The main combat training events in April included the ongoing combat readiness inspection and a series of battalion tactical drills, which were the culmination of the first half of the academic year. In the next two months (until early July), the intensity of training will decrease, as usual.
April was full of events related to rearmament. For example, in April, equipment for the Signal Troops, radio-technical and engineering units was delivered to the Belarusian Armed Forces. It also became known about the possible transfer of new fighter jets to the Belarusian Armed Forces.
The situation on the Belarusian-Ukrainian border did not change. In mid-February, the routine rotation took place. Units of the Special Operations Forces were redeployed to the border with Ukraine to replace units of the Ground Forces. These units stayed there in April as well. Units of the Internal Troops are also deployed there. The total number of the group of the Belarusian Armed Forces and Internal Troops is estimated at ≈1000 people. These units do not pose a military threat to Ukraine.
April was also an active month in the sphere of territorial defense. Training sessions with territorial defense were held in three regions. Training of national home guard detachments also continued (most actively in Homiel region).
The number of flights of Russian UAVs into Belarusian airspace has decreased sharply. In April, four cases were recorded, mainly involving UAVs of the Shahed type. No reports of shoot-downs were received. The significant reduction in UAV flights may be due to improvements in their design and adjustments to their use.
No new information has been received regarding the deployment of TNW and the Oreshnik missile system in Belarus.
The general direction of the national security measures implemented by the Lukashenka regime indicates an increasing (in the regime’s opinion) probability of Belarus’s participation in the war. At the same time, the participation of the Belarusian Armed Forces in military actions on Russia’s side still looks unlikely.
The situation with the group of the Russian Armed Forces in Belarus did not change fundamentally in April compared to previous months. As of May 1, 2025, the number of the Russian military in Belarus can be estimated at ≈ 2150 people. At least 6 Su-30SM fighters of the Russian Aerospace Forces are deployed at Baranavichy airfield.
The slight increase in the number of the aircraft is due to the arrival of military personnel for the May 9 parade. After the parade, Russian troops will most likely return home. The main factor that could significantly change the situation with the Russian military presence in Belarus remains the West-2025 drills. Their active phase will take place on September 12-16.
Contents
1. Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus
1.1. Combat training
1.2. Movement of troops by rail. Aviation activity
1.3. Military commissariats
1.4. Territorial defense
1.5. Training of the mobilization reserve
1.6. Rearmament of the Belarusian Armed Forces. Work of the military-industrial complex
1.7. Military infrastructure development. Formation of new units. Training of military personnel
1.8. Tactical nuclear weapons. Oreshnik missile system
1.9. Amendments to legislation in the military sphere
2. Internal Troops. Border guard authorities
2.1. Internal Troops
2.2. Border guard authorities
3. Group deployed in the border regions
3.1. Border with Ukraine
3.2. Border with NATO member states: Poland, Lithuania and Latvia
4. Violation of Belarus’s airspace by Russian UAVs
5. Russia’s military activity in Belarus
5.1. Russian group in Belarus
5.2. Aviation activity
If you would like to receive the full version of the report, please contact us at info@isans.org
Материал доступен на русском языке: Обзор военной активности в Беларуси за апрель 2025
