs them too.”
In addition, he indicated the possibility of refusing to deploy missiles – again in line with Russia’s strategic interests.
“The plans to deploy Oreshnik in Belarus are a response to the desire and possibility of deploying American medium-range missiles in Europe. So if they refuse to do so, then I will say to the big brother: ‘Let’s wait and see.’”
And an important point: Lukashenka did not rule out the possibility of new types of weapons appearing on the territory of Belarus.
“We have enough to defend Belarus. If necessary, we will take something else and ask for something else. Well, if something really extraordinary happens and we need Oreshnik, then we will import it from Russia.”
During his first visit to Moscow in March 2025 after his re-election, Aliaksandr Lukashenka made a number of high-profile statements. These included a joint statement by the presidents of Russia and Belarus, which presented the following position:
“The parties intend to continue coordinating their positions regarding the activities of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its member states aimed at creating challenges and threats to the security and interests of Russia and Belarus, taking countermeasures of a political, diplomatic, military, and military-technical nature, if necessary.
The most destabilizing actions of NATO countries, which provoke serious strategic risks, are, first and foremost, the continuing hostile steps in the context of the Ukrainian crisis, which could lead to direct armed conflict between nuclear powers, plans to deploy American ground-based medium- and short-range missiles in Europe, the build-up of missile defense capabilities, […] as well as the intensification of military activity in areas of contact, the development of schemes and capabilities for so-called joint NATO nuclear missions based on American nuclear weapons deployed in Europe.”
These statements were made in a specific geopolitical context. With U.S. President Donald Trump’s proposal to launch negotiations on Ukraine, the Kremlin planned to resolve a number of other issues. In particular, those related to the dissolution of the INF Treaty and the approaching expiration of the New START Treaty.
Against this background, the Kremlin positioned Belarus as an equal partner in the alliance in order to “mirror” the formats of Western cooperation within NATO. This move was intended to demonstrate that Russia is capable of creating its own military-political alliances, which could be used to strengthen its negotiating position in dialogue with Washington.
However, it is not only the obvious inequality between the partners, the incomparable scale of cooperation between NATO members and members of the Union State that draws attention. The full text of the statement was published on the Russian president’s website. On Lukashenka’s official website, this statement was paraphrased, and there is no mention of coordinating actions against NATO.
This may indicate that official Minsk is somewhat distancing itself from the Kremlin’s global plans and has its own interests related to the political survival of the existing regime. Participation in global geopolitical adventures contradicts the desire to stabilize its position and retain power.
After the formal part, Lukashenka also revealed some information about the pace of production of launchers. “We are currently finishing the production of several launchers intended for Oreshnik.”
At the same time, Lukashenka commented on the plan proposed by Head of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen to rearm Europe at a cost of €800 billion, as well as the “nuclear umbrella” for EU allies proposed by French President Emmanuel Macron.
“They should not lose this ‘umbrella’ over France. Not that they will hold this ‘umbrella’ over the whole of Europe. That is the first thing. Secondly, let them raise their ‘umbrella’ at least over Germany. Or, figuratively speaking, share their nuclear weapons with Germany, their eternal historical enemy. It seems that they have made peace now. Who knows… They have a huge number of grievances against each other. The Poles and the Germans, you know… There are a lot of contradictions there,” Lukahsenka said.
There, Aliaksandr Lukashenka also gave TV presenter Olga Skabeyeva an interview on March 14, 2025. In it, he elaborated on the story of joint production, presenting it as a “discovery” made in a conversation with Putin:
“In response, Vladimir Putin asked whether Aliaksandr Lukashenka knew that Oreshnik was being created jointly by Russia and Belarus. “I said, ‘Wait a minute. Are you trying to pass your promise on to me?’” […] Belarus is indeed manufacturing the launchers, the main basis used for the Oreshnik system. And I am now controlling the production of these launchers. By the end of the year, I believe we will have two launchers ready for deployment.”
Later, on March 18, 2025, Aliaksandr Valfovich, the State Secretary of the Security Council of Belarus, said that the sites for the system had already been prepared and had been preserved since Soviet times.
