Executive summary
The persecution of dissidents and political opponents by authoritarian regimes across borders has deep historical roots and has been practiced by various countries for centuries. However, in recent years the number of states employing transnational repression (TNR) has been continuously growing – in 2025, over a quarter of all countries in the world attempted to silence dissidents abroad. Repressive states seek not only to suppress dissent among their own nationals but also to target other individuals and groups who may exert external pressure and influence the international agenda in ways that contravene their interests. TNR manifests through a variety of evolving tactics. It can be effectively addressed only through deliberate, coordinated state action with support and guidance from intergovernmental organisations.
Awareness within the international community of the TNR phenomenon and its scope is steadily rising. Careful attention to it has translated into a willingness to condemn TNR, acknowledge the need to actively combat it, and develop concrete actionable recommendations. This work is underway at all levels – at the UN, OSCE, CoE, and EU. Two recent resolutions adopted in 2026 are of a particular value for the further development of law and practices aimed at preventing and countering TNR. Those are the CoE Parliamentary Assembly resolution “Fighting back against transnational repression” (Resolution 2669 (2026)) and European Parliament resolution “Countering transnational repression – towards an EU strategy to protect Europe’s sovereignty and democratic values”. Both resolutions emphasised that TNR violates the rule of law and state sovereignty, infringes upon human rights, poses a serious threat to national security, and undermines the European values and principles. While the PACE resolution placed emphasis on the abuse of Interpol procedures, the European Parliament resolution covered a wider spectrum of issues and stressed the importance of a coordinated interstate response to TNR. It provided for an extensive and detailed recommendations that addressed strengthening EU coordination, data collection and institutional response, strengthening protection and support for persons targeted by TNR, preventing and responding to specific forms of TNR, addressing the structures that enable it, strengthening deterrence, and ensuring accountability.
While for many years, TNR perpetrated by the Lukashenka regime received limited international attention, in 2025-2026 the situation changed dramatically. The international community has begun to recognise the scale of human rights violations against people forced to leave Belarus due to the threat of political persecution. The Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Belarus and the Group of Independent Experts on the Situation of Human Rights in Belarus established by the UN Human Rights Council not only mentioned certain TNR tools in their reports, but grouped TNR-related human rights violations in separate sections of their reports which underlined their systemic and inter-related nature. On the EU level, Belarus was named among the main perpetrators of TNR in Europe and globally.
Turning to the recent developments in TNR employed by the Lukashenka regime, it should be noted that the arsenal of tools that enable the regime to exert pressure on exiles continues growing, as is the scope of those targeted. Despite the growing awareness of the international community regarding the mass use of TNR practices by the Lukashenka regime, its tactics regarding the publicity of TNR have not changed. While other states try not to advertise their repressive actions aimed at individuals within foreign jurisdictions, the Belarusian authorities use successful cases of TNR to demonstrate their reach is not limited by borders. Another notable feature is that while the majority of documented TNR incidents involve cooperation between origin and host states or the exploitation of weak rule-of-law environments, including through misuse of extradition frameworks and international agreements, as well as through law enforcement cooperation, the Lukashenka regime has invented and is actively using many ways to independently influence the lives of the exiles.
In 2025-2026, there has been a significant increase in the use of certain types of TNR. The report pays particular attention to them. Some other TNR tools have not been used as often by the regime in the reporting period, or there is currently no information about their use. Among those are surveillance, murder, assassination attempts, physical attacks, abductions, enforced disappearances, and coerced return. However, it should be noted that these dangerous tools were used by the regime in the previous years and may be used again in the future. Therefore, it is important to be on alert.
In absentia trials and property confiscation were among the first tools of TNR that the Lukashenka regime began to use systematically. These practices have subsequently been adopted by other repressive regimes, including in Russia. Today, these tools are among the most frequently employed by the regime in Minsk. Information about in absentia trials appears every week without exception. Group criminal cases initiated within the framework of a special procedure can include from a few to several hundred defendants. This tool is now aimed not only at traditional victims of repression, such as politicians and activists, journalists, bloggers and civil society activists, but also at a broader circle of Belarusians who have the opportunity to make their dissent public, such as popular musicians, priests, writers and researchers. There has also been a rise of criminal cases against those not related to any political activity, but who have engaged in solidarity initiatives or who have left a comment on social media.
Coercion-by-proxy involves the abuse of family members remaining in the home country as a deliberate strategy to manipulate and subjugate dissidents abroad. Along with in absentia trials and confiscation of property, the harassment of exiles’ relatives has long been a coercive tool of first choice for authoritarian regimes. Searches have been and remain the primary method, but other methods of pressure have emerged, such as demands for handing in genetic material and dismissal from work.
The problem of the absence of a possibility to renew or obtain a new passport outside of Belarus that leads to limited mobility and impeded access to essential services necessary for living is not new. The relevant Lukashenka decree of 2023 has affected the estimated 800,000 Belarusians who live in exile, including newborn children. The expulsion of pardoned political prisoners from Belarus in 2025-2026 without providing them with identity documents has become a new aspect of this TNR tool. Instead of identity documents, former political prisoners were given simple identity certificates in the Russian language, which are not recognised as valid documents outside of Belarus. The lack of proper identity documents provided to the released political prisoners is further exacerbated by non-provision of court decisions, release orders, or documents on termination of criminal prosecution. Moreover, those former political prisoners who left the country on their own initiative or who were given a passport during their expulsion may have it cancelled by the authorities at any time later.
The number of reports concerning attempts by the security services of Belarus to recruit Belarusians living abroad for collecting information about the life and activities of diaspora, staging of provocations and performing other malign acts has increased significantly during the reported period. They are interested in any person who may be willing (or can be compelled) to cooperate, including citizens of other countries. Similarly, representatives of security services increasingly often engage in online unsolicited contacts with exiled dissenters, trying to obtain sensitive information, blackmailing them, threatening to persecute their relatives in Belarus, luring them for “returning home” in exchange of dropping a criminal case, etc. There is a growing recognition that contact by security services with a person is not only an act of individual repression, but rather part of a large-scale systemic persecution of Belarusians outside Belarus. Belarus security agencies do not always act on their own behalf; they often act under the guise of journalists from independent media or staff of the Office of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya.
Many civil society organisations, being unable to sustain their activities in Belarus, have relocated their operations abroad and continue their work there. In order to isolate these organisations from Belarusian society, the authorities have recognised them as extremist formations or extremist organisations. This makes it possible to prosecute thousands of people involved in their activities or supporting them in any way. Not only are people in Belarus being persecuted on this ground, but criminal cases in absentia are also being opened against the exiles. They are being added to lists of terrorists and extremists, and their relatives are being pressured. Thus, the recognition of organisations founded and operating in other countries as extremist by the Belarusian authorities can be considered another form of TNR.
Another means by which the Lukashenka regime misuses anti-terrorism and extremism legislation to suppress dissent abroad is through the inclusion of targeted exiled individuals in the government-compiled lists of “extremists” and “terrorists”. Designation of individuals as “extremists” and “terrorists” is arbitrary, politically motivated, and frequently carried out without court verdicts – such as for donations to or association with “extremist formations,” or even for the sharing of “extremist materials”. It results in severe restrictions in multiple aspects of life both inside Belarus and in exile. Recent trends in application of this tool include the adding of deceased persons to the “list of extremists” and heightened scrutiny of potential “underage extremists”.
In addition to the wide range of TNR tactics employed by the Lukashenka regime on its own, it resorts to the assistance of other states to implement TNR on their territory. The abuse of Interpol persists notwithstanding the piecemeal reforms of the organisation enacted over the last decade. Moreover, Interpol bodies and officials are not free from political bias, as confirmed by the fact that, although Belarus was previously subjected to so-called “corrective measures” and, more recently, warned by the Interpol General Secretariat regarding the abuses of Interpol procedures that it systematically commits, the access rights of Belarus’s National Bureau to the Interpol Information System have not been suspended. However, in securing the rights of Belarusian exiles persecuted by the regime much depends on the response of individual member states, which may refuse extradition if they have reason to suspect that a request is politically motivated.
Within the framework of bilateral agreements and multilateral treaties in the field of legal assistance Belarus cooperates most closely with Russia. Belarusians persecuted by the Lukashenka regime are not just formally placed on the Russian wanted database – their pursuit is actively conducted. The dynamics of Belarus’ relations with other countries within the framework of legal assistance agreements are changing. Armenia, which previously was marked in yellow on the risk map, has repeatedly refused to satisfy Belarus’ requests despite the persistence of the Lukashenka regime. On the opposite side, Georgia and Turkey tend to support the regime’s efforts to find and return members of the opposition.
The Lukashenka regime obstructs Belarusian exiles’ access to banking services abroad through two TNR tactics. Designation as a “terrorist” or an “extremist” feeds automated alerts into global compliance databases, prompting banks – fearing fines by financial regulators – to freeze or close accounts without proper individual assessment of the political nature of such designation. Hundreds and likely thousands face severe restrictions. At the EU level, the abuse of financial control frameworks by repressive regimes was already addressed through the European Parliament resolution of 16 June 2026 on countering TNR, which introduced a notion of “financial repression”. Another tactic of the regime in this field stems from the 2023 decree on cancellation of consular services abroad for exiles, potentially affecting some 800,000 people. Expired passports lead banks to refuse opening new accounts or closing existing accounts even when alternative documents exist, such as a “foreigner’s travel document” issued by the receiving country. The hardships faced by Belarusian exiles as a result of financial TNR by the Lukashenka regime are further exacerbated by over-compliance by banks in the application of EU sanctions against Russia and Belarus when denial of banking services is based on the mere fact of the client holding the Belarusian citizenship.
The recommendations presented in this report are grounded in the need to undertake active practical steps to prevent and respond to TNR. The emphasis in the recommendations is placed on the nature of the phenomenon which dictates the necessity of interstate cooperation to address it effectively and on an active engagement of intergovernmental organisations. Implementation of the European Parliament resolution into actions by EU institutions and other relevant international bodies such as Interpol and FATF as well as its implementation into national legislation and policies of EU member states should be a top priority.
It is high time for the international community to move from increased awareness of TNR and discussion of its definitions to taking concerted and effective actions to stop TNR, including the one perpetrated by the Lukashenka regime.
GOALS AND METHODOLOGY OF THE RESEARCH
This report constitutes the second study of transnational repression (TNR) perpetrated by the Lukashenka regime produced by the International Strategic Action Network for Security (iSANS). The first report, published in September 2025,[1] noted the lack of awareness within the international community of the TNR phenomenon in general and, in particular, of the scope of TNR perpetrated by the Lukashenka regime against its opponents who had been compelled to flee Belarus in the face of political persecution.
The situation has changed over the past year. There is now a greater understanding of the nature and the scale of TNR among international organisations and at the level of individual states. The TNR perpetrated by the Lukashenka regime has also been noticed. International awareness of and attention to the repression carried out by the Lukashenka regime within the jurisdiction of other states, however, has not led to its deterrence.
Accordingly, this report aims to stimulate further discussion on measures to counter the TNR, with a particular reference to the one perpetrated by the Lukashenka regime. To this end, the report is structured in three sections. The first section provides a comprehensive analysis of the international community’s response to the TNR threat, paying particular attention to the recognition of Belarus’s TNR activities. The second section examines the TNR instruments employed by the Lukashenka regime, supported by specific cases that underscore the diversity and scale of the tactics used. The third section offers recommendations to intergovernmental bodies and states, grounded in the urgent need to address the rise of TNR.
Primarily analytical in character rather that purely monitoring-oriented, the report does not seek to compile exhaustive data on TNR-related human rights violations but instead presents illustrative examples of such violations to highlight the primary methods and scope of TNR as well as the evolution of its practices. It covers the events of the period from the second half of 2025 until September 2026. The earlier events are referred to where they are necessary to illustrate certain developments. Discussion of the historical context of TNR, its global evolution, the challenge of definitions, its main targets and tactics, the main approaches to countering TNR, and challenges in their implementation were covered in detail in the first report; those interested in these subjects are invited to read it.
The research underpinning this report is desk-based, drawing on a wide range of sources, including scholarly articles, documents and reports produced by intergovernmental organisations or commissioned by them, reports from Belarusian and international non-governmental organisations, media and social media materials, and information obtained from private sources. Data sourced from media and social media was verified against multiple independent sources to ensure reliability.
iSANS has been monitoring and analysing TNR-related human rights violations for several years. The data collected during the drafting of reports on TNR by the Lukashenka regime have informed a number of analytical documents produced by iSANS and made available to the Belarusian democratic forces and governments of concerned states, as well as regular submissions to international human rights bodies by iSANS.
I. ADDRESSING TRANSNATIONAL REPRESSION: FIRST STEPS
Introduction to transnational repression
Transnational repression (hereafter – TNR) is not a new phenomenon. The persecution of dissidents and political opponents of ruling regime abroad has long-standing historical roots and has been actively employed by the authorities of various countries for centuries. Scholars call it extraterritorial repression, extraterritorial censorship, counter-exile strategies, or global authoritarianism. Definitions of TNR developed by the academic and human rights communities reflect its two core characteristics – its trans-border nature and its aim to control populations living abroad by employing repressive tools. Despite increased academic and policy attention to the extraterritorial repressive practices of certain states in the recent years, there is still no single definition of TNR at the level of international treaties. The understanding that this is a problem has already been established both among the human rights community and at the level of international organisations.[2] It has been noted that in the absence of a harmonised definition, a dangerous protection gap leaves victims exposed[3] and allows the phenomenon to grow and expand.
Today both scholars and policy actors agree TNR has become a tool of choice for authoritarian regimes to suppress the voices and activities of their critics outside their territorial jurisdiction.[i] According to Freedom House, the group of perpetrator governments expanded in 2025, with at least 54 governments, or over a quarter of all countries in the world, having attempted to silence dissidents abroad through direct physical transnational repression.[4] Governments of ten countries (Belarus, Cambodia, China, Egypt, Iran, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan) are responsible for over 70% of all such incidents recorded globally by Freedom House between 2014-2025. Although Belarus closes the “top ten” in terms of the number of cases of direct physical TNR documented by Freedom House in this period (46), for the purposes of the present research it is noteworthy that, despite its significantly smaller population, resources, and diaspora, the number of documented cases of physical TNR committed by the Lukashenka regime is approximately half that of the Putin regime (100 cases) during the same period.[5] Importantly, the Freedom House database does not include nonviolent incidents such as threats, co-optation, digital interference, etc.. Consequently, it can be argued that, were other types of TNR incidents to be counted, Belarus would likely rank in the top five countries responsible for all types of TNR, if not higher.
Although TNR was previously understood primarily as targeting politically active citizens or former citizens of the home country, recent research demonstrates that the range of its targets is much broader. While the primary targets have historically included human rights defenders, journalists, political dissidents, and former regime insiders, along with ethnic and religious minorities, regimes have expanded their scope to cover large diaspora communities abroad, including researchers, academics, and legal professionals.[6] Targets now range from recent refugees and emigrants to second- and even third-generation to individuals with citizenship of the host state. In essence, the repressive state seeks not only to suppress dissent among its own nationals but also among those with the potential to foment opposition within the country of origin or to exert external pressure and influence the international agenda in ways that contravene regime interests. TNR is not limited to diasporas. It also increasingly targets individuals and organisations that support or defend the exiles, including activists, scholars, doctors, journalists, lawyers, and legal teams, even where they have no national connection to the perpetrator state.
TNR manifests through a variety of tactics aimed at silencing and punishing exiled opponents while at the same time intimidating potential dissenters within the home country.[7] Even non-physical acts of TNR can result in profound psychological impact on survivors, including fear, anxiety, and stress. Merely knowing that a foreign government may monitor their activities or harm their families can lead survivors to self-censor or withdraw from public life. Such repression also affects how survivors socialise and interact with others. In particular, they often restrict communications with people in their home country and avoid socialising in the host country. Self-censorship may further deter survivors from reporting threats to law enforcement authorities in the host country. Moreover, TNR threats have a chilling effect on the wider diaspora, which is particularly disturbing given diaspora’s important role in transnational advocacy efforts and combatting human rights abuses in their countries of origin.
“Cooperation between governments enables TNR” represents one of a key findings from ten years of data collection and analysis by Freedom House.[8] Cooperation between like-minded autocrats is particularly dangerous for exiled dissidents. It has been observed that authorities of Belarus and Central Asian countries have relied on their deep-rooted ties with the Russian government to advance their TNR campaigns,[9] thereby forming “TNR alliances”. While autocracies have collaborated willingly with perpetrator states, democracies have at times “unconsciously” facilitated TNR by acting on politically motivated Interpol notices, granting questionable extradition requests, permitting kidnappings and removals from their territories, applying overly strict criteria when assessing applications for political asylum or subsidiary protection in situations where there are serious risks of TNR, and allowing overcompliance by financial institutions manipulated by TNR-performing states.
Emphasising complex multinational nature of TNR, researchers argue that it can be effectively addressed only through deliberate, coordinated state action, and call on the international community to undertake relevant efforts starting with establishing a common definition of TNR enshrined in an international convention. While recent resolutions of the PACE and the European Parliament establish strong and quite comprehensive definitions, adoption of a treaty would represent a major step forward as it would lay down legal obligations of states to combat TNR.[10] Such a treaty-based definition would enable policymakers and other stakeholders within intergovernmental organisations and their member states to delineate the scope and boundaries of the issue, raise awareness, coordinate and harmonise policy responses across jurisdictions, and enhance cooperation. Additional recommendations by experts include coordinating sanctions against TNR perpetrator states, reforming Interpol and mutual legal assistance mechanisms to prevent abuse, sharing intelligence and data, and supporting the development of international law and institutions dedicated to countering TNR. Finally, scholars and NGOs have emphasised the need to apply the so called “consolidated approach” by maintaining a balance between the “human rights-based approach” and the “countering foreign interference-based approach” in order to acknowledge the systemic nature of human rights violations related to TNR and protect survivors, on the one hand, and protect the sovereignty and security of the state through measures aimed at countering foreign interference, on the other.
The international community’s response to transnational repression
Over the past two years, there has been a significant surge in attention to TNR at the level of intergovernmental organisations. Although the international community has not yet reached a consensus regarding the nature and scope of the TNR, the attention of bodies and institutions contributing to the development of international law has made this problem much more visible.
Careful attention to the phenomenon, first highlighted in a speech by Volker Turk, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, in June 2024 at the 56th session of the Human Rights Council, where he noted that “there are indications that transnational repression [against certain individuals and communities] may be becoming a global one” and urged all states to have zero tolerance for such actions,[11] transformed within a year into the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights guidance paper on “transnational repression, aimed at increasing awareness and understanding of this expanding global issue” published in June 2025.[12] Entitled “Civic Space Brief on Transnational Repression”, it highlighted the severe impacts of TNR on targeted individuals and recommended that states adopt holistic, people‑centred protection measures, including accessible reporting and documentation mechanisms; systematic investigations into threats and attacks; improved vetting of extradition requests and Interpol notices; safeguards for digital security and privacy; specialised support services for affected individuals; and strengthened oversight of technology companies. On 7 October 2025, during the 60th regular session, the Human Rights Council adopted its resolution 60/23 on intimidation and reprisals for cooperating with the United Nations in the field of human rights, noting the rise in the scale and sophistication of targeted repression across borders.[13] In August 2026, in its report on cooperation with the United Nations, its representatives and mechanisms in the field of human rights, the UN Secretary-General again noted the rise of TNR stating its acts were targeted at those directly engaging with the United Nations, with their organisations and, in some instances, with their family members and associates in their countries of origin. The report stressed that awareness, prevention and risk mitigation are the best safeguards against intimidation and reprisals, and they should be at the centre of United Nations efforts. An enhanced system-wide response is also based on documentation and reporting, as well as sustained political will and increased accountability.[14]
A joint statement of more than 45 countries[15] within the framework of the 56th Session of the UN Human Rights Council in June 2024 gave a strong impulse to further work on the issue within various supranational organisations. The Joint Statement on transnational repression called upon all UN member states to stand against TNR in all its forms and to enhance collective vigilance, strengthen protections for those at risk, and hold accountable the perpetrators. In the same line, in June 2025, the G7 leaders expressed deep concern about growing reports of TNR. They stated that TNR undermines national security, state sovereignty, the safety and human rights of victims, and principles of international law and condemned all acts of TNR. The G7 leaders committed to fostering a common understanding of TNR, raising awareness, and promoting accountability to increase the costs for those who engage in acts of TNR, including by developing a TNR Resilience and Response Framework and launching a Digital TNR Detection Academy.[16] The G7 leaders stated intention to redouble efforts to keep their communities safe, defend human rights, and safeguard sovereignty must translate into concrete action rather that remaining mere rhetoric. On 3 October 2025, at the Third Committee of the General Assembly, a group consisting of 70 UN member states and the European Union delivered a cross-regional statement on reprisals. They underlined that participation of civil society and human rights defenders in the work of the United Nations was essential for the Organisation’s credibility and effectiveness and expressed concern at the use of online and offline surveillance and at the apparent increase in transnational repression.[17]
Several UN special procedures paid attention to TNR:
- In April 2024, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression Irene Khan published her report “Journalists in Exile” in which she paid special attention to the issue of TNR. She noted that in recent years hundreds of journalists have fled Belarus and the Russian Federation, among other countries, and analysed the various threats to their safety and security, with a particular focus on the role and responsibilities of the host state. She urged states to review and revise national laws or adopt new laws to allow for the prosecution of the perpetrators and facilitators of TNR and to enable individuals affected by TNR to seek legal remedies in national courts.[18] When presenting her report, she commented that journalists face physical, digital, and legal threats from their home governments, including assassination, assault, abduction, as well as prosecution in absentia on trumped up charges and retaliation against family members back home and highlighted the often inadequate responses of host countries to human rights violations;[19]
- In October 2024, the UN Special Rapporteur on Counter-Terrorism Ben Saul raised concerns during an event at the UN Headquarters in New York regarding the troubling pattern of TNR in the Middle East and North Africa region. He noted the misuse of counter-terrorism laws by regional organisations in the MENA region leading to TNR and emphasised the need for regional organisations to provide sufficient human rights safeguards to prevent such abuses;[20]
- In December 2024, a group of independent UN human rights experts, including the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, the Special Rapporteur on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of Association, the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders, and the Working Group on Discrimination against Women and Girls sent a letter to the Egyptian government regarding the allegations of continued harassment and transnational repression suffered by the exiled Egyptian investigative journalist and human rights defender Basma Mostafa in Lebanon, Kenya, Switzerland, and Germany, where she currently resides as a political refugee, by alleged Egyptian state agents or agents apparently acting on behalf of or with the acquiescence of Egyptian state authorities.[21]
UN human rights experts, including the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Belarus and the Group of Independent Experts on the Situation of Human Rights in Belarus, established by the UN Human Rights Council, have repeatedly drawn attention to the use of TNR practices for persecution of exiled Belarusians by the Lukashenka regime. An overview of these statements will be given in a relevant section, along with Belarus-focused statements of regional intergovernmental organisations.
Awareness of the scale and diversity of TNR at the UN level is currently gaining momentum. The Committee on Enforced Disappearances jointly with the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances plans to issue a joint statement on enforced disappearances in the context of transnational repression. States parties, victims, civil society organisations, national human rights institutions, UN human rights mechanisms, regional human rights mechanisms, UN country teams, academia and others were invited to submit written contributions in January 2026.[22] Similar initiatives from other UN treaty bodies and special procedures would also be useful and would allow for the analysis the practice of TNR in relation to particular human rights standards and different groups of people.
In the most recent impressive development on 23 September 2026, a large group of UN special procedures mandate holders and members of UN human rights treaty bodies issued a strong joint statement, expressing their deep concern regarding TNR and its serious implications for human rights, democracy, state sovereignty, security, safety, civic space, and the rule of law.[23] It was the first comprehensive UN document on TNR, containing a definition, a list of targets, a description of relevant international legal obligations, and detailed recommendations. The statement defined TNR as measures taken by states, both within and outside their territories, to silence, deter, punish, coerce, control or harm in any other way, individuals, groups, and communities abroad on the basis of their real or perceived opinions or beliefs, identity or action, including dissent, or exercise, defence, or advocacy for human rights and fundamental freedoms, democracy, and the rule of law. Of particular significance is the fact that although disproportionately affected groups of targets of repression were listed (and included, “inter alia, members of diaspora communities, migrants, asylum seekers, refugees and stateless persons, as well as human rights defenders, civil society organizations, social movements, journalists, media workers, lawyers, dissidents, students, academics, artists, trade unionists, judicial operators, peoples exercising their right to self-determination, and individuals and groups cooperating or seeking to cooperate with the United Nations and other international and regional human rights bodies”), the statement deliberately avoided “closed list” of targets that would exclude any new groups from protection. Moreover, the statement underlined that TNR frequently takes the form of proxy coercion or punishment, and often extends beyond direct targets to family members and affects other personal relationships, colleagues and employers, associations, assemblies, and communities, who therefore also become victims of TNR. Turning to applicable human rights obligations, the statement unequivocally stated that states have both to refrain from committing or enabling acts of TNR and from providing aid or assistance to another state or actor in the commission of acts of TNR, and to protect individuals within their jurisdiction from acts of transnational repression carried out by foreign actors, including by taking reasonable preventive and protective measures. The statement recommended that states refrain from engaging in acts of TNR, respond to acts of TNR within their jurisdiction or territory, publicly identify, recognize, raise awareness and condemn these acts, and invest resources in tracking and systematically documenting them, as well as provide enhanced protection and redress to targets of TNR within their jurisdiction. Recommendations addressed to international, regional, and sub-regional organisations, national human rights institutions and other oversight and accountability bodies, media and technology companies and other business actors, civil society organisations, academic institutions and other relevant stakeholders underline the importance of joint multi-level efforts aimed at preventing and addressing TNR. Taken together, the substantive elements of the statement suggest it constitutes a “first draft” of a possible future UN thematic treaty. Adoption of a Human Rights Council resolution on TNR could be a logical step towards this goal.
In the OSCE framework, addressing TNR would be a logical development, given the inter-dimensional nature of this type of repression in OSCE terminology, where threats to sovereignty and security of states intertwine with violations of human rights and security of individual TNR targets. In October 2024, an informal group of OSCE participating states called “Democracy Defenders”, including Canada, Denmark, Montenegro, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the U.S.A., organised a roundtable on TNR at the OSCE annual Warsaw Human Dimension Conference. On 8 May 2025, the problem of TNR was raised by the EU member states and their allies in a joint statement on the Occasion of World Press Freedom Day, presented during OSCE Permanent Council meeting 1519 in Vienna.[24] In May 2026, a “Safeguarding Civic Space in the Digital Age: Supplementary Human Dimension Meeting II” conference brought together some 355 participants from across the OSCE region, including representatives of governments, international organisations and civil society. The discussions explored how legal and institutional frameworks can help prevent the misuse of digital technologies and support the implementation of OSCE commitments. It was noted that the use of digital tools such as spyware, biometric surveillance and AI-enabled monitoring to track, intimidate, and restrict civic participation undermines the work of civil society actors and may facilitate TNR.[25] A presentation on context of a digital TNR as a growing threat to civic space, using the example of Belarus, was delivered by iSANS.[26]
The Council of Europe was the first regional organisation to realise the importance of addressing TNR through the lens of human rights. In June 2023, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) adopted a resolution entitled “Transnational repression as a growing threat to the rule of law and human rights”, providing a definition and a set of broad recommendations for countermeasures.[27] It was based on a rather comprehensive report[28] by rapporteur Christopher Chope. The report and the resolution provided a useful and compact classification, grouping methods of TNR into four main categories and offering a basis for further classifications, including in the G7 statement in June 2025.
Most recently, on 25 June 2026, the PACE adopted another resolution dedicated to TNR entitled “Fighting back against transnational repression” (Resolution 2669 (2026)).[29] It defined TNR “as a form of foreign interference by a state, its organs, proxies and/or persons whose actions can be attributed to that state, employed to intimidate, silence, harass, coerce, abduct, harm or kill individuals beyond the state’s borders, including political dissidents, activists, human rights defenders, journalists, political opponents, religious and ethnic minority groups, academics, members of diaspora and exile communities and/or their relatives, regardless of their nationality” (para.5). The resolution emphasised that TNR violates the rule of law and state sovereignty, infringes upon the human rights of the individuals targeted, poses a serious threat to national security, undermines the values and principles of the Council of Europe, and is incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights (para. 3). The PACE stated that only a coordinated international response can adequately counter the threat to national security, human rights, and the rule of law posed by TNR (para. 9). It called on all member and observer states, among other things, to enact legislation aimed at preventing and combating TNR, including through the criminalisation of its methods and the adoption of a definition of TNR and to prosecute perpetrators of TNR to the fullest extent of the law, including through relevant international criminal justice mechanisms where acts of TNR may amount to international crimes falling within their jurisdiction (para. 11.1 and 11.2).
The resolution placed emphasis on the abuse of Interpol procedures. It stated that, under certain circumstances, victims of TNR who are detained pursuant to an abusive Interpol Red Notice or extradition request may meet the criteria for a political prisoner. Accordingly, states which refuse to consider the political motivation behind such requests should be regarded as facilitators of TNR, thus sharing the responsibility for the human rights violations committed against its victims (para. 6). The Assembly made a number of recommendations in this regard. The final version of the resolution was adopted by a majority vote. Five deputies from Turkey voted against it; some representatives of Italy, Switzerland, Poland, Liechtenstein, and Luxembourg abstained.
At the EU level, TNR was initially seen primarily through the lens of foreign interference. The European Parliament initially adopted two resolutions related to TNR, in March 2022[30] and June 2023,[31] with recommendations regarding steps that need to be taken to address foreign interference, including addressing the role of online disinformation. Its Recommendation to EU institutions adopted in 2022[32] regards the negotiation of a cooperation agreement between the EU and Interpol, and is aimed, among other things, at addressing the abuse of red notices and diffusions for political reasons or violations of human rights, thereby providing some basis for taking measures against TNR. However, this Recommendations did not focus on TNR as such.
In November 2025, however, the approach has become more comprehensive: the European Parliament adopted a resolution titled “Addressing transnational repression of human rights defenders”.[33] Chloé Ridel, the European Parliament’s rapporteur on the subject, commented in the explanatory statement that TNR violates fundamental human rights, undermines the rule of law and democracy, and threatens national sovereignty and security through foreign interference.[34] A report by a group of scholars, titled “Transnational Repression of Human Rights Defenders: The Impacts on Civic Space and the Responsibility of Host States,” requested by the European Parliament’s Subcommittee on Human Rights in June 2025, situated TNR firmly in the context of the human rights obligations of EU member states, stressing that it is important to problematise TNR as a distinct threat to individual security and human rights.[35]
Resolution noted the absence of universally adopted definition of TNR as an obstacle to the fight against this phenomenon and admitted that despite growing awareness of the existence and scale of TNR, EU foreign and domestic policy responses to TNR remain limited and fragmented, resulting in a concerning gap in protection for human rights defenders (HRDs) at risk. It proposed defining TNR as attacks and threats by states, including authoritarian regimes and their proxies, that aim to defend and advance their interests by reaching across national borders to coerce, control or silence dissidents, political opponents, journalists, activists, HRDs and diaspora members, through a broad range of physical methods, such as targeted killings, abductions, violence, harassment and enforced returns, disappearances and deportations, and the strategic misuse of legal instruments, including abuse of consular services, extradition procedures or red notices, and arrests, as well as non-physical methods, such as digital surveillance, intimidation, blackmail and threats against HRDs’ families. It is important to note that the Resolution conceptualised TNR as a serious threat to international human rights law and, at the same time, a violation of the sovereignty of host countries, thus suggesting a “consolidated” approach to TNR is necessary. The resolution was clearly a step forward in acknowledging the complex nature of TNR and consequences it entails for human rights in particular. Nevertheless, this step did not reduce the urgent need to adopt a more comprehensive resolution on TNR in relation to a wider range of victims. The definition of TNR and development of broad policy recommendations also reqired further elaboration.
