This iSANS policy paper provides an overview of an instrument of transnational repression that is being used with increasing frequency by the Lukashenka regime: the co-optation of private individuals for collecting information about activities of exiled Belarusians or engaging in hostile actions against them or the host country. The paper presents recent examples drawn from cases recorded in 2025 — 2026 and a number of recommendations for addressing this problem by potential targets among the Belarusian exiles, the Belarusian democratic forces, and authorities of the host countries.
As this tool has been used by the regime increasingly actively since the release and subsequent expulsion abroad of several groups of political prisoners, we suggest a number of recommendations for addressing this problem by potential targets among the Belarusian exiles, the Belarusian democratic forces, and authorities of the host countries.
In recent years, transnational repression (TNR) has become an integral part of Lukashenka’s repressive policy.[i] The intention of the regime to completely eliminate dissent was starkly articulated in a recent interview by Lukashenka, who stressed that he would respond cruelly to any insubordination “without looking at any laws”. In his own words, the people he “does not need” will be either in prison or expelled from the country.[ii]
However, even in Europe or other regions of the world Belarusian citizens fleeing politically motivated criminal prosecution and torturous prison conditions do not feel safe. The arsenal of TNR tools available to the Lukashenka regime to exert pressure on the exiles is constantly growing, as is the scope of those targeted.
Some TNR tools, such as in absentia trials and property confiscation, coercion-by-proxy, recognition of Belarusian organisations functioning abroad as extremist formations, and the inclusion of exiled individuals in the lists of “extremists” and “terrorists” are based on the actions carried out within the jurisdiction of Belarus. Effectiveness of the application of other types of TNR depend on the alertness, policies and actions of the authorities of states where Belarusian exiles reside. In Europe, where the authorities of democratic countries are increasingly less willing to give in to hostile actions of the Lukashenka regime, it regularly resorts to the co-optation of private individuals. With their help, information about the diaspora or the host country is collected, provocations aimed at intimidating or discrediting exiled activists are organised, and actions are undertaken to disintegrate the diaspora or organise physical attacks.
Attempts to co-opt Belarusian exiles by Lukashenka’s security services have occurred regularly after 2020, when a wave of brutal repression after the rigged presidential election forced the beginning of mass migration of Belarusians to other countries. In the second half of 2025 and the first half of 2026, the number of reports concerning such attempts increased significantly.[iii] This was partly due to the release and subsequent expulsion of many political prisoners who are iconic figures in the Belarus democracy movement and who plan to continue their political and human rights activities abroad. The increase in the number of politically active Belarusians abroad has required additional efforts from the regime aimed at gathering information about activities of the diaspora and undermining it.
Among recent examples is the case of Uladzislau Nadzejka, a Belarusian citizen, who was detained by the Polish Internal Security Agency in September 2025 on charges of participating in foreign intelligence activities against Poland. Nadzejka worked in Poland as a taxi driver. During his arrest, a list of the names of Belarusians who had received asylum in Poland was found in his car.[iv] He was supposed to keep an eye on them on the instructions of the Belarusian security services. On 28 April 2026, Nadzejka was transferred to Belarus within the framework of a five-for-five exchange of prisoners between Belarus and Poland.[v]
In July 2026, the Polish Internal Security Agency (ABW) announced the detention of a Belarusian citizen Aliaksei B. and a Polish citizen Rafal G. who were filming Belarusians participating in protest actions in Warsaw.[vi] They were charged with acting in the interests of foreign intelligence in 2024-2025 in Warsaw and other cities. “Since at least last fall, they have been visiting various events of the Belarusian diaspora in Warsaw, including protest actions and festivals. On the instructions of the Belarusian security services, they photographed the participants, shot videos and sent them across the eastern border to be used by Lukashenka’s services. The goal was not only to collect information, but also to pressure and intimidate emigrant communities and strengthen propaganda narratives of states hostile to Poland,” the Agency stated.[vii] Their detention was part of an investigation in which two citizens of Ukraine and three citizens of Belarus had already been detained in November 2025. ABW does not exclude new arrests.
An additional factor contributing to the increase in the number of reports of contacts by the security services may be the heightened awareness among Belarusian exiles of the scale of TNR and the understanding that an approach by Lukashenka’s security services is not only an act of individual repression, but rather part of a large-scale systemic persecution of Belarusians outside the country.
