Attacks
In May, the intensity of attacks on energy infrastructure remained high.
During the month, 10 Russian oil refineries (refineries) were reported to have been “put into an abnormal state”[1], two of which were hit twice (a total of 12 attacks). The distribution and timeline of attacks on refineries do not indicate a long-term targeted strategy. It can only be noted that in May the main blows were directed at plants in the Volga region and central Russia. More likely, attacks occur in accordance with current conditions and data on refinery operations. For nearly all plants, the interval since previous attacks was about one month (with the exception of the Perm refinery, which was attacked together with a pumping station). At the same time, there are still plants that have not yet been attacked this year. It is also likely that this year the maintenance campaign began earlier—to increase production of petroleum products in August–September, during peak demand. Typically, these months have seen supply problems. However, current difficulties with fuel purchases in Russia’s southern regions may cause a significant number of Russians to forgo late-summer travel, thereby reducing peak demand.
Ten oil pumping stations and oil depots were also attacked. While refineries were targeted relatively evenly throughout the month, pumping stations and oil depots were attacked almost exclusively in the second half of May (except for Perm, which had been struck in April and again in early May). The geographic distribution of attacked depots and pumping stations may indicate an effort to reduce oil supplies to central Russia.
Four ports were also attacked, three of them in the first half of the month. No significant damage from these attacks was recorded. It is likely that the focus of attacks subsequently shifted to oil storage facilities.
Five tankers involved in transporting Russian oil were attacked in the Black Sea. For the first time in May, a railway train was also targeted. In occupied territories, drone strikes on fuel trucks became widespread. Together, this indicates Ukraine’s ability to strike moving targets.
In May, Sweden and France each detained one tanker.
Key Changes
Nature of refinery damage. Previously, refinery attacks primarily targeted primary oil processing units. In recent months, storage tank farms were added to these targets. In May, catalytic reforming units (LCh-35-11/1000) at the Moscow and Saratov refineries, as well as visbreaking and isomerization units (Saratov refinery), were damaged. It can be said that Ukrainian forces have learned to accurately strike not only primary processing units (typically the tallest structures at refineries) but also secondary processing units. These are more technologically complex, significantly harder to repair, and rely heavily on imported equipment, some of which is custom-made, subject to licensing control, and may be inaccessible to Russian enterprises due to sanctions. This could greatly complicate repairs and extend recovery times. Such strikes may not shut down refineries entirely, as attacks on primary units would, but the depth of processing and output of petroleum products could decline for a prolonged period.
Fuel supply disruptions at filling stations. Continuous attacks on refineries over the past two months have inevitably led to some reduction in petroleum product output. Additionally, part of the produced fuel was lost in fires at oil depots. However, the overall reduction likely does not exceed 10% of total production. The most reliable data are Rosstat statistics on petroleum products and coke production. The tightest supply-demand balance in Russia concerns gasoline, and this 10% reduction could lead to shortages. However, if shortages currently exist, they are minor and are being covered by existing reserves.
There have been photos of empty fuel stations and statements from regional authorities about restrictions on fuel sales per customer (Ryazan, Moscow, and Kaliningrad regions, with several more joining in early June).
However, these are not indicators of an actual gasoline shortage. Sales restrictions are introduced to curb panic buying, which itself can trigger shortages.
The absence of fuel at individual stations is also not evidence of a deficit. Rather, it indicates a lack of reserves. If nearby depots lack inventory, situations may arise where individual stations periodically run out of fuel due to delayed purchases or deliveries.
At the same time, there are no queues of cars at these stations, suggesting drivers simply refuel elsewhere. Signs of a real shortage would include fuel rationing or long queues—situations where people know fuel is unavailable elsewhere.
Such signs are currently observed in Crimea and occupied territories of Ukraine, though they are not part of the Russian Federation.
Wholesale market situation. Despite supply constraints, wholesale fuel prices have risen only slightly. By mid-May, gasoline prices were lower than in autumn of the previous year, even though sales volumes were about half of those in March 2026. This reflects dysfunction in Russia’s wholesale fuel market.
