– In the 2025/2026 academic year, combat training for mechanized units of the Belarusian Armed Forces is being adjusted primarily taking into account the experience of the war in Ukraine. There is an increased focus on countering UAVs and small group operations, expanded cooperation with the border service and the Internal Troops, and an increase in the number of drone operators. Joint staff training of the Belarusian Armed Forces was also conducted as part of the beginning of the academic year.
– On January 16, a combat readiness inspection began on the order of A. Lukashenka. It is publicly positioned as being conducted bypassing the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff. The 969th Tank Reserve Base and the 19th Mechanized Brigade were inspected. During the inspection, equipment was removed from long-term storage at the storage base, and some of it did not meet the established standards. In the 19th Mechanized Brigade, rapid response units were brought to full combat readiness. Positive results were announced, but there are signs of preliminary preparation of the brigade for the combat readiness inspection.
– On January 26, the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff began a comprehensive combat readiness inspection. It includes drafting conscripts, removing equipment from storage, combat alignment, and deployment to staging areas, with an emphasis on camouflage and countering UAVs. According to available information, conscripts are being transported to the 230th combined arms training ground in Brest region.
– Systematic work continued on the rearmament of the Belarusian Armed Forces. It was reported that transport launching vehicles for the S-400 SAM system had been received, indicating the phased transfer of new anti-aircraft missile divizions to Belarus. Deliveries of new Russian-made equipment to Belarus were noted, including BTR-82A armored personnel carriers and repair and evacuation vehicles. The most important event was the transfer of two Su-30SM2 fighters on January 29, which increased the total fleet of the Belarusian Armed Forces to 16 Su-30 family fighters. No plans to purchase new and modernized weapons and military equipment were announced in January.
– In the context of military infrastructure development, it was reported that construction of a military training ground had begun in Homiel region near Yakimauka station. The training ground is intended for the newly formed 37th Air Assault Brigade. At the 4970th engineering ammunition base, open ammunition storage areas were eliminated, reducing their vulnerability to external impacts. No new units were reported to have been formed.
– A key event in international military cooperation was the visit of a delegation of the Ministry of Defense to Myanmar. The parties discussed a draft agreement on military cooperation and agreed on a plan for cooperation in 2026. In other areas, a military cooperation agreement with Zimbabwe was published, and meetings were held between representatives of the Ministry of Defense and representatives of Vietnam, Qatar, the UAE, Cuba, Turkey, and the International Committee of the Red Cross.
– Aviation activity: in January, flights by fighters of the 61st Fighter Air Base at Baranavichy airfield were recorded. Some of the sorties were related to the interception of UAVs violating Belarusian airspace. On January 8, a comprehensive inspection was conducted with the participation of the 50th Combined Air Base, the 61st Fighter Air Base, and the 116th Assault Air Base.
– The main personnel change was the appointment of Aliaksandr Ilyukevich as the new Commander of the Special Operations Forces. His predecessor, Vadzim Dzenisenka, who held the position from January 11, 2014, to January 9, 2026, was dismissed and transferred to the reserve. In the context of specialist training, it is worth noting the comprehensive training of UAV operators-explosives experts at the Mine Action Center, including the training of conscripts.
– No significant activity by military commissariats was recorded. In terms of the territorial defense, inspections were carried out in Vileika district and staff training was conducted under the leadership of the deputy chief of the General Staff. According to open sources, at least 100 people were drafted for various types of training sessions in January.
– The most notable event in the activities of the Internal Troops was the combat readiness inspection of the units. During the inspection, particular emphasis was placed on the use of drones and countermeasures against them. Systematic training of “volunteers” from the Chest’ association continues.
– Further strengthening of the combat capabilities of border guard units on the border with Ukraine has been announced: this year, five more border outpost complexes are planned to be built in the Ukrainian direction. Two activities have been noted regarding emergency response and civil defense units. Trainings on the emergency distribution of reserve medicines and medical supplies, which had not been publicly announced, were held in all regions of Belarus. An alert system test was also conducted in Homiel region.
