Attacks on oil refineries
Events and implications
- August 2. Oil refineries in Novokuybyshevsk and Ryazan were attacked. Later it was reported that the plant in Novokuybyshevsk had stopped operating, while the plant in Ryazan had reduced its capacity by about two-fold.
- August 3. An oil terminal in Adler district was attacked at night. By 16:00 local time, the fire had been extinguished.
- August 10. The Saratov Oil Refinery was attacked, and the Lukoil-Ukhta oil refinery was also attacked by a drone.
- August 14. The Volgograd Oil Refinery, the largest in the Southern Federal District, was attacked. A fire broke out at the plant, and the enterprise later suspended oil intake.
- August 15. After a drone strike by the Ukrainian Armed Forces, a fire broke out at the oil refinery in Syzran. The plant temporarily suspended processing and intake of crude oil.
- August 21. A fire broke out at the Novoshakhtinsk Oil Products Plant after an attack by Ukrainian drones, which was only extinguished on the sixth day.
- August 24. A gas processing complex in Ust-Luga was attacked. One of the three gas processing units was seriously damaged, and repairs could take up to six months. The second unit was restored and launched on August 26, while the third unit was not damaged. On the same day, another attack was organized on the Syzran Oil Refinery.
- August 28. The Afipsky Oil Refinery in Krasnodar Krai and the Kuibyshevsky Oil Refinery near Samara were hit. The Kuibyshevsky Oil Refinery suspended oil intake. A fire covering an area of about 20 m² was reported at the Afipsky Oil Refinery, but according to available information, there was no serious damage. This was the third attack on the facility: on August 7, a fire covered an area of 250 m², and on August 23, drones were shot down by the air defense forces.
- August 30. The Krasnodar and Syzran oil refineries were attacked. For the Syzran facility, this is the third attack in a month.
Attacks on Russian oil refineries in August, 2025 / iSANS
Energy implications
The capacity of the refineries attacked in August is about 77 million tons of oil processing per year. At the same time, the actual damage affected capacities of about 58.7 million tons, which is equivalent to 18.7% of Russia’s total oil refining capacity.
In 2024, the average capacity utilization of Russian refineries was around 85%, which virtually means that the facilities are operating at full capacity, taking into account scheduled maintenance and technological downtime. Under these conditions, it is practically impossible to redistribute oil processing to other plants. Therefore, the production of petroleum products in the country will inevitably decline.
Energy implications of attacks on Russian refineries / iSANS
Gasoline and diesel fuel remain key petroleum products for Russia. Direct data on domestic consumption is not published, but it can be estimated based on production and export statistics.
In 2024, diesel fuel production amounted to 81.6 million tons. There is no data on consumption for this period, but it is known that in 2022, diesel exports reached about 35 million tons, or about 43% of production. Since then, domestic consumption has probably increased slightly, but for a diesel shortage to occur, production capacity would have to be reduced by almost two-fold. This seems unrealistic, given that a significant part of Russia’s oil refining capacity remains out of reach of Ukrainian drones.
Thus, there is no reason to expect a diesel fuel shortage in Russia. Therefore, attacks on oil refineries are unlikely to have a direct impact on the army, for which diesel is the main type of fuel. The situation is similar for freight and rail transport, as well as for agricultural machinery.
Russia’s main petroleum products / iSANS
The situation with gasoline is different. In 2022, production amounted to 42.6 million tons, with exports totaling only 4.8 million tons. By 2024, domestic consumption continued to grow, while production fell to 41.1 million tons. Thus, in 2025, the capacity to meet domestic demand remained limited, even without taking into account the forced downtime of refineries due to the attacks.
It is possible to avoid gasoline shortages in Russia by importing gasoline or reducing domestic consumption.
It should be taken into account that UAV attacks are usually directed at primary oil processing facilities – the first stage in the technological chain of petroleum product manufacturing. Damage to such a facility stops the operation of the entire plant or part of its capacity (if there are several units). At the same time, such equipment is relatively simple, mainly manufactured in Russia, and takes several months to repair. There are usually no problems with spare parts. Thus, drone attacks do not cause irreparable damage to oil refineries: the facilities resume operation after a while.
This leads to a key conclusion: to maintain gasoline shortages in Russia, not one-time waves of attacks are needed, but rather planned and systematic strikes on oil refineries over a long period of time. In addition, the reduction in domestic oil refining increases the volume of raw materials available for export. This partially compensates for the oil industry’s losses from the decline in petroleum product output.
Economic implications
A reduction in gasoline production as a result of attacks on refineries could lead either to higher prices at gas stations or to increased budget expenditures to maintain stable prices. It is hard to estimate the scale of future growth, but the following calculation can give an idea: a price increase of just 1 ruble per liter will result in additional consumer spending of 56 billion Russian rubles.
Organizing gasoline imports will also lead to higher prices on the domestic market or require additional budget subsidies.
A possible reduction in gasoline consumption could occur in two ways:
- Administrative (non-market) measures – fuel rationing for the population, restrictions on transport movement, introduction of fuel efficiency requirements for vehicle fleets. These measures are extremely unpopular and will cause social tension.
- Market measures – sharp price increases, which is also an extremely sensitive issue for Russian citizens and leadership.
The reduction in the production of diesel and other petroleum products will lead to a decline in export revenues and foreign exchange earnings. However, these losses can be partially offset by an increase in crude oil exports, provided that there is sustained external demand and transport accessibility to export channels.
Thus, the main risk for Russia from UAV attacks is the shortage and price increase of gasoline, which directly affects the population and could cause socio-economic instability. Meanwhile, the military and freight segments, which depend on diesel fuel, will be less affected.
