Attacks on oil refineries and pipelines
Ukraine continues to strike Russian oil refineries. 16 attacks were recorded in November, the same number as in October. Two new targets have been added to the list: Sterlitamak petrochemical plant (SPP) and Tuapse oil refinery. They had not been attacked before, but in November, they were hit twice. The attacks on SPP took place two days apart, which may indicate that the first attack did not achieve its goals.
A total of 11 plants were attacked in November. In addition to new facilities, the Ryazan oil refinery was attacked twice, and the Saratov oil refinery was attacked three times. It is known that it suspended production. Also, according to available information, production was temporarily suspended at the Volgograd, Orsk, and Tuapse oil refineries.
It is becoming more difficult to assess the impact of the attacks on the production volumes of petroleum products: attention to the attacks has decreased, there are fewer publications about the condition of the plants after the attacks, and measures to conceal the consequences are likely to be effective. It is known that the volume of oil and petroleum products transported by rail in November was 4.2% lower than last year, remained roughly at the October level, and increased slightly compared to September. We may assume that the production of petroleum products has recovered somewhat in recent months, but has not yet reached normal levels, and the attacks on refineries continue to have a tangible effect.
As we predicted, attacks on oil pumping stations have ceased. This is likely due to the low effectiveness of such strikes. There have also been no further attacks on underground gas storage facilities.
Attacks on oil depots, on the contrary, continued. The main targets were facilities on the occupied territory. Their purpose is likely to disrupt or complicate the logistics of troops in the frontline zone.
Attacks on ports
In November, two ports on the Russian Baltic Sea coast – Tuapse and Novorossiysk – were attacked. During the attack on the Tuapse port, a nearby oil refinery was also hit, which resulted in its temporary shutdown. Oil shipments from the port were also suspended. It is known that there was at least one more attempt to attack Tuapse, but it was unsuccessful.
The attack on Novorossiysk led to the shutdown of the port, damage to port infrastructure, tankers moored at the berths, and the Sheskharis oil depot with a capacity of about 1.4 million cubic meters of oil and petroleum products. This terminal has a capacity of 75 million tons of oil per year (about 1.5 million barrels per day). Three days after the attack, port authorities announced that operations had resumed, but it remains unclear whether the port can operate at full capacity. It is likely that some of the berths have not resumed operations.
If we add the successful attacks on the ports of Ust-Luga and Primorsk in September to these incidents, we can conclude that port infrastructure is highly vulnerable and that such attacks could potentially lead to a reduction in oil exports.
Nevertheless, despite the attacks on port infrastructure, oil exports from Russia did not decline in November. Russia is likely able to redistribute export flows between different ports and quickly restore capacity.
At the same time, a number of factors influence oil export volumes. Ongoing attacks on refineries are reducing the production of petroleum products, leading to an increase in crude oil exports. At the same time, sanctions imposed in October against Rosneft and Lukoil have led to a (possibly temporary) decline in demand for Russian oil on foreign markets. Against this background, oil reserves are growing, including in floating storage facilities – tankers that are already loaded with oil but have no buyer. According to Bloomberg, the volume of Russian oil in such storage facilities has reached 182 million barrels,[1] which is enough to cover current exports for more than 60 days. These reserves help mitigate the effects of port disruptions.
Attacks on tankers
On November 28, Ukraine attacked two tankers in the Black Sea (Kairos and Virat). Neither vessel was carrying oil or petroleum products, which minimized the threat to the environment. On the same day, the tanker M/T Mersin began sinking near the coast of Senegal, but its connection to Ukraine has not been confirmed.
The attack on these two tankers will not in itself affect Russia’s ability to export oil via the Black Sea from a technical point of view. However, the risk of damage or sinking of a tanker may deter some shipowners from participating in the transportation of Russian oil. A reduction in fleet supply will lead to higher freight rates and increase Russia’s transportation costs. As a result, even if export volumes remain unchanged, revenues from exports will decline.
If attacks on tankers become regular, this could potentially lead to shipowners refusing to enter Russian ports and, as a result, to a decrease in oil exports.