European Parliament embarked upon this task without delay. On 16 June 2026, almost simultaneously with the relevant effort by the CoE Parliamentary Assembly, the European Parliament adopted a resolution “Countering transnational repression – towards an EU strategy to protect Europe’s sovereignty and democratic values”.[36] The resolution sent a strong message to EU bodies and member states on the necessity to mobilise effort on national and EU level to fight this “deliberate, systematic, targeted and repressive practice” which may constitute a crime against humanity within the meaning of Article 7(h) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, taking into account the systematic and widespread nature of such acts (para. E). The resolution was fully based on the “consolidated approach” to TNR and built on the understanding that it “violates fundamental rights and international law, as well as the EU’s and member states’ sovereignty and security” (para. C). It was stressed that TNR committed on territories of EU member states is part of a broader strategy of foreign interference aimed at weakening democratic institutions and societies and directly interferes with the Union’s internal democratic space by silencing voices, fragmenting communities and generating fear and self-censorship, while also undermining the EU’s external action by restricting the ability of individuals residing in the EU to advocate for democracy, human rights and accountability in non-EU countries (para. D). The resolution emphasised that stronger coordination at EU level should support and complement member states’ competences in the field of national security (para. I).
The resolution noted that the lack of a clear definition of TNR contributes to under-reporting, limits effective policy responses and hinders the use of accountability tools, called on the Commission, the Council and the member states to adopt a common EU definition of TNR, and suggested the wording very similar to the one given by the PACE later the same month (para. 4). Extensive and detailed recommendations given in resolution address strengthening EU coordination, data collection and institutional response, strengthening protection and support for persons targeted by TNR, preventing and responding to specific forms of TNR, addressing the structures that enable it, strengthening deterrence and accountability, and positioning the European Union as a global leader in countering TNR.
The fundamental question that researchers pose is whether the existing legal framework can secure effective protection against TNR-based human rights violations. They claim that within the Council of Europe space, the existing CoE conventions, including the European Convention on Human Rights, do not specifically and adequately address the challenges presented by TNR, and the adoption of a specialised thematic instrument is vital.[37] The EU resolution on TNR from June 2026 joined this call and advocated for adoption of a Council of Europe convention on TNR (para. 80).
While the development and adoption of a specialised treaty establishing legal obligations of states in addressing TNR may take considerable time, countering this phenomenon cannot be postponed. Already today, states should develop effective policies for dealing with TNR at all levels, allocate resources to build necessary infrastructure, provide protection to TNR targets, and conduct trainings for relevant civil servants.
The international community’s response to transnational repression by the Lukashenka regime
For many years, TNR perpetrated by the Lukashenka regime received limited international attention. Despite the fact that some egregious examples of its TNR actions were widely known, this type of repression was not considered to be a systematic state policy to combat dissent and was regarded instead as a series of isolated human rights violations. It is only over the past two years that the international community has begun to recognise the scale of human rights violations against people forced to leave Belarus due to the threat of political persecution. This awareness has been facilitated by the work of two special procedures within the UN system, whose attention was fully devoted to the human rights situation in Belarus – the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Belarus and the Group of Independent Experts on the Situation of Human Rights in Belarus established by the UN Human Rights Council, as well as the systemic work of human rights organisations supplying international bodies with factual and analytical information.
In January 2025, a group of independent UN human rights experts expressed concern about the proliferation of trials in absentia in Belarus without respect for basic guarantees of a fair trial.[38] It was noted that since the introduction of the special procedure in Belarus in 2022, hundreds of persons have been convicted.
In February 2025, a first report by the Group of Independent Experts on the Situation of Human Rights in Belarus, established by the UN Human Rights Council, was published.[39] A special section entitled “Repression of Belarusians in Exile” covered a number of TNR instruments applied by Belarus – in absentia trials, expropriation of property, mobility impediments, and coercion-by-proxy. It noted the initiation of the “special procedure” against hundreds of Belarusians in exile, a significant increase in the number of in absentia trials and the imposition of significant financial penalties, including the seizure of their property for the payment of fines and damages.[40] The Group stated that “many Belarusians in exile also recounted facing difficulties in their host country due to the implementation of Presidential Decree No. 278 of 4 September 2023, which prevents the renewal and issuance of passports and other official documents abroad and forbids real estate property transactions in Belarus under powers of attorney established abroad”. The Group also mentioned that some emigrants reported their relatives in Belarus had been forced to pay their fines, had been dismissed from their jobs, or had been threatened with prosecution for supporting “extremists”.[41] At this stage, however, repression of Belarusians in exile was not yet identified by the Group as TNR and the relevant human rights violations were not grouped together, thereby conveying a somewhat misleading impression of their relative insignificance.
In a similar vein, the April 2025 report by the UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Belarus documented several TNR tactics employed by Belarussian authorities and highlighted the growing trend of transboundary repression.[42] To disappointment by many observers, there was no separate section in the report dedicated to TNR. Instead, the in absentia trials were considered within the framework of “The Right to a Fair Trial” section (paras. 42-44) which also mentioned the expropriation of property. The pressure exerted by the authorities on relatives of persons in exile was noted in sections “Collective Punishment and Revenge for Expressing Solidarity” (paras. 45-47), “The Right to Vote and be Elected in Genuine, Periodic Elections” (para. 57), and in the section “Persecution of LGBTQ+ People” (para. 79).
On 8 December 2025, independent UN human rights experts, including Nils Muižnieks, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Belarus, along with Irene Khan, Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Gina Romero, Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, and Ben Saul, Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, denounced the deportation to Lithuania on 11 September 2025 of Belarussian prisoners released from prison. The experts noted that many had their Belarusian identity documents confiscated and some were included on the official list of individuals involved in extremist activities. In their statement, the experts placed the TNR practices applied by the Lukashenka regime towards former political prisoners in the context of statelessness. They noted that the applied measures ran counter to the objectives of the 1954 Convention on the Status of Stateless Persons and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, two treaties which Belarus agreed to ratify during its Universal Periodic Review in 2020.[43]
On 17 December 2025, Nils Muižnieks, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Belarus, issued a separate statement in which he welcomed the releases of political prisoners but cautioned against excessive optimism about the human rights situation in Belarus. Among other points, he noted that some recently released prisoners had new criminal cases opened against them in absentia. He also stressed that some of those expelled were stripped of identity documents. “Until perpetrators of grave human rights violations are held accountable, all political prisoners are released and all Belarusians in exile can safely return to Belarus and are allowed to speak and work freely, we cannot speak of a normalisation of the situation,” he concluded.[44]
In February 2026, the UN Group of Independent Experts on the Situation of Human Rights in Belarus, issued its second report, in which it documented a pattern of TNR targeting Belarusians living in exile.[45] In this report, TNR was addressed for the first time in a separate section as one of “Newly verified patterns of violations”. The Group of Independent Experts documented such TNR practices as public threats, the initiation of criminal proceedings, trials conducted in absentia, the confiscation of property and the freezing of assets, inclusion on the lists of extremists, the persecution of journalists, impediments to mobility and the harassment of the family members of dissenters. The report was presented during the 61st session of the UN Human Rights Council in March 2026.
Within the framework of the same session, a side event “Human Rights in Belarus”, dedicated to the human rights situation in Belarus, the situation of political prisoners and issues of international accountability, was held. Karinna Moskalenko, Chair of the UN Group of Independent Experts on the Human Rights Situation in Belarus, participated in the discussion and touched upon the problem of TNR.[46]
Despite international attention towards the issue, the practice of expelling released political prisoners and stripping them of their identity documents has continued in 2026. On 20 April 2026, the UN Group of Independent Experts on the Situation of Human Rights in Belarus, strongly condemned the Belarusian government’s decision to invalidate the passports of persons formerly detained on political grounds who were forcibly expelled from the country following their release in 2025 and 2026. The Group had conducted interviews with a large number of former detainees who, as a result of this measure, have been left without valid passports – contrary to international law and without legal grounds or justification. These individuals faced significant legal and practical consequences, including restrictions on their freedom of movement, inability to re-enter their own country, separation them from their families, barriers to accessing legal status, employment, healthcare, and essential services in the host country, as well as heightened risks of statelessness or prolonged legal uncertainty. The experts stressed that states have an obligation to protect their nationals and to ensure that any administrative measures affecting their rights are consistent with both domestic and international law. The invalidation of passports, while within the sovereign prerogative of states, must comply with applicable legal standards. It constitutes a legal violation when such action is arbitrary, discriminatory, disproportionate, or lacks a clear legal basis or due process. Such measures may amount to violations of fundamental rights protected under international law. The Group called upon the authorities of Belarus to immediately remedy this situation, restore the rights of affected individuals, and ensure full compliance with the state’s international human rights obligations.[47] While the experts rightly focused on the fact that depriving political prisoners of their identity documents constitutes a violation of a number of human rights, they regrettably missed the opportunity to explicitly identify this practice as a new tool of TNR.
On 6 July 2026, several mandate holders of UN special procedures once more expressed serious concern over the arbitrary invalidation of passports of eight former Belarusian political prisoners forcibly expelled from Belarus after their release from detention on 13 December 2025, warning the measure may amount to a continuing form of TNR and expose them to risks of statelessness and other human rights violations. “The sequence of politically motivated imprisonment, forced expulsion and subsequent invalidation of passports points to an escalating pattern of TNR,” the experts said.[48]
In his 2026 report on situation of human rights in Belarus,[49] the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Belarus listed TNR among “Key human rights trends and concerns” and for the first time allocated a special section to TNR, although mentions of TNR practices can also be found in other sections. Among other observations, the Special Rapporteur noted the situation of released political prisoners being coerced to leave Belarus within 48 hours or face criminal charges, often secretly and, in some cases, without valid identification documents, and the denial of the option to remain in Belarus (para. 41). He stated that in absentia trials which he called “a routine tool”, public “demonstrations’’ of property seizures, pressure on relatives and other TNR tactics create a climate of fear beyond the country’s borders (paras. 46-52). The Special Rapporteur urged the government of Belarus to put an end to TNR and formulated a number of thematic recommendations.
The International Labour Organisation (ILO) also joined UN special procedures in condemning the practice of stripping former political prisoners of their identity documents and thus became another player in combatting TNR. On 30 March 2026, the ILO called on the Belarusian authorities to return the passports of trade union leaders Alyaksandr Yarashuk and Hennadz Fyadynich and resume paying them pensions. The Administrative Council, the governing body of the ILO, while reviewing the situation of workers’ rights in Belarus, considered their cases. They had been released from imprisonment last year, but were not receiving their pensions. In addition, Yarashuk had been expelled from Belarus without a passport. According to Yarashuk, the ILO received a reply from Belarus stating that his passport was located “unknown where” and that he had been deprived of his pension for “committing a crime against the state”.[50] The reply came without a signature. The Administrative Council included this issue in its final resolution, expressing “the greatest concern” at the refusal of the government of Belarus to return the confiscated passports of Alyaksandr Yarashuk and Hennadz Fyadynich and restore their pensions, and called on the government to do so without further delay.[51] 40 Council members voted in favour of the resolution, two voted against and eight abstained. If the ILO had noted in its resolution that the seizure of passports from former political prisoners is a TNR tool, voting on the resolution would become another opportunity for states to unite in addressing TNR.
Although the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has lately paid increased attention to TNR, the level of focus specifically on TNR carried out by the Lukashenka regime remained modest until 2026. On 21 May 2026, 38 states members of the Informal Group of Friends of Democratic Belarus issued a Joint Statement at the OSCE Permanent Council meeting, marking the International Day of Solidarity with Political Prisoners in Belarus. In the statement, signatories urged the Belarusian authorities to halt the TNR of those who have left Belarus, as well as the harassment of family members of those in exile.[52] On 8 July at its 33rd annual session in the Hague, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly adopted a resolution “The Situation in Belarus in the Context of Regional Security, Transnational Repression and Human Rights”.[53] The document referred to transnational repression carried out by the Belarusian authorities, including the persecution, intimidation and harassment of Belarusians abroad, as well as the abuse of international mechanisms. “The Lukashenka regime’s innovative approaches to transnational repression serve as a powerful model for the Russian Federation and other authoritarian States to imitate as they attempt to silence opponents abroad,” the resolution said. It further stated that “a sustainable resolution of the crisis in Belarus is only possible through the cessation of repression, the holding of free and fair elections and ensuring accountability for violations of international law.” The OSCE participating states were urged to strengthen measures against transnational repression, including preventing the abuse of international mechanisms, and to ensure appropriate protection for Belarusians abroad. The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly further called for the development of concrete legal and administrative solutions for Belarusians in exile, including access to identity documents, legal status, and fundamental rights. The Assembly welcomed the launch of the International Criminal Court’s investigation into international crimes committed by the Lukashenka regime and called for the support of the investigation.
At the Council of Europe, attention to TNR by the Lukashenka regime has unfortunately remained limited over the past couple of years. The Council of Europe is prepared to discuss problems faced by Belarusians in exile, such as at the conference “Luxembourg Solutions” in June 2024 where representatives of the Council of Europe, Belarusian democratic forces and civil society discussed the role of national parliaments and other national authorities in addressing these problems[54] and supporting the implementation of the recommendations of the resolution “Addressing the Specific Challenges Faced by the Belarusians in Exile” adopted earlier by the CoE Parliamentary Assembly in June 2023.[55] However, political statements or resolutions specifically condemning TNR by the Lukashenka regime have been limited. One notable exception was the statement by the CoE Secretary General, Marija Pejčinović Burić, in July 2024, who strongly condemned in absentia trial of 20 Belarusian experts and analysts”.[56]
The European Parliament has been visibly more active in addressing TNR by the Lukashenka regime. In April 2025, it adopted a robust resolution “On the Immediate Risk of Further Repression by the Lukashenka Regime in Belarus – Threats from the Investigative Committee” (2025/2629(RSP))[57] which had a strong emphasis on TNR. It noted that the Lukashenka regime has been escalating internal and transnational repression to dismantle the structures representing the democratic forces of Belarus; the Belarusian Investigative Committee has opened “special proceedings” against hundreds of Belarusians in exile, whereas the families of the Belarusian diaspora were threatened with imprisonment and asset confiscation; the Lukashenka regime is exploiting the expiry of many Belarusian passports to force the diaspora members to return to Belarus; and the Belarusian regime’s increasing cooperation with Russian security services heightens the risk of coordinated repression, surveillance, and hybrid threats in EU territory. The resolution demanded that the Lukashenka regime immediately cease its repression, including the surveillance of exiles and demonstrators. It strongly condemned the continued expansion of repression by the Lukashenka regime, which now targets Belarusians abroad with criminal prosecution, asset seizures, and other measures designed to silence dissent abroad and called for EU-wide legal support and protection for exiled Belarusians by simplifying procedures for obtaining visas, residence permits, and provisional IDs for individuals made stateless by extraterritorial persecution.
In this resolution, the European Parliament considered the persecution of Belarusian citizens for peaceful democratic activities abroad via the Investigative Committee’s “special proceedings” to be a direct violation of the EU member states’ territorial sovereignty and urged the countries concerned to disregard Interpol arrest warrants for the extradition of Lukashenka’s political opponents. Recommendations to EU institutions and member states in the resolution were quite far-reaching. The resolution welcomed the sanctions against the Presidential Property Management Directorate and the Central Election Commission, which issued politically motivated decisions, urged the immediate imposition of personal sanctions on all members of the Belarusian Investigative Committee and officials from other state institutions complicit in the transnational persecution and intimidation of Belarusian citizens; strongly advocated the swift development and enforcement of a legal mechanism to identify, freeze, and confiscate all assets and property outside Belarus owned by Lukashenka and his inner circle, with a view to reallocating them to a fund supporting victims of repression. It urged the member states to impose further sanctions equal to those imposed on Russia, particularly on officials responsible for transnational repression; urged the EU and its member states to increase political, financial, and technical support for the independent media, human rights defenders, trade unions, and civil society initiatives operating within and outside Belarus, including monitoring trials and increasing the visibility of political prisoners; called on the High Representative/Vice President to use the EU Intelligence and Situation Centre and the European Digital Media Observatory to counteract Belarusian intelligence operations and disinformation; and urged the International Criminal Court to expedite proceedings on crimes against humanity by the Lukashenka regime. It also demanded that member states pursue accountability through national proceedings, based on the principle of universal jurisdiction.[58] Thus, it was not the actions of one Belarus’ agency, the Investigative Committee, but the TNR actions on the part of the state of Belarus in its entirety, including cooperation with Russia in this area, that became the subject of this resolution. The resolution examined TNR in a comprehensive manner, both from the point of view of human rights violations and violations of state sovereignty.
In October 2025, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on the situation in Belarus, five years after the fraudulent presidential elections (2025/2900(RSP)).[59] TNR was mentioned in the resolution once – the European Parliament denounced the continuing repression of democratic forces, free media and civil society through politically motivated show trials and transnational repression (para. 1). Additionally, it was noted that restrictions on renewing Belarusian documents outside Belarus have left exiles in legal limbo, rendering them unable to apply for residency documents or conduct any other activities that requires valid national identification (para. I). However, this practice was not identified as TNR. There were no reference to other TNR instruments, nor calls for the states parties to address the issue. With this in view, the need for another resolution on Belarus that would cover a full range of egregious TNR practices by the Lukashenka regime is still acute.
In its resolution of 16 June 2026 “On countering transnational repression – towards an EU strategy to protect Europe’s sovereignty and democratic values”[60], the European Parliament named Belarus among four main perpetrators of TNR in Europe and globally (along with Russia, China, and Iran). The resolution stated that Belarus conducts TNR at an alarming scale, including on EU territory, notably through physical violence, the abuse of Interpol mechanisms, denial of travel documents, the use of spyware, coercive consular practices, forced returns, asset seizures and intimidation. It uses Interpol’s red notice system to target political opponents in exile, and targets the diaspora and dissidents, including those residing in the EU, through criminal cases, special in absentia trials and coercion-by-proxy (para. AF). By mentioning Belarus in this resolution, the European Parliament demonstrated its awareness of a complex nature of TNR realised by the Lukashenka regime which gives hope for the future strategic actions by the EU specifically aimed at deterrence of TNR carried out by the Lukashenka regime.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE INSTRUMENTS OF TRANSNATIONAL REPRESSION BY THE LUKASHENKA REGIME
The scale of emigration from Belarus and specific features of TNR carried out by the Lukashenka regime
According to UN estimates for 2024, almost 800,000 Belarusians live outside the country – that is 8.7% of the population”.[61] Another statistical indicator that can be used to assess the number of Belarusians abroad is the number of primary residence permits issued to Belarusians in the European Union: between 2020 and 2024, a total of 981,679 such permits were issued.[62] Although this figure is somewhat inaccurate, since it also includes those Belarusians who have moved several times and obtained a residence permit in different countries, it still provides an idea of the scale of migration. An overwhelming consensus among academic studies, publications by human rights organisations, and think-tank reports supports the claim that the post-2020 mass exodus from Belarus was primarily driven by political persecution.[63]
The level of repression inside Belarus shows no sign of decreasing. It is characterised as critical, with state terror and repression against dissidents and potential political opponents and participants in protest initiatives continuing unabated.[64] The intention of the regime to completely eliminate the dissent was starkly articulated in a recent interview by Lukashenka, who stressed that he will react cruelly to any insubordination “without looking at any laws”. In his own words, the people he “does not need” will be either in prison or expelled from the country,[65] thereby confirming once again his encouragement and approval of coercive acts leading to mass persecution and deportation.
Today, Belarusian citizens fleeing criminal prosecution or in fear of repeated prison sentences do not feel safe in Europe or other regions of the world due to the growing TNR by the Lukashenka regime. The arsenal of tools that enable the regime to exert pressure on exiles is growing, as is the scope of those targeted. Dzyanis Kuchinski, diplomatic adviser to Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, reported a further intensification of transnational repression in 2026. “Almost every day, KGB officers contact employees of Tsikhanouskaya’s Office, threaten their relatives in Belarus and commit cyberattacks. Threats are received both personally by Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya and her office staff. Lukashenka’s propaganda has also increased pressure on the entire democratic community,” he said.[66]
Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, in her speech at the international discussion in Berlin on countering TNR by authoritarian regimes, stated that it is becoming a serious threat to international security. “In the past, repression was mostly limited to the borders of the country. But today, even abroad, you can no longer feel safe. Dictatorships have learned to persecute their opponents wherever they are,” she said.[67] Addressing international partners, she stressed that supporting Belarusian refugees, civil society, human rights organisations and independent media is not only a matter of helping Belarusians, but also a means of protecting Europe itself.
Despite the growing awareness of the international community regarding the mass use of TNR practices by the Lukashenka regime – practices that justify treating Belarus as one of the most aggressive repressive regimes, Lukashenka’s tactics regarding the publicity of TNR have not changed. While other states try not to advertise their repressive actions aimed at individuals within foreign jurisdictions, the Belarusian authorities do not hide their involvement in TNR acts. On the contrary, they actively use successful examples of TNR to demonstrate that their abilities to pursue people are not limited by borders. This approach is reflected in speeches by the regime representatives and statements by their propagandists.
Among the examples of public threats to individuals is the case of the stand-up comedian Vanya Usovich, who was reminded that he could “rest for five years or repeat the fate of Kamissarenka”[68] in a Telegram channel close to the Main Directorate for Combating Organised Crime and Corruption, and activist Hanna Fedaronak, who became an object of elaborated psychological attack – unknown people arranged fundraising for her “funeral”, sent funeral wreaths, and threatened her. She is currently preparing a report to the Warsaw police.[69] On a “group level”, the seizure of property “even if sold or donated to someone” [70] and calls for direct violence against opposition leaders by other Belarusians abroad[ii] were used as public threats.
Lukashenka’s propagandists boast that legal channels of interaction with other countries can be used for persecution. Propagandist Vadzim Baravik, who was appointed a deputy of the Minsk City Council, said in an interview: “If we need it, we will deliver you from anywhere in the world. There have been precedents, and not only with a famous person who is in Belarus now.[iii] We have diplomatic services and other services, and we work closely with Interpol and the Russian Federation. Therefore, if someone thinks that because they have some financial assets, they can do anything, they are mistaken. We will find them and punish them.”[71]
In September 2026, a wave of public discussions about the deprivation of citizenship of “mankurts who do not remember their homeland, traitors and outright enemies of Belarusians” was organised in Belarusian state media. The publications stated that the exiles were “sitting in Vilnius, Warsaw and other capitals of unfriendly states busy demanding that their Western masters tighten the noose of sanctions around our necks day and night, lying about Belarus, denigrating both our lives and our country. They damage their former homeland and everyone who lives here.” Further, the publications discussed the “international experience of deprivation of citizenship” and emphasized that “in recent years, quite reasonable proposals have been increasingly heard in Belarus to deprive those who really harm our country and its people of citizenship. There are provisions in our law “On Citizenship” that provide for its loss, including the deprivation of a passport for dirty tricks against your own country. However, so far this article has not affected anyone. So far…»
Another distinctive feature of TNR carried out by the Lukashenka regime is a relative independence in its implementation. While EU Parliament-commissioned research demonstrated that majority of documented TNR incidents involve cooperation between origin and host states or the exploitation of weak rule-of-law environments, including through misuse of extradition frameworks, law enforcement cooperation and international organisations,[72] the Lukashenka regime has invented and is actively using many ways to independently influence the lives of exiles, including in absentia trials and property expropriation, coercion-by-proxy, including exiled individuals in the lists of “extremists” and “terrorists” and cancellation of consular services.
In 2025-2026, there has been a significant increase in the use of certain types of TNR by the Lukashenka regime. These are examined in separate sections. Other TNR tools have not been used as often by the regime in the reporting period, or there is currently no information about their use. It should be noted, however, that these tools have already been used by the regime earlier and may be used again in the future. Therefore, they are covered in a shorter overview in a separate section.
In absentia trials and property confiscation
In absentia trials and property confiscation were among the first tools of TNR that the Lukashenka regime began to use systematically. These practices have subsequently been adopted by other repressive regimes, including in Russia. Today, these tools are among the most frequently employed by the regime. Information about in absentia trials appears every week. Human rights defenders noted certain reduction in documented cases of this type of repression due to the restricted access to the courts’ schedules since the beginning of spring 2025 and stress that the real number of cases of in absentia trials and property confiscations targeting exiles is much greater than the number they are able to register.
Opening criminal investigation and holding trials in absentia
Since July 2022, Belarusian law has allowed individuals abroad to be tried in absentia, using a “special procedure”. Possible sentence includes death penalty. This tool immediately became a preferred TNR tool for the regime. The provision initially applied to those tried on charges of serious crimes such as an act of terrorism, genocide, mercenary activities, treason, sabotage, the creation of an extremist formation or participation in it, as well as charges related to mass riots and calls for sanctions.[73], However, three years later, the list of charges eligible for in absentia trials was expanded. According to the law “On Amendments to the Codes of Criminal Responsibility”, signed by Lukashenka on 17 February 2025, the list now includes such charges as inciting discord, discrediting the Republic of Belarus, insulting the president or a government official, abuse of state symbols, and disclosure of state secrets.[74] According to another important amendment, “a special procedure” can be applied in other cases by a decision of the Prosecutor General, the Chair of the Investigative Committee, or the KGB, thereby allowing any crime to be tried in absentia.[75]
Below are some examples of the application of this tool in 2025-2026:
- In October 2025, Pinsk resident Andrei Kuzmyanchuk was convicted in absentia for participating in protest actions in 2020. The court found him guilty of “participating in mass riots, which resulted in direct violence against individuals, pogroms, and destruction of property” and sentenced him to four years of imprisonment in a high-security colony. Kuzmyanchuk was added to the “terrorist list”;[76]
- The Supreme Court considered an appeal against the verdict handed down to Mikalai Katsalapau, co-founder of the Wargaming company. The appeal was rejected, and the verdict was upheld. The verdict was handed down at the beginning of October. Katsalapau was sentenced in absentia to 13 years of imprisonment in a high-security colony. He also received a substantial fine of 50,000 base units (2,100,000 rubles or more than 530,000 Euro). He was found guilty of financing extremist and terrorist activities. Propagandists claimed that Katsalapau had transferred hundreds of thousands of dollars in cryptocurrency to “extremist” and “terrorist” funds which support political prisoners and their families;[77]
- In November 2025, Aksana Kolb, former editor-in-chief of the newspaper Novy Chas who lives now in exile, became a defendant in a new criminal case. In late 2023, the Investigative Committee in the Brest region opened a case against her on charges of “facilitating extremist activities” and “organising actions that grossly violate public order”. According to Kolb, she learned about the nature of the charges only on 11 November 2025, after a call from an employee of the Frunzenski police department in Minsk. She also discovered that the Valozhinski District Court had increased the severity of sentence previously imposed on her for “organising and preparing actions that grossly violate public order or actively participating in them”. Instead of two and a half years of restriction of freedom, she was sentenced to one year, one month and three days of imprisonment. The police officer who called her asked if she planned to apply to the Return Commission or return to Belarus independently. Kolb replied that she intended to return, but “not under this government”;[78]
- A criminal investigation was initiated against Iryna Khalip, a special correspondent of Novaya Gazeta Europe. According to Khalip, on 27 November 2025, police officers searched her parents’ apartment in Minsk. Police officers commented that a case had been opened against their daughter on “extremist” charges. The details of the charges are unknown. Police officers interrogated Khalip’s mother, Lucyna Byalzatskaya, attempting to ascertain her daughter’s whereabouts and her phone number. No items related to Khalip’s work were found in the apartment. “This is a very clear signal: remember that you have a family in Belarus before you slander our prosperous regime. Dictatorships all over the world like to send such signals. It’s a mistake to say that a person who has managed to flee the country is already out of reach. Those whose relatives remain as hostages in the country of origin are just as vulnerable, knowing that they cannot protect their loved ones from persecution,” Khalip said;[79]
- In December 2025, the Investigative Committee launched a special procedure against Artsyom Shabuneu. He was accused of incitement to discord, violence or threat of violence against an officer of the Department of Internal Affairs, violence or threat of violence against an official, and insulting a government official;[80]
- A criminal case was opened in absentia against Alyaksandr Kukhta, a well-known Belarusian priest and author of the “Batushka otvetit” (The priest will answer) YouTube channel, for facilitating “extremist” activities. Kukhta had condemned the repression in 2020 and opposed Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. In early 2022, he left Belarus for Lithuania. In October 2025, Kukhta announced that he was leading BYSOL fundraising efforts for specific individuals;[81]
- In January 2026, the Investigative Committee announced the start of a special procedure against Mikalai Tarasenka. He is accused of slander, calls for sanctions against Belarus, slandering Lukashenka, and insulting Lukashenka;[82]
- In February 2026, a new criminal case was opened against the famous writer Sasha Filipenka. He was accused of calling for action against national security. The reason for his persecution was an interview with the YouTube channel “Obychnoye Utro” (Ordinary Morning). Under the new charge, he faces five to seven years of imprisonment; his home in Belarus was searched. Filipenka lives abroad. In February 2025, a criminal case had already been opened against him under the charge of incitement to hostility;[83]
- In March 2026, a new criminal case was initiated against opera singer Marharyta Liauchuk on charges of insulting Aliaksandr Lukashenka. In June 2024, Liauchuk had already been convicted in absentia for “creating or participating in an extremist formation” and “insulting Lukashenka”. It is not known what term of imprisonment she was sentenced to back then. Liauchuk is a Belarusian singer, blogger, and former soloist of the National Opera and Ballet Theatre of Belarus. During the 2020 elections, she supported the protesters, and later had to leave Belarus due to persecution;[84]
- In March 2026, Aliaksei Karpeka, a journalist with the Bureau investigative media, was detained in absentia in a criminal case against him. Karpeka shared on his Facebook page a fragment of a document stating that he is accused under Part 3 of Article 361-1 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Belarus (participation in an extremist formation) and that a preventive measure of detention has been applied;[85]
- In March 2026, the Minsk City Court delivered a verdict in absentia against Victoryja Bakunovich. She was accused of creating an “extremist formation” and facilitating “extremist activities”. She was sentenced to six years of imprisonment in a special regime colony. Bakunovich was mentioned in the case of the display of the national Belarusian and Ukrainian flags on Lesya Ukrainka Street in Minsk in August 2022;[86]
- On 20 March 2026, the verdict was announced for Vadzim Krivasheyeu, the former Director of the Republican Centre for Olympic Freestyle Training, who was tried in absentia. He was found guilty of abuse of power, conspiracy or other actions committed with the aim to seize state power, calls for sanctions or other actions harmful to national security, and the creation or participation in an extremist formation. Krivasheyeu was sentenced to 12 years of imprisonment in a high-security colony and ordered to pay 1,000 basic units (45,000 roubles or approximately 13,000 Euro) of fines. In addition, he was banned from holding positions related to organisational, managerial, and administrative duties for five years. In September 2020, Krivasheyeu was dismissed from his position as Director of the Republican Centre for Olympic Freestyle Training for Freestyle Skiing for “poor ideological work in the team”. This happened after famous freestyle skiers Alyaksandra Ramanouskaya and Dzmitry Dachynski, as well as the national team coach Mikalai Kazeka, expressed their dissatisfaction with the violence committed by security forces in response to the protests of 9-11 August 2020;[87]
- Aliaksandr Karneeu from Maladechna was convicted in absentia in November 2024 on charges of violence or threat of violence against a police officer. The court sentenced him to three years of high-security imprisonment and ordered payment of compensation for moral damage in the amount of 2,500 rubles (approximately 750 Euro). He lived in Poland, but returned to Belarus for an unknown reason. There, he was retried on charges of facilitating “extremist activities” and sentenced to five and a half years of imprisonment and a fine of 42,000 rubles (approximately 12,630 Euro). As reported in the state newspaper in December 2025, the criminal case was related to the organisation “Dapamoha”, which was recognised as an “extremist formation”. “Karneeu assisted the extremist activities of the extremist formation ‘Dapamoha’ in organising the illegal departure from the Republic of Belarus of persons brought to criminal and administrative responsibility for crimes and offenses of an extremist nature,” the article said. In April 2026, Karneeu was added to the “list of extremists”;[88]
- On 7 May 2026, the Hrodna Regional Court considered a criminal case against Aliaksandr Zubryk in absentia. He was found guilty of inciting social hatred, actively participating in actions that grossly violate public order, insulting Lukashenka, insulting a government official, and abusing state symbols. The court sentenced him to three and a half years of imprisonment. It is not known what exactly Zubryk was accused of.[89] He had previously been detained for comments in the “Lida dla zhyzni CHAT” (Lida for Life) and was released on bail pending trial, after which he left Belarus;[90]
- On 12 May 2026, the Homel Regional Court sentenced Stanislav Pryhodzich in absentia to five years of imprisonment and a fine of 4,500 rubles (approximately 1,350 Euro). Pryhodzich was found guilty of incitement to discord, participation in an “extremist formation”, insulting Lukashenka, insulting a government representative, and discrediting Belarus;[91]
- On 20 May 2026, the Hrodna Regional Court considered a criminal case in absentia against Maksim Shabutski, a former policeman, blogger and soldier of the Kalinouski Regiment. He was charged under 17 criminal articles, including calls for sanctions, inciting social hatred, mass riots, slandering Lukashenka, insulting Lukashenka, insulting a government official, insulting a judge, slander, discrediting Belarus, abusing state symbols, financing extremist activities, facilitating extremist activities, creating an extremist formation or participation in it, creation of a criminal organisation, participation of a citizen of Belarus on the territory of another country in an armed formation or conflict, undergoing training or other training to participate in extremist activities, plotting to seize power. Shabutski was sentenced to 19 years of imprisonment in a high-security colony and a fine of 3,500 basic units (157,500 rubles or approximately 49,570 Euro);[92]
- On 25 May 2026, political scientist Dzmitry Balkunets was sentenced by the Minsk City Court in absentia to 12 years of imprisonment. Balkunets was found guilty under eleven articles of the Criminal Code. In addition to 12 years of imprisonment in a high-security regime, he was fined 5,000 basic units (225,000 rubles or approximately 70,800 Euro). The indictment said that Balkunets “among other things, in 2020-2024 created and posted at least 28 informational publications of an incentive nature, including on the ‘Dmitry Bolkunets’ YouTube channel.” In the texts, he allegedly called for the seizure of state power and violent change of the constitutional order, harming the national security of Belarus, and the use of sanctions against Belarus, its individuals and legal entities;[93]
- In May 2026, a new criminal case against a former political prisoner Paval Sieviarynets was initiated in absentia. “A criminal case was opened because of the Freedom Day, and a search was conducted in Vitsebsk,” he wrote on his Facebook page. Sieviarynets headed the organising committee of the Freedom Day celebrations this year;[94]
- In May 2026, a criminal case was initiated in absentia against Illya Mironau, a former political prisoner and activist from Homel, under the charge of the legalisation of criminally obtained funds. “The logic of the punitive authorities is simple: if I helped people, it means I was laundering money. But the truth is that all my ‘criminal activities’ after my release from the detention centre were simply acts of civic solidarity,” Mironau wrote on Facebook. He believed that a new criminal case was opened to discredit the idea of civic assistance and restrict his activities abroad;[95]
- In May 2026, a new criminal case was initiated against former political prisoner Pavel Mazheika. According to human rights defenders, he is most likely charged with “facilitating extremist activities”. Mazheika said that he was not aware of what he was accused of this time. He knew, however, about “dozens of so-called ‘procedural actions’” against his relatives, family members and acquaintances: searches, interrogations, including informal conversations. As he noted, during the searches, the security forces “were looking for him” and “surprised that they could not find him”. Initially, Mazheika was detained on 30 August 2022 and in July 2023 was sentenced to six years of imprisonment in a high-security colony on the charge of “facilitating extremist activities”. In September 2025, we was released together with other 51 political prisoners and expelled to Lithuania;[96]
- In May 2026, archpriest Georgy Roy, performing his service in the Belarusian Orthodox parish in Vilnius, reported he saw his name on the police wanted lists. He is accused of “facilitating extremist activities”. Georgy Roy was forced to flee persecution to Lithuania in 2023;[97]
- On 27 July, the Hrodna Regional Court sentenced Pavel Mickiewicz in absentiato five years of imprisonment in a high-security colony and a fine of 22,500 rubles (approximately 6,900 Euro). Pavel Mickiewicz has been living in Poland for more than 20 years. In 2008, he founded the Okno na Wschód (Window to the East) Foundation in Białystok, which promotes good-neighbourly relations with Eastern European countries, migrant support, and educational projects. The court found Mickiewicz guilty of spreading deliberately false information about the political and social situation of the Republic of Belarus, the legal status of citizens in the Republic of Belarus, and the activities of government agencies, discrediting the Republic of Belarus and facilitating extremist activities;[98]
- On 4 August 2026, the Minsk City Court sentenced Siarhei Mikhalok, leader of popular music bands Lyapis Trubetskoy, Brutto, and Drezden, to four years of imprisonment in absentia. He was found guilty of “insulting the president” and “inciting other social hostility”. According to the prosecution, the basis for the criminal case was video recordings published in 2021–2022 on the Brutto project’s social media. The investigation claimed that they contained a “negative assessment” of Aliaksandr Lukashenka, as well as criticism of law enforcement officers and military personnel;[99]
- The in absentia trial of Katsiaryna Mankevich, the vocalist of the bands Dymna Lotva and Hangover in Minsk, began in the Minsk City Court on 14 August. Mankevich is charged with propaganda of terrorism, financing of “terrorist activities”, assistance to “extremist activities”, insulting Lukashenka, and violence or threat of violence against Lukashenka.[100]
As it becomes clear from the list above, TNR by the Lukashenka regime is now aimed not only at traditional victims of repression, such as politicians, journalists, bloggers and civic activists, but also at a broader circle of Belarusians who have an opportunity to make their dissent public, such as popular musicians, priests, writers, and researchers. We can also witness a rise of criminal cases against those not related to any political activity, but involved in solidarity initiatives or having once left a comment on social media.
