Attacks on oil refineries
In September, attacks on Russia’s energy infrastructure became significantly more intense. In 18 days of the month, damage to various facilities was reported. A total of 11 attacks on oil refineries and one on a gas processing plant were recorded. Two oil depots, seven oil pumping stations, and one gas pumping station were hit. An oil pipeline and a regional gas pipeline were also damaged.
In addition, three ports were attacked – Primorsk, Novorossiysk, and Tuapse; oil loading docks were hit in Primorsk and Tuapse. Strikes were also recorded on two electrical substations and one power plant.
Assessing the damage to Russia from the drone attacks in September is much more difficult. Several factors contribute to this:
- Russian authorities are taking measures to restrict the dissemination of information about the attacks and their consequences;
- There is no reliable data on the completion of repairs and restoration of facilities after previous damage.
It is unknown what additional damage was caused in September and how much capacity was restored after the attacks in August. The restoration is indicated by repeated strikes on refineries that had already been shut down earlier.
Nevertheless, the impact of the attacks can be assessed by indirect signs. The main one is the lack of gasoline at some gas stations and long queues at others, which confirms the existence of a fuel shortage. At the same time, queues can form even with minor sales restrictions, and rumors of possible disruptions create frenzied demand, exacerbating the situation. Thus, this indicates the existence of a shortage, but does not allow us to assess its scale.
A more accurate indicator of the depth of the crisis is the decline in the transportation of petroleum products by rail. In September 2025, the loading of petroleum products by rail decreased by 9.5% compared to September of the previous year. This indicator probably most closely reflects the actual decline in production, although it may be influenced by other factors not directly related to the operation of refineries. Nevertheless, the most likely scenario is a deficit of up to 10% of total fuel demand. However, even this deficit could cause significant problems. First, it is likely that there will be categories of consumption that cannot reduce consumption (special transport, municipal and public utilities, military needs, personal transport of workers in certain sectors of the economy, transport of industrial enterprises, etc.). This means that the shortage will be felt more acutely by other consumer groups.
The constant shortage will drive up fuel prices on the stock exchanges, which will either lead to higher gasoline prices at gas stations that are still operating or to an increase in budget expenditures to compensate for this. The prolonged closure of independent gas stations could lead to their bankruptcy and subsequent inability to resume operations. In remote areas, such stations are often the only source of fuel, which could have serious social consequences.
It is difficult to assess the impact of attacks on oil terminals in ports (Primorsk, Novorossiysk, Tuapse). When oil refining is reduced, these facilities must operate at increased capacity, which increases the potential consequences of attacks. However, ports have significant reserve capacity, and their equipment is generally less technologically complex than that at refineries, so damage can be repaired more quickly.
There were also reports of strikes on oil pipeline pumping stations. The consequences of these strikes are likely to be minor: with reduced processing and export restrictions, oil can be temporarily stored in storage facilities. For example, the port of Novorossiysk can store about 1.3 million tons of oil, and Primorsk can store over 1 million tons, which is enough to maintain exports during repairs.
The possible goal of such attacks may be to create conditions for forced reduction of oil production at oil fields or to test tactics for damaging oil transportation infrastructure for future operations, when technical capabilities will allow key oil pipelines to be put out of action for a longer period of time.
Conclusion: The deficit is unlikely to exceed 10% of total gasoline demand, but even this fuel shortage could lead to significant economic and social problems in the long term. The damage from attacks on export ports and oil pipelines is difficult to assess, but it is probably insignificant.
Consequences for Belarus
In September, attacks on the Druzhba oil pipeline ceased, temporarily removing the threat to Belarus’s oil supply. However, the attack on the Andreapol pumping station, which pumps oil through both the BTS-2 system and the Surgut-Polatsk oil pipeline, shows that Ukraine has the capability to strike both routes of oil supply to Belarus.
Conclusion: Belarusian oil refineries are currently supplied with oil, but in the future, Ukraine may restrict or even temporarily halt oil supplies to Belarus if it considers it expedient.