– The main news in the activities of the State Security Committee was the BELPOL investigation into the Alfa special forces unit. It states that in November 2022, a photo of the Ukrainian Korsar anti-tank system was taken at the unit’s base. The origin of the trophy may indicate the participation of Belarusian security forces in hostilities in Ukraine, but no additional evidence is provided. Previously, there have been cases in Belarus of the display and use of trophy weapons and equipment captured during the war.
– No significant information about the work of the military-industrial complex was received. The most notable event in military-technical cooperation was the visit of a delegation from the State Authority for Military Industry to Chad and Ethiopia, where memoranda and roadmaps for cooperation were signed. There were also reports of deliveries of UAVs and electronic warfare equipment to Ethiopia, as well as deliveries of UAVs to India.
– No fundamentally new information has emerged regarding the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus. During the month, officials and politicians made no noteworthy statements. In the context of the deployment of the Oreshnik missile system, the Community of Railway Workers of Belarus reported that a unit of the Russian Armed Forces with equipment arrived at Krychau airfield on December 18-20, 2025. However, there are no signs of Oreshnik launchers being delivered to Belarus yet. Analysis of satellite images leads to a similar conclusion. However, this does not negate another fact: a new Russian military facility has appeared on Belarus’s map.
– In the context of legislative changes, it is worth noting that on January 9, a decree was signed introducing a new administrative procedure for men aged 18-27. From February 11, when obtaining or exchanging a passport, ID card, driver’s license, and gun permits, a certificate from the military commissariat regarding military liability will be required. This measure strengthens the military commissariats’ control over conscripts and makes it more difficult for citizens living abroad to renew their documents. This may indirectly indicate problems with conscription.
– The situation on the border with Ukraine has not changed significantly. Another rotation of units of the Special Operations Forces was recorded in Homiel region, as well as the presence of units of the Special Operations Forces in Luninets district. It was also reported that air defense units were deployed on the territory of the Mazyr Oil Refinery. The number of the Belarusian Armed Forces and Internal Troops in southern Belarus is still estimated at around 1,000 people. This group is not considered a military threat to Ukraine. No changes were recorded on the border with NATO member states. No redeployments have been recorded in the western direction (Poland, Lithuania, Latvia).
– Systematic incursions of drones (mainly Russian) into Belarusian airspace continued. Ukrainian monitoring channels recorded at least 38 cases in January. The share of incursions in January amounted to ≈0.77% of the total number of launches against Ukraine. During the month, there were reports of a drone crash in Dobrush on January 26. The Belarusian military confirmed that targets had been destroyed using the Tor-M2K SAM system and that the Internal Troops had been deployed to search for the crashed aircraft. Belarusian officials publicly acknowledge the problem and the need to improve their response to drone incursions.
– The situation with the Russian military presence in Belarus hasn’t changed in January. As of February 1, the number of Russian military personnel in Belarus is estimated at about 2,100.
– The aviation activity of the Russian Aerospace Forces was insignificant. In January, only one transport aircraft was recorded arriving at Baranavichy airfield, which could be related to the delivery of another batch of Su-30SM2 fighters. No arrival of passenger aircraft was recorded. At the end of January, a Mi-8 helicopter arrived at Machulishchy airfield from Pskov; the purpose of its arrival is unknown. As of February 1, the helicopter was still in Belarus.
Contents
1. Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus
1.1. Combat training
1.2. Rearmament
1.3. Military infrastructure development. Formation of new units
1.4. International military cooperation
1.5. Aviation activity
1.6. Personnel appointments. Staffing and training of specialists
1.7. Military commissariats
1.8. Training of military-trained reserve
2. Structural components of the state’s military organization
2.1. Internal Troops
2.2. Border Guard Service
2.3. Emergency response units. Civil defense
2.4. State Security Committee
3. Work of the military-industrial complex. Military-technical cooperation
4. Tactical nuclear weapons and the Oreshnik missile system in Belarus
4.1. Tactical nuclear weapons
4.2. Oreshnik missile system
5. Legislative changes
6. Situation in the border regions of Belarus
6.1. Border with Ukraine
6.2. Border with NATO member states
7. Violation of Belarus’s airspace by Russian UAVs
8. Russia’s military presence in Belarus
8.1. Strength of the Russian group in Belarus
8.2. Aviation activity
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Материал доступен на русском языке: Обзор военной активности в Беларуси за январь 2026
