Summary
July saw the military situation in Belarus unchanged. The forces on the Ukrainian front remained unchanged in both composition and strength, no credible confirmation of the actual deployment of tactical nuclear weapons or the Oreshnik missile system emerged, and no changes to security legislation were recorded. At the same time, the month was replete with decisions that significantly furthered the already established trajectory of the Belarusian military system’s adaptation to the protracted regional confrontation.The month saw significant equipment deliveries to troops, a reshuffling of the senior military command, and the first public instance of the use of military training as an administrative sanction in the civilian sphere. Themain manifestations of the month were rearmament, primarily through the upgrade of Soviet-era models, the inclusion of unmanned aerial vehicles and counter-drone training as mandatory components of combattraining, staffing changes in the leadership of the Ministry of Defense, the expansion of non-core functions for military commissariats, and a shift from international military cooperation to bilateral cooperation with countries in the “far arc” [ed. – developing nations in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America outside of traditional regional neighbors and core Western markets].
- Combat training remained within the planned second semester cycle during which no major maneuvers were conducted and with the bulk of the training focused on unit coordination, control exercises, and tactical exercises at the platoon and battery levels. The substantive emphasis consistently repeated acrossunits was in the use of and countering unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) as a mandatory element of training, camouflage, fortification equipment, and unit survivability. The linkages between and consolidation of the artillery and drone crews as a standard form of fire engagement indicates a progressive transfer of experience from the war in Ukraine.
- In terms of weapons deliveries, July was significantly more intensive than May and June. The most significant event was the delivery of the first battalion complement of T-72BM2 tanks to the 11th Mechanized Brigade. Judging by photos published, the upgrade does not include standard anti-UAV defenses. Separately, the 1st Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment announced the start of replacing the S-300 air defense system with the S-400 – the first public confirmation of a specific unit’s transition to the new system – which indirectlysupports the announcement of future deliveries of the S-400 and Buk-MB2.
- Military infrastructure development was limited to repairing and upgrading existing facilities, with the bulk of funds going toward hard surfaces in parks and military camps and the construction of standard shelters for equipment storage. All information about the forming of new units concerned theSpecial Operations Forces, including the forming of the 109th and 114th separate airborne assault battalions, temporarily assigned to the 103rd and 38th brigades. Both battalions are likely intended for the newly formed 37th Airborne Assault Brigade, which could be completed by the end of 2027.
- International military cooperation has clearly shifted towards bilateral formats. Only working and expert-level events were observed within the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the mostsignificant of which was the second round of staff negotiations on the autumn cycle of exercises, and there were no contacts with NATO states. The most concentrated direction was Pakistan, with an exchange of visitsby the Air Force Commander and the Chief of the General Staff within one The Chinese track looksqualitatively new. In addition to an agreement for training military personnel at the Military Academy, a delegation of the Information Support Forces of the People’s Liberation Army of China visited Belarus to discuss the construction of communication systems, cybersecurity, and the protection of control systems. The program of the visit of the Chief of the General Staff of the Azerbaijani Armed Forces was shifted fromformalities to a demonstration of military-industrial complex products and “drone competencies.”
- Aviation activity remained focused on countering UAVs with 18 sorties by alert forces – 10 Su-30SM/SM2 fighters and eight helicopters – were recorded during the This represents a downward trend, from eight sorties in the first five days of the month to two in the week of July 20-26. Rotational combat duty of Mi-24/35M helicopters continued in the Krasnopolsky and Mozyr Districts, including to cover the Oreshnik Missile System position area and the Mozyr Oil Refinery. No other significant aviation activity was recorded.
- Staffing changes affected the highest level of military command and were the most extensive inrecent In less than a month, two deputy defense ministers, the head of the Main Directorate of Combat Training, and the Commander of the North-Western Operational Command troops were replaced. Vladimir Bely was appointed Deputy Defense Minister, Alexander Mosolov was appointed Deputy Minister for Logistics, and Dmitry Bitny was appointed head of the Main Directorate of Combat Training. All replacements were made from the internal reserve, and the position of commander of the North-Western Operational Command troops remained vacant at the end of the month. These changes appear to be acontinuation of the May meeting between Lukashenko and Viktor Khrenin, which was dedicated to staffing issues and the results of the combat readiness inspection.
- Military enlistment offices were operating in three traditional areas, but a distinctive feature of the month was the emergence of a non-core task. Beginning July 22, military enlistment offices in all regions wereinvolved in monitoring the harvest campaign, and conscription for military training was publicly linked to labordiscipline in This is the first time that the mechanism of training has been openly used as a sanctionfor violations in the civilian sphere. At the same time, field visits to businesses were used to verify human andtransport mobilization resources. In the area of military defense, the most significant event was the trainingcamp for military personnel liable for military service in the Malorita and Drohichyn Districts bordering Ukraine (July 7-31), with a final exercise on July 26-28, where special attention was paid to counter-UAV combat. Material support for military defense continued to be funded through local budgets. Since the start of the year, 15 district and city executive committees have purchased at least 3,800 bulletproof vests. In July, atleast 439 people were called up for military training, and since the beginning of the year at least 9,411.
