The intensity of attacks on Russian energy infrastructure decreased significantly in December 2025. 8 successful attacks on oil refineries were recorded during the month, compared to 16 in November. The focus had shifted more toward tankers and ports. 3 tankers were attacked (according to available information, all of them were unloaded, subject to sanctions, and not officially registered in any country). 3 ports (Tuapse, Temryuk, and Taman) were also attacked. Tankers were damaged during the attacks on these ports. The latter two ports were attacked twice in one month. There are also reports of attacks on two oil depots (Tuapse and Rybinsk). A notable qualitative change was the use of Storm Shadow missiles to attack the Novoshakhtinsk Oil Refinery.
No major attacks on the pipeline transportation system were recorded, nor are there any known attacks on system-critical substations. One attack was recorded on the Luch CHP plant in Belgorod. At the same time, power outages occurred in various regions of Russia, but these incidents are unlikely to be related to attacks by the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
At the same time, five months have passed since the intensification of attacks on Russia’s energy infrastructure, and statistics for the past period have now become available, allowing us to assess the effect and draw preliminary conclusions.
OPEC data on oil production volumes in Russia show that, despite all the restrictions, Russia was able to increase production in the second half of the year. And although production volumes fall short of the OPEC+ agreement quota of 9.574 million barrels per day (mb/d), production in November amounted to 9.367 mb/d, compared to 8.969 mb/d in the first quarter of 2025.
No significant reduction in oil consumption for refining has been observed either. In quarterly terms, refining volumes are increasing year on year, although it was precisely in these data that the most noticeable reduction was expected to be observed.
There could be several reasons for this. First, the impact of the attacks may not have been as significant as initial estimates suggested. Second, Russia may have managed to redistribute production between refineries while maintaining the overall volume of processing.
It is also possible that, given the shortage of petroleum products, less efficient plants were operating at higher capacity, which meant that even with a decline in petroleum product yields, there was no significant reduction in oil refining volumes.
The possibility of inaccurate statistics cannot be ruled out either. Russia is a participant in the OPEC+ agreement and, as such, submits official data to OPEC that may differ from the actual figures. However, it is also possible that the real impact of the attacks was indeed less than expected, which led to a decrease in their intensity on refineries. In addition, consumption of petroleum products in Russia traditionally declines in winter, so even with a reduction in production, it becomes much more difficult to reach a gasoline shortage.
The most noticeable change in this regard was the price of Russian crude and the difference between it and the price of Brent crude.
For a long time, the discount on Russian Urals crude oil remained at around $10 per barrel relative to Brent, but after the U.S. sanctions on Rosneft and Lukoil, the discount rose sharply to $20 per barrel, and the price of Urals crude oil dropped to $40 per barrel.
In November, oil and gas revenues to the budget were 34% lower than a year earlier. It should be noted that taxes are paid in November based on October’s performance. Therefore, this decline does not yet reflect the drop in oil prices recorded in OPEC’s November data. It is likely that the decline in oil and gas revenues was even more significant in December.
Conclusions
In December, the intensity of Ukraine’s attacks on Russian energy infrastructure decreased sharply, with the focus shifting to tankers and ports. The analysis of statistical data shows that, despite the strikes on refineries and port infrastructure, it was not possible to reduce oil production or the production of petroleum products in Russia. At the same time, the price of Urals crude oil dropped significantly in November.
Probably, the reduction in the number of attacks on oil refineries is due to the lack of the expected impact, while the shift in focus to transport infrastructure (tankers and ports) is aimed at putting additional pressure on prices through increased transportation costs. Already in November, oil and gas revenues to the budget were 34% lower than last year, and an even greater decline is expected in December, as this month taxes are paid on the results of oil production and sales in November, when the price of Urals crude, according to OPEC, declined to $40 per barrel, and the discount to Brent reached $20 per barrel.
