Belarus Review by iSANS — September 8, 2025 

Belarus Review by iSANS — September 8, 2025
Photo: Ministry of Defense of Belarus
  1. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
  2. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
  3. HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE
  4. OFFICIAL NARRATIVES & PROPAGANDA

MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

According to Ukrainian monitoring channels, at least 16 Russian unmanned aerial vehicles (combat and decoy types) were recorded in Belarusian airspace between 1 and 7 September. Most of them subsequently later crossed into Ukraine. There were no reports of drones being downed or crashing. Belarusian Air Force standby aviation units were deployed for search and interception.

During the week, the active phase of a series of CSTO drills took place. According to the Belarusian Ministry of Defence, the “Interaction-2025” exercises with the CSTO Collective Rapid Reaction Forces included two episodes: neutralising criminals in a building and in a vehicle and stopping an attempted escape by river. In the broader phase, troops practised blocking illegal armed formations, conducting reconnaissance, evacuation, and supply replenishment.

As part of the “Echelon-2025” logistics exercises, troops trained the delivery of ammunition and other supplies for the CRRF. To protect transport against drone attacks, a corridor covered by netting and air observation posts was established. The Ministry of Defence reported that troops also practised medical evacuation by rail.

During the “Search-2025” reconnaissance exercises, troops carried out search operations. Once objects were detected, they placed them under surveillance, conducted ambushes, and guided and adjusted air strikes on a simulated enemy.

On 6 September, a closing ceremony was held for “Interaction-2025,” “Echelon-2025,” and “Search-2025,” after which participants were due to return to their home stations.

On 1 September, the Military-Technical Faculty of the Belarusian National Technical University opened a training classroom for unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) operations, the military news agency Vayar reported. The classroom is equipped with an interactive panel, computers with software, and visual training aids. FPV drones were procured for flight training, along with a maintenance laboratory for UAV servicing.

From 2 to 26 September, training assemblies are being held with reservists of the Territorial Troops in the Maladziechna district of Minsk region and the Aktsiabrski district of Minsk city. The programme includes processing of reservists, refresher training for commanders, and preparation of reservists for territorial defence tasks, culminating in command-staff exercises. According to state media, more than 250 reservists will be called up in Maladziechna; figures for Minsk were not disclosed.

On 2 September, the Ministry of Defence reported that the Department of International Military Cooperation held a meeting with Finnish Defence Attaché Jussi Jamsen (accredited to Russia and Belarus) and his deputy Leo Vehmola, marking the completion of accreditation procedures for foreign military diplomats. The sides exchanged views on the regional military-political situation and bilateral defence relations.

On the same day, Leanid Kasinski, Head of the Main Directorate for Ideological Work of the Ministry of Defence, attended Vietnam’s Independence Day parade. Photographs released by the Ministry of Defence showed Belarusian-produced military equipment in use, including MAZ-6317 trucks towing artillery pieces and MZKT-7930 chassis (payload unspecified).

On 6 September, the Ministry of Defence announced that cadets of the Military Academy took the military oath. Around 700 cadets were enrolled in the first year, including about 40 women. According to the admission plan, 758 cadets are expected to be admitted in 2025, of whom 618 will join the Belarusian Armed Forces.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

On 6 September, Donald Trump said that the United States and Belarus are negotiating the release of around 1,400 political prisoners. He recalled that Lukashenka had previously released 16 people, stating: “A few weeks ago, very little written about it, but there should have been. But it was a very nice gesture. The head of Belarus, who is a very respected man, strong, strong person, strong leader. He released 16 hostages. John Coule, a lawyer who works for me, a great lawyer, actually.” Trump expressed hope that many more would soon be freed. Earlier, in an interview with Chinese state media on 22 August, Lukashenka said he would not release those he called “bandits,” signalling limits to possible agreements.