Group criminal cases initiated within the framework of the special procedure can include from a few to several hundred defendants (in cases of mass civil resistance):
- On 22 January 2026, the Vitsebsk Regional Court handed down sentences in absentia to the founders and participants of the Chestnyje liudi (Honest People) initiative, created in 2020 to combat electoral fraud. Alena Zhivahlod was sentenced to ten years of imprisonment with a fine of 1,500 basic units (approximately 19,600 Euro). Zarina Sarokina, Aleh Davydchik and Tsimafey Malakhouski each were sentenced to eight years of imprisonment with a fine of 900 basic units (approximately 11,800 Euro). They were convicted of creating an “extremist” formation, insulting Lukashenka, inciting hostility, slandering Lukashenka, discrediting Belarus, and calling for action against national security.[101] The “Chestnyje liudi” initiative was recognised as an extremist group back in 2022. On 18 June 2025, the KGB added Alena Zhivahlod, Zaryna Sarokina, Aleh Davydchik, and Tsimafei Malakhouski to the list of those involved in the “Chestnyje liudi” “extremist formation”;[102]
- On 5 March 2026, the Minsk City Court delivered sentences in absentia to five Belarusian volunteers associated with the Kalinouski Regiment. Among the charges were “acts of terrorism” and “creation of a terrorist organisation”. Former Commander Dzyanis Prokharau was sentenced to 25 years of imprisonment in a high-security colony. He is required to serve the first five years in prison regime. He was fined 700 basic units (approximately 9,300 Euro). Former Commander Pavel Shurmei was also sentenced to 25 years of imprisonment in a high-security colony with the obligation to serve the first five years in prison regime. He was fined 2,000 basic units (approximately 26,500 Euro). Vadzim Kabanchuk, a former Deputy Commander and the Representative for Defence and National Security of the United Transitional Cabinet, was sentenced to 25 years of imprisonment in a high-security colony with the first five years in prison regime and a fine of 700 basic units (approximately 9,300 Euro). Kabanchuk was also stripped of his military rank of senior reserve lieutenant. Instructor Aliaksei Nazarau was sentenced to 12 years of imprisonment in a high-security colony. He was fined 700 basic units (approximately 9,300 Euro). Soldier Aliaksei Kavalchuk was also sentenced to 12 years of imprisonment in a high-security colony. He was fined 500 basic units (approximately 6,650 Euro);[103]
- On 23 March 2026, the Investigative Committee traditionally threatened Belarusians abroad with criminal prosecution and confiscation of property for participating in rallies in celebration of Freedom Day on 25 March. The agency stated that Freedom Day is being used by “extremist groups and their foreign handlers” to discredit Belarus in the international arena. “The main goals of such actions remain unchanged: creating the appearance of mass protests, creating a negative information background around the Republic of Belarus, trying to involve citizens who have left the country in illegal activities, and attracting further financial resources for extremist activities,” the Investigative Committee said in a press release;[104]
- On 8 May 2026, the Minsk City Court sentenced four participants of the “Chestnyje liudi” (Honest People) initiative in absentia. Yauhenia Tachytskaya was sentenced to five years of imprisonment for “facilitating extremist activities”. In October 2024, she was convicted in absentia in the Machulishchi case on five criminal counts, including “high treason” and “financing a terrorist organisation.” At that time, she was sentenced to 15 years of imprisonment and a fine of 1,000 basic units (approximately 12,000 Euro). Her overall sentence now is 17 years of imprisonment and a fine of 67,000 rubles (approximately 20,150 Euro). Katsyaryna Vostrava was sentenced to five years of imprisonment and a fine of 27,000 rubles (approximately 8,120 Euro) for “facilitating extremist activities”. Antanina Naidovich, in addition to “facilitating extremist activities”, was accused of “insulting a government official”. She was sentenced to six years of imprisonment and fined 29,250 rubles (approximately 8,800 Euro). Andrei Balmakov was also sentenced. Presumably, it is lawyer Andrei Balmakov, who defended individuals in “political” cases after the 2020 protests. He was detained in March 2025 on charges of “facilitating extremist activities”. He was held in the KGB pre-trial detention centre until February 2026, after which he was transferred to pre-trial detention centre No. 1. The essence of the charges against him is unknown;[105]
- In the end of August, the Investigative Committee launched special procedure (in absentia investigation) against the founders of Dissidentby civic initiative, which was recognised as an extremist group. Yauhen Razumko is accused of mass riots and attempted murder of an employee of the Department of Internal Affairs. Vyachaslau Kasinerau and Maryna Kasinerava are accused of creating an “extremist formation”, inciting hostility or discord, discrediting Belarus, insulting Lukashenka, and facilitating “extremist activities”;[106]
- On 14 September, five representatives of the Kalinouski Regiment Mikalai Boika, Yury Makitau, Natallia Nikitsina, Krystsina Stankevich and Mikhail Chuprynski were found guilty of participating in a criminal organisation, conspiracy to seize power, participation in an extremist formation, participation in an armed formation or armed conflict on the territory of a foreign state, military operations, as well as recruiting or preparing persons for such participation, facilitating extremist activities, undergoing training to participate in extremist activities, and participation in a terrorist organisation. Yury Makitau was sentenced to 20 years of imprisonment. Mikalai Boika, Natallia Nikitsina, Krystsina Stankevich and Mikhail Chuprynski were sentenced to 12 years of imprisonment each.[107]
In absentia investigations and trials are a multifunctional TNR tool. They not only put the accused at risk of arrest and extradition through Interpol or mutual assistance in criminal matters agreements, but also serve as a tool for obstructing their access to bank services or legal residence documents due to their “criminal status”. They also allow the Belarus authorities to conduct searches and issue threats to the relatives of exiles remaining in Belarus as the relevant section of this report proves.
Property seizure
The seizure of property belonging to exiles is not a mere interim measure applied to ensure payment of a fine ordered in a court verdict, but is deployed as a repressive measure used on a mass scale since at least 2023.[108] Those who flee Belarus to escape political persecution, are unable to return home for security reasons. At the same time, any property-related agreements, including sale or gift, from 2023 onwards can only be carried out inside the country, according to the Belarusian law. Moreover, in September 2023 Lukashenka signed Decree No. 278 “On the Procedure for Issuing Documents and Performing Actions” which bans Belarusians from performing notarial acts abroad. In particular, it prohibits selling or gifting real estate or registering or deregistering a car without their personal presence in Belarus or through a representative acting with a power of attorney issued in Belarus.[109] As a result, exiled Belarusians cannot dispose of their property or authorise their relatives to act on their behalf. This allows the state to seize and sell apartments, and evict tenants. Furthermore, the authorities are able to cancel property sale agreements on the grounds that they were concluded in order to avoid paying fines imposed by the court.
Below are examples of property confiscations in 2026 from individuals found guilty under “extremist” charges:
- In February 2026, a four-room apartment, registered in the name of a relative of three-time Olympicmedalist Aliaksandra Herasimenya, who was sentenced in absentia to 12 years of imprisonment in 2022 on charges of calling for sanctions, was auctioned off. Aliaksandra herself, her husband and daughter were registered in this apartment. “The apartment is not my property, nor is the garage and everything inside the apartment and the This is my close relative’s apartment, and in addition to my husband and me, my minor daughter is registered there, so I do not know how they can take it away. But then, there are no laws in our country,” Herasimenya commented. Along with the apartment, money in Herasimenya’s accounts (more than 48,000 USD), a Land Rover car, her mobile phones, a parking space, a refrigerator, and a sound system were seized. Herasimenya’s house in Drozdy had already been seized in March 2022;[110]
- The apartment of Aliaksei Patsko, a former judge of the Pinsky district and the city of Pinsk, who refused to hear cases against protesters in 2020, was subsequently suspended from work, then fired, and forced to leave the country, was scheduled for sale at a state auction. The auction was scheduled for 7 April 2026, but information about its results is not yet available. Patsko confirmed that the apartment belonged to him. He stated that he had not received any documents on the sale of the apartment and therefore did not know the details of how the apartment ended up at auction. The real estate was acquired through a preferential loan; therefore, the bank is formally considered its owner. Aliaksei Patsko continues to service the loan;[111]
- The seized apartment of the in absentia convicted economist Pavel Daneika was auctioned off in June. The apartment was put up for auction on 23 April for 737,000 rubles (approximately 225,700 Euro) but attracted no buyers. It was put up for auction again on 11 June at a reduced price of 589,600 rubles (approximately 180,570 Euro). The apartment was subsequently claimed by a single buyer. In February 2025, the Minsk City Court handed down a verdict against Pavel Daneika. He was sentenced in absentia to 12 years of imprisonment and fined 13,000 base units (585,000 rubles). According to the prosecution, in August 2020 Daneika joined the Coordination Council and, “as a member thereof, took active steps to achieve the objectives of an unconstitutional seizure of state power”;[112]
- The cottage of Hrodna journalist Uladzimir Khilmanovich, who was sentenced in absentia to five years of imprisonment and a fine under “extremist” charges, was auctioned in June. At the first auction, the lot was valued at 8,400 rubles (approximately 2,539 Euro). At every consecutive auction the price was On the fifth and final auction, it was sold for 3,360 rubles (approximately 980 Euro).[113] Uladzimir Khilmanovich’s apartment in Hrodna was auctioned off on the second attempt;[114]
- In July, three ancient icons confiscated from Catholic priest from Valozhin Henrikh Akalatovich were sold at auctions. The icons were sold through separate auctions, each of which had only one participant. According to legislation, if only one participant is allowed to participate in the auction, the auction is declared invalid, but this participant gets the right to purchase property at a price 5% higher than the starting price. The 18th-century icon “The Resurrection of Christ from the Tomb” was sold for 3,360 rubles (approximately 1,000 Euro), the icons of the late 19th and early 20th centuries “Great Martyr Paraskeva Friday” and “Our Lady of Three Joys” — for 735 and 525 rubles, respectively (approximately 225 and 160 Euro). Henrikh Akalatovich was detained at the end of 2023. He was sentenced to 11 years of imprisonment under the charge of high treason, accused of espionage in favour of Poland and the Vatican. In November 2025, he was pardoned by Lukashenka and left for Rome.[115]
The property seized from those sentenced in absentia is not always successfully sold at an auction. However, this does not mean that it will remain with its former owner. On the contrary, in such cases the state can take it away. In case of the absence of willing buyers, an announcement will appear on the website of “BelYurObespechenie”, stating “We offer the claimant to confirm its consent to retain the seized property towards the settlement of the debt arising from enforcement proceedings.” Yauhgen Pylchenka, a lawyer at the Belarusian Association of Journalists, explained that when the value of the property exceeds the amount owed in a fine, the state is obliged to transfer the difference to the account of the enforcement authority. If the claimant (in this case – the state) does not agree “to retain the seized property”, the auction is rescheduled with a reduced value of the property. This can be done several times, each time offering the claimant to take the property. Only if, after the fourth revaluation, the auction again did not take place, and the claimant refused to keep the property, the arrest should be lifted from it.[116]
Actions targeting a person’s family, loved ones or business partners, based in the country of origin (coercion-by-proxy)
Coercion-by-proxy involves the abuse of family members and other people dear to an exile remaining in the home country as a deliberate strategy to manipulate and subjugate the exile. It is a pervasive yet under-examined method in the TNR toolkit.[117] Along with in absentia trials and confiscation of property, the harassment of exiles’ relatives has long been a coercive tool of first choice for authoritarian regimes.
To emphasise that the repression of those who happen to be related to individuals who have left the country due to political persecution is not a separate instance of repression, but is directly related to the activities of exiles, international human rights organisations have argued that the definition of TNR should acknowledge that the perpetrator state’s conduct on its own territory may produce TNR effect in the host country.[118]
A number of recent examples of coercion-by-proxy provided below illustrate that this practice in 2026 has been carried out by the Lukashenka regime on a systematic and massive scale:
- In January 2026, security forces began to visit the relatives of political prisoners who had been releasedand expelled from VolhaZazulinskaya, Representative of the UnitedTransitionalCabinetforSocialPolicy, reported a recentvisitto the parents of oneof those expelled:“[Through the relatives,] theyoffered him to returntoBelarusandspend 15years in prison.”“When the mother [of a former political prisoner] saidthat‘you took himout of the countryyourself,’ they told herthathe had escapedfrom the colony,”Zazulinskayasaid;[119]
- In March 2026, in the Hrodna region, a number of searches of the homes of relatives and friends of exiled activists was reported. The security forces were interested in the activists’ personal lives. They later contacted several exiles and offered them cooperation in exchange for ending the pressure on their families and allowing them to return to Belarus;[120]
- On 6 May 2026, “Viasna” Human Rights Centre became aware of more than ten searches in homes of candidates from several factions who are running for the Coordination Council for the first time. The searches were conducted within the framework of investigation initiated on charges of participating in an extremist group, high treason, conspiracy to seize power, and calls for Relatives of the candidates were interrogated during the searches. Some of them were pressured to force their loved ones to leave their factions on the eve of the elections. Earlier, the KGB had recognised a number of Coordination Council electoral lists as “extremist formations;[121]
- On 12 May 2026, employees of the Investigative Committee searched Vasil Plyashkunov’s apartment in Mahileu where his relatives live. The reason for the search was his participation in the elections to the Coordination Council;[122]
- On 21 May, the Day of Solidarity with Belarusian Political Prisoners, mass searches were reported in Minsk in the apartments of activists who left Belarus, including of Uladzimir Labkovich, a lawyer at “Viasna” and the head of “Human Rights Defenders for Free Elections” campaign. The search in his apartment was conducted as part of a new criminal case initiated against him after his release and forced expulsion from It is known that more than ten searches took place on that day. Anastasia Vasilchuk, “Viasna” human rights activist, stated that three KGB officers visited her apartment in the morning in connection with her participation in Freedom Day celebrations in Warsaw. Similar visits were made to her friends who participated in Freedom Day protest action in Vilnius. KGB officers also broke into the apartment of the parents of activist Artsyom Basalai, who lives in Poland. Criminal cases have been opened against him for “extremism”, “high treason”, as well as for participating in Freedom Day action in Warsaw;[123]
- At the end of May 2026, KGB officers pressured those in exile through their friends, who have been summoned to the traffic police, tax inspectorate, or passport office, where they were met by KGB officers. The officers asked questions about donations to the Kalinouski Regiment, exiles’ desire to join it, and those already serving there. They inquired whether the person wished to return to Belarus and promised assistance in exchange for information. They mentioned that they had started by approaching friends rather than relatives, knowing that relatives were e This tactic can be interpreted both as an attempt to create an impression of humane treatment and as an implicit threat;[124]
- A wave of searchesat the places of registration of exiles who had participatedin Freedom DaycelebrationsinWarsaw,Vilnius,Bialystokand the USA was conducted in June 2026. Human rights defendersdocumentedmorethan30 searchescarried out by the KGB;[125]
- In June-July 2026, the Belarusian Association of Journalists received numerous reports of pressure being exerted on parents, relatives and acquaintances of journalists who had been forced to leave Belarus. They were visited by members of various law-enforcement agencies — district police officers, KGB officers and officers from the Main Directorate for Combating Organised Crime and Corruption. They were asking about the exiles: where they were, with whom they maintained contact, and who was registered or lived in their apartments. In some cases, searches and inspections of apartments were conducted, and the exiles’ relatives were called in for questioning. Several of them were forced to submit saliva samples for genetic analysis;[126]
- In June-August 2026, more than 150 searches were conducted at the homes of relatives of students of the European Humanities University (for more details on the case please see section “Recognition of Belarusian organisations functioning abroad as extremist formations” below).[127]
Searches remain the primary method of exerting pressure on relatives of exiles. However, the toolkit of TNR employed by the Lukashenka regime continues to expand. In early August 2025, several cases were recorded in Mahileu region in which police officers visited relatives of exiled activists and former political prisoners and collected their genetic material (saliva). The stated reason was the creation of a DNA database to enable identification of exiles’ identity “if necessary”. According to human rights defenders, this practice has been implemented in different cities across Belarus.[128] “According to the law, such information is considered personal, its collection and dissemination are prohibited. A procedure for collecting DNA samples in a specific criminal case is prescribed by law. However, we are now seeing that on a large scale DNA are being taken from people fraudulently, by deception or coercion in order to form databases that are essentially illegal. We don’t know how this information is stored or how it is used,” commented Aleh Aheeu, a lawyer and Deputy Chairman of the Belarusian Association of Journalists.[129]
In 2026, the Committee of Forensic Medical Examination initiated the adoption of a law on the genomic registration of citizens. According to Aliaksei Volkau, Chairman of the Forensic Medical Examination Committee, the legal initiative to create a DNA database containing the data of Belarusian citizens is still under development, but is already receiving support from law enforcement and other government agencies. Human rights activists have emphasised that the Belarusian security forces are already collecting DNA samples without waiting for the adoption of relevant legislation, and that the new law represents an attempt to legalise the existing practice.[130]
Another method of coercion-by-proxy repression was registered in February 2026, when it emerged that individuals whose relatives live in “unfriendly countries” had been dismissed from their jobs. One person was dismissed from an enterprise of the military-industrial complex, but similar cases have been reported at other military-industrial enterprises. In these instances, contracts were not renewed or employees were compelled to resign voluntarily. This practice represents a logical extension of the policy that separates individuals with connection to a foreign state into a distinct group deprived of their rights.[131]
Impediments to mobility and access to social services
On 4 September 2023, Aliaksandr Lukashenka signed Decree No. 278, pursuant to which the diplomatic missions of Belarus abroad ceased issuing new passports to Belarusians residing abroad and renewing the old ones.[132] The decree has affected the estimated 800,000 Belarusians who live in exile, including newborn children. Many of them are unable to return to Belarus to process their documents because of the high risk of political persecution. Therefore, their ability to live, obtain or extend legal status, travel, work, and access essential services such as medical care or bank services is severely limited. By the same decree, they are also deprived of the opportunity to issue powers of attorney and, accordingly, dispose of their property back home, which is used by the authorities to expropriate it.
UN experts condemned the adoption of this decree and called for states not to deport Belarusians with expired passports and help them with obtaining alternative documents.[133] However, only a small number of countries have taken practical steps in this direction in 2025, including Austria, Germany, Lithuania, Portugal and Slovenia.[134] In 2026, several more countries, including Bulgaria, Cyprus, Denmark, Spain, Sweden have joined the pool of countries willing to adapt their laws and practices to the challenges Belarusians face.
In February 2026, Denmark issued the first foreigner’s passport to a Belarusian citizen without the refugee status. The “Talaka—Belarus Sabry in Denmark” Association, which was involved in cooperation with the Danish authorities on this issue, noted that this decision has not only practical, but also symbolic significance for the Belarusians of Denmark. A foreigner’s passport not only makes it possible to legally travel and perform all actions that require identification, but also confirms that Denmark truly supports people who defend democratic values and human rights.[135]
From the beginning of 2026, the passports of Belarusians who reside in Spain will be recognised as valid even after the expiration date, without the need to obtain a cédula de inscripción (certificate of registration). “Belarusians are allowed to present an expired passport in order to obtain any permits and statuses provided for by the legislation on foreigners, as well as a foreigner’s identity card,” says a general instruction signed by the Spanish police and migration services.[136]
As of August 2026, Belarusian citizens residing in Sweden became eligible to obtain a foreigner’s passport. In a statement published on 11 August 2026, the Swedish Migration Service referred to the opinion of the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Belarus, according to which the ban on issuing and exchanging passports abroad constitutes “part of a policy of punishing Belarusians living in exile” for their alleged “political disloyalty”. The agency further stated that “under the circumstances, Belarusians should not be encouraged to travel to their country to obtain a document serving as passport. Consequently, they may be issued a Swedish alien’s passport, although such a document is not valid for travel to Belarus.”[137]
Belarusian citizens who hold permanent or long-term residence permits in Bulgaria and are unable to obtain a new Belarusian passport will be able to obtain a temporary foreigner’s document. “Unfortunately, due to the absence of a full-fledged equivalent of a foreigner’s passport in Bulgaria, this document will have very limited functionality, but it may become an important step forward and help temporarily to resolve certain problems (at least for children). A special group at the Bulgarian Ministry of Internal Affairs will continue to work on finding a more convenient solution,” the People’s Embassy of Belarus in Bulgaria informed. Efforts to find a solution for Belarusians holding only temporary residence permits are likewise under way.[138]
In Cyprus, Belarusian citizens holding expired passports are able to obtain and renew residence permits. This administrative decision of the Cypriot authorities entered into force in May 2026. Children born in Cyprus to Belarusian citizens who are unable to obtain a Belarusian passport for their child may be granted a residence permit on the basis of a birth certificate issued by the competent Cypriot authorities. In such cases, both parents must be citizens of Belarus.[139]
Poland began issuing a foreigner’s travel document (dokument podróży dla cudzoziemca) to Belarusians in 2023[140] and is preparing legislative changes aimed at further facilitating the integration of Belarusians. At present, a foreigner’s travel document is issued for a period of one year; the amendments to the law “On Foreigners” currently prepared by the Polish authorities would enable the document to be issued for a period of two years. Polish Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs Maciej Dusczyk stated that the amendments will also confer on the Polish travel document the status of a full-fledged identity document of a foreign national. Meanwhile, the Head of the Office for Foreigners Tomasz Cytrynowicz confirmed that recommendations have already been issued to the voivodes (heads of provinces) to treat expired Belarusian passports as identity documents when examining legalisation applications “due to exceptional circumstances”.[141] In the summer of 2026, Poland extended the simplified procedure for issuing these documents to Belarusian citizens until 31 December 2026. According to the Office for Foreigners, the number of such documents issued to Belarusians has increased year on year. In the first five months of 2026 alone, 2,737 travel documents were issued.[142]
A further safeguard for Belarusian exiles In Poland against TNR by the Lukashenka regime is the possibility for those unable to obtain educational documents in Belarus to enrol at Polish universities under a special procedure. The Polish Ministry of Science and Higher Education confirmed that in 2022, the National Agency for Academic Exchange (NAWA) introduced mechanisms enabling the recognition of education received abroad even in the absence of a complete set of documents.[143]
The expulsion of pardoned political prisoners from Belarus without providing them with identity documents has become a new form of TNR leading to limited mobility and impeded access to social services necessary for living abroad. According to Volha Zazulinskaya, the Social Policy Representative of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus, the Belarusian authorities announced the pardon of 293 people in 2025, but human rights defenders confirmed only about 200 names. Of these, 175 were forcibly expelled from Belarus.[144] On 19 March 2026, Aliaksandr Lukashenka released 250 political prisoners.[145] Of these, 235 people remained in Belarus, while the rest were expelled from Belarus. Among them were Viktar Babaryka, Maryja Kalesnikava, Maksim Znak, Aliaksandr Feduta, Maryna Zolatava and other individuals. They arrived in Lithuania without documents. Instead, they were given simple identity certificates in the Russian language, which are not official documents outside of Belarus.[146] “They have no documents, no passports; this is again one of the methods that the regime uses to make life more difficult for our heroes,” said Dzyanis Kuchinski, Diplomatic Advisor to Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya and Director of her Office in Lithuania.[147] The Dissdentby initiative noted another aspect: the lack of proper documents indicates “they have no court decision, no release order, no documents on termination of criminal prosecution. In fact, people were taken out of the country without any legal registration of this fact.” “In Belarus, the police and KGB officers continue to search for many of the released and expelled political prisoners at their former place of residence. This means that legally a person can still be considered involved in a criminal case,” human rights defenders stressed.[148]
Those former political prisoners who left the country on their own initiative or who were given a passport during their expulsion may have it cancelled at any time. As of the end of March 2026, at least 16 such cases were documented.[149] It is not known exactly when the authorities carried this out. The cancellation of passports was reported by political prisoners released on various dates, including 11 September and 13 December 2025. [150]
On 18 December 2025, during the 7th Belarusian People’s Assembly, Aliaksandr Lukashenka openly admitted that passports were not issued to political prisoners who had been released and deported from the country deliberately, so that they would not have a legal opportunity to enter Belarus. “We don’t need them. If these are your people, take them away, for God’s sake, take them out there, do whatever you want. But when they [political prisoners] moved out — they [international community] started to shout ‘there are no passports!’ Why would we issue passports to our enemies?” — said Lukashenka. Information about this and other public statements in this regard was sent by the People’s Anti-Crisis Administration to the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court for inclusion in the file of the case against Belarus.[151]
Despite the fact that the absence of a valid passport does not de jure entail loss of citizenship, it creates a situation of de facto statelessness, affects human dignity and hinders the realisation of many basic rights.[152] Such a deliberate practice of violating the fundamental rights of Belarusian citizens by the Lukashenka regime has attracted the attention of international bodies. Statements have been made in this regard by the International Labor Organisation, mandate holders of UN special procedures, and the UN Group of Independent Experts on the Situation of Human Rights in Belarus (see relevant section above for more detail).