Aliaksandra Mamayeva, an experienced opposition activist living in exile in Slovenia, delegate of the Coordination Council and head of its International Commission, who played an active role in the creation of the People’s Embassies of Belarus, disclosed in 2025 a number of attempts by the KGB to recruit her. These attempts had occurred over years, starting in 2021. The security services requested cooperation from her and promised “a safe return to Motherland”. In the most recent case in 2024, the person who contacted her posed as a business client living in Munich and asked questions about the Belarusian diaspora in Germany and Slovenia and whether it was possible to join the diaspora chats. After a while, he offered cooperation and soon began making threats to diaspora activists. “Threats were [also] made to my relatives who remained in Belarus, and the standard wording was used: ‘We are ready to verify ourselves through your relatives in Belarus,’” Mamayeva said in an interview. She informed the Slovenian police and her colleagues in the democratic forces about the recruitment attempts. “I believe that publicity is a guarantee of my safety,” said Mamayeva. Even correspondence with a KGB officer can, under EU law, be interpreted as collaboration with the intelligence services of another country, she stated. Following the latest incident, Alexandra and her colleagues drew up guidelines for internal use on how to deal with such situations. “I definitely wouldn’t advise replying to messages like that. You need to take screenshots, flag the account from which the messages were sent, and, where possible, keep all information relating to that person. And, of course, contact the police and your country’s security services straight away.”[viii]
In the period from 27 to 31 July 2025, at least ten employees of the National Anti-Crisis Management received messages with proposals for cooperation from the security services of Belarus. They were accompanied by blackmail, promises of money, and offers “to start over with a clean slate”. The Polish Prosecutor’s Office opened a criminal case on this matter. The investigation is conducted under Article 130 of the Polish Criminal Code (Activities in the interests of foreign intelligence).[ix]
Later, the National Anti-Crisis Management announced another attempt to recruit its employee by the Belarusian special services in December 2025. The initiator tried to impersonate an employee of the Ukrainian special services. The organisation stated that in total, 15 such attempts had been made. “We recommend that Belarusians who are being recruited by Lukashenka’s security services inform the competent authorities of your country of residence about such actions. This is important because any contact with representatives of the regime’s special services can be interpreted as cooperation, which entails serious criminal liability,” the National Anti-Crisis Management stated.[x]
Despite warnings, not all those in the diaspora who have been approached by the Belarusian security services or persons recruited by them report such incidents to the law enforcement bodies of the state in which they reside or disclose such attempts in the public domain. This could be due to fear of harming relatives in Belarus, ignorance of the laws of the host country, or excessive confidence in their ability to resolve the situation themselves and avoid public embarrassment and reputation damage.
In February 2026, it became known to Nasha Niva media that one of the anonymous participants of the emigrant political “Chat of Reformers” (Chat reformatorov i reformatorok) wrote private messages to several women-participants of the chat. In these messages, he flirted with them and later suggested that they either return to Belarus or start cooperating with the security services. The women confirmed privately that such a situation had taken place, but none of them wanted to talk about it publicly or share screenshots of the correspondence. In June 2026, it turned out that the same contact had repeatedly written for about a year to Alina Kharisava, political scientist, volunteer expert of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya’s Office and a member of the Coordination Council. She claimed that before intelligence officers started contacting her, her relatives inside Belarus had been pressured and blackmailed with repression against them. Kharisava, like other interlocutors of the intruder, did not disclose the fact of the contacts, later explaining that she had been afraid for her relatives. This situation became public when a propaganda film was aired on the Belarusian TV channel STV on 4 June, claiming that she cooperated with the KGB disguised as the Ukrainian security service SBU, and allegedly received money for the information about the Belarusian democratic forces she provided. Kharisava’s decision to not go public about the co-optation attempts caused a major public controversy, had negative consequences for her own reputation, and undermined the reputation of the Belarusian democratic forces.[xi]
