– In November, combat training focused on summarizing the results and planning tasks for the 2025/2026 academic year. During command staff training sessions and drills, autonomous actions of units, countering UAVs, and the use of robotic platforms were practiced. It was also announced that CSTO drills would be held in Belarus in 2026.
– In November, the aviation activity of the Belarusian Air Force was low. There were isolated sorties by fighters on duty from Baranavichy airfield (on November 1, 14, and 24), which were probably related to the interception of Russian UAVs.
– The notable activity of military commissariats was insignificant. The most indicative are criminal cases on evasion of conscription into military service. In the context of territorial defense, activity was focused on training local authorities and the national home guard. According to official data, over 16,000 people were drafted for military training sessions from January to November 2025. There has been a steady increase in the scale of reservist training compared to previous years.
– Systematic work continued on the rearmament of the Belarusian Armed Forces. The troops received V-2 APCs, Tor-M2K SAM systems, new and modernized communications equipment, engineering equipment, and other equipment. At the same time, plans were announced for further modernization of the army air defense forces. These include the delivery of modernized Osa SAM systems to the troops.
– The combat potential of the Belarusian Armed Forces continued to grow through the formation of new units and the optimization of organizational and staffing structures. These include military unit 54071 (part of the Special Operations Forces), which is currently being formed. At the same time, consideration is being given to creating cyber forces based on existing structures responsible for information and cyber operations. This indicates a process of consolidation and institutionalization of these forces.
– The development of military infrastructure continued. New facilities were opened in military compounds after major repairs. Repairs of the runway at Machulishchy airfield were completed. At the same time, measures to improve the preservation of weapons and equipment in long-term storage are continuing.
– No significant personnel appointments have been officially announced. However, the authorities have announced an increase in the staffing level of the Belarusian Armed Forces and an expansion of the conscription of reserve officers. There has also been an increase in personnel training, including through training at Russian military educational institutions. An analysis of data on the autumn conscription and official statistics indicates a continuing trend towards an increase in the number of military personnel serving in the Belarusian Armed Forces under contract.
– International military cooperation developed in line with the declared shift in priorities towards countries in the “far arc,” while maintaining limited channels of interaction with NATO and emphasizing threats from the West. Within the CSTO, the Belarusian authorities presented an image of a “besieged fortress” and emphasized the role of the “Union State” as the main response to growing militarization. During the month, negotiations and exchange visits took place with a number of countries, including Iran, Azerbaijan, Cuba, Vietnam, China, India, Kyrgyzstan, the United Arab Emirates, and Serbia.
– No confirmation of the actual deployment of TNW in Belarus has been received. At the same time, the topic was promoted in the media by statements made by A. Lukashenka about the presence of TNW in Belarus in a “modern version.” The politician demonstratively declared his readiness to show journalists the location of its storage, while emphasizing that there was no need to do so. A similar situation can be observed with the Oreshnik missile system: while there is no direct confirmation of its deployment in Belarus, the authorities have announced plans to put the system on combat duty in December. According to unofficial information, the system may be deployed based on infrastructure in the east of Mahiliou region. Given the mobile nature of the missile system, it is possible that it will be periodically moved from Russia to Belarus for combat duty and then returned to Russia.
– Scheduled combat training activities continued in the Internal Troops. The command is consistently developing a network of UAV centers and “volunteer” formations. No notable information about the activities of border service agencies has been recorded.
– The situation in the border area remains stable. The number of the group of the Belarusian Armed Forces and the Internal Troops in southern Belarus is still estimated at about 1,000 people. This number of forces does not pose a military threat to Ukraine. There is a steady presence of units of the Special Operations Forces in Homiel and Luninets districts. At the same time, the official information about the strengthening of border security is irregular and limited. No troop redeployments have been recorded in the western direction (Poland, Lithuania, Latvia).
– No fundamentally new information has been received about the work of the Belarusian military-industrial complex or military-technical cooperation with Russia. At the same time, the modernization of enterprises of the State Authority for Military Industry in Orsha district continued. In the context of military-technical cooperation with other countries, particular attention is drawn to the delivery of Buk-MB2K SAM systems to Azerbaijan, meetings of military-technical cooperation commissions with Cuba and Venezuela, A. Lukashenka’s visit to Myanmar with the signing of a package of agreements, as well as contacts of the delegation of the State Authority for Military Industry at the Dubai Airshow 2025.
– No information has been received regarding amendments to legislation in the military sphere. However, the draft budget for 2026 shows shifts in the structure of expenditures. With total national defense spending amounting to BYN 4.52 billion, funding for defense and the Belarusian Armed Forces is being reduced, but spending on mobilization training and mobilization is increasing. A final assessment of these changes will be possible after the document has passed through all the established procedures.
– The situation with the Russian group in Belarus remains stable: air defense units continue to be stationed at Ziabrauka and Mazyr airfields. As of December 1, the number of Russian troops in Belarus is estimated at about 2,000 people.
– The aviation activity of the Russian Aerospace Forces in Belarus was low. Only one arrival of an An-26 transport aircraft from Moscow to Baranavichy airfield was recorded on November 7. This is the lowest figure since September 2024. As of December 1, there is no permanent presence of aircraft of the Russian Aerospace Forces in Belarus.
– Limited incursions by Russian UAVs into Belarusian airspace continued. According to Ukrainian monitoring channels, ≈ 24 flights were recorded, with a total of about 5,311 launches against Ukraine. This amounts to ≈ 0.45% and is one of the lowest figures in 2025. At the same time, there were no reports of UAV crashes or downings on the territory of Belarus. The recorded routes were mainly limited to the southeastern part of Homiel region. The Belarusian military continued to practice countering UAVs, including with the use of helicopters. It is important to note that Russia’s increased use of UAVs against Ukraine leads to a decrease in the accuracy of open data. Therefore, the assessment of the number of violations of Belarusian airspace should be considered approximate.
Contents
1. Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus
1.1. Combat training
1.2. Aviation activity
1.3. Military commissariats
1.4. Territorial defense
1.5. Training of the mobilization reserve
1.6. Rearmament
1.7. Military infrastructure development. Formation of new units
1.8. Personnel appointments and staffing
1.9. International military cooperation
2. Other structural components of the state’s military organization
2.1. Internal Troops
2.2. Border Guard Service
3. Work of the military-industrial complex. Military-technical cooperation
4. Tactical nuclear weapons and the Oreshnik missile system in Belarus
4.1. Tactical nuclear weapons
4.2. Oreshnik missile system
5. Amendments to legislation in the military sphere
6. Situation in the border regions of Belarus
6.1. Border with Ukraine
6.2. Border with NATO member states
7. Russia’s military activity in Belarus
7.1. Russian group in Belarus
7.2. Aviation activity
7.3. Violation of Belarus’s airspace by Russian UAVs
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Материал доступен на русском языке: Обзор военной активности в Беларуси за ноябрь 2025