On 10 April 2026, a coalition of Belarusian human rights organisations issued a statement regarding the cancellation of the passports of former political prisoners forcibly expelled from Belarus after their release in September and December 2025. “The cancellation of passports is not just a refusal by the state to protect its citizens, but a deliberate abuse of power,” the statement claimed. People who have already been subjected to criminal prosecution and forced expulsion thus face additional repression. The absence of a valid passport effectively deprives a person of a legal and social identity, restricts freedom of movement, and the right to family life and property. Human rights activists also pointed out that the cancellation of passports can be considered part of a state policy, which, in the context of the International Criminal Court’s investigation on the Lithuania/Belarus situation, qualifies as an element of crimes against humanity.[153]
Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Ales Bialiatski, whose passport was also cancelled although it was valid until 2028,[154] called this practice “a ritual cutting off the ties that political prisoners have with Belarus”. He regarded it as arbitrary and illegal. “This is another form of transnational repression aimed at making life difficult for deported political prisoners,” he said.[155] Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya’s office emphasised that passport cancellation is possible only if there are clearly defined grounds and in compliance with procedural guarantees.[156] It was stressed that the cancellation of a passport inside Belarus does not automatically invalidate it abroad. Foreign countries independently assess the validity of documents. Such passports may continue to be accepted as identity documents, especially in asylum and humanitarian protection procedures.[157]
Co-optation of private individuals
Attempts to co-opt Belarusian exiles by Lukashenka’s security services have occurred regularly after 2020, when a wave of brutal repression after the rigged presidential election forced the beginning of mass migration of Belarusians to other countries. They can be recruited in exchange of payment or pressed for cooperation through promises or blackmail to collect information about location and activities of exiled dissidents, take photos and video of events in diaspora, organise provocations, engage in other malign activities, or cooperate in other ways with Belarusian security services. In the second half of 2025 and the first half of 2026, the number of reports concerning such attempts has increased significantly.[158] This has been partly due to the release and subsequent expulsion of many political prisoners who are iconic figures in the Belarus democracy movement and who plan to continue their activities abroad. The increase in the number of politically active Belarusians abroad has required additional efforts from the regime aimed at gathering information about activities of the diaspora and undermining it.
Among recent examples is the case of Uladzislau Nadzejka, a Belarusian citizen, who was detained by the Polish Internal Security Agency in September 2025 on charges of participating in foreign intelligence activities against Poland. Nadzejka worked in Poland as a taxi driver. During his arrest, a list of the names of Belarusians who had received asylum in Poland was found in his car.[159] He was supposed to keep an eye on them on the instructions of the Belarusian security services. On 28 April 2026, Nadzejka was transferred to Belarus within the framework of a five-for-five exchange of prisoners between Belarus and Poland.[160]
In July 2026, the Polish Internal Security Agency (ABW) announced the detention of a Belarusian citizen Aliaksei B. and a Polish citizen Rafal G. who were filming Belarusians participating in protest actions in Warsaw.[161] They were charged with acting in the interests of foreign intelligence in 2024-2025 in Warsaw and other cities. “Since at least last fall, they have been visiting various events of the Belarusian diaspora in Warsaw, including protest actions and festivals. On the instructions of the Belarusian security services, they photographed the participants, shot videos and sent them across the eastern border to be used by Lukashenka’s services. The goal was not only to collect information, but also to pressure and intimidate emigrant communities and strengthen propaganda narratives of states hostile to Poland,” the Agency stated.[162] Their detention was part of an investigation in which two citizens of Ukraine and three citizens of Belarus had already been detained in November 2025. ABW does not exclude new arrests.
In the most recent documented case, Vadim Pashkovsky, a former prisoner now living in Poland, made a public statement in early October 2026 claiming that, while still living in Belarus after serving his sentence, he had been recruited by the KGB, who blackmailed him with the threat of another long prison term. A 23-year-old process development engineer, Pashkovsky was convicted in 2024 for taking part in the protests in August 2020, having been identified from police CCTV footage. A year and a half later, he was released after serving his term and went on to work for a private manufacturing company in Mogilev. One day, KGB officers arrived at his workplace, took him to the regional KGB headquarters and asked him why he had been imprisoned, whether he had received any assistance from human rights organisations, whether he had links to foreign intelligence services, and whether he was involved in extremist activities. He was subjected to a polygraph test. They searched his apartment and seized his laptop and mobile phone. Upon discovering technological drawings and other files related to manufacturing on his laptop, they stated that he could face 15 years’ imprisonment for industrial espionage, but that he could avoid this if he carried out tasks for the KGB, namely by moving to Poland and gathering information for them on human rights organisations, including BYSOL, Viasna and others. KGB officers provided him with links to human rights organisations operating in Poland and instructed him on how to obtain a Polish humanitarian visa. They maintained contact via Telegram under the guise of a classmate. The security service officers threatened him with reprisals should he reveal the fact of his recruitment and intimidated him by saying that, in that case, “Poland would throw him out” and that, upon his return to Belarus, “his life would be over”. Despite the threats, after moving to Poland, Pashkovsky contacted Viasna and announced that he decided to speak out publicly about what had happened to him and to refuse any cooperation with the Belarusian KGB.[163]
An additional factor contributing to the increase in the number of reports of contacts by the security services may be the heightened awareness among Belarusian exiles of the scale of TNR and the understanding that an approach by Lukashenka’s security services is not only an act of individual repression, but rather part of a large-scale systemic persecution of Belarusians outside the country.
Aliaksandra Mamayeva, an experienced opposition activist living in exile in Slovenia, delegate of the Coordination Council and head of its International Commission, who played an active role in the creation of the People’s Embassies of Belarus, disclosed in 2025 a number of attempts by the KGB to recruit her. These attempts had occurred over years, starting in 2021. The security services requested cooperation from her and promised “a safe return to Motherland”. In the most recent case in 2024, the person who contacted her posed as a business client living in Munich and asked questions about the Belarusian diaspora in Germany and Slovenia and whether it was possible to join the diaspora chats. After a while, he offered cooperation and soon began making threats to diaspora activists. “Threats were [also] made to my relatives who remained in Belarus, and the standard wording was used: ‘We are ready to verify ourselves through your relatives in Belarus,’” Mamayeva said in an interview. She informed the Slovenian police and her colleagues in the democratic forces about the recruitment attempts. “I believe that publicity is a guarantee of my safety,” said Mamayeva. Even correspondence with a KGB officer can, under EU law, be interpreted as collaboration with the intelligence services of another country, she stated. Following the latest incident, Alexandra and her colleagues drew up guidelines for internal use on how to deal with such situations. “I definitely wouldn’t advise replying to messages like that. You need to take screenshots, flag the account from which the messages were sent, and, where possible, keep all information relating to that person. And, of course, contact the police and your country’s security services straight away.”[164]
In the period from 27 to 31 July 2025, at least ten employees of the National Anti-Crisis Management received messages with proposals for cooperation from the security services of Belarus. They were accompanied by blackmail, promises of money, and offers “to start over with a clean slate”. The Polish Prosecutor’s Office opened a criminal case on this matter. The investigation is conducted under Article 130 of the Polish Criminal Code (Activities in the interests of foreign intelligence).[165]
Later, the National Anti-Crisis Management announced another attempt to recruit its employee by the Belarusian special services in December 2025. The initiator tried to impersonate an employee of the Ukrainian special services. The organisation stated that in total, 15 such attempts had been made. “We recommend that Belarusians who are being recruited by Lukashenka’s security services inform the competent authorities of your country of residence about such actions. This is important because any contact with representatives of the regime’s special services can be interpreted as cooperation, which entails serious criminal liability,” the National Anti-Crisis Management stated.[166]
Despite warnings, not all those in the diaspora who have been approached by the Belarusian security services or persons recruited by them report such incidents to the law enforcement bodies of the country in which they reside or disclose such attempts in the public domain. This could be due to fear of harming relatives in Belarus, ignorance of the laws of the host country, or excessive confidence in their ability to resolve the situation themselves and avoid public embarrassment and reputation damage.
In February 2026, it became known to Nasha Niva media that one of the anonymous participants of the emigrant political “Chat of Reformers” (Chat reformatorov I reformatorok) wrote private messages to several women-participants of the chat. In these messages, he flirted with them and later suggested that they either return to Belarus or start cooperating with the security services. The women confirmed privately that such a situation had taken place, but none of them wanted to talk about it publicly or share screenshots of the correspondence. In June 2026, it turned out that the same contact had repeatedly written for about a year to Alina Kharisava, political scientist, volunteer expert of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya’s Office and a member of the Coordination Council. She claimed that before Belarusian intelligence officers started contacting her, her relatives inside Belarus had been pressured and blackmailed with repression against them. Kharisava, like other interlocutors of the intruder, had not disclosed the fact of the contacts, later explaining that she was afraid for her relatives. This situation became public when a propaganda film was aired on the Belarusian TV channel STV on 4 June, claiming that she cooperated with the KGB disguised as the Ukrainian security service SBU, and allegedly received money for the information about the Belarusian democratic forces she provided. Kharisava’s decision not to go public about the co-optation attempts caused a major public controversy, had negative consequences for her own reputation and undermined the reputation of the Belarusian democratic forces.[167]
In mid‑June, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya’s Office published a statement announcing that “in connection with the dissemination of materials concerning Alina Kharisava on propaganda resources, an internal investigation was initiated.” Published audio recordings, correspondence materials, browser history, programmes and files, as well as devices and accounts that Kharisava used, were examined. The investigation “did not reveal any evidence of the transfer of any sensitive, official, or non‑public information that could harm the Office’s activities, the safety of its staff members, partners, or Belarusians who sought assistance. The analysis of the available materials also did not confirm the transfer of internal documents or other confidential information.”[168] Nor were any indications of remuneration for alleged cooperation with third parties identified. At the same time, the Office emphasised that Kharisava’s communication “grossly violated the internal security protocols in force at the Office.” Consequently, it was decided that “the current safety protocols will be revised and additional training will be conducted for employees, as well as for volunteers and individuals interacting with the Office in the context of expert and advisory activities.” At present, Kharisava’s participation in any activities of the Office has been suspended by a mutual agreement, and the investigation into the incident is ongoing. Her interaction with the Coordination Council has continued. The “European Choice” faction, to which she belongs, waited for the preliminary results of the investigation and then supported her return. Her current activities remain not public; she is engaged in the bureaucratic work necessary to secure representation for Belarus democratic forces in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.[169]
Kharisava has lodged a formal statement with the police in Germany, where she lives, concerning recruitment attempts and requesting verification of information regarding individuals potentially acting in the interests of the Belarusian intelligence services, together with assistance in protecting her personal data. A decision on her complaint has not yet been made. Her psychological state currently precludes an active lifestyle. She has developed an anxiety disorder and a phobia of unknown numbers. She sought help from a psychologist and is now undergoing therapy.[170]
The security services pursue not only well-known activists and members of the opposition. Uladzislau Yefimovich, a 22-year-old former political prisoner who now lives in Lithuania, also received an offer to return to Belarus through Telegram. On 30 March 2026, a contact posing as “Anton” using a Ukrainian number tried to initiate conversations with him about politics, the meaning of life, the purpose of government agencies, the Russian-Ukrainian war, and returning to Belarus. From the context, it could be understood that “Anton” represents one of the law enforcement agencies of Belarus. “We’ll cooperate, and after a while you’ll come back as … — it’s unlikely that you’ll be a hero, but you’ll have respect,” “Anton” assured. During the same period, pressure was exerted on Yefimovich’s relatives in Belarus. “My 12-year-old brother received a call from Minsk at school and was questioned about me, although they had no right to question him without adults present,” he said.[171]
The Belarusian security agencies can also pose as a journalist, including a real figure in the media community. In February 2026, Nastya Rahatko, former editor-in-chief of independent Belarusian journal KYKY.org, designated as “extremist” by the authorities, received an offer of cooperation which allegedly came from Irina Garina, a Russian journalist for a leading Russian exiled independent publication Novaya Gazeta Europe. Rahatko turned to this media to verify the message and was informed that it was a fake and that Irina Garina, who works for them, does not deal with Belarus, and there is no Belarusian editorial board in the media at all. This is not the first provocation where the name of “Irina Garina” was used. In June 2025, the National Anti-Crisis Management press service received a request allegedly coming from her to interview Pavel Latushka. The request offered participation in the filming of a full-length documentary about Europe’s resistance to aggression from Russia and Belarus.[172]
In March 2026, Journalist Zmicier Pankavets reported that unknown people tried to collect information about Belarusian volunteers fighting in Ukraine, using a fake account under his name. A contact under the name of “Zmitser Pankavets” in Telegram contacted the widow of a deceased soldier Vasil Rapitski with a request for an interview. During the conversation, the interlocutor said that Tsikhanouskaya’s Office does nothing for volunteers, and expected Rapitski’s widow to confirm this. The interlocutor also asked for a contact of volunteer Aliaksandr Klachko.[173] Zmicier Pankavets publicised information about this provocation in his social media.[174]
In August 2026, an account under the name “Mark Fridryh” wrote to several former political prisoners, introduced himself as a BBC journalist, and after the conversations offered “further communication on his terms”. Human rights activists could not find open evidence of his work at the BBC, and a reverse search showed that the photo used in the profile could belong to another person or was created using AI. Such contacts are “especially dangerous for former political prisoners, who may disclose information about themselves, relatives, and other people not knowing who they are actually talking to”, human rights defenders say. A warning about the account’s actions was sent to the BBC, where the situation was described as “very serious and alarming”.[175]
In July 2026, the Office of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya reported an increase in cases where intruders pose as employees or representatives of the Office in electronic communications with exiled Belarusians. Scammers try to gain the trust of their interlocutors and obtain their personal information.[176] The Office urged people not to trust messages simply because the sender claimed to be an Office employee, recommended always checking their contact information, and published recommendations regarding the most common questions about security.[177]
To create the effect of the “ubiquitous presence of the regime” in other countries, as well as to fragment the diaspora, security services hire individuals through social networks to provide one-time services for collecting information and engaging in provocations. In June 2025, after the announcement of an event in Warsaw with the participation of the leader of the democratic forces of Belarus Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya and her husband, a politician, blogger, and former political prisoner Syarhei Tsikhanouski, searches for a photographer to film people at the meeting began in Warsaw’s emigrant chat groups. In the “Warszawa-Bemowo” Telegram chat, a message appeared from a person named “Bogdan Bondarenko” stating that “the task is to take high–quality photos of the participants and convey the atmosphere of the event”.[178] In the chat groups “Belarusians of Warsaw: Mokotów and Not Only” and “Belarusians of Poznan”, a person named “Tatyana Lebedeva” published similar messages. In follow-up private messages, she offered 100 Euro for the work and noted that the pictures were needed for the “GU BASA”, a Telegram channel close to the security forces. The channel publishes personal data, footage of arrests, and propaganda material targeting protesters, members of the opposition and people accused by the authorities of ‘extremism’ or making donations to opposition initiatives. One of those contacted by “Tatyana Lebedeva” commented that “they regularly look for photographers before major events of the Belarusian opposition. Most likely, [they are from] the Belarusian special services, but possibly also the Russian ones,” and called the situation “quite a standard one”.[179] At the protest action of Belarusians on Freedom Day in Vilnius in 2025, three young people filmed the participants. As it turned out, the young people were Ukrainian citizens who were paid 70 USD for filming. The videos were later used by Belarusian state propagandists.[180]
Ex-political prisoner Mikalai Dziadok reported that two provocateurs had come to his meeting with Belarusians in Krakow in March 2026. One of them was a Belarusian citizen from the city of Barisau, born in 2003, the other was a Ukrainian citizen. They were an hour and a half late for the meeting, and after arriving began asking aggressive questions about Dziadok’s personal life. None of the Belarusians residing in Krakow and present at the meeting knew them personally.[181] In a post in his Telegram channel, Dziadok suggested that the young people had found a side job on Telegram and had been paid to ‘create a stressful situation for the speaker’. “It was clear that they had been very poorly prepared — they could barely grasp where they were or who they were actually talking to. Arriving late for the event (by an hour and a half!) suggests they were recruited at the last minute. Their age and scruffy appearance point to financial difficulties. In short, they are the very same sort of people who are hired to hold up ‘Vilnius is ours’ placards or to film Belarusian rallies in Warsaw,” wrote Mikalai.[182]
Attention of Lukashenka’s special services’ is directed not only at members of the Belarusian diaspora living in European countries, but can be extended to any person who may be willing to cooperate with the regime and may be useful today or in the future. Based on this, the most likely targets of recruiters are people living in Belarus and visiting Europe and, conversely, European citizens visiting Belarus. This is confirmed by reports from European intelligence agencies. According to the report of the Agencja Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego (ABW, Polish Internal Security Agency) for 2024-2025,[183] the Belarusian security services were actively offering cooperation to Polish citizens who often visit Belarus. Belarusian security forces were also increasingly recruiting and sending citizens of Belarus to Poland using blackmail. Their efforts, according to ABW, were focused on the “infiltration and disruption” of the Belarusian opposition in Poland.[184] According to the Latvian State Security Service annual report,[185] “in 2025, the priority recruitment targets of the Belarusian special services were persons permanently residing in Belarus but regularly visiting Latvia or other NATO or EU countries. The Belarusian special services were also interested in establishing cooperation with representatives of the Belarusian diaspora in Latvia, who continue to visit Belarus.”[186]
Several Lithuanian citizens were recently tried in Lithuania for cooperation with Belarusian security services:
- MantasDanelius,fromJuly2022toFebruary2023, infiltrated the ranks of Belarusian oppositionorganisations inVilnius,collectedinformationabouttheirfinancing,projectsandpersonaldata of activists,whichcreated a directthreattopeople who fledHismostcynicaloperationwas a meetingwith a formervolunteer of the KalinouskiRegiment.Daneliusconvincedhimthat he was actingin the interests of the USEmbassy,secretlyrecorded the conversationandsentittoMinsk.InMay2025, the LithuanianCourt of Appealapprovedhissentenceofnineyears of imprisonment for espionage in the interests of the Lukashenka regime;[187]
- the spousesMindaugasJanuitisandTatsianaBialetskayawerefoundguiltyofespionageinfavour of On 15 April2026, the KlaipedaDistrictCourtsentencedMindaugasJanuitistosevenyears of imprisonment andhiswifetosix and ahalfyears of imprisonment.According to the investigation,inMay2022, BialetskayaandJanuitiswenttoMinsk,wherethey were recruited by the MainIntelligenceDirectorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Belarus.Then, untilNovember2023, theycollectedandtransmittedtoBelarusinformationabout the Lithuanianarmedforces, the volunteerdefencesystem,NATOforcesandweaponsin the country,aswell as about the Belarusianopposition based inLithuaniaandaboutLithuanianswho could potentiallyberecruited in the interests of the Lukashenka regime. They receivedarewardofmore than 8,000Euro for the informationtheyprovided.[188]
Given the alreadyknowncases of attempts by Lukashenka’s special services to co-opt exiled Belarusiancitizens,aswell as thefactthat the TNRcarried out by the Lukashenkaregimeremainslargelyunderreported, it canbearguedthatalmosteveryBelarusian exile,aswellaspersonsassociatedwiththem, is under a threat of either being approached for recruitment or becoming a subject of hostile actions resulting from recruitment of others.
Recognition of Belarusian organisations functioning abroad as extremist formations
Since 2020, the Belarusian authorities have liquidated at least 2,033 non-profit organisations. Although the intensity of NGO liquidation has decreased during the period under review compared to the peak periods of 2021-2024, pressure on civil society organisations and their participants continues.[189] Many organisations unable to sustain their activities in Belarus have relocated their operations abroad and continue their work there. In order to isolate these organisations from Belarusian society, the authorities have recognised many of them (as well as newly established entities founded by Belarusians to express their civic stance, preserve Belarusian culture, and provide assistance to political prisoners, their families, and those forced into exile due to political persecution) as extremist formations or extremist organisations. They are included in the “List of Extremist Formations”. Authorities may include their websites, social network accounts and produced materials in the Republican List of Extremist Materials. This makes it possible to prosecute thousands of people involved in their activities, receiving support from them or subscribed to their online publications.
Not only are people in Belarus being persecuted, but criminal cases are being opened against those in exile in other countries: they are being added to lists of terrorists and extremists, and their relatives’ apartments are being searched. Thus, the recognition of organisations founded and operating in other countries as extremist by the Belarusian authorities can be considered a TNR. The most striking example in this context is the recognition of the European Humanities University (EHU), a higher education institution where the majority of staff and students are Belarusian citizens, as an “extremist organisation” by the decision of Ministry of Internal Affairs of 14 April 2026.[190] This marked the first instance in which a university was labelled an “extremist organisation”.
The decision of the Belarusian authorities to recognise the EHU as an “extremist organisation” provoked widespread international condemnation. Lithuanian Foreign Minister Kęstutis Budrys called the decision “outrageous”. “It puts students, faculty, and families at serious risk and obstructs access to independent, unbiased education. It is yet another hostile act by the Lukashenka regime against Lithuania and the EU. We stand ready to back the EHU community,” he wrote on the X social network. The Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Estonia and Sweden also expressed their support for the EHU. “Belarus’ decision to designate EHU as an extremist organisation is deeply troubling. Such a step affects thousands of students, alumni, and academic staff and raises broader questions about the environment for independent education. It constitutes a serious violation of the right to education free from political interference.[191]
Strong international reactions have not, however, halted the repression. Already at the end of April 2026, the security forces searched the home of a student of the EHU’s correspondence course. He was forced to write an application for expulsion, and his Lithuanian residence card was cut up. Another correspondence student was dismissed from her job in Belarus immediately following the university’s designation.[192] By the end of May, about a hundred students left the EHU.[193] In early June, mass searches and interrogations of graduates, students and other people related to the EHU took place across Belarus as part of a criminal case on “facilitating extremist activities” and “financing extremist activities”. Parents have been pressured to contact children studying at EHU and living in Lithuania and demand that they drop out and return to Belarus. Security forces have bluntly warned that failure to comply will result in parents’ detention. It is known that some relatives of the students have already been arrested. The KGB is also targeting EHU graduates from the years 2019–2025. They were required to provide graduation certificates. From the decision to initiate criminal proceedings demonstrated during one of the searches it became known that the basis for a criminal case was tuition fees paid to EHU starting in 2016. “Unidentified persons provided and collected funds, securities and other property no earlier than 30.04.2016 to deliberately support the extremist activities of the extremist organisation European Humanities University recognised as such by a decision of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Belarus dated 14.04.2026,” the decision stated.[194] By the end of August 2026, more than 180 cases of persecution have been recorded, “Viasna” Human Rights Centre reported. Human rights defenders call the campaign against EHU unprecedented.[195]
Other recent examples of human rights organisations and solidarity initiatives recognised as “extremist formations” and/or their websites and social networks as “extremist materials” include:
- On 15 January 2026, the KGB recognised the Free Belarus Centre as an “extremist formation”. It was added to the corresponding list on the website of the Ministry of Internal Affairs on 20 The list mentions the initiative’s Facebook, Telegram, Instagram pages, as well as a YouTube channel. Free Belarus Centre provides legal and psychological assistance and supported the evacuation of Belarusians to safer places in Ukraine and beyond after the outbreak of Russia’s war against Ukraine in February 2022. The initiative has offices in Warsaw and Kyiv;[196]
- On 23 February 2026, the website and social networks of Press Club Belarus and PEN Belarus, along with more than 25 other civic and media projects, were recognised as “extremist materials”. Both Press Club Belarus and PEN Belarus operate in exile due to state repression, with their core activities, staff, and leadership based outside Belarus, primarily in Poland, while continuing to monitor and report on the situation regarding freedoms inside Belarus;[197]
- The Belarusian PEN was recognised as an “extremist formation”. The decision was made by the KGB on 27 February 2026. The Belarusian PEN is the oldest Belarusian human rights organisation dedicated to defending freedom of speech. It was founded in 1989. Both Belarusian Nobel laureates, Sviatlana Alexievich and Ales Bialiatski, are members of the Belarusian PEN;[198]
- On 31 March 2026, the KGB recognised the Belarusian Helsinki Committee as an “extremist formation”. On 6 April, information about it was added to the list maintained by the Ministry of Internal The Belarusian Helsinki Committee’s website, its social networks, and email addresses were also included in the list. The Belarusian Helsinki Committee is one of the oldest human rights organisations in the country. It was founded in 1995. The founders were well-known public and cultural figures: writers Vasil Bykau, Ryhor Baradulin, Sviatlana Aleksievich, Hennadz Buraukin, translator Carlos Sherman, and others. In September 2021, the authorities revoked the Belarusian Helsinki Committee’s registration, and in October that year, the Supreme Court liquidated it. However, it continued its activities remotely, and in July 2022 received consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council, becoming the first Belarusian non-governmental organisation with such status;[199]
- On 3 April 2026, Centre Novych Idey (the Centre for New Ideas), Fundacja Brama Dziedzictwa, Belaruski Rassledovatelski Centre (the Belarusian Investigative Centre), and Novy Chas (the New Hour) were recognised as “extremist formations”. Novy Chas was recognised as “extremist” by the decision of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the rest by the decision of the [200]
Intensified repression against cultural organisations both within Belarus and abroad has become a notable recent trend in the last twelve months:
- On 12 November 2025, the KGB recognised the Polish event agencies Terra Group Event and SSL Production as “extremist formations”. In addition to the agencies, the unregistered art space Sklad Butelek in Barysau was also recognised as an “extremist formation”;[201]
- On 16 February2026, the KGB designated Gutenberg Publisher publishing house an “extremist formation”. On 24 February its details were added to the relevant list maintained by the Ministry of Internal Facebook, TikTok, Instagram, Threads, Telegram and publisher’s website were included in the list of “extremist materials”.[202] The publishing house is based in Krakow. “It employs Belarusians who were forced to leave their homeland. We maintain personal contacts with Belarusians throughout the country and involve them in efforts to financially support and maintain a unified intellectual space,” Gutenberg Publisher’s website said.[203] Management viewed the designation as an intimidation tactic. “It seems that any other publishing house could have been in our place,” said Valyantsina Barbara Andreyeva, editor-in-chief of the Gutenberg Publishing. According to her, the effect of the repressive act turned out to be the opposite. “The decision of the Belarusian authorities ‘freed our hands’ and allows us to embark on more ambitious projects, because ‘now there is nothing to be afraid of’,” she said.”[204] The ramifications of recognising a publishing house as an extremist formation extend well beyond management, staff, authors and collaborators, affecting anyone who has purchased or possessed relevant publications. As Sviatlana Halavneva, lawyer at “Viasna” Human Rights Centre, explained, formal prohibition of storage arises only upon the inclusion in the Republican List of Extremist Materials. However, even prior to this, discovery of such books may lead to their confiscation for verification of “extremist” content, subsequent classification as “extremist” materials and administrative liability for possession. Even minimal interaction with or simply belonging to a common field of activity with those sentenced for “extremism” suffices to trigger persecution. Consequently, possessing or transporting such books – especially across the borders – entails significant risk;[205]
- On 18 March, bydecision of the KGB, threenew “extremist formations” were included in the relevant list: the Northern Lights Film Festival, an annual festival of feature and documentary films from the Baltic States and Northern Europe, human rights organisation Human Constanta, which advocates for the rights of foreigners and stateless persons and promotes anti-discrimination laws and is based now in exile, and non-governmental organisation Spadcyna Belarusi, a project founded in Wroclaw, Poland, which organises cultural and educational events, supports children and women from Belarus who have found themselves in exile, as well as the LGBTQ community;[206]
- TheBelarusian Council for Culture/Belaruska Rada Kultury (Tallinn, Estonia) was recognised as “extremist formations” in Belarus by the KGB decision of 9 April along with a number of other cultural [207]
National associations of Belarusians abroad have also faced increased pressure:
- On 15 January 2026, the Ministry of Informationincluded inits list of extremist materials socialnetworks of Belarusian communities from Canada,PolandandGeorgia;[208]
- On 10 March 2026, the Ministry of Internal Affairs recognised the Telegram chat “Belarusy in Valencia” as an “extremistformation”. The chatunitesBelarusianslivinginValencia(Spain) andhasmore than 360members;[209]
- On 3 April 2026, the Ministry of Informationpublished an updated list of “extremist materials”. Accounts of the Belarusian diaspora in different countries were added to it;[210]
- On 25 June 2026, the Ministry of Internal Affairs recognised the ABA Together (Association of Belarusians in America) as an “extremist formation”. It is a non-profit organisation uniting Belarusians across the United States. It has become the 373rd “extremist” organisation on the list of extremist groups.[211]
Including targeted exiled individuals in the government-drawn lists of “extremists” and “terrorists”
The Belarusian authorities persistently employ legislation on combating terrorism and extremism to suppress dissent. There are two related lists: The List of Organisations and Individuals Involved in Terrorist Activities and the List of Citizens of the Republic of Belarus, Foreign Citizens, and Stateless Persons Involved in Extremist Activities in the Republic of Belarus. Individuals are included in these lists even in the absence of court verdicts. These lists are regularly updated and expanded. Inclusion in these lists is arbitrary and is widely used to persecute people on political grounds. Belarusian legislation allows a broad range of grounds for designation of a person as a terrorist or an extremist, including for a donation to or another association with an organisation or an informal initiative included in a separate list of “extremist formations” or for a subscription to or re-posting of “extremist material” included in yet another list.[212] De-listing procedures remain opaque, and effective remedies are lacking.
Individuals included in these lists face severe limitations both inside Belarus and in exile. Inside the country, these include barriers to employment and education, and, in the case of those designated as “terrorists”, restrictions on SIM cards, banking and basic financial transactions.[213] Mandate holders of several special procedures of the UN Human Rights Council raised allegations of intentional ill-treatment of prisoners designated as “extremists” or “terrorists”. Furthermore, concerns persist that such prisoners face severe restrictions on receiving money transfers and packages, leaving them dependent on inadequate provisions from penitentiary institutions.[214]
The “List of Organisations and Individuals Involved in Terrorist Activities”, as of end of August 2026, included 1,477 people. Of these, 723 were Belarusians.[215] Along with people whose actions may pose a real threat to state security, the Belarusian authorities routinely include representatives of the Belarusian opposition and civil society in the list.
As of end of August 2026, 6,887 persons were on the “List of Citizens of the Republic of Belarus, Foreign Citizens, and Stateless Persons Involved in Extremist Activities in the Republic of Belarus”.[216] Several restrictive measures are applied against them.