In mid‑June, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya’s Office published a statement announcing that “in connection with the dissemination of materials concerning Alina Kharisava on propaganda resources, an internal investigation was initiated.” Published audio recordings, correspondence materials, browser history, programmes and files, as well as devices and accounts that Kharisava used, were examined. The investigation “did not reveal any evidence of the transfer of any sensitive, official, or non‑public information that could harm the Office’s activities, the safety of its staff members, partners, or Belarusians who sought assistance. The analysis of the available materials also did not confirm the transfer of internal documents or other confidential information.”[xii] Nor were any indications of remuneration for alleged cooperation with third parties identified. At the same time, the Office emphasised that Kharisava’s communication “grossly violated the internal security protocols in force at the Office.” Consequently, it was decided that “the current safety protocols will be revised and additional training will be conducted for employees, as well as for volunteers and individuals interacting with the Office in the context of expert and advisory activities.” At present, Kharisava’s participation in any activities of the Office has been suspended by a mutual agreement, and the investigation into the incident is ongoing. Her interaction with the Coordination Council has continued. The “European Choice” faction, to which she belongs, waited for the preliminary results of the investigation and then supported her return. Her current activities remain not public; she is engaged in the organisational work necessary to secure representation of the Belarusian democratic forces in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.[xiii]
Kharisava has lodged a formal statement with the police in Germany, where she lives, concerning the recruitment attempts and requested verification of information regarding individuals potentially acting in the interests of the Belarusian intelligence services, together with assistance in protecting her personal data. A decision on her complaint has not yet been made. Her psychological state currently precludes an active lifestyle and public engagement. She has developed an anxiety disorder and a phobia of unknown numbers. She sought help from a psychologist and is now undergoing therapy.[xiv]
The security services pursue not only well-known activists and members of the opposition. Uladzislau Yefimovich, a 22-year-old former political prisoner who now lives in Lithuania, also received an offer to return to Belarus through Telegram. On 30 March 2026, a contact posing as “Anton” using a Ukrainian number tried to initiate conversations with him about politics, the meaning of life, the purpose of government agencies, the Russian-Ukrainian war, and returning to Belarus. From the context, it could be understood that “Anton” represents one of the law enforcement agencies of Belarus. “We’ll cooperate, and after a while you’ll come back as … — it’s unlikely that you’ll be a hero, but you’ll have respect,” “Anton” assured. During the same period, pressure was exerted on Yefimovich’s relatives in Belarus. “My 12-year-old brother received a call from Minsk at school and was questioned about me, although they had no right to question him without adults present,” he said.[xv]
The Belarusian security agencies can also pose as a journalist, including a real figure in the media community. In February 2026, Nastya Rahatko, former editor-in-chief of independent Belarusian journal KYKY.org, designated as “extremist” by the authorities, received an offer of cooperation which allegedly came from Irina Garina, a Russian journalist for a leading Russian exiled independent publication Novaya Gazeta Europe. Rahatko turned to this media to verify the message and was informed that it was a fake and that Irina Garina, who works for them, does not deal with Belarus, and there is no Belarusian editorial board in the media at all. This is not the first provocation where the name of “Irina Garina” was used. In June 2025, the National Anti-Crisis Management press service received a request for an interview with Pavel Latushka allegedly coming from her. The request offered participation in the filming of a full-length documentary about Europe’s resistance to aggression from Russia and Belarus.[xvi]
In March 2026, journalist Zmicier Pankavets reported that unknown people tried to collect information about Belarusian volunteers fighting in Ukraine, using a fake account under his name. A contact under the name of “Zmitser Pankavets” in Telegram contacted the widow of a deceased soldier Vasil Rapitski with a request for an interview. During the conversation, the interlocutor said that Tsikhanouskaya’s Office does nothing for volunteers, and expected Rapitski’s widow to confirm this. The interlocutor also asked for a contact of volunteer Aliaksandr Klachko.[xvii] Zmicier Pankavets publicised information about this provocation in his social media.[xviii]