“The missile system is a product of the Union State, because the base, the main vehicle are manufactured at the enterprises of the military-industrial complex in the Republic of Belarus. The means of destruction, missiles, are manufactured in the Russian Federation. We are completing the manufacture of the required number of these vehicles, which will soon be transferred to the Russian Federation for the installation of means of destruction. Sites have already been prepared for the deployment of this missile system. Although it is mobile, sites have still been designated. We have preserved this practice since Soviet times.”
On May 16, 2025, at a meeting with Russia’s new Defense Minister Andrei Belousov, Aliaksandr Lukashenka announced significant progress.
“We are working very actively on promising types of weapons. […] We are implementing the plan we discussed with Vladimir Putin to deploy the most advanced types of weapons for defense here. These include Oreshnik and so on. We have made significant progress here.”
On May 28, 2025, State Secretary of the Security Council Aliaksandr Valfovich, commenting on the skeptical attitude towards Oreshnik in the West, confirmed the seriousness of the intentions:
“Statements by a number of officials from Ukraine and other leaders that this is a bluff, that none of this is true… Let them comfort themselves with hope. […] We are confident in what we are doing. This weapon will, above all, be a reliable deterrent to any aggression.”
Convincing the domestic audience
Another statement was made on July 1, 2025, in a speech on Independence Day. Aliaksandr Lukashenka named a specific deadline – the end of the year – and again compared Oreshnik to nuclear weapons, presenting it as an alternative to WMD:
“In Volgograd, we agreed with the ”big brother,” Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, that the first positions of Oreshnik would be in Belarus. […] By the end of the year, these weapons will be deployed in Belarus. Then no one will need to fear that Belarus, having nuclear weapons, is ready to strike. Of course, the strike will not be carried out with nuclear weapons.”
But what is interesting is that official reports about the meeting in Volgograd (held in April 2025) only mentioned “industrial cooperation.” This means that the topic is of strategic importance and is regularly discussed by the heads of the two states. Another important point – “the strike will not be carried out with nuclear weapons.” In other words, Oreshnik is still positioned as a deterrent, but one that is less risky than the threat of nuclear weapons.
The main message of his speech was to refute the arguments of his critics that the deployment of hypersonic weapons puts Belarus at risk.
I understand some people who say that by placing nuclear weapons in Belarus, we have put ourselves at risk. That idea came from there [the West]. But name a case in history when a country with nuclear weapons was attacked.
And this is not to fool around and amuse you. I do not want anyone to attack you and my country (as President and Commander-in-Chief, I am responsible for this), as they did before. And I told representatives of the United States of America directly, point-blank: ‘Nuclear weapons exist quietly, peacefully, and are guarded as they should be in the world, but God forbid you set foot on our land without our consent. The response will be instantaneous, immediate, and with the very weapons you fear most’.”
“I am sure that those of our supporters who do not understand this will soon understand it without a war. Therefore, Oreshnik will remain on Belarusian soil. So that there are no rebellions.”
This speech tied together security against external threats, reduced risks compared to nuclear weapons, and internal security (“no rebellions”) into a single narrative.
Meanwhile, preparations were underway in Belarus, according to Deputy Minister of Defense and Chief of the General Staff of the Belarusian Armed Forces Pavel Muraveika.
“I will only say that, as of today, all logistical issues, issues related to the creation, formation, and development of units equipped with Oreshnik have been resolved. Moreover, we have people who are ready to master them, apply them, and interact with our Russian brothers in the functioning of units that have such weapons on the territory of our country.”
The meeting between Lukashenka and Putin on Valaam on August 1, 2025, put an end to speculation on the subject. Lukashenka initiated the dialogue:
“Vladimir Vladimirovich said directly: ‘This year, we must mostly complete these processes…’ Are we still committed to this?”
Putin confirmed that he is still committed and announced that the first serial missile has been produced:
“We have produced the first serial Oreshnik system. The first serial missile. And it has been delivered to the troops. Now the series is up and running. […] Belarusian and Russian military experts have chosen the location for future positions and are now working on their preparation. So, most likely, we will resolve this issue by the end of the year.”