Below are recent illustrative examples of inclusion of individuals in “extremists” and “terrorists” lists:
- On 9 January 2026, former political prisoner Maria Batalonok, a Lithuaniancitizen who was pardoned in 2025, was recognised as an “extremist”.ThelistindicatedthatBatalonok was serving her sentence,despitethefactthatshehad beenreleased within a group of political prisonersandexpelledfromBelarustoUkraine on 13 December 2025;[217]
- On 1 April 2026, the KGB updated its list of persons involved in “terrorist activities”. Eleven individuals were added, including six former soldiers of the Kalinouski Regiment convicted in absentiain early March, Dzyanis Dzyanisenka, a resident of Pinsk, convicted in absentia for participating in mass riots, and other people;[218]
- On 10 April 2026, the Ministry of Internal Affairs added 37 more people to the “List of citizens of the Republic of Belarus, foreign citizens or stateless persons involved in extremist activities”. Among others, Yahor Buzhilau, director of the Belaruskicryjewellery brand, was included. In March 2026, the court had sentenced him to four years of restriction of freedom for participation in an “extremist formation”;[219]
- On 17 April 2026, the KGB updated the list of people involved in “terrorist activities” adding another ten individuals, including neurologist Ruslan Badamshin. In 2024, he was sentenced to three years of imprisonment for participating in protests, and in 2026, he received a further two and a half years of imprisonment sentence for facilitating extremist activities;[220]
- On 17 April 2026, the Ministry of Internal Affairs added 21 more people to the “List of citizens of the Republic of Belarus, foreign citizens or stateless persons involved in extremist activities”. Among others were Dzmitry and Volha Kapuzi, a married couple from the Drahichin district, who were sentenced to 24 and 21 years of imprisonment respectively on charges of “acts of terrorism” and “illegal actions with ammunition.” It was alleged that they had collected explosives and made caches on the territory of Belarus. During the arrest, Dzmitry was shot and wounded in the thigh. The trial was held behind closed doors;[221]
- On 25 April 2026, the Ministry of Internal Affairs added 17 more people to the “List of citizens of the Republic of Belarus, foreign citizens or stateless persons involved in extremist activities”. Among others, neurologist Ruslan Badamshin was included in the list;[222]
- On 8 May 2026, the Ministry of Internal Affairs added another 25 people, including two political prisoners, to the “list of persons involved in extremist activities”;[223]
- On 15 May 2026, the Ministry of Internal Affairs added 17 more people to the “List of citizens of the Republic of Belarus, foreign citizens or stateless persons involved in extremist activities”. Among them were journalist Tsina Palynskaya and her daughter Marharyta Rabinovich, who were sentenced to two years of imprisonment in March for creating or participating in an “extremist formation”. Palynskaya and her eldest daughter were detained in May 2025. The criminal case against them may be related to the recognition of Professor Andrei Vardamatski’s “Belarusian Analytical Workshop”, which conducts sociological surveys, as an “extremist formation”. Palynskaya had not been involved in journalism for a long time, she raised her daughters and worked in archives, including Russian ones, to create biographical sketches, family books, and stories about participants in the Second World War;[224]
- On 29 May 2026, the Ministry of Internal Affairs added 19morepeople to the “List of citizens of the Republic of Belarus, foreign citizens or stateless persons involved in extremist activities”. Amongthemwasmusicianandradio host Aleh KhamenkawasdetainedinMinsk on 17 June2025after a searchofhisapartment.Initially, he was placedin a temporarydetention facility inAkrestsina detention centreonadministrativecharges.InearlyJuly, it becameknown that acriminalcase had been initiated against him andhe was transferred to the pre-trialdetention centre No.1inKalyadzichi. On 4 March2026, the MinskCityCourtsentencedKhamenkatothreeyears of imprisonment and a fineof20,000rubles(approximately6,300Euro)onchargesoffacilitating“extremistactivities”. According tothecase file,theaccusation was based on hisconstantcooperationwith the editorial board ofBelaruskae Radyjo Racia;[225]
- On 22 June 2026, the KGB updated the list of “persons involved in terrorist activities”, adding 21 people. Among them was Aliaksandr Lyubianchuk, a former journalist who was convicted twice. In 2022, he was sentenced to three years of imprisonment under the charge of participation in an “extremist formation.” He was released in early 2025, but detained again in the “Belarusian Hajun” case in September of that year. Lyubianchuk was released in May 2026 after serving his second term;[226]
- On 28 August 2026, 12 more people were added to the “List of citizens of the Republic of Belarus, foreign citizens or stateless persons involved in extremist activities”. Among them was 28-year-old Lithuanian citizen David Medvedev (Davidas Stanulavicius), who, as indicated, is serving a sentence for facilitating extremist activities;[227]
- On 4 September 2026, the Ministry of Internal Affairs added 52 more people to the List of extremists.[228]
In August 2026, human rights defenders noted a new trend: deceased persons were added to the list. Increased attention to “underage extremists” was also noted. In April 2026, the Mastouski district Prosecutor’s office held a special seminar for principals and classroom teachers to identify “extremism” among minors, human rights defenders reported. Similar seminars in educational institutions were held in Maladzetskaya, Babruisk, Lyubanski, Pastauski, Berastavitskaya, Kobryn, Cherykauskaya, Hrodna, and Minsk.[229]
Abuse of the counter-terrorism framework and the legal cooperation agreements with other countries
In addition to the wide range of tactics, employed by the Lukashenka regime within its territory, which are of a transnational nature and are aimed at curbing the freedom of speech and civil participation of Belarusians who have left their homeland as well as taking revenge on them for their opposition to the regime, the regime resorts to the assistance – whether willing or unwilling – of other states to implement TNR on their territory. Two particularly prominent legal avenues used most often by the Lukashenka regime are the abuse of the Interpol system and the abuse of bilateral agreements or multilateral treaties on legal assistance.
The basis of the abuse of these frameworks is the inclusion of individuals in the List of Organizations and Individuals Involved in Terrorist Activities, the List of Citizens of the Republic of Belarus, Foreign Citizens, and Stateless Persons Involved in Extremist Activities in the Republic of Belarus, as well as in absentia proceedings on fabricated criminal charges, which enable the regime to regime to seek “assistance” from other states.
Abuse of the Interpol system
The abuse of the instruments of the Interpol, the world’s largest international organisation that facilitates worldwide police cooperation and crime control, is based on using fabricated criminal charges against targeted individuals living in exile with the goal of requesting their arrest and subsequent extradition to the home country.[iv]
A number of Interpol instruments allow a state to locate and request a targeted person to be detained and forcibly returned on political grounds. The key tool that transnational repressors use to manipulate Interpol is the Red Notice system which enables the sending of arrest and extradition request to all member countries of Interpol simultaneously. A Blue Notice is used to obtain information about individuals. The stolen and lost travel documents database allows a government to report a person’s passport as stolen or lost. Thus, when this person crosses a border, the border police in the country which they enter may return the individual to the reporting country.[230] Finally, “diffusions” (email messages sent directly to other states) are used to notify law enforcement authorities of a particular country that the arrest of a specific individual is sought. Unlike Red Notices, diffusions can be issued without prior review by the Interpol General Secretariat. Consequently, they can pose a greater risk than Red Notices, as they enable governments that misuse Interpol’s mechanisms to bypass review by the Interpol General Secretariat before dissemination of the request.
Although every request for a Red Notice is formally reviewed by the Notices and Diffusions Task Force to ensure compliance with Interpol’s rules and to confirm that it is not politically, military, religiously, or racially motivated, experts have identified a number of problems that facilitate abuse. These include insufficient scrutiny, a lack of funding for the review of challenged notices, and a structural view and attitude in Interpol that there is nothing wrong with the system.[231] Individuals whose data are being processed often face limited access to information, lengthy review periods, and an inability to develop an effective defence strategy promptly.[232] Although Interpol has enacted piecemeal reforms over the last decade aimed at addressing such abuse, its oversight bodies remain underfunded and understaffed. A core vulnerability continues to be its default acceptance of the validity of accusations made by member states. According to the organisation’s Rules on the Processing of Data, submissions by members are generally assumed to be reasonable. This benefit of the doubt is afforded even to governments with questionable human rights records. Addition vetting measures have not fully prevented abuse. In 2025, in at least 11 cases of detention or unlawful deportation, perpetrator governments were able to use Interpol notices against exiled dissidents.[233]
A recent media investigation based on leaked internal documents revealed that Interpol is not free from political bias. Even after it introduced new checks on Russia’s ability to submit requests following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, 90 percent of requests made by Russian authorities were approved. When targeted individuals complained, about half of their requests to remove notices were approved, suggesting that many of the Kremlin’s efforts to pursue people via Interpol were politically motivated and should not have been permitted.[234] Moreover, the investigation showed that some stricter measures were quietly lifted in 2025.[235]
Similar tolerance towards politically motivated requests may extend to Belarus, Russia’s closest ally. Although in 2023, abuses by the Lukashenka regime had already become the subject of review within Interpol, under which Belarus was subjected to its so-called “corrective measures”,[236] and more recently the Interpol General Secretariat has again explicitly drawn the attention of the Belarusian authorities to violations of Article 3 of the organisation’s Constitution, which strictly forbids it from undertaking any intervention or activities of a political, military, religious or racial character, including in the cases of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya and Volha Kavalkova,[237] Belarus National Bureau’s access rights to the Interpol Information System were not suspended.
It should be noted that Interpol does not issue arrest warrants itself or employ its own agents to conduct arrests. Instead, it distributes arrest requests in various forms, issued by member states among 194 national law enforcement bodies worldwide.[238] Therefore, much depends on the response of individual member states, which may refuse extradition if they have reason to suspect that the request is politically motivated.
Armenia and Poland are among the countries that systematically refuse extradition requests from Belarus. In November 2025, a Belarusian citizen named Natalia was detained in Armenia. She was informed that she could not leave the country because she was on the international wanted list at the request of the Belarusian authorities. Following intervention by Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya’s Office, the Coordination Council, human rights organisations and lawyers, the Armenian Prosecutor’s Office issued her an official travel permit.[239] In December 2025, a Belarussian citizen was detained in Poland under the Interpol Red Notice initiated by Belarus. After he contacted Belarusian solidarity initiatives, which clarified the political context of the situation to the authorities and verification of his international protection status, he was released the next day.[240] In February 2026, a Polish court refused to extradite a Belarusian citizen wanted on charges of tax crimes. The District Court in Plotsk recognised that the Belarusian judicial system does not guarantee the right to a fair trial and that trials of opposition-minded citizens are often show trials. It concluded that extradition would create a real risk of violating the individual’s fundamental rights and freedoms under the European Convention on Human Rights, including the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment.[241] In June 2026, Belarusian activist Viktar Klimus was detained at Yerevan airport on the basis of an international wanted list but was released a few hours later.[242]
Even after the national court refuses the extradition, the Interpol notification — whether a Red Notice or a Diffusion — is not automatically cancelled. It remains in effect until the requesting state withdraws it or until Interpol decides to delete it in accordance with its rules. Consequently, the risk of repeated detentions in other countries persists. For instance, Karina Zdaniewicz-Spychalska, who holds dual Polish and Belarusian citizenship, faced ongoing consequences of being placed on the Interpol wanted list for two years. The Belarusian authorities claim she is wanted on an “economic” charge, but Karina maintains that the request stems from her political activity in 2020. She has encountered repeated problems, including denial of entry to Bali in February 2024, Turkey in May 2025, and detention in Poland and Italy in 2026. Karina reported that on her way back from Italy she was detained for five days. She was then released on the obligation to appear for hearings and could not leave Italy for three and a half months. Later, this measure of restraint was annulled and Karina managed to return to Poland. On 11 June 2026, the Brescia Court of Appeal rejected Belarus’ extradition request. Polish Vice Consul in Milan Eva Adamczyk attended the hearing, and lawyers from the Belarusian democratic forces submitted an opinion highlighting the risk of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment and political persecution.[243]
To minimise risks of repeated detentions, it is advisable to submit a petition to Interpol requesting deletion of the relevant notice. Human rights defenders recommend Belarusian citizens who have left the country for political reasons and have not yet applied for international protection should do this promptly, as Interpol notification can appear suddenly, even years later, and result in detention.[244]
Abuse of cooperation within the framework of bilateral agreements or multilateral treaties on legal assistance
Bilateral agreements and multilateral treaties in the field of legal assistance, such as the Convention on Legal Assistance and Legal Relations in Civil, Family and Criminal Matters, concluded on 7 October 2002 in Chisinau (Chisinau Convention)[245] and the Convention on Legal Assistance and Legal Relations in Civil, Family and Criminal Matters, concluded on 22 January 1993 in Minsk[246] aimed at simplifying and speeding up the interaction among states in legal matters, including the search, detention and extradition of those convicted or wanted for committing a crime. Eight states of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), namely Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, are parties to the Chisinau Convention while Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine and Turkmenistan did not join the treaty and remain parties to the previous treaty, the Minsk Convention.[v] The Commonwealth of Independent States inter-State wanted-list system based on these conventions allows for a person to be placed on a wanted list and detained across member States without the political-motivation screening that applies, at least nominally, within Interpol.[247] Belarus, like other repressive states, regularly abuses bilateral and multilateral agreements in an effort to return to its jurisdiction those who have left the country due to political persecution.
Belarus cooperates most closely with Russia which reportedly grants over 80 per cent of extradition requests.[248] Persons who are wanted in Belarus are regularly added to the database of wanted persons in Russia. This makes it possible to search for them not only in Russia, but also in all CIS member states, as the Russian wanted database is formally considered to be the CIS search database. All CIS countries have access to this database.
Between October 2025 to April 2026, 1,118 Belarusian citizens were added to the Russian wanted database. Currently there are 5,880 Belarusians on it. Among those put on the wanted list are journalists, activists, politicians, and former political prisoners who were forced to leave Belarus. For example, this is the case of Victoryja Kulsha, who was released by the authorities on a “pardon” and expelled from Belarus in December 2025. Before her release, a new criminal case was opened against her – about the disruption of the colony’s work. Human rights defenders noted that this was the first known case in which a political prisoner was charged with this offence.[249]
The names of the Nobel Peace Prize laureate and head of “Viasna” Human Rights Centre Ales Bialiatski and civic activist Mikalai Dzyadok, who had been pardoned and expelled from Belarus after their release from prison, were added to Russia’s wanted list as well in 2026. It is indicated there that the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Belarus is seeking them on criminal charges, although the concrete charges remain unspecified.[250]
Among other Belarusian citizens sought by Russia are former Belarusian national football team players Mikalai Zolatau and Hennadz Tumilovich. Mikalai Zolatau was among the athletes who, after publicly criticising the Belarusian authorities and condemning the war in Ukraine, were effectively barred from competing in Belarus. In 2025, Zolatau stated that he regretted his previous statements. He is currently playing for a Moldovan club. The former goalkeeper of the national team, Hennadz Tumilovich, is known for his harsh statements about the situation in Belarusian football.[251]
Belarusians are not just formally placed on the Russian wanted database, their search is actively conducted. For example, in October 2025, Vasil Krauchuk was extradited to Belarus after being detained in Russia. On 17 October, it was reported that Krauchuk was detained in St. Petersburg. It was noted that he was on the interstate wanted list and that the St. Petersburg police informed the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Belarus about the detention. Earlier, on 7 February 2022, Krauchuk was sentenced by a court in Pinsk to two years of restriction of liberty for insulting a government official. The basis for the charges was a humorous comment in the Telegram channel “Karateli Belarusi” (Executioners of Belarus) regarding an employee of the Juvenile Affairs Inspectorate. After the verdict, Krauchuk left Belarus.[252]
Apart from regular everyday search activities, there are special multi-country operations. From 15 to 16 April 2026, a special “Search” operation was held in the CIS countries, in which security forces searched for wanted persons, missing persons, defendants and debtors in civil and economic matters. As a result of the operation, more than 270 people wanted by the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Belarus were detained. Of these, 150 were detained in Russia. Among them were those who were accused of “extremist activities”.[253]
The dynamics of Belarus’ relations with other countries within the framework of legal assistance agreements is changing. Earlier, Moldova was considered the only safe country in the CIS region for Belarusians, while Armenia was marked in yellow on the risk map drawn by human rights activists.[254] Over the past year, Armenia has repeatedly refused to satisfy Belarus’ requests despite the persistence of the Lukashenka regime. For instance, blogger Aliaksandr Lapshin has already been detained by the Armenian authorities at the request of the Belarusian authorities six times and was released six times. On 19 March 2026, he was once again detained at Yerevan Airport at the request of Belarus, where he was in transit. “Belarus has updated the extradition request. The Armenian Prosecutor General’s Office decided to lift the search under the previous one. What has Belarus done? They’ve sent a new request under the absolutely same charges — insulting Lukashenka, calls for something. The standard set.” he said. Lapshin was released three hours later, but he missed his flight. In February 2026, an Armenian court found that the Belarusian charges against Lapshin contradict Armenian legal norms, but it could not stop his detention during his next visits to the country.[255]
Among countries to avoid is Georgia, whose security services cooperate with the Belarusian KGB, although this cooperation is not based on a formal agreement with Belarus, and Turkey, which signed an agreement on “synchronisation of legal approaches to extradition issues” with Russia in June 2026.[256] Serbia, China, Iran, Iraq, Vietnam, the UAE, India, Myanmar and many African countries are also unsafe.[257] Visiting them is highly likely to result in expulsion, an unfair trial, and a high prison term. For example, Vasil Verameychik, a former soldier of the Kalinouski Regiment, was sentenced to 13 years of imprisonment after he was detained in Vietnam on 13 November 2024 and extradited to Belarus on the next day.[258] Vasil Hrechikha, another former soldier of the Kalinouski Regiment, was sentenced to five years of imprisonment under 12 charges, including the “extremist” ones and participation in an armed conflict on the territory of another state.[259] His “delivery to the country” along with Pavel Byalyutsin, a former candidate for the Coordination Council, was reported in a story broadcasted by the state TV channel “Pervy Informacionny”. According to available information, Byalyutsin was extradited from Türkiye.[260]
While Belarus’ cooperation with some countries is expanding,[vi] other states consider the possibility of denouncing their agreements on legal assistance with Belarus. In November 2025, Lithuanian Prime Minister Inga Ruginienė publicly stated the urgency of discussing this issue.[261] This step would be in line with recommendations voiced by human rights and expert organisations at the international level. Nevertheless, even before the denunciation of mutual assistance agreements, repression in Belarus should be taken into account by the relevant officials of democratic states when they receive extradition requests.
Obstruction of access by Belarusian exiles to financial services
The impact of the status of a “terrorist” or an “extremist” on access to banking services
Another TNR-based method of repression employed by the Lukashenka regime that is grounded in the designation of a person as a “terrorist” or an “extremist” and their subsequent inclusion in the related lists maintained by the Belarusian authorities is obstruction of access by Belarusian exiles to banking services abroad. The Lukashenka regime systematically weaponises international financial control frameworks to create serious obstacles to the daily lives and economic activities of Belarusian exiles.
Recognition of a person as a “terrorist” or an “extremist” triggers automated alerts in global financial compliance databases, designed to combat money laundering and financing of terrorism to implement the requirements of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), a global inter-governmental organisation.[262] These databases, maintained by private providers such as LexisNexis, Sumsub, Dow Jones Risk & Compliance, and LSEG, incorporate national sanctions lists, information about politically exposed persons, and adverse media mentions. These databases are consulted by financial institutions worldwide during the mandatory customer due diligence procedure. Importantly, the process of compiling information for the databases is 95-99% automated. Algorithms scan news, court decisions, and government websites. When an individual’s status changes, banks receive online notifications from the databases flagging the person’s “association with terrorism”.[263]
Banks then must decide whether to investigate further or simply terminate the relationship with the customer. Given that national financial regulators impose steep fines on banks for missed risks (recent examples include Canadian TD Bank’s payment of 3.09 billion USD in fines and penalties in 2024 for enabling money laundering and violations of the Bank Secrecy Act,[264] and a fine of 125 million USD imposed on the Swiss UBS Financial Services Inc. in August 2026 for repeatedly violating anti-money laundering rules[265]), but impose no penalties for excessive caution in applying the due diligence procedures, the choice for banks striving to avoid risks is obvious.[266] Without further clarification of the circumstances surrounding an individual’s inclusion on the lists of “extremists” and “terrorists”, banks often restrict even the most innocuous transactions or simply close accounts altogether, preferring to avoid any association with the “problematic client from the list”.[267]
Representatives of LSEG and LexisNexis confirmed that they incorporate data from jurisdictions where courts may render politically motivated rulings in their databases, but emphasised that the decision on how to use such data is made by banks themselves.[268] They also noted that individuals can send additional information about themselves for the inclusion in their “profile”.
The case of Dzmitri Navosha demonstrates that this avenue is not always effective. Navosha, living in exile co-founder of the Tribuna media project, who was sentenced to 12 years of imprisonment in absentia in Belarus under political charges, was subjected to severe restrictions across Europe, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Transactions from American banks were completely blocked, some accounts in Europe were closed, and protracted complicated negotiations were required to unfreeze others.[269] Although some data providers eventually incorporated the explanatory materials submitted by Navosha, others, including Dow Jones Risk & Compliance, refused to do so. The British regulator, the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO), which was also approached by Navosha’s lawyers, declined to intervene, stating that, despite concerns about the judicial system in Belarus, it could not challenge foreign courts decisions and that Navosha himself should appeal the verdict in Belarus.”[270] The demand appears quite ironical and demonstrates a total lack of knowledge of the situation in Belarus by the UK state agency and a lack of communication between the regulator and the UK Foreign Office. The latter has led UK’s consistent efforts in the international arena for many years, demanding the end of repression and supporting democratic aspirations of Belarusians.[271] The UK has imposed and expanded sanctions in respect of the Lukashenka regime for undermining democratic principles and the rule of law, serious violations of human rights, repression of civil society and democratic opposition as well as for facilitating Russia’s aggression against Ukraine[272] – and yet the financial regulator recommends Navosha to appeal his verdict in Belarus.
Even the partial success achieved by Navosha would not have been possible for the majority of ordinary Belarusians who lack the resources to engage expensive legal counsel. Moreover, one person’s success in having additional information included in his/her “profile” within these databases does not alleviate the difficulties faced by other Belarusians denied banking services. The continuous expansion of the regime-drawn lists of “extremists” and “terrorists” ensures a steady flow of new “high-risk” alerts into the global compliance systems, rendering financial security needed for ordinary life impossible for the affected. As a result, hundreds, if not thousands, of Belarusian exiles face obstacles of varying severity in conducting their lives in exile, being unable to access banking services.
At the EU level, a clear position on the abuse of financial control frameworks by repressive regimes was finally established in the European Parliament resolution of 16 June 2026 on countering TNR.[273] The resolution introduced a notion of “financial repression” (para. 13) and indicated that “TNR frequently exploits the ordinary operation of host-state administrative, financial, and migration systems, including compliance-driven financial controls, rigid documentation requirements and fragmented data-handling practices, […] as a result, EU institutions and Member States risk their structures being abused by perpetrators, even in the absence of intent or direct cooperation with perpetrator states; […] addressing TNR therefore requires scrutiny of internal EU and national procedures to prevent their exploitation for repressive purposes”. Furthermore, the resolution directly listed the misuse of the anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) standards of FATF among TNR tactics that need to be countered (para. X). It stated that financial TNR involves the misuse by repressive regimes of FATF AML/CFT standards to disseminate false allegations and trigger compliance-based account freezes and de-banking and indicated that these practices deprive affected individuals and organisations of funding and financial services and undermine their livelihoods, civic and political activities (para. Z). In this regard, the resolution called on the Authority for Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (AMLA), which constitutes a key EU safeguard mechanism to develop rapid-response mechanisms against abusive freezes and closures and to establish strict limits on data-sharing with perpetrator states (para. Z). Importantly, the resolution stated that “Belarus conducts TNR at an alarming scale, including on EU territory” (para. AF), highlighting its leading role in employing TNR along with Russia, China and Iran.
The resolution suggested a wide range of recommendations to EU financial regulators and relevant supervisory authorities, the European Commission, and EU member states to prevent and address abuses of financial systems as an important instrument of TNR (para 51-57). These include a call on member states’ law enforcement and judiciaries to cooperate with financial regulators to help prevent and address abuses of financial systems and travel databases used to facilitate TNR; a call on EU financial regulators, including the AMLA, to develop safeguards to prevent such manipulation, including pre-freeze verifications, and apply appropriate screening and data protection measures; a call on EU financial regulators to develop victim-centred redress mechanisms to remedy financial manipulation and long-term harm, including public correction mechanisms; a call for increased coordination between financial regulators, entities and relevant supervisory authorities with the relevant EU bodies addressing TNR; a call on the Commission and the member states to establish mechanisms ensuring guaranteed access to basic banking services to individuals credibly at risk of TNR and emergency financial continuity or liquidity mechanisms where repression results in sudden asset freezes; a call on Financial Intelligence Units to identify and systematically analyse TNR-linked financial patterns and report relevant findings to national and EU TNR coordination hubs; a call on the member states to ensure specialised training for law-enforcement, judicial, financial and cybersecurity authorities on identifying TNR-linked financial patterns, including the misuse of FATF, Interpol and travel database tools; and a call on the member states to provide guidance to financial institutions and ensure that their national financial regulators have the mandate to share the data available to them with law enforcement and judiciaries, and establish an effective national complaint and review mechanism.
The recognition at the EU level of the abuse of anti-moneylaundering/counteringthefinancingofterrorism frameworks as a distinct form of TNRat the EUlevelrepresents a significantsteptowardsprotecting the rights of individuals who have been forced to fleerepressionand now resideinEuropeancountries.Otherinternationalorganisationsshouldfollow the EU’s example by declaringtheunacceptability of financialTNRanddeveloping robust policies to combat and deter suchabuses.
At the national level, practical measures are required to deter financial TNR, including that perpetrated by the Lukashenka regime, and to safeguard the rights of targeted exiles. Implementation of the European Parliament resolution on countering TNR into national legislation and policies of EU member states should be a top priority.
The impact of the cessation of consular services on access to banking services
Another problem faced by Belarusian exiles in the financial sector as a result of Lukashenka’s TNR is the refusal of banks to open accounts or the closing of existing accounts once their Belarusian passport expires. In this case, the ground for obstruction of access to financial services is not inclusion of a person in the lists of “terrorists” and “extremists”, but the termination of consular services to Belarusian exiles – another TNR tool of the Lukashenka regime.
Infamous Decree No. 278, pursuant to which the consulates of Belarus ceased issuing new passports to Belarusians residing abroad and renewing the old ones, was signed by Lukashenka on 4 September 2023.[274] Since then, the decree has affected the estimated 800,000 Belarusians who live in exile.[275] Many of them are unable to return to Belarus to renew their documents because of the high probability of political persecution. Consequently, their ability to live, travel, work, and access essential services abroad such as medical care, education or banking services is severely limited. UN experts condemned the adoption of this decree and called upon states not to deport Belarusians with expired passports and to assist them in obtaining alternative documents.[276]
Even Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, the leader of the Belarusian opposition, faced difficulties in opening an account with a Polish bank after moving to Poland from Lithuania. She stated that the bank refused to open an account because her Belarusian passport had expired. She lives in Poland on the basis of a residence permit and a foreigner’s travel document (dokument podróży dla cudzoziemca).[277] After several unsuccessful attempts, she succeeded in opening a bank account with another bank, but only after she “demonstrated her connection to Poland” where her Office is located.[278]
After Tsikhanouskaya publicly reported her inability to open an account, many Belarusians, including those who had been living in Poland for a long time, wrote to her about the difficulties they had encountered after the expiration of their national passport. This once again confirmed the systemic nature of the problem and the need to develop an institutional solution. One possible solution could be the issuance by the host state of a foreigner’s travel document[279], as Tsikhanouskaya’s case, in which she managed to open a bank account using such a document, demonstrated. However, the availability of a foreigner’s travel document has not helped many other Belarusians. Banks often refuse to accept it as a full-fledged identity document. Therefore, a clarification from financial regulators is necessary to ensure that a foreigner’s travel document should be accepted by banks as a document confirming the identity of an individual. In the absence of such a clarification, much depends on the discretion of individual bank regulations and individual bank employees. “I myself have come across the fact that a lot depends on the employee who accepts your documents. I was dealing with an employee who was very sympathetic to the fact that banks refuse to open accounts to Belarusians. He really wanted to help, although he took into account certain limitations,” noted Tsikhanouskaya.[280]
An alternative approach has been adopted in Spain. There, the authorities decided to recognise the validity of passports of Belarusian citizens even after their expiration date, which allows Belarusian exiles to effectively interact with government agencies.[281] Unfortunately, because banks do not fall directly under migration regulations, most financial institutions in Spain still require a valid passport to carry out due diligence procedures. The position of each bank is formed at the level of its compliance department and may change.[282] Therefore, additional efforts should be undertaken by the authorities of Spain (and other countries) to secure Belarusian exiles’ access to banking services, even if expired Belarusian passports are recognised by the government as valid.
The first step in this direction could be to secure the right to a “basic bank account” under the EU Payment Accounts Directive (PAD) 2014/92/EU.[283] According to this directive, any consumer legally residing in the EU has the right to open and use a payment account with basic features. Although Article 16(4) of the PAD establishes a ground for refusal – namely, if opening an account would result in a violation of AML/CFT provisions, in its recent case C 81/24,[284] the Court of Justice of the European Union ruled on 11 June 2026 that “Article 16(4) PAD […] must be interpreted as not authorising member states to require credit institutions to refuse to open a basic payment account for a consumer solely on the ground that that consumer is included on a list of persons subject to restrictive measures imposed by a third country, without the credit institution concerned having carried out an individual assessment of the risk of money laundering or terrorist financing associated with the intended business relationship” (para 56). Experts commented that the judgement has immediate and concrete implications for compliance frameworks, including that “blanket screening policies that generate per se refusals are unlawful under EU law. Institutions maintaining such policies are exposed to enforcement action by the competent national authorities and to civil claims from persons wrongly denied accounts.”[285] Relevant efforts on the part of national authorities could therefore assist Belarusian exiles in gaining access to at least basic financial services.
Discrimination in the financial sector based on the principle of belonging to the Belarusian nationality
There is yet another problem that exacerbates the hardships Belarusian exiles face due to TNR by the Lukashenka regime. It is not directly related to TNR and is grounded in over-compliance by banks in the application of EU sanctions against Russia and Belarus. This problem has existed for Belarusian and Russian exiles for several years,[286] but recently it has been exacerbated by the adoption of the 19th package of EU sanctions applied to Russian citizens[287] that apply “by analogy” to citizens of Belarus.[288] The result is what the World Bank calls “de-risking”: banks reject entire categories of clients based on their citizenship rather than evaluating individual cases.[289]
In its responses to inquiries from organisations of Belarusian democratic forces, the Polish Financial Supervision Authority (KNF) explained that Belarusians may be considered “a high-risk client group,” but this cannot be the sole reason for terminating or denying them service. Therefore, the bank must justify and document each refusal, stated the KNF, but must first ensure that it has “considered all possible measures to mitigate the risk”.[290]
The EU authorities have recognised that over-compliance by European banks of application of EU restrictive measures leads to discrimination against groups of people based on their nationality. However, clarifications (FAQ) issued by the European Commission on the application of Art. 5b(2) of Council Regulation 833/2014, introduced as part of the 19th package, where it gave broader explanations regarding the rules governing the operations of European banks regarding citizens of Russia and Belarus[291] have not only failed to produce any substantial improvement in the situation of exiled Belarusians but have also provided a basis for further violations of their rights. Answering the question “When a new payment instrument is issued under the exception referred to in [paragraph] 5b(3), must a customer’s residence permit be valid for the entire validity period of the [financial] instrument, or is it sufficient for the residence permit to be valid on the day the new instrument is issued?”, the FAQ stated that the residence permit must be valid for the entire validity of the instrument (Q. 8). This caused a situation when many banks have started to obstruct customers’ access to their services and close accounts when a person’s residence permit had expired and s/he had submitted a timely application for a new permit and is waiting for a decision by the authorities, disregarding that according to domestic legislation, a person is considered legally residing in the country during a process of review of her/his application for residence.[vii]
Finally, a further reason for the mass blocking of bank accounts may lie in banks’ reluctance to incur the costs of “manual” verification of individual customers. This rationale was provided by the German financial institution Scalable Capital, which has blocked accounts on a large scale. Scalable Capital explained that it takes into account country‑specific risk profiles and, where the costs of manual monitoring of transactions are no longer covered by the standard terms of service, it may terminate the contractual relationships.[292] In this regard, the German national regulator, the Bundesbank, stated in a response to one of Scalable Capital’s clients that European sanctions do not prohibit investment companies from serving Russian (and Belarusian) citizens residing in Europe. Moreover, Russian and Belarusian citizens holding European residence permits are expressly exempt from the EU restrictions. The regulator therefore concluded that Scalable Capital’s actions were most likely “the result of internal corporate risk management.”[293]
An overview of TNR tools less used in 2025-2026
Certain TNR tools have not been used as often by the regime in the reporting period, or there is limited information about their recent use. Among those are surveillance and other forms of digital interference, murder, assassination attempts and physical attacks, abductions, enforced disappearances, and coerced return. However, these tools have been used by the regime in the past and may be used again in the future. A short overview below provides illustrative cases from the years preceding the period under review.
