— The Zapad-2025 joint strategic drills became the main event in the combat training of Belarus and Russia in 2025. Up to 7,000 military personnel were involved (including 1,000 from the Russian Armed Forces) in Belarus. The maneuvers took place at training grounds in Minsk region. The Belarusian Armed Forces involved a wide range of forces in the drills, while the Russian Armed Forces involved two composite battalions and aviation. The military practiced planning the use of TNW and the Oreshnik missile system (without practical actions). The drills were accompanied by an intensive information campaign. Overall, the maneuvers confirmed the military integration of Minsk and Moscow, giving Belarus the opportunity to learn from advanced combat experience.
— A series of CSTO drills (Vzaimodeystviye-2025, Poisk-2025, and Echelon-2025) has come to an end. The military practiced blocking and storming an illegal armed formation camp, reconnaissance, fire damage, and the elimination of sabotage and reconnaissance groups and illegal armed formations. Logistics units deployed a mobile field bakery unit, ensured the delivery of ammunition, organized an anti-drone “corridor” and medical evacuation by rail. Reconnaissance groups conducted searches and set up ambushes. After the drills were completed, the participants returned to their permanent deployment points.
— In September, the aviation activity of the Belarusian Air Force included regular sorties to intercept Russian UAVs: Mi-24/35 helicopters from Machulishchy airfield (September 2, 3, 6, 7, 10, 14) and fighters from Baranavichy airfield (September 6, 7, 9-13, 22, 23, 30). The peak of activity was during the Zapad-2025 drills.
— The key event in the work of military commissariats was the start of the autumn conscription. At the same time, work was carried out on conscription of reserve officers into service under Decree No. 179, signed in May. In the context of territorial defense, training sessions for territorial troops were held in two regions of Belarus in September. At least 730 people were drafted for the training sessions, and about 10,611 since the beginning of the year.
— The main event in terms of rearming the Belarusian Armed Forces was the transfer of modernized armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles to the troops. There were reports of some deliveries of UAVs, and information was confirmed about the BM-21B BelGrad-2 MLRS entering service with the 92nd Rocket Artillery Regiment. Plans include further rearmament with Su-30 fighters, modernization of T-72 tanks to the T-72BM2 level (so far, it is about two battalion sets), as well as the deployment of the Sopka-2 radar station at Barautsy airfield.
— There have been reports of military infrastructure development. Infrastructure for training UAV operators in Belarus continues to be expanded. In 2025, such classrooms were created in educational institutions and military units, forming a basic training network. And in Slutsk district, a new military facility with an area of over 2 km² has been under construction since June 2024. Its purpose is still unknown. According to updated information, the 92nd Rocket Artillery Regiment has been formed as part of the Special Operations Forces. In addition, new units for the use of UAVs are being formed in mechanized brigades, but no detailed information about them is available yet.
— In September, Belarus actively developed international military contacts. A Belarusian delegation visited Vietnam. Special attention should be paid to the accreditation of military diplomats from Finland, the UK, and Japan, the completion of a year-long training cycle for Libyan military personnel in Belarus, and the meeting of the CIS Chiefs of Staff Committee in Minsk.
— There were no confirmations of the actual deployment of TNW in Belarus in September. For example, planning for the use of TNW was worked out at the Zapad-2025 drills (without any practical measures being taken). At the same time, there were reports of the possible construction of infrastructure in Minsk region for the Oreshnik missile system. A. Lukashenka made statements (that Oreshnik was “already on its way” to Belarus), and Foreign Minister M. Ryzhankou announced the future deployment of the system. Some media outlets interpreted the latter’s words to mean that Oreshnik had already been deployed in Belarus, although the official was referring to the future deployment. In general, the topic remains at the level of political statements, but steps towards the possible preparation of infrastructure require further monitoring.