Also, in August, Lukashenka gave an interview to Time magazine, where he again emphasized that the return of nuclear weapons was his initiative and again mentioned that he had signed a corresponding decree on the procedure for their use. “It is in the safes of those who should have it. We clearly understand and know what it is and how to use it. The targets have been determined.” In addition, Lukashenka stated that Oreshnik could also carry nuclear warheads, which contradicts the initial emphasis on the non-nuclear nature of this type of weapon.
In an interview to China Media Group, Lukashenka did not mention nuclear weapons at all, only briefly referring to the Budapest Guarantees that did not work.
But at exactly the same time, at the end of August, State Secretary of the Security Council Aliaksandr Valfovich said that the issue of integrating nuclear warheads into the Belarusian-Chinese Polonez MLRS was being considered. “The range of the missile was 200 km, today it is 300 km. This is a high-precision weapon. Of course, any weapon requires adjustments and modifications. Questions are already being raised about equipping these missiles with nuclear warheads. And how to integrate Oreshnik technology, perhaps into some joint missiles. How to adjust and work in this direction jointly with the Russian side, creating modern missiles.”
Andrei Bahadzel, the deputy head of the General Staff Faculty at the Military Academy of Belarus, also commented on the topic.
“Yes, we will have Oreshnik, yes, we will have the latest missile systems, and we will also be switching Polonez to new missiles, with the possibility of using nuclear weapons,” Bahadzel said.
“But what is fundamentally important here is that we […] need to form a space group that will ensure the targeting and tracking of targets at a depth of more than 5,000 kilometers. And just in case, that includes all of Europe and all of its islands,” he emphasized.
Later, the topic of testing the use of nuclear weapons and the Oreshnik missile system was raised during the Zapad drills, but it was not given much emphasis. However, after the drills, at the end of September, when discussions about the possible transfer of Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine began again, Lukashenka’s press service posted a photo of a model of Oreshnik in Lukashenka’s office. The timing and format were probably not accidental – with the help of its only ally in the region, Moscow signaled to Ukraine’s allies that the potential for threats had not yet been exhausted.
Part 3: Strategic background: Burevestnik, Poseidon, a new era of deterrence
The deployment of Oreshnik in Belarus cannot be viewed apart from the broader context – the campaign of strategic deterrence and show of force launched by the Kremlin in October 2025.
The coordination of actions was directly mentioned on October 18 in a speech by a representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry at a thematic discussion in the First Committee of the 80th session of the UN General Assembly:
“…Russia has to take into account the sharp escalation of threats associated with the West’s policy of inflicting a ‘strategic defeat’ on our country, which could lead to a direct military confrontation between nuclear powers. Our closest allies in Belarus are also experiencing increasing military and political pressure from NATO, including efforts by countries directly bordering the Union State, some of which have long and openly sought to deploy part of the U.S. nuclear arsenal on their territory.
We have shown restraint for a long time. For years, we have been persuading Washington to follow our example and return all nuclear weapons to national territory. In vain. We had to act differently.
The measures taken by Russia and Belarus are of a forced and retaliatory nature, are undertaken strictly within the framework of deterrence, and represent measured steps that are not comparable in scale to NATO’s practices, which are being implemented on the territory of two brotherly countries united in the Union State, forming a single defense space.”
Lukashenka also supported Putin in direct statements. In particular, at the nuclear forum in late October, he commented on Putin’s proposal on the future of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START).
“Today I spoke about nuclear power. Everyone is beating us up: aggressors, co-aggressors, and we are this and that… But we, first and foremost the Russian Federation, are offering the world: here is peaceful nuclear power, let’s develop it, here are peaceful technologies – take them. The same goes for the New START Treaty,” Lukahsenka noted. “No matter how much we talk about various conflicts (it’s bad, people are dying, and so on), God forbid we don’t solve the problem you mentioned [regarding the actions of the New START Treaty – ed.], it will be a disaster. And at this moment, Russia is reaching out to everyone: let’s come to an agreement. If you cannot do it today, let’s extend the treaty for a year and come to an agreement.”