Surveillance and other forms of digital interference
Digital repression per se has not been the subject of a separate chapter in this report. However, the authors note that the digital environment significantly expands opportunities for TNR by creating new tools to influence targets of repression, including digital surveillance, phishing, attacks on digital infrastructure, deepfakes, including with the use of AI, doxxing and other forms of discreditation, data collection, personal data exposure, etc.[294] Digital tools are also applied in other TNR instruments in cheaper and more direct ways, such as threats and co-optation. The Lukashenka regime has been using such technologies for several years to gather evidence for criminal cases concerning participation in protest actions around the world. Evidence is collected both by specially hired people filming the demonstrators and from the social networks of dissenters. This has enabled the initiation of criminal cases in absentiaagainsthundreds of people.
Lukashenka’s security services hack websites, social network accounts, chats, private chatbots, and messenger accounts of independent media, civil society, and political opposition to gather information on individuals and organisations in exile. Targets have included the BYSOL solidarity initiative[295] and the Dissidentby documentation project.[296] Such activities not only discourage participation in civic initiatives but also enable their discrediting, potentially leading to their closure. In the biggest incident, a chatbot of the Belarusian Hajun project,[297] a prominent open-source intelligence monitoring initiative created to track military activity on the Belarusian territory, was hacked by the regime’s secret services in February 2025. This has led to the arrests of at least 200 people inside Belarus who had sent monitoring information to the project. They were charged with “facilitation of extremist activities”, and many were sentenced to prison terms. In a different type of activity, the regime’s agents create fraudulent chatbots of solidarity initiatives and monitoring projects to lure people, identify, and persecute them.[298]
Security services also use surveillance technologies, including the most famous Pegasus spyware, to spy on activists in exile. An investigation,[299] conducted in 2024 by Access Now and the Citizen Lab, revealed that several Belarusian independent journalists and opposition activists based in Europe were targeted and/or infected with Pegasus between August 2020 and January 2023. The full extent of surveillance of other members of the Belarusian diaspora remains unknown. However, in December 2025 it became known that the KGB uses previously unknown espionage software for surveillance, including of journalists. The program, which was named ResidentBat after its discovery, is used on smartphones and tablets with the Android operating system. It allows access to call logs, microphone recordings, SMS messages, messages from encrypted messengers, and local files. Unlike spyware programs such as Pegasus, Resident Bat is not installed remotely; KGB officers must gain physical access to the device. It is disguised as a regular application.[300]
Murder, assassination attempts and physical attacks
The use of lethal retribution by the Lukashenka regime as a tool of TNR has a long history. There is documentary evidence of the preparation in April 2012 by Lukashenka and the leadership of the Belarusian KGB of the physical elimination of former law enforcement officers Aleh Alkayeu, Uladzimir Baradach, and Vyacheslau Dudkin, who had fled to Germany, as well as the prominent investigative journalist Pavel Sheremet, who lived in Moscow.[301] In August 2021, Vital Shishou, a Belarusian political activist and dissident who co-founded the Kyiv-based Belarusian House in Ukraine, was found dead in Kyiv. His suspicious and unexpected death raised public concerns about the possibility of his possible assassination by Belarusian agents.[302]
On 2 July 2025, a rubbish bin was thrown at Pavel Latushka, Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet, during his public speech in Warsaw. The attacker shouted insults at the politician, including “traitor,” “shame,” and “murderer,” and claimed that Latushka “wanted to burn down the entire opposition.” Yauhen Kazantsau, a citizen of Belarus and a University of Warsaw student, was detained immediately after the attack, tried and found guilty of defamation and violation of physical integrity. He was ordered to pay a fine and deported from Poland.[303]
In 2025, the Lithuanian Department of State Security learned about the plans of the Belarusian and Russian security services to organise violent attacks on Belarusians in Lithuania. Along with efforts to incite interethnic tensions between Lithuanians and Belarusians, they planned organised and sponsored vandalism and physical attacks. They used social media for searching people willing to carry out these acts.[304]
Abductions, enforced disappearances and coerced return
Shortly after the “elections” of 2020, there were two cases of the use of this type of TNR. The most frequently mentioned is the public abduction in 2021 of opposition journalist Raman Pratasevich and his companion, Sofia Sapega.[viii] Also in 2021, but in Tokyo during the Olympic Games, the Belarusian authorities attempted to force athlete Krystsina Tsimanouskaya to return home after she publicly criticised her team’s coaches for mismanaging a track event. Tsimanouskaya was taken to the airport against her will by coaching staff, but managed to contact the Japanese police and avoid boarding the flight.[305]
The next series of “returns” occurred in 2024-2025. Maksim Ralko, a former soldier of the Kalinouski Regiment (the volunteer Belarusian military unit within the Armed Forces of Ukraine), who retired in early 2024 and resided in Poland, and later in Germany, was apparently abducted by Lukashenka’s special services and returned to Belarus. His whereabouts were unknown for several months. In November 2024, Belarusian ONT state TV channel aired a story featuring Ralko, who was already in the KGB detention centre and was handcuffed.[306] The propagandists stated that he had voluntarily returned to his homeland.[307] This statement, like other statements by propagandists, should be taken with caution and bearing in mind the use of torture and inhuman treatment in detention by the Lukashenka regime to obtain testimonies.
In May 2025, the authorities announced the so-called “delivery to the country” of two oppositionists, Pavel Byalyutsin, a former candidate for the Coordination Council, and Vasil Hrechikha, a soldier of the Kalinouski Regiment. This was reported in a story of the state TV channel “Pervy Informacionny” (First Informational). The actions of the KGB were presented as the result of a multi-level intelligence operation. There were no direct indications of the countries from which the men were abducted;[308] however, it later emerged that Byalyutsin was extradited from Türkiye [309].
The above examples of enforced disappearances illustrate that the authorities follow a consistent pattern: the person residing outside of Belarus’ jurisdiction disappears for several weeks or months and then reappears on Belarusian territory. After the disappearance, the first information about the individual appears in stories on propaganda channels.
Pavel Latushka, Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet and Head of the National Anti-Crisis Management, frequently receives threats concerning his potential abduction and forcible return to Belarus. In 2025, he received an email containing a veiled threat suggesting his imminent return to Belarus.[310] An exile interviewed by the BBC reported that the callers knew her new address and threatened to forcibly return her to Belarus. Another one described a caller alternating between direct threats to “get to her” and persuasion to return.[311]
The 2025 case of disappearance of Anatol Kotau, an actively wanted in Belarus, Russia, and several other former Soviet allies former Belarus official who had resigned in 2020 from the post of Deputy Head of the Department of Financing State Bodies of the Main Financial Directorate of the Office of the President and was sentenced in absentia to 12 years of imprisonment for “conspiracy with the purpose of seizing power,” and “leading an extremist formation”, can also be considered an ongoing disappearance. Kotau, who lived in Poland with his wife and young son, went to Türkiye for a brief visit and disappeared on the day of his arrival. The independent investigation revealed that the yacht carrying Kotau and three other passengers from Trabzon (Turkey) to Sochi (Russia) was likely intercepted off the coast of Abkhazia by a Russian coast guard boat. Kotau was taken from the yacht onto a patrol boat and vanished.[312] The Polish police and prosecutor’s office refused to initiate an investigation into his disappearance on the grounds that he was not a Polish citizen and did not disappear on Polish territory.[313] Turkish authorities stated that Kotau had left the country at the time the missing persons report was filed and therefore they would not investigate the case.
The circumstances of the case, which suggest possible coordination between Russian and Belarusian security-linked networks, also raise questions about the role of the Turkish authorities, who refused to open a full investigation into Kotau’s disappearance. It should be noted that previously Turkish security forces cooperated with the Belarusian authorities in executing TNR. It was with the assistance of Türkiye that Pavel Byalyutsin was forcibly returned to Minsk. Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya’s senior adviser Franak Vyachorka, who shares this understanding, noted that the European governments and the United States were notified about the case.[314]
There is currently no information about abductions, enforced disappearances, and coerced returns in 2026. This type of TNR remains rare in use.
III. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The situation in the field of countering TNR at the global and European level has changed significantly over the past year. The international community has now realised the scale and specific nature of this phenomenon, and there is a growing consensus on the need to perceive it not only through the prism of state security, but also as a cause of systemic and intentional human rights violations. Based on the understanding of the dual, or inter-dimensional, nature of TNR, the importance of the consolidated approach to addressing TNR is shared by an increasing number of actors.
The TNR carried out by the Lukashenka regime has also been paid higher attention to by a range of states at various levels. However, the condemnation of the international community has not yet led to an effective response and the Lukashenka regime ceasing its repressive practices. Aliaksandr Lukashenka has repeatedly and publicly confirmed his intention to completely eradicate any dissent both within Belarus and abroad. He is confident that the restoration of diplomaticties and trade relations withindividualcountries will allowhim to continuethepolicy of repressionandavoidresponsibilityfor the crimescommitted.
The unity of states and their effective cooperation at the international level are key to developing a coordinated policy for effectively pressuring the Lukashenka regime, and, in particular, preventing and combating the TNR employed by it. In developing concrete strategies and policies, it is essential not to prioritise security measures at the expense of a human rights-based approach. Focusing primarily on preventing foreign interference by means of restrictive tools aimed at blocking the infiltration of agents and hostile activities by aggressor states – such as the Lukashenka regime – can create an atmosphere of distrust towards all nationals in exile from the country concerned, Belarusians included. Such a stance risks curtailing their rights and pathways to legal status, thereby intensifying the pressures they already face from their home government. Based on this understanding, we consider it important to focus our recommendations on practical steps that states need to undertake to implement the consolidated approach to addressing TNR as well as on joint pressure to be exerted on international structures such as the Interpol and the Financial Action Task Force in order to prevent and combat TNR.
To inter-governmental organisations on countering TNR globally and specifically by the Lukashenka regime:
- to UN bodies, EU institutions, CoE bodies and OSCE bodies: put the issue of TNR, including TNR employed by the authorities of Belarus, high on your agenda and treat it as a multi-dimensional problem and a specific threat to human rights and the security of states;
- to UN bodies and member states and CoE bodies and member states: commence the elaboration of a Convention on countering TNR, encompassing a precise legal definition of TNR and international legal obligations of states prohibiting its use, forbidding cooperation with states in its implementation, ensuring the protection of survivors and targets of TNR, and providing for the prosecution of those responsible for ordering, organising and carrying it out;
- to UN bodies, EU institutions, CoE bodies and OSCE bodies: establish special bodies with the mandate to conduct research on TNR at regional and global levels to address under-reporting;
- to UN bodies, EU institutions, CoE bodies and OSCE bodies: facilitate regular exchange of information on TNR manifestations and trends between various international organisations with a view to developing common standards, early-warning mechanisms, and best practices for preventing and responding to TNR;
- to UN bodies, EU institutions, CoE bodies and OSCE bodies: facilitate regular exchanges between member states through a network of TNR-dedicated national bodies, enabling them to share experiences, trends, good practices, and lessons learned;
- to UN bodies, EU institutions, CoE bodies and OSCE bodies: publish an annual public report on TNR, assessing trends, patterns, and emerging risks;
- to UN bodies, EU institutions, CoE bodies and OSCE bodies: systematically integrate countering TNR into security, political and human rights dialogues and public diplomacy;
- to UN bodies, EU institutions, CoE bodies and OSCE bodies: take into consideration systematic TNR practices by Belarus when considering Belarus’ involvement and initiatives within international bodies;
- to UN bodies, EU institutions, CoE bodies and OSCE bodies: co-ordinate efforts aimed at increasing the level of transparency within Interpol and its further reforms aimed at strengthening the filtering, oversight, and independent review mechanisms applicable to notices and diffusions, with particular attention to requests emanating from states with a high number of abusive submissions;
- to Interpol: further strengthen disciplinary measures in relation to states for repeated non-compliance and abuse of Notices, Diffusions and other mechanisms in violation of article 3 to commit acts of TNR, including restricting or suspending access to certain Interpol channels and tools;
- to Interpol: undertake further reforms of the organisation with a view to eliminating the possibility of abuse of its instruments and restricting access to those instruments by States that exploit them for political purposes;
- to EU institutions, CoE bodies and OSCE bodies: recognise that requirements for compliance with Financial Action Task Force Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing (AML/CFT) frameworks may be misused as a tool for TNR and support the development of safeguards to prevent such manipulation by repressive regimes, including the Lukashenka regime;
- to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (MONEYVAL): to treat the misuse of FATF recommendations and anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing methods for the purpose of TNR as grounds for finding a state non-compliant with these recommendations and for subjecting it to grey-listing;
- to EU institutions, CoE bodies and OSCE bodies: advocate increasing the cost of TNR and strengthening deterrence through effective investigation and prosecution of perpetrators and enablers, including through international mechanisms.
- to the European Parliament: commission the preparation of a report and adopt a resolution concerning TNR carried out by the Lukashenka regime;
- to EU institutions: put combating TNR high on the agenda of the European Democracy Shield and consider it among key hybrid threats threatening democratic systems across the European Union through foreign interference;
- to OSCE bodies: establish focal points on TNR at the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the Office of the Representative on Freedom of the Media, develop programmes in these institutions to monitor instances of TNR, analyse its evolution, provide assistance to states in legislative work, policy development, capacity building and training of representatives of relevant agencies, and interact with civil society;
- to OSCE participating States: provide necessary resources for these programmes through extra-budgetary contributions; consider launching an investigation in the framework of the Moscow Mechanism in respect of TNR employed by an authoritarian regime such as the Lukashenka regime; consider adopting a joint Declaration on TNR by a large majority of states and present it at the Ministerial Council meeting with a view of the need to bring the issue of combating TNR high on the OSCE agenda and the impossibility of adopting an MC decision in the absence of consensus of all participating States.
To states with regard to countering TNR globally:
- publicly identify, recognise, and condemn acts of TNR, and invest resources in tracking and systematically documenting such acts to improve analysis of patterns, evolving risks and threats, early warning signs of escalation, and policy responses;
- enact legislation aimed at preventing, combating and punishing TNR, including through the criminalisation of its methods and the adoption of a comprehensive definition of TNR, reflecting its dual nature;
- refrain from aiding or assisting in acts of TNR by other states, including through the misuse of information sharing, surveillance cooperation, joint operations, extradition and mutual legal assistance, or by allowing foreign officials to operate in the state’s territory to commit acts of TNR;
- refuse, document and report informal, coercive or extra-legal requests from foreign authorities to engage in surveillance, detain, restrict, intimidate or hand over exiles or members of diaspora communities, including when such requests are conveyed through diplomatic channels; refrain from extraditing victims or targets of TNR and to ensure their protection;
- apply additional vetting to red notices and diffusions from the governments that are known to engage in TNR;
- include conditions preventing the abuse of multilateral and bilateral cooperation agreements in criminal matters for TNR in international agreements and cooperation frameworks, including the possibility of suspension;
- respect and protect the rights of migrants, asylum-seekers, refugees and stateless persons, and respect and uphold non-refoulement obligations under international refugee law and international human rights law, including the absolute prohibition on return, extradition or transfer to situations where individuals face a real risk of persecution, torture and ill-treatment, enforced disappearance, arbitrary deprivation of life and liberty, flagrant denial of justice or other serious human rights violations, without exception and regardless of immigration or national security status;
- facilitate, in accordance with international obligations, the acquisition of alternative travel and identity documents to ensure that the exiles who cannot visit their home country safely to renew their passport, have access to essential services in the country of residence and the freedom of movement, ensure that such a document is accepted by all institutions and organisations as a full-fledged identity document, and extend the validity period of such a document to several years;
- develop comprehensive national strategies for tackling TNR, including financial TNR, grounded in a consolidated approach that combines the protection of human rights of those targeted by repression with the safeguarding of state security and sovereignty;
- identify, assess, and mitigate structural vulnerabilities in administrative, legal, and financial systems that may be exploited for TNR;
- address existing protection gaps, including access to legal and administrative assistance, and psychosocial support for victims and targets of TNR, and ensure that protective measures extend to family members;
- establish a specific government agency to comprehensively address the issue of TNR, act as a clear contact point for targets to lodge complaints and receive support, monitor and report on instances of TNR within the state’s jurisdiction, and provide advice to other state agencies;
- designate national contact points on TNR tasked with coordinating between relevant authorities at all levels and with TNR contact points in other states;
- create specialised units in relevant law enforcement bodies to address TNR cases and ensure prompt and effective investigation, and provide necessary training and resources to them;
- produce and distribute clear guidelines to relevant agencies and services on the process of handling reports of TNR and TNR-related human rights violations and providing protection to its targets, including in the cases of financial TNR;
- provide guidance to financial institutions, ensure that national financial regulators take into consideration abuse of AML/CFT frameworks by repressive states, issue guidance for banks to eliminate their over-compliance with FATF standards and enforce the principle of individual assessment, and have the mandate to share the data available to them with law enforcement and judiciaries, and establish an effective national complaint and review mechanism;
- undertake awareness-raising efforts aimed at public officials who come into contact with victims of TNR and make decisions affecting their interests, including the police, migration services, prosecutors, judges, intelligence services, government services for the protection of human rights, as well as civil society organisations and the general public;
- build the capacity of relevant agencies to address TNR; ensure government officials who may encounter perpetrators or victims of TNR, including those in law enforcement, the judicial, intelligence, diplomatic, financial, cybersecurity, immigration and asylum authorities, receive the training necessary to detect, prevent, respond to and redress acts of TNR, including when they do not constitute a crime under domestic law;
- actively engage with diaspora communities and relevant civil society groups; conduct proactive outreach and information-sharing with affected communities, ensuring meaningful consultation in the development of community-led protection strategies;
- provide accessible, prompt and effective remedies, protection, redress and rehabilitation and other needed support for affected individuals, groups and communities, including through the establishment of accessible, transparent and responsive focal points and reporting channels, effective physical protection for victims, their relatives and associations, legal and psychosocial support, as well as reasonable accommodation and personal assistance where required;
- review and ensure that protection policies and programmes are holistic, victim-centred, trauma-informed, gender-sensitive, intersectional, inclusive, culturally-sensitive, accessible and non-discriminatory, and provided with sufficient funding and adequate institutional arrangements, including for documentation and legal assistance, humanitarian visas, fast-tracking asylum applications and family reunification, effective resettlement programmes, psychosocial or livelihood support, counselling and peer support;
- undertake a coordinated effort with other concerned states to establish cooperation between government bodies of various states dealing with TNR;
- take active steps in pursuing further reforms of the Interpol and other mechanisms of international cooperation on legal matters;
- push within Interpol for the publication, on an annual basis, of detailed statistics for each type of notice and diffusion, broken down by issuing state and indicating the number and reasons for approvals, refusals and deletions;
- regularly inform Interpol about the outcomes of domestic extradition proceedings, especially in cases concluding with a refusal to extradite the individual sought;
- establish clear legal liability for individuals and entities who knowingly engage in, facilitate or profit from acts of TNR on behalf of foreign states;
- treat TNR as an aggravating factor when prosecuting crimes committed in its context;
- work towards accountability of TNR perpetrators and enablers through national proceedings based on accepted principles of extraterritorial and universal jurisdiction;
- use targeted sanctions as a tool to constrain and punish the perpetrators and enablers of TNR, and highlight their actions to a wider international audience.
To states with regard to countering TNR by the Lukashenka regime:
- monitor and study incidents of TNR by the Lukashenka regime with regard to Belarusians in exile;
- reflect information on TNR by Belarus in country reports on human rights and report it in communication with inter-governmental organisations;
- resist and oppose abuse of international mechanisms of cooperation on criminal matters by the Lukashenka regime; in particular, significantly strengthen the review of all requests, originating from Belarus, deny requests for extradition of Belarusians at risk of politically motivated persecution;
- raise the issue of Belarus’s abuse of international mechanisms of cooperation on criminal matters by the Lukashenka regime at bilateral and multilateral levels;
- review extradition, legal cooperation, readmission and return, and intelligence-sharing agreements with Belarus, and revise or terminate these agreements;
- build resilience against the use of spurious terrorism and extremism charges against Belarusians to distort host countries’ asylum and extradition processes;
- review asylum processes and include details on the use of TNR in the information about Belarus that is consulted during reviews of asylum or international protection applications to ensure that exiled dissenters are not denied legal status as a result of illegitimate criminal charges levelled against them in Belarus;
- facilitate, in accordance with international obligations, the issuance of alternative travel and identity documents to ensure that exiled Belarusians who cannot visit their home country safely to renew their passport, have access to essential services in the country of residence and the freedom of movement, ensure that such a document is accepted by all institutions and organisations as a full-fledged identity document, and extend the validity period of such a document to several years;
- ensure that national financial regulators instruct banks to accept the foreigner’s travel document as a sufficient identity document, and expand the list of documents confirming the legality of stay of a foreigner in the territory of the host state;
- establish appropriate mechanisms for exiled Belarusian human rights defenders, journalists, and opposition activists to receive permanent legal status when needed and without excessive administrative obstacles;
- develop specific outreach strategies to connect relevant authorities with offices of Belarusian democratic forces, Belarusian NGOs in exile and Belarusian diaspora communities;
- continue supporting Belarusian civil society organisations in exile, including those providing legal, psychosocial and other assistance to victims of human rights violations, including victims of TNR;
- financially support TNR awareness-raising, media literacy, and cybersecurity skills programmes implemented by civil society groups.
Endnotes
[i] The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) of Germany stated that cases of TNR have ceased to be an isolated phenomenon and pursue a clear goal – those who have left their country should not be able to escape from the regime’s power. According to the Office, the number of TNR cases will grow in Germany as well. Therefore, it has opened a special hotline where victims can share information about the repression against them. This information is planned to be used to analyse the TNR strategies of authoritarian states and to develop measures to counter them (German spy agency opens helpline for those exiled from Russia, China. Reuters, 20.08.2026. https://www.reuters.com/world/china/german-spy-agency-opens-helpline-those-exiled-russia-china-2026-08-20/).
[ii] On 5 July 2025, Deputy of the House of Representatives and Chair of the pro-government Liberal Democratic Party of Belarus, Aleh Haidukevich, called on Belarusian emigrants to attack opposition politicians in order to facilitate their return to their homeland. In his opinion, such an act “will be recognised by the relevant authorities upon return.” (Гайдукевич призвал белорусов нападать за границей на оппозиционных политиков, чтобы вернуться на родину. Позірк, 5 июля. https://pozirk.online/ru/news/145414/)
[iii] He was, probably, talking about Raman Pratasevich, publicly abducted in 2021 when a foreign civilian aircraft was forcibly landed in Minsk under the pretext of a terrorist threat.
[iv] Leaked audio recordings of telephone conversations among law enforcement officials in Belarus, as well as practices documented by the Legal Department of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya’s Office, revealed how staff at the National Central Bureau in Minsk discuss ways to conceal the political nature of cases, disguising them as ordinary criminal charges, including charges of tax evasion, fraud, property crimes, drug-related crimes, or defamation (“Wanted by Dictator: Red Notice State”. Report. Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya’s Office, BELPOL, and Cyber Partisans. 2026. P. 15.).
[v] Additionally, in a most recent development, on 01.10.2026, the Prosecutor General’s Offices of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan signed an agreement on cooperation in the field of combating terrorism and extremism. The document provides for the rapid exchange of information about organisations, groups and individuals whom the authorities of these countries consider a security threat. The countries are also going to share information about the international relations of such groups, possible terrorist attacks and “encroachments on sovereignty,” as well as about illegal armed groups. Separately, the agreement refers to “terrorist fighters” and their family members returning to their countries of origin. (Россия и пять стран СНГ ускоряют обмен данными об «экстремистах». Что это значит для россиян. ОВД-инфо, 01.10.2026. https://ovd.info/express-news/2026/10/01/rossiya-i-pyat-stran-sng-uskoryayut-obmen-dannymi-ob-ekstremistakh-chto-eto)
[vi] In April 2024, a delegation of the Criminal Investigation Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Belarus visited Kazakhstan, where the parties discussed issues of exchanging information about wanted persons, the procedure for processing requests, and the mechanism for their implementation (Беларусь и Казахстан обсудили вопросы выдачи людей в межгосударственном розыске. Reform.news, 16.04.2024. https://reform.news/belarus-i-kazahstan-obsusdili-voprosy-vydachi-ljudej-v-mezhgosudarstvennom-rozyske). In May 2025, Belarus ratified an extradition treaty with Pakistan. It was reported about plans to sign agreements on the extradition of persons wanted for criminal prosecution or for the execution of court sentences with Venezuela, Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Brazil, Cambodia, Nicaragua, South Africa, Korea, and Sri Lanka (Беларусь разрабатывает договоры о выдаче c 9 странами. Reform.news, 14.05.2025. https://reform.news/belarus-razrabatyvaet-dogovory-o-vydache-9-stranami
[vii] See, for example, Article 108 of the Polish Law on Foreigners (Ustawa z dnia 12 grudnia 2013 r. o cudzoziemcach (Dz. U. 2013 poz. 1650)), according to which the foreigner’s stay in Poland is officially recognised as fully legal from the day they submit the application until the day the final decision on their temporary residence case becomes legally binding.
[viii] The actions of the Belarusian authorities, which forcibly landed a foreign civilian aircraft under the pretext of a fabricated terrorist threat were qualified by the International Civil Aviation Organisation as a gross violation of the norms of international civil aviation law, endangering the lives of dozens of passengers and crew. (ICAO releases fact-finding report on forced landing of Ryanair plane in Belarus. Belsat, 18.01.2022. https://en.belsat.eu/80485180/icao-releases-factfinding-report-on-forced-landing-of-ryanair-plane-in-belarus)
[1] Dr. Natasza Krawczyk, Yuri Dzhibladze, Transnational Repression in Belarus: A Brutal Tool of the Persecution of Dissent by the Lukashenka Regime. Research report. iSANS, September 2025. https://isans.org/human-rights/transnational-repression-in-belarus-a-brutal-tool-of-the-persecution-of-dissent-by-the-lukashenka-regime.html
[2] Transnational repression as a growing threat to the rule of law and human rights. Report by Christopher Chope, Doc. 15787, Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, 05 June 2023. https://pace.coe.int/en/files/32828/html. Para. 65, 66, 75; Draft Report on addressing transnational repression of human rights defenders. Committee on Foreign Affairs. By Chloé Ridel. 2025/2048(INI). https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/AFET-PR-774242_EN.pdf, P.3.; Position Paper: The Need for a Council of Europe Convention on Transnational Repression. International Partnership for Human Rights, State Capture Accountability Project, June 2025. https://iphronline.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/position-paper_convention-on-prevention-of-transnational-repression_24.06.2025.pdf. P. 5.
[3] Nowhere is safe: exporting the rule of fear beyond borders – transnational repression by the Russian Federation. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Russian Federation, Mariana Katzarova. A/HRC/63/60, 8 September 2026. https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country-reports/ahrc6360-nowhere-safe-exporting-rule-fear-beyond-borders-transnational. Para 82.
[4] Yana Gorokhovskaia, Grady Vaughan. Collaboration and Resistance: Tracking Transnational Repression in 2025. Washington, DC: Freedom House, April 2026. https://freedomhouse.org/report/special-report/2026/collaboration-and-resistance-tracking-transnational-repression-2025. P. 1.
[5] Ibid. P.2, graphic illustration.
[6] Andrew Chubb, Kirsten Roberts Lyer, Transnational human rights violations: Addressing the evolution of globalized repression through National Human Rights Institutions, Journal of Human Rights Practice, Volume 16, Issue 3, November 2024. N. 16. Pp. 770–793. https://doi.org/10.1093/jhuman/huae017. P. 771.
[7] Dr. Natasza Krawczyk, Yuri Dzhibladze, Transnational Repression in Belarus: A Brutal Tool of the Persecution of Dissent by the Lukashenka Regime. Research report. Op.cit.
[8] Ten findings from ten years of data on transnational repression. Freedom House, 6 February 2025. https://freedomhouse.org/article/ten-findings-ten-years-data-transnational-repression
[9] Ibid.
[10] Policymaker’s guide to addressing transnational repression. International Partnership for Human Rights, State Capture Accountability Project, 2026. https://iphronline.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/policymakers-guide-to-addressing-tnr.pdf. P. 7.
[11] “We must urgently find our way back to peace”, says High Commissioner Volker Türk as he presents his global update to the 56th session of the Human Rights Council. OHCHR, 18.06.2024. https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements-and-speeches/2024/06/we-must-urgently-find-our-way-back-peace-says-high-commissioner
[12] Transnational Repression. Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, 18 June 2025. https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/tools-and-resources/transnational-repression
[13] Cooperation with the United Nations, its representatives and mechanisms in the field of human rights. Resolution adopted by the Human Rights Council on 7 October 2025. A/HRC/RES/60/23.
[14] Cooperation with the United Nations, its representatives and mechanisms in the field of human rights. Report of the Secretary-General. A/HR C/63/62.20 August 2026. https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/thematic-reports/ahrc6362-cooperation-united-nations-its-representatives-and-mechanisms. Para. 108, 115.
[15] States must desist from and ensure accountability for transnational repression. International Service for Human Rights, 27.06.2024. https://ishr.ch/latest-updates/states-must-desist-from-and-ensure-accountability-for-transnational-repression/
[16] G7 Leaders’ Statement on Transnational Repression. 17 June, 2025, Kananaskis, Alberta, Canada. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_25_1552
[17] General Debate of the Third Committee: Cross-Regional Joint Statement on Reprisals for Cooperation with the UN. H.E. Ambassador Laura Dupuy Lasserre, Permanent Representative of Uruguay to the United Nations, delivered a cross-regional statement on behalf of Ireland, Uruguay, and 68 other UN Member States and the European Union. Permanent mission of Ireland to the United Nations, 3 October 2025. https://www.ireland.ie/en/un/newyork/news-and-speeches/speeches-archive/general-debate-of-the-third-committee-cross-regional-joint-statement-on-reprisals-for-cooperation-with-the-un/
[18] “Journalists in exile”. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Irene Khan. A/HRC/56/53. 26 April 2024. https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/thematic-reports/ahrc5653-journalists-exile-report-special-rapporteur-promotion-and. Para. 24-53, 104
[19] Transnational repression of journalists threatens democracy: Special Rapporteur. The Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, 26.06.2024. https://www.srfreedex.org/transnational-repression-of-journalists-threatens-democracy-special-rapporteur
[20] Civil society, UN Special Rapporteur alarmed about transnational repression in the MENA region. MENA Rights Group, 10.12.2024. https://menarights.org/en/articles/civil-society-un-special-rapporteur-alarmed-about-transnational-repression-mena-region
[21] Communication by mandates of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression; the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances; the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association; the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders and the Working Group on discrimination against women and girls. AL EGY 6/2024. 23.12.2024. https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=29562
[22] Call for inputs on Enforced Disappearances in the context of transnational repression issued by multiple mechanisms, https://www.ohchr.org/en/calls-for-input/2026/call-inputs-enforced-disappearances-context-transnational-repression
[23] Joint Statement by United Nations Human Rights Experts on Transnational Repression. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 23 September 2026. https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements-and-speeches/2026/09/joint-statement-united-nations-human-rights-experts-transnational
[24] World Press Freedom Day 2025: Joint Statement to the OSCE. UK and others call for action to safeguard media freedom across the OSCE. Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office and French Ambassador to the OSCE, Fatène Benhabylès-Foeth, 08.05.2025. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/world-press-freedom-day-2025-joint-statement-to-the-osce
[25] Protecting civic space from growing digital threats requires sustained efforts, leading OSCE officials say. OSCE, 11.05.2026. https://www.osce.org/chairpersonship/664069
[26] Yuri Dzhibladze. Digital Transnational Repression: A Growing Threat to Civic Space. An example of Belarus. 15.05.2026. https://isans.org/human-rights/digital-transnational-repression-a-growing-threat-to-civic-space-an-example-of-belarus.html
[27] Transnational repression as a growing threat to the rule of law and human rights. Resolution 2509 (2023) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. 23 June 2023. https://pace.coe.int/en/files/32999/html
[28] Transnational repression as a growing threat to the rule of law and human rights. Report by Christopher Chope. Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights. Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. Doc. 15787. Op.cit.
