— The combat training of the Belarusian Armed Forces was eventful. On August 6-30, operational-tactical drills were held with the Air Force and Air Defense Forces: the first stage focused on covering troops and facilities, while the second stage involved live-fire exercises at the Russian Ashuluk training ground, where S-300, Tor-M2K, and Buk SAM crews performed combat launches, and Su-30 pilots practiced the use of air-to-air missiles. In addition, a series of drills were held in the units of the Belarusian Armed Forces, ranging from battalion- and company-level tactical drills to field drills and training for UAV operators.
— The Zapad-2025 joint strategic drills will take place in Belarus on September 12-16 and will be defensive in nature: it is planned to practice repelling aggression, liberating territories, using the latest technologies, and planning the use of nuclear weapons. They will involve units of the Belarusian Armed Forces (5,000 to 7,000 personnel), as well as a contingent of the Russian Armed Forces, including composite battalions from the Kantemirovskaya and Tamanskaya divisions – a total of 1,200 to 2,000 military personnel, according to various sources.
— On August 31, a series of CSTO drills (Interaction-2025, Search-2025, and Echelon-2025) began in Belarus, involving more than 2,000 military personnel and 450 pieces of equipment. Units of the Russian Armed Forces (including the 71st Motorized Rifle Division and the 98th Airborne Division) arrived in Belarus, as well as about 150 military personnel from Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan.
— There were virtually no recorded troop movements by rail, with the exception of the redeployment of units of the Belarusian Armed Forces to Russia to participate in the operational-tactical drills. At the same time, there was a high level of aviation activity: regular flights by helicopters and fighters to intercept Russian UAVs, as well as flights by transport and passenger aircraft between Belarusian airfields and Russia.
— The key event in the work of the military commissariats was the start of the autumn conscription. At the same time, work was carried out on the conscription of reserve officers in accordance with Decree No. 179, signed in May. In the context of the territorial defense, only mobilization training was noted in some military commissariats. In total, at least 451 people were drafted for military training sessions in August, and about 9,604 since the beginning of the year.
— The main event in terms of rearming the Belarusian Armed Forces was the arrival of two Su-30SM2 fighters, which allowed the formation of a squadron at the 61st Fighter Air Base to be completed. It also became known that the Special Operations Forces were being rearmed with new 82 mm mortars. And at the training grounds, the Manul universal combat platform for transporting mortar crews, new communications equipment, an automated control system, and fiber-optic-controlled UAVs were demonstrated. There are plans to deliver four more Su-30SM2 in 2025.
— There were reports of military infrastructure development. The 111th Artillery Brigade opened a class for training UAV operators, and the 72nd Training Center is purchasing equipment for a similar class. New units are being formed within the Special Operations Forces: an anti-aircraft missile regiment and a rocket artillery regiment, as well as the 37th Air Assault Brigade. All of them are intended to strengthen the southern direction without creating a separate operational command. In addition, new units for the use of UAVs have begun to be formed in the 6th and 11th Mechanized Brigades.
— Belarus has been actively developing international military contacts. Chief of the General Staff of the Belarusian Armed Forces P. Muraveika visited Cuba, where they discussed strengthening cooperation and exchanging experience, and held negotiations with the leadership of the Cuban army. In addition, visits and meetings were held with military delegations from Pakistan, Vietnam, Azerbaijan, China, and Kazakhstan, as well as an accreditation meeting with Indonesian military diplomats.
— No new confirmed information has been received regarding the deployment of TNW in Belarus. In an interview with Time magazine, A. Lukashenka confirmed the existence of a decree on the handling of nuclear weapons. The deputy head of the General Staff faculty announced the deployment of Russian RN-40 (30 kiloton) aerial bombs and 9M723-1 (up to 50 kiloton) missiles in Belarus. Despite ongoing official statements, there is no reliable data on the actual deployment of TNW. There is also no actual data on the deployment of the Oreshnik missile system, but A. Lukashenka and Vladimir Putin have confirmed plans to deliver it by the end of the year, stating that the launch sites are ready and serial production has begun. So far, these remain only political statements.