In August 2026, an account under the name “Mark Fridryh” wrote to several former political prisoners, introducing himself as a BBC journalist, and after the conversations offered “further communication on his terms”. Human rights activists could not find open evidence of his work at the BBC, and a reverse search showed that the photo used in the profile could belong to another person or was created using AI. Such contacts are “especially dangerous for former political prisoners, who may disclose information about themselves, relatives, and other people not knowing who they are actually talking to”, human rights defenders say. A warning about the account’s actions was sent to the BBC, where the situation was described as “very serious and alarming”.[xix]
In July 2026, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya’s Office reported an increase in cases where intruders pose as employees or representatives of the Office in electronic communications with exiled Belarusians. Scammers try to gain the trust of their interlocutors and obtain their personal information.[xx] The Office urged people not to trust messages simply because the sender claimed to be an Office employee, recommended always checking their contact information, and published recommendations regarding the most common questions about security.[xxi]
To create the effect of the “ubiquitous presence of the regime” in other countries, as well as to fragment the diaspora, security services hire individuals through social networks to provide one-off services for collecting information and engaging in provocations. In June 2025, after the announcement of an event in Warsaw with the participation of the leader of the democratic forces of Belarus Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya and her husband, a politician, blogger, and former political prisoner Syarhei Tsikhanouski, searches for a photographer to film people at the meeting began in Warsaw’s emigrant chat groups. In the “Warszawa-Bemowo” Telegram chat, a message appeared from a person named “Bogdan Bondarenko” stating that “the task is to take high–quality photos of the participants and convey the atmosphere of the event”.[xxii] In the chat groups “Belarusians of Warsaw: Mokotów and Not Only” and “Belarusians of Poznan”, a person named “Tatyana Lebedeva” published similar messages. In follow-up private messages, she offered 100 Euro for the work and noted that the pictures were needed for the “GU BASA”, a Telegram channel close to the security forces. The channel publishes personal data, footage of arrests, and propaganda material targeting protesters, members of the opposition and people accused by the authorities of ‘extremism’ or making donations to opposition initiatives. One of those contacted by “Tatyana Lebedeva” commented that “they regularly look for photographers before major events of the Belarusian opposition. Most likely, [they are from] the Belarusian special services, but possibly also the Russian ones,” and called the situation “quite a standard one”.[xxiii] At the protest action of Belarusians on Freedom Day in Vilnius in 2025, three young people filmed the participants. As it turned out, the young people were Ukrainian citizens who were paid 70 USD for filming. The videos were later used by Belarusian state propagandists.[xxiv]
Former political prisoner Mikalai Dziadok reported that two provocateurs had come to his public meeting with Belarusians in Krakow in March 2026. One of them was a Belarusian citizen from the city of Barisau, born in 2003, the other was a Ukrainian citizen. They were an hour and a half late for the meeting, and after arriving began asking aggressive questions about Dziadok’s personal life. None of the Belarusians residing in Krakow and present at the meeting knew them personally.[xxv] In a post in his Telegram channel, Dziadok suggested that the young people had found a side job on Telegram and had been paid to ‘create a stressful situation for the speaker’. “It was clear that they had been very poorly prepared — they could barely grasp where they were or who they were actually talking to. Arriving late for the event (by an hour and a half!) suggests they were recruited at the last minute. Their age and scruffy appearance point to financial difficulties. In short, they are the very same sort of people who are hired to hold up ‘Vilnius is ours’ placards or to film Belarusian rallies in Warsaw,” wrote Mikalai.[xxvi]