[29] Fighting back against transnational repression. Resolution 2669 (2026). Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. 25 June 2026. https://pace.coe.int/en/files/36247/html
[30] European Parliament resolution of 9 March 2022 on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation (2020/2268(INI)). Document 52022IP0064. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=oj:JOC_2022_347_R_0008
[31] European Parliament resolution of 1 June 2023 on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation (2022/2075(INI)). Document 52023IP0219. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/C/2023/1226/oj/eng
[32] European Parliament recommendation of 5 July 2022 to the Council and the Commission on the negotiations for a cooperation agreement between the European Union and the International Criminal Police Organization (ICPO-INTERPOL) (2022/2025(INI)). https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2022-0275_EN.html
[33] European Parliament resolution of 13 November 2025 on addressing transnational repression of human rights defenders (2025/2048(INI)). https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-10-2025-0258_EN.html
[34] Draft Report on addressing transnational repression of human rights defenders. Report by Chloé Ridel. Committee on Foreign Affairs. European Parliament. 2025/2048(INI). https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/AFET-PR-774242_EN.pdf
[35] Saipira Furstenberg, Marcus Michaelsen, Siena Anstis. Transnational repression of human rights defenders: The impacts on civic space and the responsibility of host states. External Policies Analysis and Support Unit, Directorate-General for External Policies of the European Union, 2025. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2025/754475/EXPO_STU(2025)754475_EN.pdf
[36] European Parliament resolution of 16 June 2026 on countering transnational repression – towards an EU strategy to protect Europe’s sovereignty and democratic values (2025/2179(INI)). https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-10-2026-0203_EN.html
[37] Position Paper: The Need for a Council of Europe Convention on Transnational Repression. Op.cit. P. 4.
[38] Belarus: UN experts alarmed about widespread in absentia trials. Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, 22.01.2025. http://ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/01/belarus-un-experts-alarmed-about-widespread-absentia-trials
[39] Report of the Group of Independent Experts on the Situation of Human Rights in Belarus. Human Rights Council. A/HRC/58/68, 7 February 2025. https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/ohchrbelarus/a-hrc-58-68-aev.pdf
[40] Ibid. Para. 66-67.
[41] Ibid. Para. 68.
[42] Report of human rights in Belarus. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Belarus, Nils Muižnieks. Human Rights Council. A/HRC/59/59. 22 April 2025. https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country-reports/ahrc5959-report-human-rights-belarus. Para.3.
[43] Belarus: UN experts denounce expulsion of citizens, warn about risk of statelessness. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 08.12.2025. https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/12/belarus-un-experts-denounce-expulsion-citizens-warn-about-risk-statelessness
[44] Belarus: Freeing political prisoners does not end policy of repression, warns UN expert. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 17.12.2025. https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/12/belarus-freeing-political-prisoners-does-not-end-policy-repression-warns-un
[45] Report of the Group of Independent Experts on the Situation of Human Rights in Belarus. Human Rights Council. A/HRC/61/57. 6 February 2026. https://docs.un.org/A/HRC/61/57
[46] На полях сессии Совета ООН прошел сайд-ивент о правах человека в Беларуси. Reform.news, 12.03.2026. https://reform.news/na-poljah-sessii-soveta-oon-proshel-sajd-ivent-o-pravah-cheloveka-v-belarusi
[47] Belarus: UN experts condemn Government move to invalidate passports of exiled opponents. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 20.04.2026. https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/04/belarus-un-experts-condemn-government-move-invalidate-passports-exiled
[48] Belarus: Former political prisoners face continuing repression in exile through passport invalidation, say UN experts. OHCHR, 06.07.2026. https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/07/belarus-former-political-prisoners-face-continuing-repression-exile-through
[49] Situation of human rights in Belarus. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Belarus, Nils Muižnieks. Human Rights Council. A/HRC/62/52, 19 May 2026. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4117856?ln=ru&v=pdf
[50] МОТ призвала Беларусь вернуть паспорта Ярошуку и Федыничу. Reform.news, 31.03.2026. https://reform.news/mot-prizvala-belarus-vernut-pasporta-jaroshuku-i-fedynichu
[51] Decision concerning the follow-up to the resolution concerning the measures recommended by the Governing Body under article 33 of the ILO Constitution on the subject of Belarus. GB.356/INS/12(Rev.2)/Decision. International Labour Organisation. https://www.ilo.org/resource/record-decisions/gb/gb356/decision-concerning-follow-resolution-concerning-measures-recommended
[52] Political prisoners in Belarus: Joint Statement to the OSCE Permanent Council, May 2026. Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office and H. E. Mr. Mario Horvatić, Permanent Representative of Croatia to the OSCE, 21.05.2026. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/political-prisoners-in-belarus-joint-statement-to-the-osce-permanent-council-may-2026
[53] The Situation in Belarus in the Context of Regional Security, Transnational Repression and Human Rights. Resolution. In “The Hague declaration and resolutions adopted by the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly at the thirty-third annual session”. The Hague, 4–8 July 2026. https://www.oscepa.org/en/documents/annual-sessions/2026-the-hague/declaration-32/5581-the-hague-declaration-eng/file, P. 83.
[54] See a report on the conference proceedings: “The Luxembourg Solutions”: outcomes and perspectives. Council of Europe, September 2024. P. 8, 15, 16, 26-27. https://rm.coe.int/prems-149524-bil-3011-outcomes-and-perspectives-txt-web-a4-1-/1680b1b274. Six panels addressed the key challenges facing Belarusians in exile and the solutions proposed in Resolution 2499 (2023): legal entry and stay, threats to freedom of movement and the denial of consular services, access to education, pursuing a professional career and entrepreneurship in exile, and preserving and promoting Belarus cultural identity.
[55] Addressing the specific challenges faced by the Belarusians in exile. Resolution 2499 (2023) of the Parliamentary Assembly of Council of Europe, 20 June 2023. https://pace.coe.int/en/files/32899/html
[56] Situation in Belarus. Statement by Secretary General. Council of Europe, 03.07.2024. https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/-/situation-in-belarus-1
[57] European Parliament resolution of 3 April 2025 on the immediate risk of further repression by Lukashenka’s regime in Belarus – threats from the Investigative Committee (2025/2629(RSP)). https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-10-2025-0063_EN.html
[58] Ibid.
[59] European Parliament resolution on the situation in Belarus, five years after the fraudulent presidential elections (2025/2900(RSP)). https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/B-10-2025-0451_EN.html
[60] European Parliament resolution of 16 June 2026 on countering transnational repression – towards an EU strategy to protect Europe’s sovereignty and democratic values (2025/2179(INI)). https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-10-2026-0203_EN.html
[61] “Almost 800,000 Belarusians live outside the country”. Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, 01.02.2026. https://tsikhanouskaya.org/en/news/almost-800000-belarusians-live-outside-the-country.html
[62] «Точка роста сегодня – Испания». Сколько в мире живет беларусов и какие они? Belsat, 01.05.2026. https://ru.belsat.eu/93027988/belarusy-za-rubezhom
[63] See, for example: Aliaksandr Kazakou, Felicity Thomas. The mental health and wellbeing of Belarusians in exile in Lithuania, Poland and Georgia // Journal of Migration and Health. 2025. Vol.11. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/390408945_The_mental_health_and_wellbeing_of_Belarusians_in_exile_in_Lithuania_Poland_and_Georgia, P. 1.; Kseniya Homel, Marta Jaroszewicz., Magdalena Lesińska. New permanent residents? Belarusians in Poland after 2020 // Centre for Migration Research Newsletter. The University of Warsaw. 2023. N. 5 (51). https://www.migracje.uw.edu.pl/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/Spotlight-MAJ-2023.pdf, P. 1-2.
[64] Human rights situation in Belarus. May 2026. Human Rights Centre “Viasna”, 08.06.2026. https://spring96.org/en/news/120447
[65] Лукашенко заявил, что будет продолжать репрессии против оппонентов «не глядя ни на какие законы». Reform.News, 13.03.2026. https://reform.news/lukashenko-zajavil-chto-budet-prodolzhat-repressii-protiv-opponentov-ne-gljadja-ni-na-kakie-zakony
[66] В Офисе Тихановской заявили об усилении давления со стороны режима. Reform.news, 03.01.2026. https://reform.news/v-ofise-tihanovskoj-zajavili-ob-usilenii-davlenija-so-storony-rezhima
[67] Тихановская призвала вынести тему транснациональных репрессий на Совбез и Генассамблею ООН. Reform.news, 01.04.2026. https://reform.news/tihanovskaja-prizvala-vynesti-temu-transnacionalnyh-repressij-na-sovbez-i-genassambleju-oon
[68] Comedian Slava Kamissarenka was sentenced in absentia to six years of imprisonment and added to the “terrorist list” (Силовики угрожают комику Усовичу. Reform.news, 27.05.2025. https://reform.news/siloviki-ugrozhajut-komiku-usovichu
[69] Лукашисты опустились так низко, что пробили дно. NEXTA, 13.05.2026. https://t.me/nexta_tv/26818
[70] Позор Беглых на митинге в Варшаве. Видео разведки Беларуси. Приказ президента и юмор разведчиков. ONT TV channel, 27.01.2025. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lb6x8myG5Zg&t=500s
[71] Беларусский пропагандист угрожает оппонентам: Мы из любой точки мира доставим. Reform.news, 31.10.2025. https://reform.news/belarusskij-propagandist-ugrozhaet-opponentam-my-iz-ljuboj-tochki-mira-dostavim
[72] European Parliament resolution of 16 June 2026 on countering transnational repression – towards an EU strategy to protect Europe’s sovereignty and democratic values (2025/2179(INI)). Para. AC.
[73] Анна Неверова. Лукашенко разрешил заочно судить уехавших из Беларуси. DW, 22.07.2022. https://www.dw.com/ru/lukashenko-razreshil-zaochno-sudit-uehavshih-iz-rb-obvinjaemyh/a-62560031
[74] Дарья Бернштейн. В Беларуси может стать еще больше заочных судов за политику. DW, 30.01.2025. https://www.dw.com/ru/v-belarusi-mozet-stat-ese-bolse-zaocnyh-sudov-za-politiku/a-71449257
[75] Ibid.
[76] Жителя Пинска заочно осудили за участие в протестах в 2020-м году. Вясна, 29.10.2025. https://spring96.org/ru/news/118959
[77] Верховный суд оставил приговор Николаю Кацелапову без изменений. Reform.news, 28.10.2025. https://reform.news/verhovnyj-sud-ostavil-prigovor-nikolaja-kacelapovu-bez-izmenenij
[78] Журналистке Оксане Колб заменили «химию» на колонию. По новому делу ее обвиняют в «содействии экстремизму» и «беспорядках». Reform.news, 14.11.2025. https://reform.news/zhurnalistke-oksane-kolb-zamenili-himiju-na-koloniju-po-novomu-delu-ee-obvinjajut-v-sodejstvii-jekstremizmu-i-besporjadkah
[79] Против спецкора «Новой-Европа» Ирины Халип возбудили уголовное дело в Беларуси. Новая газета Европа, 27.11.2025. https://novayagazeta.eu/articles/2025/11/27/protiv-spetskora-novoi-evropa-iriny-khalip-vozbudili-ugolovnoe-delo-v-belarusi-news
[80] СК начал спецпроизводство в отношении Артема Шабунева. Reform.news, 18.12.2025. https://reform.news/sk-nachal-specproizvodstvo-v-otnoshenii-artema-shabuneva
[81] В Беларуси против священника Александра Кухты возбудили уголовное дело о содействии «экстремистской» деятельности. Настоящее Время, 02.01.2026. https://www.currenttime.tv/a/kuhta-ugolovnoe-delo/33638586.html
[82] СК начал спецпроизводство в отношении Николая Тарасенко. Reform.news, 29.01.2026. https://reform.news/sk-nachal-specproizvodstvo-v-otnoshenii-nikolaja-tarasenko
[83] «Мы с вами говорим о книгах – и я, получается, третий раз нарушаю». Писатель Саша Филипенко – о новом деле против него в Беларуси. Настоящее Время, 07.02.2026. https://www.currenttime.tv/a/pisatel-sasha-filipenko-o-novom-dele-v-belarusi/33671639.html
[84] В Беларуси против оперной певицы Маргариты Левчук возбудили новое уголовное дело – об оскорблении Лукашенко. Настоящее Время, 17.03.2026. https://www.currenttime.tv/a/belarus-levchuk-ugolovnoe-delo/33708659.html
[85] Журналиста-расследователя Карпеко заочно заключили под стражу. Reform.news, 17.03.2026. https://reform.news/zhurnalista-rassledovatelja-karpeko-zaochno-zakljuchili-pod-strazhu
[86] Мингорсуд вынес заочный приговор Виктории Бакунович. Reform.news, 04.03.2026. https://reform.news/mingorsud-vynes-zaochnyj-prigovor-viktorii-bakunovich
[87] Экс-директора РЦОП по фристайлу, которого уволили в 2020-м за «плохую идеологическую работу», заочно приговорили к 12 годам колонии. Зеркало, 23.03.2026. https://news.zerkalo.io/life/123302.html
[88] Заочно осужденный житель Молодечно вернулся в Беларусь и попал в колонию на 5,5 года. Reform.news, 06.05.2026. https://reform.news/zaochno-osuzhdennyj-zhitel-molodechno-vernulsja-v-belarus-i-popal-v-koloniju-na-5-5-goda
[89] Беларусу Александру Зубрику заочно назначили 3,5 года колонии. Вясна, 11.05.2026. https://spring96.org/ru/news/120239
[90] СК начал спецпроизводство в отношении Александра Зубрика. Reform.news, 05.02.2026. https://reform.news/sk-nachal-specproizvodstvo-v-otnoshenii-aleksandra-zubrika
[91] Пинчанина заочно приговорили к 5 годам колонии. Reform.news, 13.05.2026. https://reform.news/gomelchanina-zaochno-prigovorili-k-5-godam-kolonii
[92] Бывшего калиновца Максима Шабуцкого заочно осудили на 19 лет колонии. Вясна, 21.05.2026. https://spring96.org/ru/news/120309
[93] Политолога Дмитрия Болкунца заочно приговорили к 12 годам лишения свободы. Зеркало, 25.05.2026. https://news.zerkalo.io/life/127972.html
[94] На Павла Северинца возбуждено уголовное дело за День Воли. Еврорадио, 25.05.2026. https://euroradio.fm/ru/na-pavla-severinca-vozbuzhdeno-ugolovnoe-delo-za-den-voli
[95] На экс-политзаключенного Илью Миронова завели новое уголовное дело. Reform.news, 27.05.2026. https://reform.news/na-jeks-politzakljuchennogo-ilju-mironova-zaveli-novoe-ugolovnoe-delo
[96] В Беларуси возбудили новое уголовное дело против экс-политзаключенного Павла Можейко. Его ранее освободили и вывезли в Литву. Настоящее время, 03.07.2026. https://www.currenttime.tv/a/belarus-mozheyko-ugolovnoe-delo/33802643.html
[97] Фото беларусского священника Георгия Роя разместили на стендах «Их разыскивает милиция». Reform.news, 26.05.2026. https://reform.news/foto-belarusskogo-svjashhennika-georgija-roja-razmestili-na-stendah-ih-razyskivaet-milicija
[98] Основателя польского фонда «Окно на восток» заочно приговорили к 5 годам колонии. Reform.news, 27.07.2026. https://reform.news/pavel-miczkevich/
[99] Belarusian musician Siarhei Mikhalok gets four years in prison in absentia. Belsat, 4.08.2026. https://en.belsat.eu/94688467/belarusian-musician-siarhei-mikhalok-gets-four-years-in-prison-in-absentia
[100] Вокалистку группы Dymna Lotva будут заочно судить в Беларуси. Reform.news, 24.07.2026. https://reform.news/vokalistku-gruppy-dymna-lotva-budut-zaochno-sudit-v-belarusi/
[101] Стали известны заочные приговоры создателям и участникам инициативы «Честные люди». Медиазона Беларусь, 22.01.2026. https://mediazonaby.com/news/2026/01/22/honest
[102] Заочный суд над участниками инициативы “Честные люди“ начнется 5 ноября. Позірк, 27.10.2025. https://pozirk.online/ru/news/161709/
[103] Пятерых калиновцев заочно осудили — от 12 до 25 лет колонии. Еврорадио, 09.03.2026. https://euroradio.fm/ru/pyaterykh-kalinovcev-zaochno-osudili-ot-12-do-25-let-kolonii
[104] СК Беларуси пригрозил белорусам за рубежом уголовным преследованием за участие в акциях в честь Дня воли. Настоящее Время, 23.03. 2026. https://www.currenttime.tv/a/belarus-aktsii-den-voli/33713372.html
[105] До 17 лет колонии. Вынесли заочные приговоры фигурантке дела о диверсии в Мачулищах и еще троим беларусам. Зеркало, 12.05.2026. https://news.zerkalo.io/amp/life/127028.html
[106] В отношении основателей Dissidentby начато спецпроизводство. Reform.news, 28.08.2026. https://reform.news/v-otnoshenii-osnovatelej-dissidentby-nachato-specproizvodstvo/
[107] Пятерых калиновцев заочно осудили на 12 и 20 лет. Reform.news, 28.09.2026. https://reform.news/pjateryh-kalinovcev-zaochnoj-osudili-na-12-i-20-let/
[108] Елена Доронина. «Квартира опечатана». В РБ массовый арест имущества уехавших. DW, 08.12.2023. https://www.dw.com/ru/vlasti-belarusi-massovo-arestovyvajut-imushhestvo-uehavshih/a-67672450
[109] The analysis of violations by the Republic of Belarus of international human rights obligations and constitutional guarantees in respect of its citizens due to the adoption of Decree No. 278 «On the Procedure for Issuing Documents and Performing Actions». Belarusian Helsinki Committee, 21.09.2023. https://belhelcom.org/en/news/analysis-violations-republic-belarus-international-human-rights-obligations-and-constitutional
[110] В Беларуси продали квартиру, в которой была прописана спортсменка Александра Герасименя. Настоящее Время, 13.02.2026. https://www.currenttime.tv/a/gerasimenya-belarus-kvratira/33676938.html
[111] В Пинске продают квартиру Алексея Пацко — бывшего судьи, который отказался судить протестующих. Наша Нiва, 24.03.2026. https://d2accbiqacj5y8.cloudfront.net/ru/391152
[112] Квартиру заочно осужденного экономиста Данейко продали с аукциона. Reform.news, 12.06.2026. https://reform.news/kvartiru-zaochno-osuzhdennogo-ekonomista-danejko-prodali-s-aukcziona
[113] Дачу журналиста Хильмановича продали с аукциона. Reform.news, 24.06.2026. https://reform.news/dachu-zhurnalista-hilmanovicha-prodali-s-aukcziona
[114] Квартиру заочно осужденного журналиста Хильмановича продали с аукциона. Reform.news, 01.07.2026. https://reform.news/kvartiru-zaochno-osuzhdennogo-zhurnalista-hilmanovicha-prodali-s-aukcziona
[115] Три старинные иконы бывшего политзаключенного ксендза Околотовича продали с аукциона в Беларуси. Reform.news, 12.07.2026. https://reform.news/tri-starinnye-ikony-byvshego-politzakljuchennogo-ksendza-okolotovicha-prodali-s-aukciona-v-belarusi/
[116] Квартира заочно осужденного журналиста может отойти государству. Reform.news, 29.05.2026. https://reform.news/kvartira-zaochno-osuzhdennogo-zhurnalista-mozhet-otojti-gosudarstvu
[117] Dana M. Moss, Marcus Michaelsen, Gillian Kennedy. Going after the family: Transnational repression and the proxy punishment of Middle Eastern diasporas // Global Networks. 2022. Vol.22, N.4. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/360507519_Going_after_the_family_Transnational_repression_and_the_proxy_punishment_of_Middle_Eastern_diasporas. P. 735.
[118] Policymaker’s guide to addressing transnational repression. Op.cit. P. 8.
[119] К родственникам освобожденных и вывезенных из Беларуси заключенных приходят силовики. Медиазона Беларусь, 14 января 2026. https://mediazonaby.com/news/2026/01/14/relat
[120] В Гродненской области продолжается давление на родственников и близких уехавших активистов. Reform.news, 05.03.2026. https://reform.news/v-grodnenskoj-oblasti-prodolzhaetsja-davlenie-na-rodstvennikov-i-blizkih-uehavshih-aktivistov
[121] «Вясне» известно о более 10 обысках у родственников кандидатов в Координационный совет. Reform.news, 06.05.2026. https://reform.news/vjasne-izvestno-o-bolee-10-obyskah-u-rodstvennikov-kandidatov-v-koordinacionnyj-sovet
[122] Силовики пришли с обыском в квартиру кандидата в КС. Reform.news, 13.05.2026. https://reform.news/siloviki-prishli-s-obyskom-v-kvartiru-kandidata-v-ks
[123] «Вясна» рассказала подробности массовых обысков в Беларуси. Reform.news, 22.05.2026. https://reform.news/vjasna-rasskazala-podrobnosti-massovyh-obyskov-v-belarusi
[124] Кагэбэшники звонят белорусам в эмиграции через их друзей — чего хотят? Наша нiва, 31.05.2026. https://storage.googleapis.com/nashaniva-by/read.html
[125] Правозащитники: КГБ продолжает проводить обыски по месту регистрации уехавших беларусов. Reform.news, 02.06.2026. https://reform.news/pravozashhitniki-kgb-prodolzhaet-provodit-obyski-po-mestu-registracii-uehavshih-belarusov
[126] В Беларуси усилилось давление на семьи журналистов, покинувших страну — БАЖ. 06.08.2026. https://reform.news/v-belarusi-usililos-davlenie-na-semi-zhurnalistov-pokinuvshih-stranu-bazh/
[127] Допросы в клетке и угрозы смертной казнью. Что происходит со студентами ЕГУ — белорусского вуза в изгнании. Русская служба Би-би-си, 05.08.2026. https://www.bbc.com/russian/articles/cvgwqzqgl2zo
[128] В Могилевской области силовики собирают ДНК родственников людей, уехавших из Беларуси. Mayday Team, 08.08.2025. https://t.me/MAYDAYMog/5312
[129] Генетически ненадежные данные. Как Беларусь создает базу данных ДНК противников режима. Радио Свобода, 28.08.2026. https://www.svaboda.org/a/33842380.html
[130] Ibid.
[131] Права человека в Беларуси: Основные тренды государственной политики. Январь-апрель 2026.Беларусский Хельсинкский Комитет, 2026. https://belhelcom.org/sites/default/files/bhc_trends_2026_jan_apr_rus.pdf. P. 17.
[132] Белорусам, проживающим за границей, больше не будут выдавать белорусские паспорта. Зеркало, 05.09.2023. https://news.zerkalo.io/economics/48123.html
[133] Belarus: Presidential decree denying consular services puts Belarusians abroad at risk. UN OHCHR, 20.09.2023. https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/09/belarus-presidential-decree-denying-consular-services-puts-belarusians
[134] Эмма Левашкевич, Марта Сакавік. Как живут белорусы с паспортами иностранца. DW, 03.06.2025. https://www.dw.com/ru/bez-dokumentov-kak-zivut-belorusy-s-pasportami-inostranca/a-72775590
[135] В Дании выдан первый паспорт иностранца беларуске без статуса беженца. Reform.news, 18.02.2026. https://reform.news/v-danii-vydan-pervyj-pasport-inostranca-belaruske-bez-statusa-bezhenca
[136] Испания будет принимать просроченные паспорта беларусов. Belsat, 21.01.2026. https://ru.belsat.eu/91156921/ispanija-priznajot-prosrochennye-pasporta-belarusov
[137] Швеция: Белорусам-эмигрантам больше не нужно ездить в Беларусь за новым паспортом. Наша Нiва, 10.08.2026. https://d2accbiqacj5y8.cloudfront.net/ru/402034
[138] Болгария частично решила проблему с выдачей документов беларусам с просроченным паспортом. Reform.news, 14.08.2026. https://reform.news/bolgarija-chastichno-reshila-problemu-s-vydachej-dokumentov-belarusam-s-prosrochennym-pasportom/
[139] Кипр начал выдавать виды на жительство гражданам Беларуси с просроченными паспортами. Meduza, 26.08.2026. https://meduza.io/news/2026/08/26/kipr-nachal-vydavat-vidy-na-zhitelstvo-grazhdanam-belarusi-s-prosrochennymi-pasportami
[140] Максім Шульц. Временная замена паспорту. Польша начала выдавать беларусам проездной документ по упрощённой схеме. Моsт, 07.07.2023. https://mostmedia.io/2023/07/07/polskij-proezdnoj-dokument-dlja-inostranca/
[141] В Польше могут увеличить срок действия проездного документа для иностранцев до двух лет. Reform.news, 31.07.2026. https://reform.news/v-polshe-mogut-uvelichit-srok-dejstvija-proezdnogo-dokumenta-dlja-inostrancev-do-dvuh-let/
[142] Польша до конца года продлила упрощенный порядок выдачи беларусам проездного документа иностранца. Зеркало, 19.06.2026. https://news.zerkalo.io/life/130014.html
[143] Беларусы без образовательных документов могут поступить в польские вузы по спецпроцедуре. Reform.news, 03.08.2026. https://reform.news/belarusy-bez-obrazovatelnyh-dokumentov-mogut-postupit-v-polskie-vuzy-po-specprocedre/
[144] Зазулинская: помилование с принудительным выдворением — новая форма репрессий. Reform.news, 06.03.2026. https://reform.news/zazulinskaja-pomilovanie-s-prinuditelnym-vydvoreniem-novaja-forma-repressij
[145] Лукашенко освободил 250 политических заключенных. DW, 19.03.2026. https://www.dw.com/ru/lukasenko-osvobodil-250-politzaklucennyh-v-obmen-na-smagcenie-sankcij-ssa/a-76440474
[146] «Можно сказать, что меня лишили гражданства»: власти Беларуси аннулировали паспорта многих политзаключенных, высланных из Беларуси. Радыё Свабода, 31.03.2026. https://www.currenttime.tv/a/mozhno-skazat-chto-menya-lishili-grazhdanstva-vlasti-belarusi-annulirovali-pasporta-mnogih-politzaklyuchennyh-vyslannyh-iz-belarusi/33721233.html
[147] 15 освобожденных политзаключенных выдворены из Беларуси в Литву без документов. Reform.news, 19.03.2026. https://reform.news/15-osvobozhdennyh-politzakljuchennyh-vydvoreny-iz-belarusi-v-litvu-bez-dokumentov
[148] Вывезенные из Беларуси политзаключенные находятся в неопределенном юридическом статусе — правозащитники. Reform.news, 23.01.2026. https://reform.news/vyvezennye-iz-belarusi-politzakljuchennye-nahodjatsja-v-neopredelennom-juridicheskom-statuse-pravozashhitniki
[149] Права человека в Беларуси: Основные тренды государственной политики. Январь-апрель 2026. Беларусский Хельсинкский Комитет, 2026. https://belhelcom.org/sites/default/files/bhc_trends_2026_jan_apr_rus.pdf. P. 17.
[150] „Можно сказать, что меня лишили гражданства”: власти Беларуси аннулировали паспорта многих политзаключенных, высланных из Беларуси. Радыё Свабода, 31.03.2026. https://www.currenttime.tv/a/mozhno-skazat-chto-menya-lishili-grazhdanstva-vlasti-belarusi-annulirovali-pasporta-mnogih-politzaklyuchennyh-vyslannyh-iz-belarusi/33721233.html
[151] Высказывания Лукашенко как доказательства направлены Прокурору МУС в Гааге. Народное Антикризисное Управление, 30.12.2025. https://t.me/nau_belarus/3145
[152] Права человека в Беларуси: Основные тренды государственной политики. Январь-апрель 2026. Op.cit. P. 17.
[153] Заява праваабарончай кааліцыі з нагоды адвольнага прызнання несапраўднымі пашпартоў грамадзян Рэспублікі Беларусь. Вясна, 10.04.2026. https://spring96.org/be/news/120008
[154] Режим аннулировал паспорт Нобелевского лауреата Алеся Беляцкого. Вясна, 03.04.2026. https://spring96.org/ru/news/119965
[155] Ibid.
[156] Офис Тихановской назвал аннулирование паспортов транснациональными репрессиями. Reform.news, 31.03.2026. https://reform.news/ofis-tihanovskoj-nazval-annulirovanie-pasportov-transnacionalnymi-repressijami
[157] Тихановская призвала вынести тему транснациональных репрессий на Совбез и Генассамблею ООН. Reform.news, 01.04.2026. https://reform.news/tihanovskaja-prizvala-vynesti-temu-transnacionalnyh-repressij-na-sovbez-i-genassambleju-oon
[158] See, for example, Dissidentby: КГБ пытается завербовать уехавших беларусов через родителей. Reform.news, 23.06.2026. https://reform.news/dissidentby-kgb-pytaetsya-zaverbovat-uehavshih-belarusov-cherez-roditelej
[159] Tajemnicza lista u taksówkarza z Białegostoku. Miał donosić KGB. RMF24, 23.09.2025. https://www.rmf24.pl/fakty/polska/news-tajemnicza-lista-u-taksowkarza-z-bialegostoku-mial-donosic-k,nId,8023454
[160] Польша передала Беларуси задержанного за шпионаж Владислава Надейко. Reform.news, 28.04.2026. https://reform.news/polsha-peredala-belarusi-zaderzhannogo-za-shpionazh-vladislava-nadejko
[161] Стали известны подробности о задержанных в Польше за съемку акций беларусов. Reform.news, 02.07.2026. https://reform.news/stali-izvestny-podrobnosti-o-zaderzhannyh-v-polshe-za-semku-akcij-belarusov
[162] Kolejne zarzuty dla dwóch osób w śledztwie dotyczącym szpiegostwa i dywersji. Prokuratura Krajowa, 02.07.2026. https://www.gov.pl/web/prokuratura-krajowa/kolejne-zarzuty-dla-dwoch-osob-w-sledztwie-dotyczacym-szpiegostwa-i-dywersji
[163] Бывший заключённый за политику заявил, что КГБ принудил его к сотрудничеству и отправил в Польшу. Вясна, 06.10.2026. https://spring96.org/ru/news/121354
[164] “Мы готовы верифицироваться через ваших родственников в Беларуси»: как КГБ вербовал главу Народного посольства Беларуси в Словении. Правозащитный центр «Вясна», 03.11.2025. https://spring96.org/ru/news/118999
[165] В Польше завели уголовное дело из-за попыток беларусских спецслужб завербовать сотрудников НАУ. Reform.news, 09.11.2025. https://reform.news/v-polshe-zaveli-ugolovnoe-delo-iz-za-popytok-belarusskih-specsluzhb-zaverbovat-sotrudnikov-nau
[166] В НАУ заявляют о 15 попытках вербовки своих сотрудников беларусскими спецслужбами. Reform.news, 13.12.2025. https://reform.news/v-nau-zajavljajut-o-15-popytkah-verbovki-svoih-sotrudnikov-belarusskimi-specsluzhbami
[167] «Спасибо, Лена! Продолжайте вести наблюдение». Офицер, который писал Харисовой, пасся в чатах политэмиграции, а некоторым девушкам даже предлагал обменяться нюдсами. Наша нiва, 08.06.2026. https://nashaniva.com/ru/397138
[168] Офіс Ціханоўскай: Паводзіны Харысавай нельга апраўдаць ціскам. Наша Нiва, 13.06.2026. https://nashaniva.com/ru/397558
[169] Чым займаецца Аліна Харысава пасля гучнага скандалу з КДБ і якія высновы зрабіла са сваёй прыкрай гісторыі? Наша Нiва, 09.07.2026. https://nashaniva.com/399403
[170] Ibid.
