May brought no dramatic changes to the military situation in Belarus. There was no significant buildup of forces near the Ukrainian border, no permanent presence of Russian Aerospace Forces aircraft, or credible confirmation of the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons or the Oreshnik missile system. However, the events of May indicate further adapting of the Belarusian military system to the situation of a protracted regional confrontation. The primary manifestations of this are anti-UAV countermeasures, nuclear force training, territorial defense development, and the strengthening of Russian military infrastructure in Belarus.
– Combat training of the Belarusian Armed Forces focused on more exercises on mobilization deployment, crisis response, and the use of the armed forces in the face of modern threats. A key event was the training of military units in the combat use of nuclear weapons and nuclear support. This included practicing operations from unprepared areas, stealth, long-distance movements, and interaction with the Russian military. Exercises were also conducted with technical and logistics support units, a tactical flight exercise for the Air Force and Air Defense Forces, and interdepartmental exercises on actions following the retaking of populated areas.
– There were no major deliveries of new weapons or military equipment to the Belarusian Armed Forces. However, targeted modernization continued in several areas: UAVs, communications equipment, radars for air defense units, and medical and command vehicles. Regarding future purchases and deliveries, it is worth noting the continued modernization of communications equipment along with an expanding of the supply of special vehicles based on the Manul universal combat platform.
– There has been little information on significant developments in military infrastructure, the exception being more precise information regarding the infrastructure of the Oreshnik missile system’s position. At the same time, there have been reports of the formation of new units in the Belarusian Armed Forces. For example, it is possible that the 285th Information Security Center has been established in Grodno. Furthermore, the new Military Unit 97116, formed in 2024 and the work of which may be related to the use of UAVs, began public activity in 2026.
– International military cooperation developed along lines previously identified, including contacts with countries in the post-Soviet space, the “far arc” [trans. note – a diplomatic and foreign economic term used in Belarus to refer to states in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America, and individual European partners]. The most notable interaction was with Azerbaijan and Myanmar. Belarusian-Serbian consultations, which resulted in the agreement on a military cooperation plan for 2026, are of particular note.
– Aviation activity was primarily related to countering UAVs. Forty-three flights of fighter jets and helicopters from the alert force were recorded together with instances of combat use of aircraft to destroy UAVs. Mi-24/35M helicopters continued to be on alert in the Krasnopolsky and Mozyr districts, as they provide protection from UAVs for the Oreshnik missile launch site and the Mozyr Oil Refinery. In addition, aviation forces were actively involved in nuclear force training and tactical flight exercises for the Air Force and Air Defense Forces. These exercises included relocation to operational airfields and intensive flight operations.
– The most notable staffing change was the retirement of Major General Sergei Lagodyuk, Chief of the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff, due to his age. Regarding troop recruitment, the results of the spring conscription campaign are worth noting. In May, over 12,000 new recruits from the Belarusian Armed Forces, Internal Troops, and the Special Operations Forces took the military oath. The discrepancy with formerly announced conscription plans likely reflects the inclusion of contract servicemen who began their service in the Belarusian Armed Forces.
– The key event regarding military enlistment offices was the intensification of troop recruitment. Training sessions for those called up for military service were held in the Lida, Lepel, and Chashniki districts. Training sessions for reserve officers for troop recruitment units were held in the Mogilev and Minsk regions. Separately, the establishment of a recruitment training center in Borisov and the ongoing conscription of reserve officers for military service are worth noting. According to open sources, at least 7,971 people were called up for various types of military training in January-May.
– The Internal Troops continued to build up their combat potential through intensive combat training and classes with instructors with combat experience. The primary focus was on counter-sabotage and assault operations, small-group work, tactical medicine, and the use of UAVs. At the same time, a system for training “volunteer” formations and assigned personnel for wartime missions was developed.
– The border service focused on developing infrastructure on the Belarusian-Ukrainian border. This was demonstrated by the commissioning of a new border outpost in the Bragin district, as well as the further fortification of units providing border security.
– The military-industrial complex focused on preparing for the next stage of rearmament of the Belarusian Armed Forces and developing its own production niches. Priorities remained electronic warfare, counter-battery warfare, reconnaissance, communications, small air defense, missile production, UAV countermeasures, and fire-control systems. At the same time, Belarus continued to develop technical military cooperation with foreign clients, including Eastern Libya, Myanmar, and an unidentified purchaser of modernized Osa air defense systems.
– In May, no reliable confirmation emerged of the actual deployment of tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) or the Oreshnik missile system in Belarus. However, reports of the arrival of a Russian military convoy at the Krichev Airfield and the development of rail infrastructure there indicate a strengthening of a Russian military presence. The nature of the facility allows the airfield to be considered not only for the possible deployment of the Oreshnik missile system, but also as a potential logistics hub for the Russian Armed Forces in Belarus.
– The situation in the border area with Ukraine has not changed fundamentally. Units of the Belarusian Armed Forces and the Internal Troops, numbering approximately 1,000 personnel, remained stationed there and pose no military threat to Ukraine. At the same time, the Belarusian-Ukrainian border remained a prominent topic for public rhetoric. Ukraine spoke of possible provocations and the risks of Russia using Belarusian infrastructure, but did not record any signs of preparations for an invasion. Overall, rhetoric around the border has become more escalatory. However, the discussion remains primarily focused on theoretical threats. No changes in security legislation were recorded.
– UAV violations of Belarusian airspace remained systematic. At least 154 incidents were recorded, 131 of which were Russian UAVs. Belarus responded with combat use of aircraft, the diversion of a civilian flight due to the “Kovyor” plan, and increased protection of defense industry facilities from UAVs. At the same time, uncertainty remains surrounding the possible use of Belarusian infrastructure to support Russian drone attacks on Ukraine.
– The situation regarding the Russian military presence in Belarus has not changed. As of June 1, the number of Russian troops in Belarus is estimated at approximately 2,200. There have been no signs of increased Russian Aerospace Forces flights to Belarus. A permanent Russian air force presence at Belarusian airfields has also not been observed. The most notable event was the brief arrival of two MiG-31Ks at Machulishchi Airfield. This could have been related to nuclear exercises or intended as a demonstration against Ukraine.
Contents
1. Armed Forces
1.1. Combat Training
1.2. Rearmament
1.3. Development of Military Infrastructure. Formation of New Units
1.4. International Military Cooperation
1.5. Aviation Activity
1.6. Personnel Appointments. Manning of Troops and Training of Specialists
1.7. Military Commissariats
1.8. Preparing a Military-Trained Reserve.
2. Other Sections of State Military
2.1. Internal Troops
2.2. Border Service Agencies
3. Military-Industrial Complex Activities. Military-Technical Cooperation
4. Tactical Nuclear Weapons and the Oreshnik Missile System in Belarus
4.1. Tactical Nuclear Weapons
4.2. Oreshnik Missile System
5. Legislative Changes
6. Situation in the Regions of Belarus Bordering Ukraine
7. Violation of Airspace by Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)
8. Russia’s Military Presence in Belarus
8.1. Size of Russian Units
8.2. Aviation Activity
