Attacks on oil refineries
In October, Ukrainian attacks on energy infrastructure did not stop, but their nature changed.
During the month, there were 12 confirmed attacks on oil refineries and 4 attacks on gas processing plants. A total of 40 attacks have been confirmed since August (14 in August, 10 in September, and 16 in October). Of these, 16 were repeat attacks, i.e., on facilities that had already been attacked after August 1. 6 repeat attacks occurred 10 days after the previous one, and the remaining 10 occurred on average 35 days later (range 21-51 days). It is likely that if the target is not achieved, a repeat strike will be organized in the coming days. If the attack is successful, the facility will not be attacked for about a month, which may correspond to the average repair time after a strike.
Some plants (Novoshakhtinsk, Kuibyshev, Krasnodar, Ilsky) were attacked only once in August and were not attacked again. In October, 10 new plants (oil and gas processing) that had not previously been attacked were added. The inclusion of new plants indicates an expansion of the geography of the strikes (for example, the attack on the Orsk oil refinery, a distance of about 1,500 km). The cessation of attacks on previously targeted plants may be due to the lack of the expected effect, the strengthening of air defense systems, unsuccessful or unreported attacks, or the prioritization of other targets with limited strike capabilities.
There have also been attempts to attack underground gas storage facilities. According to our estimates, strikes on underground storage facilities will also be ineffective: it is practically impossible to damage the underground storage facility itself, and damage to the reinforcement on the surface can be repaired fairly quickly. Moreover, the European part of Russia now has significant reserves of gas transportation network and production capacity, which were formed after the loss of the European gas market. It would be very difficult to damage the gas transportation system together with the underground gas storage facilities in such a way as to create a gas shortage under these conditions. This is probably why there was only one attack on the underground gas storage facilities.
Main attacks on Russian oil refineries and gas processing plants
Attacks on oil pipelines
There were also attempts to attack pumping stations in early October. These were not stations of the Druzhba oil pipeline, but stations of oil pipelines supplying oil for export to the port of Novorossiysk on the Black Sea. The stations attacked were Sukhodolnaya (October 1), Yekaterinovka (October 9), and Yefimovka (October 10).[1] Earlier, in September, two other stations were attacked. The likely goal of these attacks was to reduce oil exports. With the decline in oil processing at refineries, the volume of crude oil exports increased. On the one hand, this allowed Russia to partially offset losses from the reduction in oil product exports. On the other hand, the high utilization of transport capacity makes the consequences of the attacks more noticeable.
After October 10, attacks on oil pumping stations ceased. There were no reports of shipments through the ports of the Black Sea being halted, and oil exports did not decline. It is likely that the strikes on the pumping stations did not have the expected effect. This is confirmed by the attacks on the stations of the Druzhba oil pipeline – their operation was restored fairly quickly.
Instead, attacks on substations began, which is likely linked to retaliatory strikes by the Russian army on energy facilities of Ukraine. On October 10, one of the largest concentrated strikes against energy infrastructure was launched by Russia.[2]
Attacks on large substations
Starting on October 14, five systemically important substations (500 and 750 kV) were attacked, as well as one substation with a voltage of 220 kV and one 110 kV substation. The systemically important substations are located on the routes for transmitting electrical energy from the Middle Volga energy system to the Center energy system.
The Middle Volga unified energy system borders the Center, South, and Ural energy systems. The Volga-Kama cascade hydroelectric power plants account for 26% of the system’s installed capacity (which is 14% of the total installed capacity of hydroelectric power plants of the Russian Unified Energy System). This feature allows for rapid changes in generation in the range of up to 5,000 MW.[3] The Middle Volga system maintains the balance in the Center energy system (including Moscow) and transits electrical energy from the Urals. The failure of the main lines may limit the supply of electrical energy to the Center energy system, but it is unlikely that this will lead to serious problems. The capacity utilization rate in the system in 2019 was just over 50%, which indicates sufficient reserves. Although part of these reserves are located at CHP plants operating on a thermal schedule, in the event of an electricity shortage, they can switch to condensation mode. This will reduce efficiency, but it is technically feasible.
Even if there’s major damage to the lines between the Center system and other energy systems, electricity can still be supplied from Belarus via the line 750 kV Belorusskaya substation – Smolensk NPP. It’s difficult to disrupt this line, as an attack on the substation of the Smolensk NPP is considered an attack on a nuclear facility. Damage to line supports is usually repaired quickly, and Ukraine has not yet attacked any facilities on the territory of Belarus.
Attacks on CHP plants
In terms of attacks on the energy system, strikes on CHP plants in regional cities (Belgorod, Oryol) proved to be more critical. This led to widespread, albeit local and short-term, outages. Continuing this tactic with a focus on specific small areas could create serious problems in the energy supply to these territories.
Conclusions:
Over the past month, Ukraine has expanded the geography and intensity of attacks on oil refineries. This probably allows it to keep gasoline production below consumption levels, which creates constant pressure on the gasoline market in Russia with emerging local shortages.
In October, Ukraine stopped attacking oil pumping stations, probably due to their low effectiveness. Instead, attacks began on system substations and power plants in border areas, which cause local but more significant economic and social damage. Moreover, it is much more difficult to defend facilities located near the border, and strikes against them require fewer resources.
- [1] https://t.me/istrebin/27647
- [2] https://www.obozrevatel.com/ekonomika-glavnaya/economy/odin-iz-krupnejshih-skontsentrirovannyih-udarov-protiv-energetiki-kogda-mogut-vosstanovit-svet-i-vodosnabzhenie-v-ukraine.htm
- [3] https://www.so-ups.ru/functioning/ups/oes-volga/
Материал доступен на русском языке: Атаки на нефтяной комплекс России в октябре 2025 года