— On September 1-17, ammunition from the Main Missile and Artillery Directorate arsenals arrived in Belarus. Formally, this is not related to the Zapad-2025 drills. Empty railcars were also spotted being delivered for loading with ammunition for subsequent shipment to Russia. Possible reasons: delivery of new types of ammunition to Belarus (including under the contract concluded at MILEX-2025), repair and/or maintenance of ammunition, or a logistics operation under the cover of the Zapad-2025 drills.
— In September, the Internal Troops conducted a series of combat training events, including the Groza-2025 drills and a seminar on tactical medicine with Russian instructors. Active and systematic work continued with “volunteer units” consisting of former employees and servicemen of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Internal Troops who are in reserve. In the Border Guard Service, the main event was the opening of the Asarevichy outpost on the southern border.
— The situation in the border regions of Belarus remained stable. Units of the 38th Air Assault Brigade are deployed in the Ukrainian direction (in Homiel district). Internal Troops units are also stationed in Homiel region on a rotational basis. The total strength of the group is estimated at 1,000 personnel, it does not pose a military threat to Ukraine. No redeployment of troops in the western direction (Poland, Lithuania, Latvia) was recorded.
— Several events took place in the Belarusian military-industrial complex. For example, Belarusian-made military equipment was demonstrated at a military parade in Hanoi. In 2025, Belarus plans to supply at least 1,180 Sosna-U tank sights to Russia. Also note the work being done by the State Authority for Military Industry on a remote-controlled version of an armored vehicle, a prototype of which is currently undergoing research testing.
— During the period from 01.09 (19:00) to 01.10 (09:30), Russia launched 5,688 UAVs against Ukraine, 82 (≈1.44%) of which flew into Belarus. This is three times more than in August. Some of the drones flew to Ukraine, Poland, and Lithuania, some disappeared, and two were shot down. Drones were reported to have crashed near Baranavichy and in Zhlobin district. The increase in the number of UAVs flying into Belarus may be related to the increase in the number of launches by Russia (compared to August). There is no reason to believe that Russian UAV incursions into Belarus will stop.
— The main news in the legislation sphere was the new Regulation on Military Registration, approved by the Council of Ministers on September 17.
— The situation with the Russian group in Belarus remains stable – air defense units continue to be stationed at Ziabrauka and Mazyr airfields. The contingent of the Russian Armed Forces that arrived to participate in the Zapad-2025 and CSTO drills returned to Russia. The total number of Russian troops in Belarus as of October 1 is estimated at around 2,000 people.
— In September arrivals of aircraft of the Russian Aerospace Forces and FSB in Belarus were recorded: at Machulishchy airfield – 5 Tu-134 passenger aircraft; at Lida airfield – 5 An-12 and 2 An-26 transport aircraft; at Vitsiebsk airport – 1 Tu-134 passenger aircraft; at Minsk National Airport – 3 Il-76 transport aircraft and 1 An-148 passenger aircraft. The increased activity is connected with the Zapad-2025 drills. As of October 1, there is no data on the permanent deployment of Russian aircraft and helicopters in Belarus.
Contents
1. Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus
1.1. Combat training
1.2. Aviation activity
1.3. Military commissariats
1.4. Territorial defense
1.5. Training of the mobilization reserve
1.6. Rearmament of the Belarusian Armed Forces
1.7. Military infrastructure development. Formation of new units
1.8. Personnel appointments and staffing of the Belarusian Armed Forces
1.9. International military cooperation
1.10. Tactical nuclear weapons. Oreshnik missile system
1.11. Military-technical cooperation with Russia
2. Internal Troops. Border Guard Service
2.1. Internal Troops
2.2. Border Guard Service
3. Group deployed in the border regions of Belarus
3.1. Border with Ukraine
3.2. Border with NATO member states
4. Work of the military-industrial complex
5. Violation of Belarus’s airspace by Russian UAVs
6. Amendments to legislation in the military sphere
7. Russia’s military activity in Belarus
7.1. Russian group in Belarus
7.2. Aviation activity
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Материал доступен на русском языке: Обзор военной активности в Беларуси за сентябрь 2025
