– In February, on the initiative of A. Lukashenka, a combat readiness inspection continued, involving rapid response units from four formations, as well as separate combat support units. The inspection focused on practicing marches, occupying strongholds, countering sabotage and reconnaissance groups and UAVs, and, in a broader sense, practicing elements of maneuverable defense. In addition, the condition of equipment in long-term storage was inspected. Public statements by A. Lukashenka and A. Valfovich emphasized the political and practical significance of these events.
– The Ministry of Defense and the General Staff continued to gradually build up combat readiness inspection with the deployment of a number of units of the Western Operational Command, including the command headquarters, the 6th Mechanized Brigade, a communications regiment, an engineering brigade, and a reserve regiment for march replenishment. A distinctive feature of this stage was the early draft of reserve officers, which was intended to ensure that command personnel were prepared in advance to take up their posts and train personnel. At the same time, reports on social media pointed to organizational problems and elements of chaos in the work of the mobilization deployment system.
– No reports of rearmament in the Belarusian Armed Forces were received in February, but previously completed deliveries and modernization of equipment became known. At the same time, plans for further weapons renewal have been confirmed, including the readiness of the 377th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment to rearm with S-400 SAM systems and the continuation of serial modernization of vehicles, SAM systems, and MLRS. Overall, the focus remains on modernizing and extending the service life of Soviet-made equipment, adapting it to modern conditions, and gradually re-equipping units where modernization is no longer feasible (e.g., in aviation).
– In the context of military infrastructure development, the Ministry of Defense confirmed that the fuel supply system is being developed, including by increasing the survivability and security of fuel service facilities. Special attention is being paid to protecting such facilities from UAVs. No information was reported on the formation of new units.
– A key event in international military cooperation was a briefing by the leadership of the Department of International Military Cooperation of the Ministry of Defense for foreign military attaches. The Ministry of Defense continues to promote the thesis of growing confrontation in the region, while at the same time declaring its interest in normalizing security and restoring contacts with European countries and the U.S. At the same time, Belarus has been developing military cooperation with its key partners, primarily Russia, China, the CIS and CSTO countries, and Zimbabwe.
– The main aviation activity remained the regular deployment of duty aviation forces for flights from Baranavichy and Machulishchy airfields, including to intercept UAVs violating Belarusian airspace. This included the combat use of aircraft against UAVs on the night of February 17-18 in the vicinity of Minsk, as well as the interception of a weather balloon with telecommunications equipment on February 18. In addition, as part of the drills, the temporary relocation of aircraft to operational airfields was practiced.
– The key personnel change was the appointment of Uladzimir Safonau as Chief of Staff – First Deputy Commander of the Special Operations Forces. In terms of staffing, the Belarusian Armed Forces continued to emphasize their high level of staffing: according to the Minister of Defense, the army is “65% contract-based.” In terms of the training of specialists, contacts were recorded between commanders at the tactical level and participants in the war against Ukraine on the side of the Russian Armed Forces.
– No significant activity by military commissariats was recorded. The main activity was the annual mobilization readiness exercises led by the chairmen of regional executive committees, aimed at practicing the formation of territorial troops and national home guard detachments. According to open sources, in January-February, more than 6,000 people were drafted for various types of military training sessions.
– The Ministry of Defense continued to train surgeons from civilian healthcare institutions to treat gunshot wounds. This practice may indicate a more pronounced focus of the healthcare system on working in times of crisis, including wartime.
– In the Internal Troops, the main focus of combat training shifted to operations in modern threat conditions, including repelling attacks on military facilities, the use of UAVs, engineering support, and command of assault units, taking into account the experience of the war in Ukraine. At the same time, the development of new weapons and equipment continued, primarily the BTR-82A APCs and the RPO-A Shmel rocket-propelled infantry flamethrowers. Systematic training of “volunteer” units was also noted.
– Key events in the work of the military-industrial complex included the summary of the work of the State Authority for Military Industry for 2025 and a meeting on the development of ammunition production. The authorities announced an increase in production and exports, the continued development of new air defense and EW systems, and the production of artillery ammunition. In the field of military-technical cooperation, joint work with Russia on improving camouflage and successful combat launches of the modernized Pechora SAM system for a foreign customer were noteworthy.
– No fundamentally new information emerged regarding the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus. Officials and politicians made no notable statements during the month. In the context of the deployment of the Oreshnik missile system, new facts emerged regarding infrastructure development in the area of Krychau airfield. There have been reports of air defense units being deployed around the airfield, the possible presence of EW equipment, and the construction of storage facilities for equipment. However, there is no confirmation that launchers have been delivered to Belarus, and some of the observed objects may be false.
– The situation on the border with Ukraine has not changed significantly. Units of the Special Operations Forces, Air Defense Forces, and Internal Troops continued to be stationed in the region, performing security, facility protection, and service duties on a rotational basis. The total number of the group is still estimated at around 1,000 people. There were no signs of an offensive threat to Ukraine. The situation hasn’t changed in the western direction (Poland, Lithuania, Latvia). No redeployments of troops were recorded in the border areas, except for the temporary deployment of individual units to “resistance nodes” as part of the combat readiness inspection.
– Systematic incursions of UAVs (mainly Russian) into Belarusian airspace continued. There has also been an increase in the number of Ukrainian UAVs transiting the country during strikes against the territory of Russia. Ukrainian monitoring channels recorded at least 52 cases in February (11 of which were Ukrainian UAVs). The share of incursions in February amounted to about 0.81% of the total number of launches against Ukraine. During the month, there were reports of one UAV being shot down near Homiel on February 26. The Belarusian authorities and military demonstrated growing concern about the threat posed by UAVs. Ukrainian representatives repeatedly stated that Belarusian infrastructure was being used to provide technical support for the launch and routing of Russian UAVs.
– The situation with the Russian military presence in Belarus remained unchanged in February. As of March 1, the number of Russian military personnel in Belarus is estimated at about 2,100. Arrivals of aircraft of the Russian Aerospace Forces in Belarus remained rare, and as of March 1, no permanent presence of Russian aircraft was recorded. Some of the flights were probably related to non-military or logistical tasks, but the arrival of an An-12 aircraft in Machulishchy and Homiel could indicate a rotation of the Russian contingent in Homiel region.
Contents
1. Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus
1.1. Combat training
1.2. Rearmament
1.3. Military infrastructure development. Formation of new units
1.4. International military cooperation
1.5. Aviation activity
1.6. Personnel appointments. Staffing and training of specialists
1.7. Military commissariats
1.8. Training of military-trained reserve
1.9. Preparation of healthcare facilities for treating gunshot wounds
2. Other agencies of the state’s military organization
2.1. Internal Troops
2.2. Border Guard Service
3. Work of the military-industrial complex. Military-technical cooperation
4. Tactical nuclear weapons and the Oreshnik missile system in Belarus
4.1. Tactical nuclear weapons
4.2. Oreshnik missile system
5. Legislative changes
6. Situation in the border regions of Belarus
6.1. Border with Ukraine
6.2. Border with NATO member states
7. Violation of Belarus’s airspace by UAVs
8. Russia’s military presence in Belarus
8.1. Strength of the Russian group
8.2. Aviation activity
If you would like to receive the full version of the report, please contact us at info@isans.org
Материал доступен на русском языке: Обзор военной активности в Беларуси за февраль 2026
