In January, there were practically no notable combat training events in the Belarusian Armed Forces. Significant events included preparations for the West-2025 drills, tactical training sessions, practice in countering UAVs (using “improvised means”), and drills with Polonez MLRS units.
The situation on the Belarusian-Ukrainian border hasn’t changed. To “strengthen the protection of the state border,” mechanized units of the Ground Forces of the Belarusian Armed Forces and the Internal Troops (up to ≈ 1500 servicemen in total) continue to be stationed in the border area with Ukraine. The established group does not pose a military threat to Ukraine.
The month was rich in events related to rearmament. The most significant event was the supply of the Sopka-2 and Rosa-RB radar systems to the units of the Radio-Technical Troops. It was also reported about the testing of armament and military equipment samples by the enterprises of the Belarusian military-industrial complex. Here we can mention the Klyon short-range reconnaissance radar system and the Volat V2 APC.
Russian UAVs continued to enter Belarus’ airspace. A total of 94 UAVs (mostly of the Shahed type) were detected in January. At least two UAVs were shot down by the air defense units. There is still no reason to believe that the situation will be radically resolved in the coming months. This is also indicated by another extension of the flight restriction zone in southern Belarus.
The general direction of the national security measures implemented by the Lukashenka regime indicates an increasing (in the regime’s opinion) probability of Belarus’ participation in the war. At the same time, the participation of the Belarusian Armed Forces in military actions on the side of Russia still looks unlikely.
The situation with the group of the Russian Armed Forces in Belarus in January did not change fundamentally compared to previous months. As of February 1, 2025, the number of the Russian military in Belarus can be estimated at ≈ 2000 people. At least 2 Su-30SM fighters of the Russian Aerospace Forces are permanently deployed at Baranavichy airfield.
No increase in the number of the Russian group in Belarus has been recorded. The main factor that can significantly change the situation with the Russian military presence in Belarus is the West-2025 drills.
Contents
1. Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus
1.1. Combat training
1.2. Movements of military equipment. Aviation activity
1.3. Military commissariats
1.4. Territorial defense
1.5. Training of the mobilization reserve
1.6. Rearmament of the Belarusian Armed Forces. Work of the military-industrial complex
1.7. Development of military infrastructure. Formation of new units
1.8. Tactical nuclear weapons. Oreshnik missile system.
1.9. Amendments to legislation
2. Internal Troops. Border guard authorities
2.1. Internal Troops
2.2. Border guard authorities
3. Group deployed in the border regions. Situation on the Belarus-Ukraine border
4. Violation of Belarus’ airspace by Russian UAVs
5. Russia’s military activity in Belarus
5.1. Russian group in Belarus
5.2. Movements of military equipment. Aviation activity
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Материал доступен на русском языке: Обзор военной активности в Беларуси за январь