In this regard, journalists made a clarifying remark that the support of U.S. President Donald Trump is very important for solving the problem, followed by a question about what advice Aliaksandr Lukashenka could give him. “I will definitely do that,” Lukashenka replied. “Thank God, I have that opportunity.” In other words, Lukashenka is once again acting as a proxy, conveying Moscow’s point of view on this issue.
On October 26, 2025, Vladimir Putin announced the testing of the Burevestnik missile with a nuclear power unit. Just a few days later, on October 29, 2025, another announcement followed: at a meeting with participants in the war against Ukraine, Putin reported on the successful testing of the Poseidon underwater unmanned vehicle. He emphasized that the Poseidon’s power “significantly exceeds that of the Sarmat missile” and that it is impossible to intercept.
These statements develop the line that the regional decision to deploy Oreshnik is part of the Kremlin’s strategic plans. Burevestnik and Poseidon were positioned as “doomsday” weapons aimed at guaranteed destruction of the enemy and neutralization of the U.S. missile defense system. At the same time, Oreshnik in Belarus became a regional element of the same strategy, aimed at deterring NATO in the European theater of military operations.
Belarusian officials merely reflect these trends, adapting these events to their narrative. Speaking on October 28, 2025, at the III Minsk International Conference on Eurasian Security, Aliaksandr Lukashenka directly linked the deployment of weapons in Belarus to global escalation:
“The deployment of this weapon [Oreshnik] in Belarus is nothing more than a response to the escalation of the situation in the region and current threats. Please, let’s move on from this, and the talk about Oreshnik will stop. But they don’t want to.”
It should also be noted that Lukashenka made a statement at the end of October that nuclear weapons were being taken to Russia for maintenance: “Just so you know, we have exchanged our nuclear weapons again. We took them to Russia and brought back the latest ones. They have been fixed. It is expensive to maintain them. The Russians are helping. We brought them back. We are training how to use them, both from aircraft and as missile weapons. We are not hiding this either.”
Conclusions:
The information campaign built around the Burevestnik and Poseidon missiles is in line with the deployment of the Oreshnik. This once again emphasizes that this is not an isolated act of regional escalation, but part of the Kremlin’s global policy towards the West.
In this construct, Belarus is positioned as a springboard in Russia’s deterrence strategy, where hypersonic weapons (Oreshnik) complement the global threats posed by a new generation of Russian strategic systems. This could be a bargaining chip in potential negotiations with the U.S. on new arms control treaties.
The security guarantees stipulated in Russia’s new nuclear doctrine only reinforce the strategic dependence of official Minsk on the Kremlin. For Lukashenka, such guarantees are both desirable and extremely risky. This narrows his room for maneuver to local, tactical steps.
The inclusion of Belarus in the Kremlin’s plans to counter NATO raises the stakes for Minsk itself, turning its territory into a potential target for a first strike in the event of a full-scale conflict. It is indicative that Lukashenka is aware of these risks and is trying to neutralize them in his narratives to the domestic audience. At the same time, in some aspects of the confrontation with the West, Lukashenka is ready to distance himself from certain aggressive initiatives of the Kremlin, sending conciliatory signals. But in other respects, he remains a projection point for Russia’s forces.
Based on this, there are still risks of deployment of strategic nuclear weapons, restoration of infrastructure, deployment of strategic aviation, etc. In addition, it is possible that new types of weapons currently being developed by Russia could be deployed. There is also still a possibility of a real demonstration of the presence of nuclear weapons on the territory of Belarus in case of extreme necessity. Hypothetically, this could be triggered by the start of discussions on the deployment of nuclear weapons in Poland or the transfer of new long-range weapons to Ukraine.
Furthermore, statements about the possible modernization of Belarusian missiles to enable them to carry nuclear weapons should be noted. Currently, this serves more as a statement to reinforce agency, but it also indicates the long-term plans of official Minsk to develop and instrumentalize this issue in its own interests.
You can read or download the report with observations of the discourse of official Minsk on the topics of the deployment of nuclear weapons and Oreshnik hypersonic system at the link.
Материал доступен на русском языке: Беларусский ядерный миф 2: в тени «Орешника»