- The Internal Troops spent a month in intensive combat training mode. Two training sessions withspecial forces units were held, including under the guidance of instructors with combat experience. The culmination of this was the Ministry of Internal Affairs’ comprehensive command and staff exercise on July 29-30 in the Grodno Region. Significantly, the most challenging scenario involved suppressing mass riots during the seizure of a facility, and the actions, according to the Minister of Internal Affairs, were based on an analysis of the events of 2020. In parallel, planned work was conducted with “volunteer” units and assignedpersonnel that focused on firearms, tactical and military medical training, and the use of UAVs.
- No significant changes were recorded in the work of border service agencies in
- The military-industrial complex focused on maintaining Soviet-made equipment. The extensive upgrade of the Osa SAM system’s transporter-loader vehicle to the 9T217-1B standard is indicative, while thesystemic upgrade of all components of the military is Military-technical cooperation developed along two lines – the institutional deepening of ties with Russia (the submission to the State Duma of a protocolamending the Military-Technical Cooperation Agreement and a meeting between Dmitry Pantus and the head of Rosoboronexport) and the diversification of contacts in South and Southeast Asia, including Indonesia, Myanmar, and the approved draft agreement with India on the mutual protection of classified information,which usually precedes more sensitive areas. At the same time, military rail transport statistics indicate a sharp decline in arms deliveries from Russia, with no arms or ammunition imported at all from January to April 2026. Cooperation with Eastern Libya continues to expand. The completion of the first year of training for Libyan cadets at the Border Service Institute has been supplemented by evidence of the delivery of armored personnel carriers, small arms, and upgraded Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS) to the Libyan National Army.
- No fundamentally new information has emerged regarding the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons, and reliable confirmation of their actual deployment does not exist. Among political statements,Alexander Lukashenko’s speech on July 6 stands out, once again characterizing tactical nuclear weapons not as “junk” but as a serious factor in strategic deterrence.
- The situation in the border area remained stable. The Armed Forces and Internal Troops contingent on the Ukrainian front maintained its previous composition and strength – approximately 1,000 personnel, excluding border services – and performed primarily security missions. The most notable change was not any difference in force configuration, but the shift in rhetoric. On July 22, Viktor Khrenin characterized the military-political situation as stable and stated that there were no signs of preparation for an attack, a marked departure from his assessments from May-June and on July 26, Alexander Volfovich publiclyexpressed similar The shift in two security officials to reassuring language within a single week, despite any changes in force configuration, deserves attention as a possible sign of a conscious adjustment inthe public narrative. No changes to security legislation were recorded in July.
- Violations of Belarusian airspace by drones remained At least 107 incursions were recorded this month, 99 of which were Russian and with 83 of them heading towards Ukraine. The key story of the month, however, was the fate of the retransmitter stations. A combination of indirect indicators suggests that Ukraine has shifted to targeted kinetic strikes on such facilities and has disabled at least one retransmitter station in the Brest Region and two in the Gomel Region. A substantive confirmation of this was the unusual tender by MTS for the complete restoration of a destroyed 39-meter structure in the village of Tonezh, Lelchitsy District.
- The Russian military presence has remained unchanged. As of August 1, the number of Russian Armed Forces in Belarus is estimated at approximately 2,200 personnel, with S-400 battalions from the 1530th stationed at the Mozyr and Zyabrovka Airfields. The most notable indicator of the month was the complete absence of Russian Aerospace Forces aircraft arrivals. In three and a half years of observation, thishad only been observed once, in January A permanent Russian air presence at Belarusian airfields was also not observed. This zero figure alone does not indicate a change in the nature of cooperation andnecessitates an assessment together with data from subsequent months. No fundamentally new informationregarding the Oreshnik Missile System was received. Reliable information regarding the delivery of launchers remains unavailable. The system is operated by Russian Armed Forces personnel and the BelarusianArmed Forces are responsible for securing the launch site.
Contents
1. Armed Forces
1.1. Combat Training
1.2. Rearmament
1.3. Development of Military Infrastructure. Formation of New Units
1.3.1. Development of military infrastructure
1.3.2. Formation of new units
1.4. International Military Cooperation
1.4.1. Cooperation with regional organizations
1.4.2. Bilateral cooperation
1.5. Aviation Activity
1.6. Staffing Changes
1.7. Military Commissariats
1.8. Preparing a Military-Trained Reserve
2. Other Sections of State Military
2.1. Internal Troops
2.2. Border Service Agencies
3. Military-Industrial Complex Activities. Military-Technical Cooperation
4. Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Belarus
5. Changes in Legislation
6. Situation in the Regions of Belarus Bordering Ukraine and NATO Countries
7. Violation of Belarusian Airspace by Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)
8. Russia’s Military Presence in Belarus
8.1. Size of Russian Forces
8.2. Aviation Activity
8.3. Deployment of the Oreshnik Missile System in Belarus
9. Appendices