Attacks on energy infrastructure
Ukraine has not stopped attacking electrical substations. 16 attacks were recorded in November. Some of them targeted substations in Donetsk region. This does not include attacks on distribution substations in border areas.
Balashovskaya, Vladimirskaya, and Veshkayma substations were attacked again, but this did not lead to large-scale power outages. The other substations were attacked for the first time.
In addition to substations, power plants were also attacked, including large ones such as Kostroma Power Plant (3,720 MW), Ryazan Power Plant (3,000 MW), and Shatura Power Plant (1,500 MW). These are systemically important gas power plants that not only generate a significant amount of electricity but also play a key role in maintaining the power balance. Combined strikes on system substations and power plants make it difficult to maintain the balance between generation and consumption and could potentially lead to power supply problems.
At the same time, attacks on CHP plants (Oryol, Kursk, Belgorod, Voronezh, etc.) continued. Strikes on these facilities periodically led to power and heat outages in the surrounding areas.
Thus, attacks on small regional power plants have an effect at the local level, while strikes on systemically important elements have not yet led to significant technological consequences. However, their continuation leads to the accumulation of damage to the power system, which over time can result in large-scale outages.
Supplies of petroleum products from Belarus to Russia
New data has emerged on the volume of petroleum product exports from Belarus to Russia and transit to third countries, citing an article by Reuters.[2]
Data on the export of petroleum products in transit through Russia is provided. The volume of gasoline exports in October decreased to 103,600 tons, which is 29% lower than in the same period in September, and in total for 10 months amounted to 1.26 million tons, which is also 29% lower than last year.
Data on diesel fuel supplies to the Russian market in October (33,300 tons, 3% lower than in September) are also provided, but the most important data are on gasoline supplies – 55,500 tons (an increase of 9.3%). It was expected that gasoline supplies to Russia would increase significantly – several times over – against the background of the fuel crisis.
At the beginning of October, it became known that Russian Deputy Prime Minister Novak had sent a letter to Prime Minister Mishustin with a proposal to fill the market with gasoline. In it, he proposed increasing gasoline supplies from Belarus to 300,000 tons.[3]
In our previous analysis, we showed that supplying such volumes of gasoline is quite difficult, and impossible if exports to third countries are preserved. Nevertheless, supply volumes could have amounted to about 100,000 tons, while preserving exports to third countries at a level of about 100,000 tons.
There is also data on fuel supplies to the exchange.[4] Although this data and the Reuters data differ slightly from our estimates, the conclusion remains the same: Belarus has not significantly increased its supplies of petroleum products to the Russian market, while maintaining exports to third countries.
The reason for this was probably delays in negotiations on the terms of oil supplies to Belarus. Already in early December, the head of the Belarusian Presidential Administration, Dzmitry Krutoi, stated, “All agreements have already been signed, oil supplies have begun to be processed at our two refineries, and petroleum products are being delivered to Russia.” Therefore, it is likely that in December, oil processing volumes in Belarus will increase and refineries will return to profitable operation.
Conclusions
Ukraine is increasing the number of attacks on Russia’s energy infrastructure. While maintaining the intensity of strikes on oil refineries and substations, the Ukrainian side is expanding the list of targets, including ports, tankers, and power plants. Pressure on the gasoline market remains, although it has eased compared to September and October. The increase in attacks on CHP plants is leading to local power and heat outages.
Belarus has not increased supplies of gasoline and other petroleum products to Russia to the expected volumes, probably due to the lack of agreements on the parameters of such supplies. However, according to Dzmitry Krutoi, the necessary agreements have been concluded, and an increase in supplies of petroleum products from Belarus to Russia can be expected in the near future.
[1] https://t.me/istrebin/30387
[2] https://www.moscowtimes.ru/2024/09/04/belorussiya-sokratila-eksport-nefteproduktov-cherez-porty-rf-na-36-v-avgiyul-istochniki-a141204
[3] https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/8079486
[4] https://theins.ru/news/287165
Материал доступен на русском языке: Атаки на российскую энергетику в ноябре 2025