In May, the Russian government lifted the moratorium on zeroing the fuel damper mechanism. This mechanism compensates oil companies for the difference between domestic and global prices. However, if wholesale prices deviate significantly from government-indicated levels, payments are not made. This was intended to encourage companies to supply sufficient volumes to keep prices stable. The moratorium introduced in October 2025 allowed prices to fluctuate and the market to seek equilibrium, offering hope of avoiding a crisis.
It now appears that such hopes are fading, and the government has chosen to restrain fuel prices even if supply becomes insufficient. Thus, even in the case of a nationwide shortage, wholesale prices will remain within a designated corridor. Otherwise, refiners would lose damper payments.
Belarus
Belarusian refineries do not receive direct compensation under the damper mechanism. Therefore, supplying petroleum products to Russia at domestic wholesale prices is economically unattractive. However, in conditions of shortage, prices can be significantly increased. On May 20–21, the price of AI-95 gasoline at the Belarus–Russia border was 104.5 thousand rubles, compared to about 70 thousand rubles on the exchange. Thus, exports to Russia provide additional profit for Belarusian companies.
Oil and Gas Revenues
Russia’s oil and gas revenues in May amounted to 678.9 billion rubles. This is significantly lower than in April (down 21%), due to the absence of the additional income tax (paid quarterly). The mineral extraction tax — the main source of oil and gas revenue — increased by 10% (exceeding 1 trillion rubles). However, about 20% of this was returned to companies through the damper mechanism.
May was the first month since April 2025 in which oil and gas revenues exceeded budget expectations, with part of the surplus directed toward foreign currency or gold purchases. Nevertheless, even in gross terms, revenues remain below the levels of 2022 and 2024.
Oil production in Russia fell by approximately 50 thousand barrels per day in May, approaching 9 million barrels per day. This steady monthly decline continues.
At the same time, OPEC countries continue to raise production quotas. In May, Russia’s quota was 9.7 million barrels per day. While Gulf countries are currently constrained by conditions in the Strait of Hormuz rather than quotas, Russia is limited primarily by its own production capacity.
The decision to increase OPEC+ quotas reflects expectations that once the Hormuz crisis ends, countries that relied on strategic and commercial reserves will seek to replenish them, creating additional demand.
International Situation
Global oil prices remained high in May due to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. However, Russian oil became cheaper by $11.5 per barrel, falling to $84, while other benchmarks rose slightly.
This increased the discount on Russian oil to nearly $20. Discount levels have returned closer to autumn–winter levels of the previous year ($22–29) following U.S. sanctions against Lukoil and Rosneft, rather than pre-sanctions levels ($10–11).
Conclusions
Ukrainian strikes on Russian energy infrastructure remain intense. Attacks on refineries have stayed at a consistent level for several months. In the second half of May, the focus shifted from port infrastructure to oil storage facilities and pumping stations. Although these attacks do not significantly reduce oil production or refining immediately, their cumulative long-term impact may be greater, as rebuilding destroyed storage tanks is more difficult than repairing primary processing units. Additionally, strikes increasingly target secondary processing units, which rely on imported components.
Russian budget revenues remain high due to elevated oil prices but are still below record levels seen in 2022 and 2024. At the same time, Russian oil prices on global markets have declined, and the discount has widened to levels seen before the escalation of tensions involving Iran (interpretation of “войны в Иране” may require clarification).
Domestically, there are disruptions in fuel supplies at gas stations—typical of a situation with limited spare capacity and low reserves. However, there is no widespread fuel shortage or energy crisis at present.
Oil production in Russia continues to decline by approximately 50,000 barrels per day each month, now reaching around 9 million barrels per day, while unused OPEC+ quota has increased to 700,000 barrels per day.
[1] https://belta.by/president/view/lukashenko-na-vstreche-s-rossijskim-gubernatorom-predlozhil-podstavit-plecho-v-neftepererabotke-781242-2026/
Материал доступен на русском языке: Российская энергетика в мае 2026
