— The combat training of the Belarusian Armed Forces was full of both large-scale drills and specialized events. The main focus was on statements and international reactions to the upcoming West-2025 drills, which the Baltic states and Ukraine see as a potential threat, while Belarus claims they are defensive in nature. At the same time, Air Force drills were conducted with the aircraft of the Air Force and Air Defense Forces without the participation of foreign military personnel. Active preparations were also underway for the CSTO drills to be held in September.
— There were no official reports of movements of troops by rail in Belarus, while aviation activity remained high. The main attention was drawn to flights of a Mi-8 helicopter to the Asipovichski training ground, air force actions on June 1 in response to Russian UAV violations of Belarusian airspace, and training in searching for UAVs. At the end of the month, army aviation practiced dispersal to operational airfields and simulated air combat.
— Mobilization drills were held with military commissariats of Brest region. As part of territorial defense, training sessions were held in Brest, Krasnapollie, and Cherykau districts, including command-staff drills. In total, at least 116 people were drafted for military training sessions in June, and about 8,288 since the beginning of the year.
— A key event in the rearmament of the Belarusian Armed Forces was the transfer of new Sopka-2 and Rosa-RB systems to the Radio-Technical Troops, which expands their airspace control capabilities. It also became known that Russia would soon deliver aviation ammunition in the estimated volume of two military cargo trains. The Ministry of Defense plans to purchase nine Russian Supercam UAVs (S150 and S350), continuing cooperation with the manufacturer and considering new models such as the Supercam X4. In addition, there are plans to purchase 24 fuel tankers, probably to replace outdated Soviet-made equipment, which indicates a desire to upgrade the material and technical base.
— There have been no official reports on the development of military infrastructure, but the likely repair of the runway at Machulishchy airfield is confirmed by the relocation of aircraft and the purchase of PAG slabs. Also in June, formation of new units was recorded: the 62nd Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment in Hrodna officially received its Battle Banner, UAV troops were formed, and the structure of units of the Special Operations Forces is being changed.
— In June, four officers were promoted to major general in the Belarusian Armed Forces. The Military Academy also graduated 155 officers from the General Staff Faculty and 288 from other faculties. Taking into account the ‘distribution’ (obligatory job placement for graduates), about 200 officers were trained for the needs of the Belarusian Armed Forces, which is the lowest figure since 2019. The reason for the decrease may be the shortage of applicants in 2021 due to the 2020 protests and the decline in the attractiveness of military service.
— Belarus has intensified international military cooperation by holding a number of important meetings. Defense Minister V. Khrenin paid his first official visit to Pakistan. Contacts were also held with military delegations from China, Iran, Azerbaijan, India, Indonesia, Vietnam, Myanmar, and Russia. Issues of military education, military-technical cooperation and the fight against terrorism were discussed. Belarus took part in SCO and CSTO events, proposing to resume the Peace Mission drills.
— No new confirmed information has been received on the deployment of TNW or the Oreshnik missile system in Belarus. Despite continuing official statements, there is no reliable information on the actual deployment of TNW, although infrastructure development in Asipovichy district requires further monitoring. State Secretary of the Security Council Aliaksandr Valfovich confirmed plans to deploy Oreshnik by the end of 2025, stating that sites have been determined and technical preparations are underway.
— The Internal Troops continued active combat training: joint exercises were held at the Valoushchyna training center between the rapid response unit (SOBR), investigators and operatives from the Main Directorate for Combating Organized Crime and Corruption (GUBOPiK), where they practiced actions in conflict situations, the use of UAVs and EW, etc. At the same time, work was carried out with “volunteer” units and reservists: fighters from the Chest’ special forces detachment and conscripts underwent specialized training, including small group operations, first aid, etc.
— There were no notable events in the Border Guard. The chairman of the State Border Committee, K. Molastau, stated that tensions remained high on the border with Ukraine and announced plans to establish six military towns by the end of the year. In addition, the State Border Committee’s procurement plan includes 200 smoothbore rifles (MR-155 Baikal) and ammunition for them. These purchases are likely related to negative experience in combating UAVs and demonstrate the agency’s desire to respond to modern challenges.
— The situation in the border regions of Belarus remained stable. Units of the 103rd Airborne Brigade continue to be stationed in the Ukrainian direction (in Homiel district). Units of the Internal Troops, including the Rys’ and Granit special forces detachments, are also stationed in Homiel region on a rotational basis. The total number of troops is estimated at 1,000; they do not pose a serious military threat to Ukraine. No redeployment of troops has been reported in the western direction (Poland, Lithuania, Latvia).
— Military-industrial complex: Belarus and Russia have already begun work on establishing a joint plant for the production of UAVs; the production of civilian drones with possible military applications is also being discussed. In addition, large-scale reconstruction is continuing at the Legmash plant in Orsha: the plant is modernizing its machines and expanding production. The work will be completed by the end of 2026.
— There were 38 recorded cases of UAVs, mainly Russian Shahed-type UAVs, entering Belarusian airspace. Two UAVs may have crashed on the territory of Belarus. The increase in such incidents is linked to the sharp rise in Russia’s use of UAVs against Ukraine (over 5,300 launches in June). In this situation, there is no reason to expect an end to UAV entries into Belarus in the near future; on the contrary, they are likely to increase further.
— The main legislative event was the decree of June 11, which amended the Regulations on Military Service.
— The situation with the Russian group in Belarus remains stable – S-400 SAM divizions continue to be stationed at Ziabrauka and Mazyr airfields. The withdrawal of Russian air defense forces reported in May has not been confirmed. Another rotation of the contingent probably took place on June 4-6 and 25, as confirmed by the arrival of an An-12 transport aircraft of the Russian Aerospace Forces. The total number of Russian troops in Belarus remains stable at around 2,000.
— There was an increase in the aviation activity of the Russian Aerospace Forces in Belarus: 22 aircraft, including IL-76, An-124, Su-30 and Tu-214, arrived in Belarus. The aircraft arrived at Machulishchy and Baranavichy airfields, as well as at Homiel, Minsk and Mahiliou airports. Some of the flights were related to prisoner exchanges between Russia and Ukraine and Putin’s visit, while others were for an unidentified purpose, including possible preparations for the West-2025 drills. There were no signs of permanent basing of Russian aircraft or helicopters in Belarus.
Contents
1. Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus
1.1. Combat training
1.2. Movement of troops by rail. Aviation activity
1.3. Military commissariats
1.4. Territorial defense
1.5. Training of the mobilization reserve
1.6. Rearmament of the Belarusian Armed Forces
1.7. Military infrastructure development. Formation of new units
1.8. Personnel appointments and staffing of the Belarusian Armed Forces
1.9. International military cooperation
1.10. Tactical nuclear weapons. Oreshnik missile system
2. Internal Troops. Border guard authorities
2.1. Internal Troops
2.2. Border guard authorities
3. Group deployed in the border regions of Belarus
3.1. Border with Ukraine
3.2. Border with NATO member states: Poland, Lithuania and Latvia
4. Work of the military-industrial complex
5. Violation of Belarus’s airspace by Russian UAVs
6. Amendments to legislation in the military sphere
7. Russia’s military activity in Belarus
7.1. Russian group in Belarus
7.2. Aviation activity
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Материал доступен на русском языке: Обзор военной активности в Беларуси за июнь 2025