Attacks on oil pipelines
Events and implications
- August 6. A fire broke out at the Unecha station (Bryansk region) as a result of a UAV crash. According to reports, debris from the drones fell, but there is no information about significant damage to the equipment.
- August 13. Ukrainian drones attacked the Unecha pipeline pumping and control station. On the night of the attack, the Russian Ministry of Defense reported the destruction of 15 UAVs over Bryansk region. Nevertheless, fires were recorded on the station’s territory. Damage to main and booster pumps was reported, causing temporary suspension of supplies through the pipeline.
- August 18. On the night of August 18, the Nikolskaya pipeline pumping and control station in Tambov region was attacked. As a result, oil pumping through the Druzhba pipeline was completely halted. Representatives of Hungary and Slovakia reported the cessation of oil supplies. According to their data, transportation resumed only on the evening of August 19.
- August 21. Another attack on the Unecha pipeline pumping and control station (Bryansk region). Videos showing a fire near the pumping facilities were posted online. Oil pumping was halted again and only resumed on August 28.
Attacks on Russian oil pipelines in August, 2025 / iSANS
Attacks on the infrastructure of the Druzhba oil pipeline have caused concern among oil-importing countries. Hungary and Slovakia have expressed dissatisfaction with Ukraine’s actions, viewing them as a threat to their own energy security.
The Russian media mentioned the reaction of European Commission representative Eva Grincirova, who allegedly said that attacks on Druzhba were unacceptable. However, the original source of these reports is RIA Novosti. No such statements have been recorded in official EU sources. Instead, the European Commissioner for Preparedness and Crisis Management emphasized, “It is important to note that this suspension will not affect energy security, which is always a priority for the European Commission.”
Oil supplies through Druzhba resumed on August 28. On August 29, Ukraine launched another massive attack (18 UAVs). Preliminarily, this attack was repelled: there were no reports of fires, equipment damage, or pumping halt. Pumping station 8N was also attacked, but it is not involved in pumping oil through the Druzhba pipeline , and is used in the operation of the oil products pipeline.
Energy implications
About 6 million tons per year are supplied to Hungary and Slovakia each through the southern branch of the Druzhba oil pipeline, or about 12 million tons in total. The pipeline’s capacity is about 20 million tons, meaning there is some extra capacity in this direction. The northern branch supplies about 1.5-2 million tons of oil, while the pipeline’s capacity is 50 million tons.
Supplies through the Druzhba pipeline / iSANS
Thus, each day of pipeline downtime means a halt in the pumping of 281,000 barrels of oil. However, each refinery has a certain amount of oil reserves, and OECD countries have requirements for strategic oil reserves for 90 days. Therefore, if supplies are interrupted for several days, this does not significantly affect the operation of refineries. And the spare capacity of oil pipelines allows reserves to be restored after supplies resume. In other words, the volume of oil supplied will not change over the next few months.
In addition to supplies through Druzhba, the BTS-2 pipeline runs westward from the Unecha station to the export oil terminal in the port of Ust-Luga on the Baltic Sea. The pipeline has a capacity of 50 million tons. The usual volume of oil transshipment in Ust-Luga is about 35 million tons per year.
However, there is information that in September its capacity will be reduced to 50% (17.5 million tons) as a result of an attack by Ukrainian drones, which indicates a partial restoration of the oil pumping stations. The restored capacity is sufficient to organize supplies to Belarus, Hungary, and Slovakia, but it will take more time for the station to return to full capacity.
It is assumed that the oil will be redirected to the ports of Primorsk and Novorossiysk, but these ports are also significantly congested, and it will probably not be possible to redirect all of the oil.
Implications for Belarus
In addition to Slovakia and Hungary, oil is also supplied to Belarus through the Druzhba pipeline. According to the energy security concept, oil storage volumes should correspond to 10 days of consumption. In addition, petroleum products for 30 days must be stored. Thus, short-term supply disruptions do not affect Belarusian oil refineries.
Moreover, JSC Naftan can receive oil from the Surgut-Polatsk oil pipeline, and the bypass pipeline between Naftan and the Mazyr Oil Refinery built in 2022 will allow the Mazyr Oil Refinery to be loaded at 50% capacity using oil from the Surgut-Polatsk oil pipeline.
Economic implications
As mentioned above, short-term interruptions in oil supplies through the Druzhba pipeline do not have a significant economic impact, except for the need for additional costs to replace equipment.
However, full recovery from the attacks may take longer. If oil supplies resume in 2-5 days, operations with limited capacity may last for weeks or months. In this case, there may be a reduction in oil exports and, therefore, direct economic losses from oil sales, as well as foreign exchange earnings.
Conclusion
Attacks on Russia’s oil refineries and oil transportation system have a very limited direct impact on the Russian army’s ability to continue military operations. However, they have an indirect impact by reducing budget revenues from the sale of oil and petroleum products, as well as by increasing the cost of containment of gasoline prices or the purchase of gasoline on foreign markets.
The impact of attacks on energy infrastructure will increase with prolonged series of strikes on oil refineries. Virtually all organizations that transport or process oil have their own reserves in case of supply disruptions. If the downtime of the transport infrastructure exceeds the period during which these organizations can operate from their reserves, economic losses will increase significantly.
Attacks on refineries lead to a reduction in the production of petroleum products, but at the same time increase the potential for crude oil exports. Therefore, the greater effect of attacks on refineries will be observed during the period of restrictions on crude oil exports for Russia.
Материал доступен на русском языке: Атаки на энергетическую систему РФ в августе 2025
