– In March, on the orders of A. Lukashenka, a combat readiness inspection of the Belarusian Armed Forces continued, covering both individual formations and units of the Belarusian Air Force and Air Defense Forces. During the inspection, the condition of equipment and supplies was assessed, as well as the units’ readiness for rapid deployment, their performance of air defense and critical infrastructure protection tasks, and their ability to detect small aerial targets, including UAVs. Based on the results of the combat readiness inspection, the leadership deemed the overall level of combat readiness sufficient, but at the same time confirmed the existence of problematic issues, primarily in the training of some officers and in the detection of targets at low altitudes.
– The Ministry of Defense and the General Staff continued to intensify their combat readiness inspections, culminating in comprehensive drills involving troops of the Western Operational Command. The drills focused on defense, troop command and control, the use of UAVs, EW systems, artillery, and air defense systems, as well as the operations of units at a considerable distance from command posts. According to the Belarusian military leadership, the drills confirmed the troops’ readiness to carry out their tasks and also allowed for the testing of new approaches to reducing the time required to prepare a defensive operation and to establish a command and control system.
– In March, the Belarusian Armed Forces reached a peak in combat training, as evidenced by a series of battalion- and company-level tactical drills, including bilateral ones. The main focus was on conducting defensive and counteroffensive operations, combating sabotage and reconnaissance groups, as well as practicing command and control, communications, camouflage, countering UAVs under conditions of electronic warfare and the use of reconnaissance-strike chains.
– Supplies of new weapons and equipment continued. Units received SV-1000 Stilet sniper rifles, RKhBR-1 Khimera NCB reconnaissance vehicles, as well as 1V228B Arba artillery fire control command-staff vehicles. However, no new plans for the procurement of weapons and military equipment were reported during the month.
– No notable information has been received regarding the development of military infrastructure. There have been indirect indications of the possible formation of a new unit within the Air Force and Air Defense Forces, in particular a helicopter squadron at the 116th Assault Air Base.
– The most notable event in international military cooperation was the visit by the Kyrgyz Minister of Defense, during which the parties discussed prospects for cooperation in military education, the exchange of expertise, and within the framework of the CSTO. At the same time, Minsk maintained contacts with Ethiopia, Vietnam, Russia, Egypt, and CSTO structures, with an emphasis on developing bilateral ties.
– The main event in aviation activity remained the regular deployment of duty aviation forces (nearly 30 sorties in March) on flights from Baranavichy and Machulishchy airfields to intercept UAVs violating Belarusian airspace. Combat use of aircraft against UAVs was also recorded. Additionally, helicopter patrols were noted in the southern and eastern regions of Belarus, as well as the practice of dispersing aircraft as part of a combat readiness inspection.
– The main personnel development was the appointments in the State Secretariat of the Security Council and the Military Academy, which were directly linked to the identified issues in the training of military personnel. The issue of women’s service in the Belarusian Armed Forces was also raised: it was announced that more than 4,000 women were serving, and that recruitment of women into the Military Academy for flight-related specialties had resumed. Furthermore, based on the reported proportion of “contract soldiers” in the Belarusian Armed Forces and the annual conscription quota for compulsory military service, the strength of the Belarusian army can be estimated at more than 72,000 personnel.
– No significant activity on the part of military commissariats was recorded. In the context of the territorial defense, it is worth noting a training on the command and control of the territorial troops, conducted as part of a combat readiness inspection of the Belarusian Armed Forces. A distinctive feature of this exercise was the simultaneous involvement of all six regions and Minsk, indicating that operations involving the territorial troops are already being practiced on a nationwide scale. According to open sources, at least 6,611 people were drafted for various types of military training sessions in January-March.
– The Internal Troops continued to build up their combat capabilities through joint drills with the Belarusian Armed Forces, staff training, counterterrorism drills, and systematic certification of special forces units. At the same time, work is underway to reorganize a number of units: the Buran and Shtorm special forces detachments are being expanded into separate special forces detachments, the 1st Special Operations Brigade is being transformed into an operational-purpose brigade, and the 2nd and 6th Special Operations Brigades are being transformed into special forces brigades. Systematic work continues on training “volunteer” units focused on carrying out assault missions. No information has been received regarding the activities of border guard agencies.
– In the military-industrial complex, the expansion of the production base and the development of new models of equipment were noted. The most notable areas included testing new computing systems, an electric motor for UAVs, an acoustic UAV detection system, the development of the ADUNOK platforms, as well as the integration of AI into the Chekan-V, Quadro-1400, and Quadro-M attack UAVs. In the sphere of military-technical cooperation, the most notable event was A. Lukashenka’s visit to the DPRK, during which Kim Jong Un was presented with a VSK-100B assault rifle.
– No fundamentally new information has emerged regarding the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons and the Oreshnik missile system in Belarus. For instance, the commander of the NATO Force Integration Unit in Lithuania stated that he had no confirmed information regarding the deployment of TNW or the Oreshnik missile system in Belarus. However, this assessment should be taken with caution, as he himself emphasized that he commands a logistics unit and may not have access to all relevant information. On March 13, A. Lukashenka stated that Belarus views Oreshnik exclusively as a defensive weapon, intends to enhance its survivability through mobility and decoys, and that the system itself was purchased from Russia using its own funds.
– The situation in the region bordering Ukraine has not changed significantly. Units of the Special Operations Forces, Air Defense Forces, and Internal Troops continue to be stationed in the region on a rotational basis, carrying out tasks to protect the border, Russian military facilities, and critical infrastructure. The total strength of this force is still estimated at about 1,000 personnel. These units do not pose a military threat to Ukraine. No changes in security legislation were recorded in March.
– Systematic incursions of UAVs into Belarusian airspace continued. According to Ukrainian monitoring channels, at least 111 such incidents were recorded, with the number of Ukrainian UAVs exceeding that of Russian ones for the first time. Throughout the month, reports came in of UAVs crashing and being destroyed on Belarusian territory, including in border regions and deep within the country. The crash of a Ukrainian UAV on March 23 in Vileika district, near the Russian Navy’s 43rd communications node, deserves special attention. The question remains open: was the UAV’s crash near the Russian military facility accidental or an intentional attempt at an attack? According to available information, the Belarusian military is relying on its aviation forces to intercept UAVs.
– The situation regarding the Russian military presence in Belarus remained the same in March. As of April 1, the number of Russian military personnel in Belarus is estimated at about 2,100 people. State media reports confirm the continued presence of Russian troops at Ziabrauka airfield. Arrivals of aircraft of the Russian Aerospace Forces in Belarus remained rare, and as of April 1, no permanent presence of Russian aircraft had been recorded. Some of the flights were related to logistical tasks, including the exchange of prisoners of war that took place between Ukraine and Russia.
Contents
1. Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus
1.1. Combat training
1.2. Rearmament
1.3. Military infrastructure development. Formation of new units
1.4. International military cooperation
1.5. Aviation activity
1.6. Personnel appointments. Staffing and training of specialists
1.7. Military commissariats
1.8. Training of military-trained reserve
2. Other agencies of the state’s military organization
2.1. Internal Troops
2.2. Border Guard Service
3. Work of the military-industrial complex. Military-technical cooperation
4. Tactical nuclear weapons and the Oreshnik missile system in Belarus
4.1. Tactical nuclear weapons
4.2. Oreshnik missile system
5. Legislative changes
6. Situation in the regions of Belarus bordering Ukraine
7. Violation of Belarus’s airspace by UAVs
8. Russia’s military presence in Belarus
8.1. Strength of the Russian group
8.2. Aviation activity
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Материал доступен на русском языке: Обзор военной активности в Беларуси за март 2026