Attention of Lukashenka’s special services’ is directed not only at members of the Belarusian diaspora living in Europe, but can be extended to any person who may be willing to cooperate with the regime and may be useful today or in the future. Based on this, the most likely targets of recruiters are people living in Belarus and visiting Europe and, conversely, European citizens visiting Belarus. This is confirmed by reports from European intelligence agencies. According to the report of the Agencja Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego (ABW, Polish Internal Security Agency) for 2024-2025,[xxvii] the Belarusian security services were actively offering cooperation to Polish citizens who often visit Belarus. Belarusian security forces were also increasingly recruiting and sending citizens of Belarus to Poland using blackmail. Their efforts, according to ABW, were focused on the “infiltration and disruption” of the Belarusian opposition in Poland.[xxviii] According to the Latvian State Security Service annual report,[xxix] “in 2025, the priority recruitment targets of the Belarusian special services were persons permanently residing in Belarus but regularly visiting Latvia or other NATO or EU countries. The Belarusian special services were also interested in establishing cooperation with representatives of the Belarusian diaspora in Latvia, who continue to visit Belarus.”[xxx]
Several Lithuanian citizens were recently tried in Lithuania for cooperation with Belarusian security services:
- MantasDanelius,fromJuly2022toFebruary2023, infiltrated the ranks of Belarusian oppositionorganisations inVilnius,collectedinformationabouttheirfinancing,projectsandpersonaldata of activists,whichcreated a directthreattopeople who fledHismostcynicaloperationwas a meetingwith a formervolunteer of the KalinouskiRegiment.Daneliusconvincedhimthat he was actingin the interests of the USEmbassy,secretlyrecorded the conversationandsentittoMinsk.InMay2025, the LithuanianCourt of Appealapprovedhissentenceofnineyears of imprisonment for espionage in the interests of the Lukashenka regime;[xxxi]
- the spousesMindaugasJanuitisandTatsianaBialetskayawerefoundguiltyofespionageinfavour of On 15 April2026, the KlaipedaDistrictCourtsentencedMindaugasJanuitistosevenyears of imprisonment andhiswifetosix and ahalfyears of imprisonment.According to the investigation,inMay2022, BialetskayaandJanuitiswenttoMinsk,wherethey were recruited by the MainIntelligenceDirectorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Belarus.Then, untilNovember2023, theycollectedandtransmittedtoBelarusinformationabout the Lithuanianarmedforces, the volunteerdefencesystem,NATOforcesandweaponsin the country,aswell as about the Belarusianopposition based inLithuaniaandaboutLithuanianswho could potentially berecruited in the interests of the Lukashenka regime. They receivedarewardofmore than 8,000Euro for the informationtheyprovided.[xxxii]
Given the alreadyknowncases of attempts by Lukashenka’s special services to co-opt exiled Belarusiancitizens,aswell as thefactthatTNRcarried out by the Lukashenkaregimeremainslargelyunderreported, it canbearguedthatalmosteveryBelarusian exile,aswellaspersonsassociatedwiththem, is underthreat of either being approached for recruitment or becoming a subject of hostile actions resulting from recruitment of others.
As in all other manifestations of TNR, recruitment by the repressive regime of private individuals for operations against the exiled opposition or against the host country represents a dual threat, violating safety and human rights of the persecuted persons as well as undermining security and sovereignty of the host state.
Given these troubling developments, both the Belarusian democratic forces and civil society, on the one hand, and the authorities of the host countries, on the other, need to pay much more serious attention to the issue of co-optation of individuals residing abroad by the Lukashenka regime and take measures to counter the regime’s actions and protect the targets of TNR. It is important to understand that this is a widespread phenomenon that requires action by both the victims and those who can protect them. In this regard, the following recommendations are offered for citizens of Belarus living abroad, the Belarusian democratic forces, and the authorities of the countries in which Belarusians reside.
Recommendations
To Belarusian exiles:
- pay particular attentiontounexpectedcontactsfromdistantacquaintancesandrelativeswithwhom you have notpreviouslymaintainedregularcorrespondence, especially if your interlocutor starts asking questions about other people, organisations or events in exile, or sensitive information about your own situation;
- pay particular attention to unsolicited contacts by unknown persons seeking information about other people, organisations or events in exile, or proposing paid assignments to you aimed at collecting information about events and/or individuals related to Belarussian civil society; if you have doubts about the person’s identity, ask for references and check background information; seize communication immediately if you feel unsafe or suspect that this person is a member of the Lukashenka regime’s special services or acts at their direction; make screenshots of the correspondence;
