June brought no fundamental changes to the military situation in Belarus. The Belarusian Armed Forces’ presence near the Ukrainian border remained stable and small, there has still been no credible evidence of the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons or the Oreshnik Missile System, and no permanent Russian Aerospace Forces presence was recorded at Belarusian airfields. However, the month was filled with events reflecting the targeted adaptation of the Belarusian military system to the conditions of a protracted regional confrontation. The main manifestations of this adaptation were the revision of the Armed Forces Development and Buildup Plan for 2026-2030 with an emphasis on air defense and counter-UAV countermeasures, increased mobilization readiness, intensive combat training for the Internal Troops, and the expansion of military-technical cooperation with Russia.
Combat training of the Belarusian Armed Forces corresponded to the logic of the start of the second semester of training with no major maneuvers being conducted and with an emphasis on inducting new reinforcements and maintaining scheduled Notable events included the crossing of the Neman River by approximately eight Western Defense Command battalions near Grodno, with vehicle crossing exercises, airborne training in Special Operations Forces units, and training for mechanized brigade commanders based on driving and shooting standards. At the same time, staff preparations were underway for the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) exercises Indestructible Brotherhood 2026 and Barrier 2026, scheduled for October. The parties agreed on the format, contingent compositions, and conducted reconnaissance of the training grounds.
No major deliveries of new weapons or military equipment were recorded. A key event was the June 18 meeting to amend the Armed Forces Development and Buildup Plan for 2026-2030 (Plan 2030), prompted by the results of a snap combat readiness inspection (January-March 2026). At the meeting, Alexander Lukashenka outlined three priorities: increasing the effectiveness of air defenses, developing counter-UAV capabilities, and improving officer training. The first two areas are still at the ideation stage, with no specific decisions or structural changes having been publicly announced. The very need to revise the plan is indicative of the operational, rather than technical, nature of any shortcomings.
No fundamentally new information about military infrastructure has been received, however several events point to the deepening militarization of civilian infrastructure: the most telling was the announcement of the permanent deployment of military structures at the Belarusian Railways Transportation Control Center, effectively integrating military command into the operational management of rail Defense Minister Viktor Khrenin also confirmed an ongoing review of the unit deployment system, taking into account “current challenges.” A separate development was the publication by Ukrainian President Zelenskyy on June 25 of a map of military and road infrastructure near the Belarusian-Ukrainian border detailing the facilities’ connection to Russia’s war in Ukraine. All of the facilities mentioned were publicly known and the publication did not reveal any fundamentally new information. Following the Plan 2030 meeting, the creation of new branches of the armed forces is being discussed, likely at the intersection of electronic warfare, air defense, unmanned aerial vehicles, and possibly cyber forces.
International military cooperation stood out for being highly active on several levels. In a multilateral format, Khrenin addressed a meeting of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) Council of Defense Ministers, describing the likelihood of military conflict as “extremely high.” Chief of the General Staff Pavel Muraveyko participated in a meeting of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Chiefs of Staff Committee in Astana. Bilaterally, interaction with Azerbaijan (two separate visits in different areas) and Zimbabwe (two delegations on Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) protection and navigation) stands out, as does the visit of the Belarusian delegation to Myanmar focusing on logistics and personnel training. A separate forum was the IV International Anti-Fascist Congress (June 25-27), an event that has a distinct ideological component and which was attended by representatives from approximately 40 countries.
Aviation activity continued to focus on countering UAVs. 35 sorties of alert forces – 25 fighters and 10 helicopters – were recorded over the A notable incident was the redeployment of Su-25 attack aircraft and Mi-24/35 helicopters to operational airfields, though the Ministry of Defense made no official comment. On June 9, a joint training exercise between the Belarusian Armed Forces and the Russian Aerospace Forces was observed in Belarusian airspace when four Russian Aerospace Forces aircraft flew over the Vitebsk Region for about an hour before departing Belarusian airspace. Rotational alert of Mi-24/35M helicopters continued in the Krasnopolsky and Mozyr Districts to cover the suspected positioning area of the Oreshnik Missile System and the Mozyr Oil Refinery.
Several staffing changes were made at the General Staff of the Belarusian Armed Forces. A new Chief of the Main Operations Directorate, Maksim Gakotin, was appointed, and Chief of Staff of Armaments, Vitaliy Shestak, was dismissed due to age. All replacements were made from the internal reserve. At the end of the month, graduations took place at the Military Academy with 133 officers graduating from the General Staff Department and more than 400 from other departments. At the same time, at a meeting on adjusting the Plan 2030, Lukashenka called officer training “issue number one,” noting the gap between formal indicators and the actual quality of training.
The main event in the work of military commissariats was the mobilization exercise with the military commissariats of the Grodno Region (June 17-26) – a record for the number of reservists called up since Up to 500 personnel were planned to be called up from the reserves. In the area of military defense, the annual increase in the number of military personnel liable for training declared by the Chief of the General Staff is noteworthy. By the end of the first half of 2026, at least 8,972 personnel were called up for various types of military training.