— The Internal Troops continued their active combat training: the Vitsiaz special forces detachment practiced cooperation with paratroopers, militia brigades engaged in blocking areas, guarding facilities, and freeing hostages, while the Tsiklon special forces detachment practiced searching for sabotage and reconnaissance groups near the Belarusian Nuclear Power Plant. At the same time, the training of “volunteers” was actively underway— training was held not only in Minsk, but also in most regional centers, including Brest, Vitsiebsk, Mahiliou, and Homiel. No notable events were recorded in the Border Guard.
— The situation in the border regions of Belarus remained stable. Units of the 38th Air Assault Brigade and the 5th Special Forces Brigade are deployed in the Ukrainian direction (in Homiel and Luninets districts). Internal Troops units are also stationed in Homiel region on a rotational basis. The total strength of the group is estimated at 1,000 personnel, it does not pose a serious military threat to Ukraine. No redeployment of troops in the western direction (Poland, Lithuania, Latvia) was recorded.
— Several events took place in the Belarusian military-industrial complex: Peleng opened a new experimental workshop, and meetings were held in Minsk with a working group from Nicaragua and a coordinating committee from China aimed at developing military-technical cooperation. A meeting was also held on the development of missile production, where A. Lukashenka announced plans to coordinate actions with Russia, and the State Authority for Military Industry announced the launch of serial production of the Buk-MB2 SAM system with a Belarusian-made missile.
— There were 27 recorded cases of UAVs, mainly Russian, entering Belarusian airspace, which is three times less than in July. Some of the drones flew to Ukraine, some disappeared, and three were shot down or crashed. Drones were reported to have crashed in Rechytsa, Smaliavichy district, and between Maryina Horka and Babruisk. The decrease in the number of flights is associated with a reduction in Russian attacks on Ukraine, but the possibility of their resumption and increase remains until the end or “freezing” of the war.
— The main news in the legislative sphere was the submission of the draft law prepared by the Belarusian Ministry of Defense to the House of Representatives on August 4, on amendments to the laws “On Defense,” “On the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus,” and “On Martial Law” as part of the implementation of the decisions of the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly on the approval of the Military Doctrine. At the end of August, the document was under consideration in parliament.
— The situation with the Russian group in Belarus remains stable – air defense units continue to be stationed at Ziabrauka and Mazyr airfields. Units of the 4th, 71st, and 98th divisions of the Russian Armed Forces arrived to participate in the Zapad-2025 and CSTO drills. The total number of Russian troops in Belarus is estimated at around 2,300 people.
— The aviation activity of the Russian Aerospace Forces in Belarus remained within normal limits. Individual arrivals were recorded: two IL-76 in Homiel, two An-72, one An-12, and one Tu-154 in Machulishchy, one IL-76 in Vitsiebsk, and one IL-76 in Baranavichy. As of September 1, there was no data on the permanent deployment of Russian aircraft and helicopters in Belarus.
Contents
1. Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus
1.1. Combat training
1.2. Movement of troops by rail. Aviation activity
1.3. Military commissariats
1.4. Territorial defense
1.5. Training of the mobilization reserve
1.6. Rearmament of the Belarusian Armed Forces
1.7. Military infrastructure development. Formation of new units
1.8. Personnel appointments and staffing of the Belarusian Armed Forces
1.9. International military cooperation
1.10. Tactical nuclear weapons. Oreshnik missile system
2. Internal Troops. Border guard authorities
2.1. Internal Troops
2.2. Border guard authorities
3. Group deployed in the border regions of Belarus
3.1. Border with Ukraine
3.2. Border with NATO member states
4. Work of the military-industrial complex
5. Violation of Belarus’s airspace by Russian UAVs
6. Amendments to legislation in the military sphere
7. Russia’s military activity in Belarus
7.1. Russian group in Belarus
7.2. Aviation activity
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Материал доступен на русском языке: Обзор военной активности в Беларуси за август 2025