- do not to trust messages simply because the sender claimed to be an employee of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya’s Office and other bodies of Belarusian democratic forces, or Belarusian civil society groups, or a representative of Belarusian or international independent media outlet, and always check their contact information and research information about the person this individual claims to be;
- immediately inform the competent authorities of your country of residence about attempts at co-optation; request protection if you feel unsafe;
- publicise information about suchattempts whenever possible and safe;
- applyto non-governmentalorganisationsinvolved in helpingBelarusianmigrantsforlegalandpsychological
To Belarusian democratic forces:
- establish and publicise a channel for submitting reportsaboutattempts at co-optation; prioritise safety of claimants and provide protection measures when necessary;
- collectandanalyseinformationaboutattempts at co-optation;
- assistcitizens of Belarusincontactingthecompetentauthorities of their country of residenceto submitinformationabout an attempt at co-optation;
- raiseawareness of the authorities of the countrieswhereBelarusiansresideabout the TNRemployed by the Lukashenkaregimeand,inparticular,aboutsystemicattempts to co-optprivateindividuals;
- in the framework of the worktopreventandcombatTNR, raiseawareness of internationalorganisationsabout the systemicattempts at co-optation of individualscarried out by the Lukashenka
To host states:
- raiseawareness among employees of the relevant agencies and authoritiesabout the nature, manifestations, targets and scope of TNR by the Lukashenkaregime;
- establishand publicise a mechanism for submitting reports to relevant authorities onattempts at co-optation of citizens of Belarus and other individuals by the Lukashenka regime’s security services orpersons actingintheirinterests; ensure safety of claimants; provide protection measures when necessary;
- collectandanalyseinformationaboutcases of co-optation;
- in the framework of broader workonpreventingandcombatingTNR, coordinateactivities withotherstates with regard to co-optation of Belarusian exiles and other individuals by the security services of Belarusandpersons actingintheir
[i] Dr. Natasza Krawczyk, Yuri Dzhibladze. Transnational Repression in Belarus: A Brutal Tool of the Persecution of Dissent by the Lukashenka Regime. iSANS, September 2025. https://isans.org/human-rights/transnational-repression-in-belarus-a-brutal-tool-of-the-persecution-of-dissent-by-the-lukashenka-regime.html
[ii] Лукашенко заявил, что будет продолжать репрессии против оппонентов «не глядя ни на какие законы». Reform.News, 13.03.2026. https://reform.news/lukashenko-zajavil-chto-budet-prodolzhat-repressii-protiv-opponentov-ne-gljadja-ni-na-kakie-zakony
[iii] See, for example, Dissidentby: КГБ пытается завербовать уехавших беларусов через родителей. Reform.news, 23.06.2026. https://reform.news/dissidentby-kgb-pytaetsya-zaverbovat-uehavshih-belarusov-cherez-roditelej
[iv] Tajemnicza lista u taksówkarza z Białegostoku. Miał donosić KGB. RMF24, 23.09.2025. https://www.rmf24.pl/fakty/polska/news-tajemnicza-lista-u-taksowkarza-z-bialegostoku-mial-donosic-k,nId,8023454
[v] Польша передала Беларуси задержанного за шпионаж Владислава Надейко. Reform.news, 28.04.2026. https://reform.news/polsha-peredala-belarusi-zaderzhannogo-za-shpionazh-vladislava-nadejko
[vi] Стали известны подробности о задержанных в Польше за съемку акций беларусов. Reform.news, 02.07.2026. https://reform.news/stali-izvestny-podrobnosti-o-zaderzhannyh-v-polshe-za-semku-akcij-belarusov
[vii] Kolejne zarzuty dla dwóch osób w śledztwie dotyczącym szpiegostwa i dywersji. Prokuratura Krajowa, 02.07.2026. https://www.gov.pl/web/prokuratura-krajowa/kolejne-zarzuty-dla-dwoch-osob-w-sledztwie-dotyczacym-szpiegostwa-i-dywersji
[viii] “Мы готовы верифицироваться через ваших родственников в Беларуси”: как КГБ вербовал главу Народного посольства Беларуси в Словении. Правозащитный центр «Вясна», 03.11.2025. https://spring96.org/ru/news/118999
[ix] В Польше завели уголовное дело из-за попыток беларусских спецслужб завербовать сотрудников НАУ. Reform.news, 09.11.2025. https://reform.news/v-polshe-zaveli-ugolovnoe-delo-iz-za-popytok-belarusskih-specsluzhb-zaverbovat-sotrudnikov-nau
[x] В НАУ заявляют о 15 попытках вербовки своих сотрудников беларусскими спецслужбами. Reform.news, 13.12.2025. https://reform.news/v-nau-zajavljajut-o-15-popytkah-verbovki-svoih-sotrudnikov-belarusskimi-specsluzhbami
[xi] «Спасибо, Лена! Продолжайте вести наблюдение». Офицер, который писал Харисовой, пасся в чатах политэмиграции, а некоторым девушкам даже предлагал обменяться нюдсами. Наша нiва, 08.06.2026. https://nashaniva.com/ru/397138
[xii] Офіс Ціханоўскай: Паводзіны Харысавай нельга апраўдаць ціскам. Наша Нiва, 13.06.2026. https://nashaniva.com/ru/397558
[xiii] Чым займаецца Аліна Харысава пасля гучнага скандалу з КДБ і якія высновы зрабіла са сваёй прыкрай гісторыі? Наша Нiва, 09.07.2026. https://nashaniva.com/399403
[xiv] Ibid.