The Internal Troops continued their consistent transformation into multifunctional Intensive special forces training was conducted with the involvement of instructors with combat experience. In one of the Internal Troops publications, a retouched flag with the insignia of the Wagner PMC was visible in a photograph, which is the first such evidence seen in a long time. Commander Nikolai Karpenkov outlined a strategy of “heavily armed special forces” with drones, MANPADS, and mortars. Systematic training of the registered personnel and “volunteer” units of the ChEST’ [Eng. – “honor”] association spanned several regions. The Internal Troops also acted as an exporter of skills with officers from the Tajik Ministry of Internal Affairs completing a two-week course in attack drone operators at the Internal Troops Faculty.
Border service agencies focused on scheduled events, including the certification of new recruits in several border detachments and the graduation ceremony of 100 officers from the Border Service Institute. A separate event was the CSTO delegation’s introductory visit to the Bruzgi checkpoint, a section of the Grodno border group, and adjacent infrastructure.
The central event of the military-industrial complex was the 3rd International Exhibition National Security. Belarus 2026 (June 17-19). 127 companies from Belarus, Russia, and China presented approximately 30 new products from the Belarusian military-industrial complex. Steady trends include the simultaneous development of strike and counter-drone capabilities and the expansion of potential in the field of wheeled armored vehicles. Specific developments include the successful testing of a domestic electric motor for the Chekan-V strike UAV and the tender for the Glazomer counter-battery countermeasure device. Military-technical cooperation with Russia deepened both at the regulatory (ratification of amendments to the 2009 agreement expanding the range of authorized procurement organizations) and practical levels, including the participation of Belarusian sappers in demining the Kursk region. India is emerging as a promising direction. The Indian army has acquired 106 kamikaze drones whose characteristics match those of the Belarusian
Reliable confirmation of the actual deployment of tactical nuclear weapons remains absent, however the infrastructure of the 1405th Ammunition Base in the Osipovichi District requires monitoring. No fundamentally new information has been received regarding the Oreshnik missile system. Noteworthy is Zelenskyy’s publication of June 25, in which the Krichev Airfield was publicly identified for the first time as the location of the missile training and combat center of the Russian and Belarusian Armed Forces, along with a unit from the 101st Missile Brigade of the Strategic Missile Forces.
The situation in the border area with Ukraine remained stable. The Belarusian Armed Forces and Internal Troops group on the Ukrainian front maintained its previous composition and strength of approximately 1,000 personnel, primarily performing security functions. Both the Belarusian and Ukrainian sides confirmed there were no signs of preparations for offensive action. Lukashenka’s statement about the “blazing” southern border, addressed polemically to the military, is worth noting, as it points to possible internal departmental disagreements regarding the advisability of a permanent deployment of In the legislative sphere, the Council of the Republic considered a bill on the right of foreign citizens to serve under contract in the Belarusian Armed Forces and the Internal Troops, effectively creating a legal mechanism for the admission of primarily Russian veterans with combat experience.
Violations of Belarusian airspace by UAVs were systematic. At least 150 incursions were recorded over the past month, 146 of which were The issue of repeater systems has become particularly significant. On June 19, Zelenskyy publicly demanded that Lukashenka dismantle four devices in the Gomel and Brest regions that were guiding Russian strikes on Ukraine, setting a deadline of one week. On June 24, Zelenskyy announced the shutdown of the repeaters as of June 22, but acknowledged uncertainty as to whether they had been dismantled or merely temporarily disabled. This episode reflects Ukraine’s mounting pressure on Lukashenka over the use of Belarusian infrastructure for Russian strike operations.
Russia’s military presence remained stable. As of July 1, the number of Russian Armed Forces in Belarus is estimated at approximately 2,200 personnel, unchanged from previous months. No permanent Russian Aerospace Forces presence has been recorded at Belarusian Among the arrivals, the activity of the An-26 aircraft of the State Flight Test Center of Russia’s Ministry of Defense from the Machulishchi Airfield (June 8-12), which was conducting a test flight and calibration of radio-technical equipment, as well as the presumably reconnaissance An-12 from the Lida Airfield (June 16-25), which was carrying out systematic routes along the western border of Belarus, are worth noting.
Contents
1. Armed Forces
1.1. Combat Training
1.2. Rearmament
1.3. Development of Military Infrastructure. Formation of New Units
1.4. International Military Cooperation
1.5. Aviation Activity
1.6. Staffing Changes. Manning of Troops and Training of Specialists
1.7. Military Commissariats
1.8. Preparing a Military-Trained Reserve
2. Other Sections of State Military
2.1. Internal Troops
2.2. Border Service Agencies
2.3. Committee for State Security (KGB)
3. Military-Industrial Complex Activities. Military-Technical Cooperation
4. Tactical Nuclear Weapons and the Oreshnik Missile System in Belarus
4.1. Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs)
4.2. Oreshnik Missile System
5. Legislative Changes
6. Situation in Belarusian Regions Bordering Ukraine
7. Violation of Airspace by Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)
8. Russian Military Presence in Belarus
8.1. Size of Russian Units
8.2. Aviation Activity
9. Appendices