Gasoline supplies from Belarus
In September, Belarus supplied 45,000 tons of gasoline to Russia. Russia expects to increase imports to 300,000 tons of gasoline in October. Let’s assess the feasibility of such supplies and their economics.
In addition to the planned 300,000 tons of gasoline deliveries to Russia, we need to add deliveries to the domestic market – about 140,000 tons per month, as well as exports at the 2024 level – about 90,000 tons per month. Thus, in October, about 530,000 tons need to be produced.
Following the modernization of the refinery, we estimate that gasoline output has increased by 22-24%, which means that about 2.2 million tons of oil will need to be processed in October. This will be extremely difficult to do for a number of reasons.
- 2 million tons of oil per month amounts to over 26 million tons per year. The capacity of Belarusian oil refineries is about 22-24 million tons, but since 2016, these enterprises have been processing no more than 18 million tons per year.
- Repair work is still underway at Belarusian oil refineries, and not all facilities and units are available. Therefore, total capacity and gasoline output will be even lower.
- The new units are designed for partial plant load (25% or 50% of nominal capacity). When operating in this mode, enterprises can process products as efficiently as possible, but at full capacity, even the most modern units will not be enough, and gasoline output will drop sharply – possibly to 19-20%.
Assuming that Belarus will not export gasoline and will maintain its output at 24%, refineries will have to operate at a capacity of about 22 million tons per year, i.e., at full capacity. However, with such a load, it will be simply unrealistic to maintain a 24% gasoline output. Perhaps the calculations in Russia were based precisely on the assumption that Belarus would stop exports.
In addition, Belarus is likely to suffer economic losses from the cessation of gasoline exports. Wholesale prices in Russia are currently held back and are now about 10% lower than in Belarus, and may differ significantly from export prices. Thus, the country is losing all its income from gasoline exports, even though refineries are already operating at a loss.
It is also assumed that gasoline supplies to Russia will be carried out based on a tolling arrangement. In this case, the plants only provide oil refining services: neither the oil nor its refined products belong to them. It will not be possible to earn additional income, for example, from the export of produced diesel fuel, since it will also not belong to Belarus. Consequently, the country will lose not only income from gasoline exports, but also from diesel fuel exports.
Conclusion: it is unlikely that 300,000 tons of gasoline can be supplied without creating a shortage within the country. At the same time, Belarus will suffer economic losses from increasing gasoline supplies to Russia.
Forecasts
The overall situation can be gauged from Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s statements (Putin has not commented on the gasoline crisis):
“The most effective sanctions are those that act quickly – fires at Russian oil refineries, terminals, and oil depots,” Zelenskyy said.
He also believes that the attacks are not yet sufficient and is demanding that the Ministry of Defense increase drone production. “As soon as the number of drones is comparable to Russia’s, they will feel it in terms of fuel shortages,” he added.
This is probably one of Ukraine’s priorities, and the intensity of attacks will only increase, both in terms of number and range of targets. In September, there were attacks on substations, and at the end of the month, the Belgorod Thermal Power Plant was attacked. It was reported that HIMARS systems were used in this attack.
As temperatures drop, the impact of attacks on electrical and thermal power facilities will increase. Therefore, once the gasoline situation normalizes (decreased demand, organization of imports, or increased protection effectiveness), Ukraine will likely attack electrical and thermal networks more actively.
Many refineries have been attacked two or three times or more. Ukraine is likely monitoring the refineries’ operating modes and launching new attacks once they resume operations. Russia has already begun using nets to protect against drones, but it is unlikely that this will be effective: the refineries cover large areas, making it difficult to cover them completely. Even if primary oil refining facilities are successfully defended, other facilities can be attacked. The impact may be less (only a partial shutdown), but deeper oil refining facilities are generally more technologically advanced, and repairs will take longer and spare parts will be more difficult to obtain. Therefore, over a long period of time, the effect may be comparable.
Thus, the intensity of attacks on oil refineries will likely reach a certain level in the future, after which new facilities will be targeted, such as substations, power plants, pumping stations, and gas stations.