[xv] «Поработаем, а спустя время вернешься». Бывшему политзаключенному предлагают возвращение в Беларусь. Reform.news, 01.04.2026. https://reform.news/porabotaem-a-spustja-vremja-verneshsja-byvshemu-politzakljuchennomu-predlagajut-vozvrashhenie-v-belarus
[xvi] Фейковая журналистка «Новой газеты. Европа» попыталась нанять Настю Рогатко. Reform.news, 19.02.2026. https://reform.news/fejkovaja-zhurnalistka-novoj-gazety-evropa-popytalas-nanjat-nastju-rogatko
[xvii] Неизвестные от имени беларусского журналиста собирают информацию о беларусских добровольцах. Reform.news, 19.03.2026. https://reform.news/neizvestnye-ot-imeni-belarusskogo-zhurnalista-sobirajut-informaciju-o-belarusskih-dobrovolcah
[xviii] Post in the Facebook account of Zmicier Pankavets, 19.03.2026. https://www.facebook.com/zmicier.pankaviec/posts/pfbid0221chfXRBPssAPE1tcuyZCAj1GvqU1UNR8yKtX2tCdiCD5agDZDCyqvNx2sBfnHUMl
[xix] Неизвестный аккаунт выдает себя за журналиста BBC — правозащитники. Reform.news, 13.08.2026. https://reform.news/neizvestnyj-akkaunt-vydaet-sebja-za-zhurnalista-bbc-pravozashhitniki
[xx] Офис Тихановской предупредил об участившихся случаях мошенничества от его имени. Reform.news, 01.07.2026. https://reform.news/ofis-tihanovskoj-predupredil-ob-uchastivshihsja-sluchajah-moshennichestva-ot-ego-imeni
[xxi] Post in the Telegram channel of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya’s Office, 01.07.2026. https://t.me/tsikhanouskaya/9361
[xxii] Спецслужбы ищут людей, чтобы заснять встречу Тихановских с беларусами в Варшаве. Belsat, 25.06.2025. https://ru.belsat.eu/87471947/tihanovskie-varshava
[xxiii] Ibid.
[xxiv] Ibid.
[xxv] На встречу с Дедком в Кракове пришли два провокатора — фото. Reform.news, 27.03.2026. https://reform.news/na-vstrechu-s-dedkom-v-krakove-prishli-dva-provokatora-foto
[xxvi] Post in the Telegram channel of Mikalai Dziadok, 27.03.2026. https://t.me/MDziadok/762
[xxvii] Agencja Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego 2024-2025. Wybrane aktywności. Website of the Agency of Internal Security of the Republic of Poland. https://www.abw.gov.pl/pl/aktualnosci/2815,Agencja-Bezpieczenstwa-Wewnetrznego-2024-2025-Wybrane-aktywnosci.html. Accessed on 13.08.2026.
[xxviii] ABW: Беларуские спецслужбы склоняют к сотрудничеству граждан Польши, которые регулярно ездят в Беларусь. Most, 06.05.2026. https://mostmedia.io/2026/05/06/belarusskie-specsluzhby-sklonjajut-k-sotrudnichestvu-grazhdan-polshi/
[xxix] VDD publicē ikgadējo pārskatu par identificētajiem apdraudējumiem un īstenoto pretdarbību. Website of the State Security Service of Latvia. https://vdd.gov.lv/aktualitates/jaunumi/vdd-publice-ikgadejo-parskatu-par-identificetajiem-apdraudejumiem-un-istenoto-pretdarbibu. Accessed on 13.08.2026.
[xxx] СГБ Латвии рассказала об активной работе КГБ и проверках в отношении беларусов. Reform.news, 09.02.2026. https://reform.news/sgb-latvii-rasskazala-ob-aktivnoj-rabote-kgb-i-proverkah-v-otnoshenii-belarusov
[xxxi] Осужденный за шпионаж в пользу Беларуси Данелюс подал в суд на Науседу. LRT, 19.04.2026. https://www.lrt.lt/ru/novosti/17/2903058/osuzhdennyi-za-shpionazh-v-pol-zu-belarusi-danelius-podal-v-sud-na-nausedu
[xxxii] Красовская К. Литовских супругов приговорили за шпионаж в пользу Беларуси. DW, 15.04.2026. www.dw.com/ru/litovskih-suprugov-prigovorili-za-spionaz-v-polzu-belarusi/a-76797912