[171] «Поработаем, а спустя время вернешься». Бывшему политзаключенному предлагают возвращение в Беларусь. Reform.news, 01.04.2026. https://reform.news/porabotaem-a-spustja-vremja-verneshsja-byvshemu-politzakljuchennomu-predlagajut-vozvrashhenie-v-belarus
[172] Фейковая журналистка «Новой газеты. Европа» попыталась нанять Настю Рогатко. Reform.news, 19.02.2026. https://reform.news/fejkovaja-zhurnalistka-novoj-gazety-evropa-popytalas-nanjat-nastju-rogatko
[173] Неизвестные от имени беларусского журналиста собирают информацию о беларусских добровольцах. Reform.news, 19.03.2026. https://reform.news/neizvestnye-ot-imeni-belarusskogo-zhurnalista-sobirajut-informaciju-o-belarusskih-dobrovolcah
[174] Post in the Facebook account of Zmicier Pankavets, 19.03.2026. https://www.facebook.com/zmicier.pankaviec/posts/pfbid0221chfXRBPssAPE1tcuyZCAj1GvqU1UNR8yKtX2tCdiCD5agDZDCyqvNx2sBfnHUMl
[175] Неизвестный аккаунт выдает себя за журналиста BBC — правозащитники. Reform.news, 13.08.2026. https://reform.news/neizvestnyj-akkaunt-vydaet-sebja-za-zhurnalista-bbc-pravozashhitniki
[176] Офис Тихановской предупредил об участившихся случаях мошенничества от его имени. Reform.news, 01.07.2026. https://reform.news/ofis-tihanovskoj-predupredil-ob-uchastivshihsja-sluchajah-moshennichestva-ot-ego-imeni
[177] Post in the Telegram channel of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya’s Office, 01.07.2026. https://t.me/tsikhanouskaya/9361
[178] Спецслужбы ищут людей, чтобы заснять встречу Тихановских с беларусами в Варшаве. Belsat, 25.06.2025. https://ru.belsat.eu/87471947/tihanovskie-varshava
[179] Ibid.
[180] Ibid.
[181] На встречу с Дедком в Кракове пришли два провокатора — фото. Reform.news, 27.03.2026. https://reform.news/na-vstrechu-s-dedkom-v-krakove-prishli-dva-provokatora-foto
[182] Post in the Telegram channel of Mikalai Dziadok, 27.03.2026. https://t.me/MDziadok/762
[183] Agencja Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego 2024-2025. Wybrane aktywności. Website of the Agency of Internal Security of the Republic of Poland. https://www.abw.gov.pl/pl/aktualnosci/2815,Agencja-Bezpieczenstwa-Wewnetrznego-2024-2025-Wybrane-aktywnosci.html. Accessed on 13.08.2026.
[184] ABW: Беларуские спецслужбы склоняют к сотрудничеству граждан Польши, которые регулярно ездят в Беларусь. Most, 06.05.2026. https://mostmedia.io/2026/05/06/belarusskie-specsluzhby-sklonjajut-k-sotrudnichestvu-grazhdan-polshi/
[185] VDD publicē ikgadējo pārskatu par identificētajiem apdraudējumiem un īstenoto pretdarbību. Website of the State Security Service of Latvia. https://vdd.gov.lv/aktualitates/jaunumi/vdd-publice-ikgadejo-parskatu-par-identificetajiem-apdraudejumiem-un-istenoto-pretdarbibu. Accessed on 13.08.2026.
[186] СГБ Латвии рассказала об активной работе КГБ и проверках в отношении беларусов. Reform.news, 09.02.2026. https://reform.news/sgb-latvii-rasskazala-ob-aktivnoj-rabote-kgb-i-proverkah-v-otnoshenii-belarusov
[187] Осужденный за шпионаж в пользу Беларуси Данелюс подал в суд на Науседу. LRT, 19.04.2026. https://www.lrt.lt/ru/novosti/17/2903058/osuzhdennyi-za-shpionazh-v-pol-zu-belarusi-danelius-podal-v-sud-na-nausedu
[188] Красовская К. Литовских супругов приговорили за шпионаж в пользу Беларуси. DW, 15.04.2026. www.dw.com/ru/litovskih-suprugov-prigovorili-za-spionaz-v-polzu-belarusi/a-76797912
[189] Мониторинг ситуации со свободой ассоциаций и положением организаций гражданского общества в Республике Беларусь Май 2026. Lawtrend, 02.06.2026. https://www.lawtrend.org/monitoring-issledovania/ezhemesyachnye-monitoringi/monitoring-situatsii-so-svobodoj-assotsiatsij-i-polozheniem-organizatsij-grazhdanskogo-obshhestva-v-respublike-belarus-maj-2026
[190] КГБ признал избирательные списки на выборах в КС «экстремистскими формированиями». Reform.news, 23.04.2026. https://reform.news/kgb-priznal-izbiratelnye-spiski-na-vyborah-v-ks-jekstremistskimi-formirovanijami
[191] Minsk’s move to brand the European Humanities University. 14.04.2026. https://x.com/BudrysKestutis/status/2044081587462004842
[192] Силовики пришли с обыском к студенту‑заочнику ЕГУ. Медиазона Беларусь, 27.04.2026. https://mediazonaby.com/news/2026/04/27/ehu
[193] Около 100 студентов покинули ЕГУ после объявления «экстремистского» статуса. Euroradio, 21.05.2026. https://euroradio.fm/ru/okolo-100-studentov-pokinuli-egu-posle-obyavleniya-ekstremistskogo-statusa
[194] Силовики приходят с обыском к тем, кто платил за учебу в ЕГУ с 2016 года — правозащитники. Зеркало, 10.06.2026. https://news.zerkalo.io/life/129237.html
[195] Допросы в клетке и угрозы смертной казнью. Op.cit.
[196] Организация Free Belarus Center признана “экстремистским формированием“. Позірк, 20.01.2026. https://pozirk.online/ru/news/172290/
[197] Gutenberg Publisher, «Перетрем с Халезиным» и Беларускі ПЭН признаны «экстремистскими материалами». Reform.news, 23.02.2026. https://reform.news/gutenberg-publisher-peretrem-s-halezinym-i-belaruski-pjen-priznany-jekstremistskimi-materialami
[198] Беларусский ПЕН признали «экстремистским формированием»: хроника преследования 4 марта. Вясна, 04.03.2026. https://spring96.org/ru/news/119721
[199] «Беларуский Хельсинкский комитет» признан «экстремистским формированием». Reform.news, 06.04.2026. https://reform.news/belarusskij-helsinkskij-komitet-priznan-jekstremistskim-formirovaniem
[200] «Новы час» и БРЦ признаны «экстремистскими формированиями» в Беларуси. Reform.news, 03.04.2026. https://reform.news/novy-chas-i-brc-priznany-jekstremistskimi-formirovanijami-v-belarusi
[201] КГБ признал польские ивент‑агентства «экстремистскими формированиями». Медиазона Беларусь, 05.12.2025. https://mediazonaby.com/news/2025/12/05/extr
[202] Издательство Gutenberg Publisher признано «экстремистским формированием». Reform.News, 23.02.2026. https://reform.news/izdatelstvo-gutenberg-publisher-priznano-jekstremistskim-formirovaniem
[203] Website of Gutenberg Publisher. https://gutenbergpublisher.eu/en/publisher/. Assessed on 15.09.2026.
[204] Таццяна Гаргалык. У Беларусі хваля рэпрэсій супраць кнігавыдаўцоў. Што вядома? DW, 10.03.2026. https://www.dw.com/ru/u-belarusi-hvala-represij-suprac-knigavydaucou-sto-vadoma/a-76293678
[205] Ibid.
[206] Кинофестиваль «Северное сияние» признан «экстремистским формированием» в Беларуси. Reform.news, 18.03.2026. https://reform.news/kinofestival-severnoe-sijanie-priznan-jekstremistskim-formirovaniem-v-belarusi
[207] «Беларуская Рада культуры» и ряд культурных инициатив признаны «экстремистскими формированиями» в Беларуси. 24.04.2026. https://reform.news/belaruskaja-rada-kultury-i-rjad-kulturnyh-iniciativ-priznany-jekstremistskimi-formirovanijami-v-belarusi
[208] Соцсети сообществ беларусов Канады, Польши и Грузии попали в список экстремистских материалов. Reform.news, 15.01.2026. https://reform.news/socseti-soobshhestv-belarusov-kanady-polshi-i-gruzii-popali-v-spisok-jekstremistskih-materialov
[209] Телеграм-чат «Беларусы в Валенсии» признан «экстремистским формированием». Reform.news, 10.03.2026. https://reform.news/telegram-chat-belarusy-v-valensii-priznan-jekstremistskim-formirovaniem
[210] Мининформ обновил список «экстремистских материалов». Reform.news, 03.04.2026. https://reform.news/mininform-obnovil-spisok-jekstremistskih-materialov-13
[211] МВД признало Ассоциацию белорусов в Америке “экстремистским формированием“. Позiрк, 25.06.2026. https://pozirk.online/ru/news/193345/
[212] Situation of human rights in Belarus. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Belarus, Nils Muižnieks. A/HRC/62/52, 19 May 2026. Para. 23. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4117856?ln=en&v=pdf
[213] Ibid, para. 25.
[214] Ibid, para. 26.
[215] В список «террористов» добавили еще двух беларусов. Reform.news, 21.08.2026. https://reform.news/v-spisok-terroristov-dobavili-eshhe-dvuh-belarusov/
[216] Более 50 человек включили в «список экстремистов» в Беларуси. Reform.news, 04.09.2026. https://reform.news/bolee-50-chelovek-vkljuchili-v-spisok-jekstremistov-v-belarusi/
[217] Освобожденную политзаключенную гражданку Литвы Марию Батальонок признали «экстремисткой». Медиазона Беларусь, 09.01.2026. https://mediazonaby.com/news/2026/01/09/extr
[218] Заочно осужденных калиновцев добавили в список террористов. Reform.news, 03.04.2026. https://reform.news/zaochno-osuzhdennyh-klinovcev-dobavili-v-spisok-terorristov
[219] Директора по производству бренда Belaruskicry внесли в «список экстремистов». Reform.news, 10.04.2026. https://reform.news/direktora-po-proizvodstvu-brenda-belaruskicry-vnesli-v-spisok-jekstremistov
[220] Врача-невролога Руслана Бадамшина внесли в список «террористов». Reform.news, 17.04.2026. https://reform.news/vracha-nevrologa-ruslana-badamshina-vnesli-v-spisok-terroristov
[221] Супругов из Дрогичинского района, приговоренных к огромным срокам по обвинению в «терроризме», внесли в «список экстремистов». Reform.news, 17.04.2026. https://reform.news/suprugov-iz-drogichinskogo-rajona-prigovorennyh-k-ogromnym-srokam-po-obvineniju-v-terrorizme-vnesli-v-spisok-jekstremistov
[222] Врача-невролога Руслана Бадамшина внесли и в список «экстремистов». Reform.news, 25.04.2026. https://reform.news/vracha-nevrologa-ruslana-badamshina-vnesli-i-v-spisok-jekstremistov
[223] В список “экстремистов“ добавлено 25 человек, включая двух политзаключенных. Pozirk, 08.05.2026. https://pozirk.online/ru/news/186783/
[224] Журналистку Тину Палынскую и ее дочь Маргариту Рабинович внесли в список «экстремистов». Reform.news, 15.05.2026. https://reform.news/zhurnalistku-tinu-palynskuju-i-ee-doch-margaritu-rabinovich-vnesli-v-spisok-jekstremistov
[225] Музыканта Олега Хоменко включили в список «экстремистов». Reform.news, 29.05.2026. https://reform.news/ekstremisty
[226] В список «террористов» добавили 21 человека. Reform.news, 22.06.2026. https://reform.news/v-spisok-terroristov-dobavili-21-cheloveka
[227] 28-летнего гражданина Литвы внесли в «список экстремистов» в Беларуси. Reform.news, 28.08.2026. https://reform.news/28-letnego-grazhdanina-litvy-vnesli-v-spisok-jekstremistov-v-belarusi/
[228] Более 50 человек включили в «список экстремистов» в Беларуси. Reform.news, 04.09.2026. https://reform.news/bolee-50-chelovek-vkljuchili-v-spisok-jekstremistov-v-belarusi/
[229] Амаль 300 экстрэмістаў, 47 тэрарыстаў. Як у Беларусі сёлета абнавіліся сьпісы «ворагаў дзяржавы». Радыё Свабода, 18.08.2026. https://www.svaboda.org/a/33831972.html
[230] Uncorrected oral evidence: Transnational Repression in the UK (HC 681). Joint Committee on Human Rights. Houses of Parliament. 12 March 2025. P. 1. https://committees.parliament.uk/oralevidence/15739/html/. P. 4.
[231] Ibid. P. 6.
[232] “Wanted by Dictator: Red Notice State”. Report. Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya’s Office, BELPOL, and Cyber Partisans. 2026. https://tsikhanouskaya.org/en/analytics/abuse-of-interpol-mechanisms-to-persecute-belarusians. P. 30.
[233] Yana Gorokhovskaia., Gillian Vaughan. Collaboration and Resistance: Tracking Transnational Repression in 2025. Op.cit. P.1.
[234] Ibid. P.4.
[235] Кейт Браун, Макс Хадсон и Джулия Луфт. Россия использует список разыскиваемых Интерполом лиц для преследования критиков за рубежом, показывают утечки. BBC News. Русская служба, 26.01.2026. https://www.bbc.com/russian/articles/cyv51jj68q9o
[236] Op. cit. “Wanted by Dictator: Red Notice State”. P. 27.
[237]Ibid. P. 25.
[238] Saipira Furstenberg, Edward Lemon, John Heathershaw. Spatialising state practices through transnational repression // European Journal of International Security. 2021. N. 6. https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/european-journal-of-international-security/article/spatialising-state-practices-through-transnational-repression/B5E43077CECF8F3A50649FB8C420E26C. P. 371.
[239] Армения разрешила выезд беларуске, находившейся в международном розыске по политическим мотивам. Reform.news, 05.11.2025. https://reform.news/armenija-razreshila-vyezd-belaruske-nahodivshejsja-v-mezhdunarodnom-rozyske-po-politicheskim-motivam
[240] Два беларуса задержаны в ЕС за два дня по уведомлениям Интерпола — Partyzanka. Reform.news, 15.01.2026. https://reform.news/dva-belarusa-zaderzhany-v-es-za-dva-dnja-po-uvedomlenijam-interpola-partyzanka
[241] Польский суд отказал в экстрадиции гражданина Беларуси, разыскиваемого по обвинению в налоговых преступлениях. Reform.news, 04.02.2026. https://reform.news/polskij-sud-otkazal-v-jekstradicii-grazhdanina-belarusi-razyskivaemogo-po-obvineniju-v-nalogovyh-prestuplenijah
[242] Беларусского активиста освободили в Ереване. Reform.news, 15.06.2026. https://reform.news/belarusskogo-aktivista-osvobodili-v-erevane
[243] Апелляционный суд в Италии отказал в экстрадиции беларуски, которую задерживали по ордеру Интерпола. Reform.news, 12.06.2026. https://reform.news/apelljacionnyj-sud-v-italii-otkazal-v-jekstradicii-belaruski-kotoruju-zaderzhivali-po-orderu-interpoal
[244] Два беларуса задержаны в ЕС за два дня по уведомлениям Интерпола — Partyzanka. Reform.news, 15.01.2026. https://reform.news/dva-belarusa-zaderzhany-v-es-za-dva-dnja-po-uvedomlenijam-interpola-partyzanka
[245] Конвенция о правовой помощи и правовых отношениях по гражданским, семейным и уголовным делам (07 октября 2002 г., г. Кишинев). https://eccis.org/page/614
[246] Конвенция о правовой помощи и правовых отношениях по гражданским, семейным и уголовным делам» (22 января 1993 г., г. Минск). https://eccis.org/reestrv2/doc/192
[247] Nowhere is safe: exporting the rule of fear beyond borders – transnational repression by the Russian Federation. Op.cit. Para. 34.
[248] Ibid. Para. 65.
[249] Более 1 000 беларусов добавили в российскую базу розыска за полгода. Медиазона Беларусь, 13.05.2026. https://mediazonaby.com/news/2026/05/13/baze
[250] Беларусская милиция разыскивает «по уголовной статье» выдворенного из страны лауреата Нобелевской премии мира Алеся Беляцкого. Зеркало, 18.08.2026.https://news.zerkalo.io/economics/134542.html
[251] Объявление в розыск МВД экс-игроков сборной Беларуси по футболу и заочный суд в отношении пяти «калиновцев»: хроника преследования 20 августа. Вясна, 20.08.2026. https://spring96.org/ru/news/120954
[252] Бывший игрок в КВН из Пинска экстрадирован в Беларусь после задержания в РФ, в 2022 году его осудили за комментарий. Позірк, 30.10.2025. https://pozirk.online/ru/news/162233/
[253] За два дня в России задержали 150 человек, находившихся в розыске в Беларуси. Reform.news, 27.04.2026. https://reform.news/za-dva-dnja-v-rossii-zaderzhali-150-chelovek-nahodivshihsja-v-rozyske-v-belarusi
[254] Ни жить, ни уехать. Что делать беларусам в Грузии, которым отказывают в убежище. BELSAT, 24.11.2024. https://ru.belsat.eu/83650647/belarusy-gruziya
[255] Блогера Александра Лапшина задержали в Ереване по запросу Беларуси в шестой раз. Reform.news, 19.03.2026. https://reform.news/blogera-aleksandra-lapshina-zaderzhali-v-erevane-po-zaprosu-belarusi-v-shestoj-raz
[256] Россия и Турция договорились сближать подходы к экстрадиции. Правозащитники ранее предупреждали о рисках для антивоенных россиян в Турции. Эхо, 24.06.2026. https://echofm.online/news/rossiya-i-turcziya-dogovorilis-sblizhat-podhody-k-ekstradiczii-pravozashhitniki-ranee-preduprezhdali-o-riskah-dlya-antivoennyh-rossiyan-v-turczii
[257] Таццяна Гаргалык. Где безопасно находиться белорусам, бежавшим от Лукашенко. DW. 03.03.2025. https://www.dw.com/ru/v-kakih-stranah-bezopasno-nahoditsa-belorusam-bezavsim-ot-lukasenko/a-71814038
[258] Экс-калиновца Веремейчика приговорили к 13 годам колонии. Reform.news, 28.11.2025. https://reform.news/jeks-kalinovca-veremejchika-prigovorili-k-13-godam-kolonii
[259] Бывшего калиновца Гречихо осудили на 5 лет колонии. Reform.news, 01.12.2025. https://reform.news/byvshego-kalinovca-grechiho-osudili-na-5-let-kolonii
[260] Бывший спортивный функционер исчез в Стамбуле; долгие сроки за помощь политэмигрантам. Главное в Беларуси за неделю. BBC, 29.08.2025. https://www.bbc.com/russian/articles/c0qlx53jwz9o
[261] Ругинене: Литва может денонсировать договор о правовой помощи с Беларусью. Reform.news, 27.11.2025. https://reform.news/ruginene-litva-mozhet-denonsirovat-dogovor-o-pravovoj-pomoshhi-s-belarusju
[262] Website of the Financial Action Task Force. Assessed on 20.08.2026. https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/home.html
[263] Александра Прокопенко. Списки без границ. Как Кремль использует для репрессий финансовую систему Запада. Carnegie. Politika, 10.11.2025. https://storage.googleapis.com/crng/russia-eu-banking-exploits.html
[264] TD Bank fined $3B US after pleading guilty in historic U.S. money-laundering case. CBC, 11.10.2024. https://www.cbc.ca/news/business/td-bank-penalties-1.7348819
[265] UBS to Pay $125 Million Over Anti-Money Laundering Violations. SwissInfo, 03.08.2026. https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/ubs-to-pay-%24125-million-over-anti-money-laundering-violations/91840545
[266] Alexandra Prokopenko. Russia weaponised global banking to silence dissidents. Financial Times, 01.02.2026. https://www.ft.com/content/9f499f4d-f78b-4154-aa2e-cabe9bd22d16
[267] Александра Прокопенко. Списки без границ. Как Кремль использует для репрессий финансовую систему Запада. Op.cit.
[268] Олег Логинов. Как банки ЕС блокируют счета граждан России и Беларуси. DW, 12.11.2025. https://www.dw.com/ru/kak-banki-es-blokiruut-sceta-grazdan-rossii-i-belarusi/a-74692230
[269] «На Западе считают адекватным представлять меня так: «Дмитрий, террорист, вот пруф от КГБ». Салidарнасць, 21.10.2025. https://gazetaby.com/post/na-zapade-schitayut-adekvatnym-predstavlyat-menya-tak-dmitrij-terroris/210133/
[270] Александра Прокопенко. Списки без границ. Как Кремль использует для репрессий финансовую систему Запада. Op. cit.
[271] See, for example, Political prisoners in Belarus: Joint Statement to the OSCE Permanent Council, 21.05.2026. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/political-prisoners-in-belarus-joint-statement-to-the-osce-permanent-council-may-2026
[272] Republic of Belarus sanctions: statutory guidance. UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, Updated 01.05.2026. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/republic-of-belarus-sanctions-guidance/the-republic-of-belarus-sanctions-guidance
[273] European Parliament Resolution of 16 June 2026 on countering transnational repression – towards an EU strategy to protect Europe’s sovereignty and democratic values (2025/2179(INI)). https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-10-2026-0203_EN.html
[274] Белорусам, проживающим за границей, больше не будут выдавать белорусские паспорта. Зеркало, 05.09.2023. https://news.zerkalo.io/economics/48123.html
[275] “Almost 800,000 Belarusians live outside the country”. Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, 01.02.2026. https://tsikhanouskaya.org/en/news/almost-800000-belarusians-live-outside-the-country.html
[276] Belarus: Presidential decree denying consular services puts Belarusians abroad at risk. UN OHCHR, 20.09.2023. https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/09/belarus-presidential-decree-denying-consular-services-puts-belarusians
[277] Светлане Тихановской не открыли счет в польском банке из-за просроченного белорусского паспорта. Meduzа, 06.08.2026. https://meduza.io/news/2026/08/06/svetlane-tihanovskoy-ne-otkryli-schet-v-polskom-banke-iz-za-prosrochennogo-belorusskogo-pasporta
[278] Тихановская всё же смогла открыть банковский счёт в Польше. Наша Нiва, 08.08.2026. https://d2accbiqacj5y8.cloudfront.net/ru/401770
[279] Anaïs Marin, Anna Matsiyeuskaya. Systemic legal vulnerability of Belarusian “relokanty” in Poland: Meeting needs for procedural regularization – recommendations based on Partyzanka’s helpline data analysis for the period January-June 2026. Policy paper. Warsaw: Fundacja Partyzanka, August 2026. https://drive.google.com/file/d/1hSrIutftTOD-ce5sOA__Pe3U2OG7x9Ne/view. P. 23.
[280] Ibid.
[281] Испания будет признавать просроченные паспорта беларусов. Зеркало, 20.01.2026. https://news.zerkalo.io/economics/118479.html
[282] Особенности для граждан РФ и РБ в 2026 году, in «Счёт в испанском банке: как открыть и пройти комплаенс». Las Vilas Real Estate, 10.03.2026. https://1lvs.estate/nedvizhimost/dokumenty/schet-v-banke/#h-%D0%BE%D1%81%D0%BE%D0%B1%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%BD%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B8-%D0%B4%D0%BB%D1%8F-%D0%B3%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%B6%D0%B4%D0%B0%D0%BD-%D1%80%D1%84-%D0%B8-%D1%80%D0%B1-%D0%B2-2026-%D0%B3%D0%BE%D0%B4%D1%83
[283] Directive 2014/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on the comparability of fees related to payment accounts, payment account switching and access to payment accounts with basic feature. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014L0092
[284] The European Court of Justice. Judgement. Case C-81/24 of 11 June 2026. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:62024CJ0081
[285] Strahberger H., Sesztak F. No Automatic Bar: European Court of Justice Prohibits Bank Account Refusals Based Solely on US Sanctions Listings (ECJ Case C 81/24). 22.06.2026. https://ceelegalmatters.com/countries/austria/no-automatic-bar-european-court-of-justice-prohibits-bank-account-refusals-based-solely-on-us-sanctions-listings-ecj-case-c-81-24/
[286] See, for example: Francesco Canepa and Anton Zverev. In Europe, ordinary Russians are shunned by wary banks. Reuters, 14.02.2025. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/europe-ordinary-russians-are-shunned-by-wary-banks-2025-02-14/
[287] EU adopts 19th package of sanctions against Russia. European Commission, 23.10.2025. https://finance.ec.europa.eu/news/eu-adopts-19th-package-sanctions-against-russia-2025-10-23_en. For the text of Regulation 2025/2033 introducing the 19th package of sanctions against Russia, see: Council Regulation (EU) 2025/2033 of 23 October 2025 amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine, European Union. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L_202502033. For the consolidated text of Regulation No 833/2014, which incorporates all later amendments to the initial document from 2014, introduced over years, see: Consolidated text: Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 of 31 July 2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine, European Union. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02014R0833-20260724. Assessed on 30.08.2026.
[288] For a collection of all relevant FAQs adopted by the European Commission, see: Frequently asked questions. Concerning sanctions adopted following Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine and Belarus’ involvement in it. European Commission. https://finance.ec.europa.eu/eu-and-world/sanctions-restrictive-measures/sanctions-adopted-following-russias-military-aggression-against-ukraine/frequently-asked-questions-sanctions-against-russia_en
[289] Alexandra Prokopenko. Russia weaponised global banking to silence dissidents. Op.cit.
[290] European banks are freezing the accounts of Belarusians without EU status. How are democratic forces protecting them? Op.cit.
[291] Provision of payments services. FAQs on sanctions against Russia and Belarus, with focus on the following provision: Article 5b(2) of Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014. EU Directorate-General for Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union. Website of the European Commission, 13 March 2026. https://finance.ec.europa.eu/publications/provision-payments-services_en. Assessed on 30.08.2026.
[292] Саша Лукьяненко. В странах Евросоюза тысячам российских эмигрантов блокируют банковские счета — рассказываем, что происходит. ВотТак, 20.08.26. https://vot-tak.tv/94937025/rossiyanam-v-evrope-blokiruyut-bankovskie-scheta
[293] Олег Логинов. Почему немецкий брокер отказывается от граждан РФ и РБ? DW, 17.08.2026. https://www.dw.com/ru/izza-sankcij-nemeckij-broker-otkazyvaetsa-ot-grazdan-rf-i-rb/a-78398928
[294] Transnational Digital Repression in Belarus: From Doxxing to Deepfakes. Digital Freedoms Lab, 25 September 2026. https://dflab.me/en/transnational-digital-repression-in-belarus-from-doxxing-to-deepfakes. P. 4, 38.
[295] Правозащитники предупредили о фейковом боте BYSOL. Зеркало, 10.02.2025. https://news.zerkalo.io/life/90999.html
[296] Силовики Беларуси создали фейковый бот для эвакуации. Будьте внимательны! Belsat, 17.08.2025. https://ru.belsat.eu/88368650/siloviki-belarusi-sozdali-fejkovyj-bot-dlya-evakuatsii-budte-vnimatelny
[297] На горячую линию BYSOL после взлома чат-бота проекта «Беларускi Гаюн» обратились 50 человек. Настоящее время, 06.02.2025. https://www.currenttime.tv/a/na-goryachuyu-liniyu-bysol-posle-vzloma-belaruski-gayun-obratilis-50-chelovek/33305319.html
[298] Поставил лайк — пришли силовики. О главных ошибках в интернете, за которые беларусы платят свободой. БАЖ, 02.05.2024. https://baj.media/ru/karysnae/postavil-lajk-prishli-siloviki-o-glavnyh-oshibkah-v-internete-za-kotorye-belarusy-platjat-svobodoj/
[299] Exiled, then spied on: Civil society in Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland targeted with Pegasus spyware. AccessNow, 30.05.2024. https://www.accessnow.org/publication/civil-society-in-exile-pegasus/
[300] «Репортеры без границ»: КГБ Беларуси устанавливает на телефоны шпионское ПО для слежки, в том числе за журналистами. Настоящее Время, 17.12.2025. https://www.currenttime.tv/a/belarus-kgb-shpionskaya-programma/33625528.html
[301] Rettman A. Exclusive: Lukashenko plotted murders in Germany. EU Observer 04.01.2021 https://euobserver.com/foreign/150486
[302] Transnational repression as a growing threat to the rule of law and human rights. Report by Christopher Chope. Op. cit.
[303] Суд в Польше вынес приговор по делу о нападении на Павла Латушко. Reform.news, 20.03.2026. https://reform.news/sud-v-polshe-vynes-prigovor-po-delu-o-napadenii-na-pavla-latushko
[304] Литва обвинила спецслужбы Беларуси и России в подготовке нападений на белорусов. Настоящее время, 23.04.2025. https://www.currenttime.tv/a/belarus-rossiya-litva-napadeniya/33394778.html
[305] Belarusian sprinter who criticised coaches refuses to be sent home. The Guardian, 01.08.2021. https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2021/aug/01/belarus-sprinter-krystsina-tsimanouskaya-criticised-coaches-says-she-will-not-return-to-country
[306] Экс-калиновца Максима Ралько признали политзаключенным. Reform.news, 16.04.2025. https://reform.news/kalinovca-maksima-ralko-priznali-politzakljuchennym
[307] Бывшего бойца полка Калиновского Максима Ралько осудили в Беларуси на 10 лет колонии. Belsat, 19.11.2025. https://ru.belsat.eu/90097428/maksim-ralko-osuzhden
[308] Лукашенковские силовики «доставили» из-за границы двоих беларусов: калиновца и экс-кандидата в Координационный совет. NEXTA, 06.05.2025. https://nexta.tv/belarus/4335-lukashenkovskie-siloviki-dostavili-iz-za-granitsy-dvoikh-belarusov-kalinovetsa-i-eks-kandidata-v-koordinatsionnyj-sovet
[309] Бывший спортивный функционер исчез в Стамбуле; долгие сроки за помощь политэмигрантам. Главное в Беларуси за неделю. BBC, 29.08.2025. https://www.bbc.com/russian/articles/c0qlx53jwz9o
[310] «До встречи на родине» – Латушко продолжает получать угрозы. Reform.news, 29.08.2025. https://reform.news/do-vstrechi-na-rodine-latushko-prodolzhaet-poluchat-ugrozy
[311] «Личная месть Лукашенко». Как белорусские власти поставили на поток преследование политических эмигрантов. BBC News Русская служба, 20.06.2025. https://www.bbc.com/russian/articles/clyn47pdrd6o
[312] How a Belarusian Dissident Vanished at Sea. OCCRP, 18.06.2026. https://www.occrp.org/en/investigation/how-a-belarusian-dissident-vanished-at-sea
[313] Польша не завела уголовного дела по факту исчезновения Анатолия Котова. Belsat, 21.09.2025. https://ru.belsat.eu/89045697/polsha-ne-zavela-ugolovnogo-dela-po-kotovu
[314] Жена Анатолия Котова надеется, что Коул поможет найти его — Reuters. Reform.news, 19.11.2025. https://reform.news/zhena-anatolija-kotova-nadeetsja-chto-koul-pomozhet-najti-ego-reuters