On 4–5 September, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya visited Austria, meeting Foreign Minister Beate Meinl-Reisinger, Minister for European Affairs Claudia Plakolm, and members of parliament. A cross-party statement was signed calling for the release of Maryia Kalesnikava and all political prisoners. Discussions focused on support for independent media and civil society, educational programmes, and simplified procedures for Belarusians with expired passports. In Vienna, Tsikhanouskaya presented the Red Paper on regional threats, including the “Zapad-2025” exercises, migration, information warfare, and demographic decline. She stressed that Lukashenka’s alliance with Putin was his personal choice to retain power, not a “historic choice” of Belarusians. During her further visit to Slovenia, Tsikhanouskaya spoke at the Bled Strategic Forum, met EU and Slovenian leaders, and on 5 September addressed the OSCE Group of Friends of Democratic Belarus. She said: “There will be no secure Europe without a free Belarus,” and called for preparations for a national dialogue once political prisoners are freed and repression ends.

From 31 August to 3 September, Lukashenka visited China, where he took part in the SCO+ summit in Tianjin, met Xi Jinping and other leaders, and attended the parade in Beijing marking the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II. Belarus joined SCO initiatives to establish a Counter-Narcotics Centre and a Universal Security Centre in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. Economic results were modest: framework documents were signed, agreements reached with Chinese companies on greenhouse construction, and talks held on engine supplies and localisation of production for Belarusian machinery manufacturers worth around USD 130 million. During the visit, Lukashenka was visibly limping, struggled with the heat, and used an elevator to reach the parade dais. The Belarusian military unit did not take part in the parade, as China denied participation to all foreign contingents.

On 31 August – 1 September, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen visited the Polish–Belarusian and Lithuanian–Belarusian borders. According to the Polish Border Guard, the number of attempted illegal crossings in June–August increased by 83% compared to the same period last year. In August alone, attempted crossings reached 5,400 cases. During her briefing with Donald Tusk, armed Belarusian troops appeared in visible range. On 1 September, the Belarusian Foreign Ministry dismissed the visit as a “show” and a “waste of time,” accused the EU of militarising the region, and stated that “Belarus is not at war with anyone and does not intend to fight.” Foreign Minister Maksim Ryzhankou said the EU sought to portray itself as a “besieged fortress” in order to justify rising defence spending and a declining standard of living, claiming that politicians in Brussels and other EU capitals use close ties with the military-industrial lobby to serve their own financial and political interests.

On 2 September, the Council of Ministers adopted Resolution No. 476, establishing procedures for restricting access to websites and suspending internet and telephone services for individual customers. Security agencies can now order restrictions, and providers must comply within four hours. Services may also be suspended for up to six months. Previously, such decisions were the prerogative of the Ministry of Information. The measure strengthens state control over the internet, allowing authorities to quickly suppress information triggers and reduce the costs of repression, while formally presenting it as regulatory policy.

On 4 September, the KGB detained Polish citizen Grzegorz Gaweł, a Carmelite monk, in Lepel, accusing him of espionage. State TV claimed he was found with documents on preparations for the “Zapad-2025” exercises and aired staged footage of a handover and interrogation. Polish authorities called the charges absurd. Prime Minister Donald Tusk warned of retaliatory measures, and President Karol Nawrocki raised the case with the Pope during his visit to the Vatican. On 6 September, Belarusian state television reported that Minsk would convey its own version of events regarding Gaweł’s arrest to the Vatican, with the Commissioner for Religious and Ethnic Affairs expressing “regret” that Catholic clergy were allegedly involved in espionage activities. Warsaw announced it is considering steps to protect its citizen, and the Polish Foreign Ministry advised its nationals to avoid travel to Belarus and leave the country.

On 5 September, Lukashenka chaired a meeting on digital assets and instructed officials to accelerate a decree on establishing a cryptocurrency bank. First Deputy Chairman of the National Bank Aliaksandr Yegorau said the bank would operate as a non-bank financial organisation under a three-year experimental regime. It will serve cryptocurrency transactions, including those of non-residents, but will not be allowed to attract funds from Belarusian citizens in traditional currencies. Individual deposits will only be accepted in cryptocurrency. Officials presented the initiative as one of the first such projects globally. Lukashenka complained that Belarusian cryptocurrency investments “do not return to the country” and demanded clear rules to develop the “digital harbour.”

HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE

In August, Viasna” Human Rights Centre recorded 72 cases of arrests and other types of politically motivated criminal and administrative prosecution. Collecting such data is significantly difficult due to the authorities’ policy aimed at the concealment of facts relating to persecution, which has tightened since the beginning of the year. The human rights situation in Belarus remains critical: repression against participants in the 2020 protests, administrative and criminal prosecution of dissidents, participants in public initiatives, journalists, human rights defenders, and lawyers under the guise of combating extremism and terrorism continues. In total, Viasna” is aware of more than 7,400 convicted persons (including 34 subjected to compulsory psychiatric treatment) in politically motivated criminal cases since 2020.

On 21 August, Yuliya Fenner, who holds British and Belarusian citizenship, was sentenced to seven years of imprisonment. She was detained in spring 2024 while crossing the Belarusian border and accused of “facilitating extremist activities” and “participating in protests”. The nature of the charges is unknown. Human rights activists have recognised Yuliya as a political prisoner.

Political prisoner Alena Malinouskaya, who was convicted in 2022 along with the cousin of Pavel Latushka, Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus and Head of National Anti-Crisis Management, on charges of stenciling the «Pagonia» emblem on doors and burning the national flag, was not released from the colony after the end of her term. According to her friends, she was taken to Minsk, where a new criminal case was opened against her, this time on charges of organisation and preparation of actions grossly violating public order, or active participation in them.

The practice of summoning Belarusians who come from abroad to Belarus for preventive talks continues. Those who did not participate in the 2020 protests and did not criticise the government are also summoned. A woman from the Hrodna region, who has been living abroad for a long time and occasionally visits Belarus, was called by phone and requested to attend an interview at the KGB, where she was asked what she does abroad, who she communicates with, whether she had been approached for recruitment, whether she reads resources banned in Belarus, what is her attitude towards the current government, and whether she knows what high treason is. The woman formed the impression that the staff were “implementing a preventive measures plan”. Similar cases were reported in Minsk, where special attention was paid to those who visit Belarus a few times a year. The topic of the talk was the same – warning about responsibility for high treason. Experts commented that, according to the law, a citizen is obliged to appear for such a conversation, even if summoned by phone or via messenger. The law stipulates that such a talk should last approximately one hour, however it can last longer, and there may also be hidden audio recordings.

The arrests in the “Belarusian Hajun case” continue. Human rights activists confirmed at least 61 defendants in the case who have been detained. However, the total number of detainees is much higher, Viasna” Human Rights Centre reported. People have been detained on charges of facilitating extremist activities. It is also known about several trials in the Hajun case. The defendants were sentenced to imprisonment or restriction of freedom. Belarusian Hajun was a monitoring project that tracked the military activity of Russian and Belarusian troops. People based in Belarus were sending information to the project via a protected chat in a social network. In early February 2025, the security forces gained access to the project’s chat following which the project announced the termination of its activities.

Last week, it was announced that 19 works of art from Viktar Babaryka’s private collection were to be auctioned by the authorities. The starting price for the 19 works is 344,000 Belarusian rubles (101,000 USD). Earlier, other property belonging to Viktar Babaryka was sold through auctions, including a plot of land, a car, and a wristwatch.

On 5 September, the Ministry of Information updated the “Republican List of Extremist Materials”. Among other resources, pages of the Belarusian Diaspora abroad were included in the list. On the same day, the Ministry of Internal Affairs added 68 more people to the list of “persons involved in extremist activities”. Thirty-six people from among them were convicted under article 342 of the Criminal Code (organisation and preparation of actions grossly violating public order, or active participation in them) for participation in protests. The document now contains 5,745 items.

On 5 September, 14 more people were recognised as political prisoners in Belarus, Viasna” Human Rights Centre reported. The decision of human rights defenders was made in connection with the receipt of information about detention and imprisonment related to the recognition of protest initiatives as extremist formations. Currently, 1,198 people in Belarus have the status of political prisoners.

The International Humanitarian Fund for Victims of Repression in Belarus, established to support Belarusian political prisoners and their families, reported on its work at a press conference in Vilnius on 1 September. According to the fund’s managers, since its establishment, it has attracted 2,025,408 Euro from eight countries and has distributed 1,315,970 Euro so far. Specific amounts, that have been transferred to recipients through partner organisations, were disclosed.

Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya’s office published the programme of the II Congress on Political Prisoners in Belarus. The event will take place on 26-28 September in Warsaw and Poznan (Poland). The purpose of the congress is to unite efforts and coordinate activities to support political prisoners and their families. The first day of the congress, on 26 September in Warsaw, will be dedicated to the human rights situation in Belarus, new trends in political repression, the work of political structures, NGOs, and initiatives for the release and support of political prisoners and their families. A festival for former political prisoners and their friends will be held in Warsaw on 27 September. On 28 September, Poznan will host a fair of assistance projects, presentations on the topics of “Uniting political prisoners and their families”, “Assistance to political prisoners and their families”, “Recording the experience of political imprisonment”, as well as discussions.

Representatives of four parties in the Austrian Parliament, Petra Bayr (SPÖ), Andreas Minnich (ÖVP), Veit Dengler (NEOS), and Meri Disoski (GRÜNE) signed a joint statement demanding the release of Maryja Kalesnikava and all Belarusian political prisoners. The signing took place during a meeting with Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya during her visit to Vienna on 5 September. In the statement, the Austrian MPs also demanded that political prisoners be provided with access to medical care, legal support and that their contact with relatives be restored. “Kalesnikava is regularly kept in solitary confinement and, despite serious health concerns, does not receive proper medical care. Her imprisonment is not only politically motivated, but also meets the criteria for inhuman and degrading treatment, which clearly contradicts international human rights standards,” the representatives stated. “It is our democratic duty not to remain silent when such brave people as Maryja Kalesnikava suffer for their beliefs. She is a representative of many others who have been imprisoned in Belarus for their peaceful activities in defence of human rights and democracy. Her voice should not be silenced,” the statement said.

7 September marked the fifth anniversary of Maryja Kalesnikava’s arrest. To mark this date, her sister, Tatsiana Khomich, along with several human rights initiatives, announced the launch of a manifesto demanding the release of political prisoners and the start of a humanitarian dialogue with authorities in Minsk. The initiative is called “Release N:OW”. This is a joint project of the platform politzek.me, the association of relatives of political prisoners and former political prisoners FreeBelarusPrisoners, the “21 May” Foundation, the Euro-Atlantic Cooperation Agency, and the Taskforce Belarus initiative. The primary goal is to achieve the release of all political prisoners in Belarus by drawing international attention to the situation in prisons, mobilising public and political support, and conducting a systematic dialogue with decision makers in Europe. The authors of the initiative insist on adjusting the strategy of the democratic forces. According to them, while previously the priority was “regime change”, which would lead to the release of political prisoners, the focus should be on the release of political prisoners and the initiation of dialogue with the regime of Aliaksandr Lukashenka. According to the organisers, Belarusian society needs to demonstrate the demand for a change of focus. The Release N:OW Manifesto is thus a public call to action. The document is open for individual signatures and signatures on behalf of organisations.

The 91st Congress of the International PEN Club, held in Kraków from 2 to 5 September, expressed support for Belarusian political prisoners. An exhibition dedicated to books banned in Belarus was presented at the opening of the congress. The names of Belarusian political prisoners were repeatedly mentioned at its meetings. The President of the Belarusian PEN Club, Tatsiana Niadbai, noted: “The Belarusian PEN Club is incredibly grateful to everyone for the immence wave of solidarity with us, with Belarusian writers and cultural figures who are currently imprisoned, either in actual prisons or on parole, but continue to be under the yoke of repression, censorship, and prohibition of their profession,” she said.

OFFICIAL NARRATIVES & PROPAGANDA

Throughout the period under review, state propaganda focused on the coverage on Lukashenka’s trip to China. The SCO+ summit and the Beijing parade were presented as the beginning of a new era in global politics, with China cast as the emerging centre of international leadership and Belarus as its European partner. Lukashenka’s speeches at the SCO+ summit and related events were broken into soundbites and circulated widely in state media. Special emphasis was given to his remarks on the strategic importance of Belarus’s SCO membership and belonging to the “Shanghai family,” as well as his pledge of “full and complete support” for Xi Jinping’s initiative on “global governance” and readiness to promote it both within the SCO and at the UN.

Deputy of the “parliament” and propagandist Vadzim Hihin described Lukashenka’s participation in the SCO+ summit and the Beijing parade as “historic, fateful, epochal,” insisting this was “no hyperbole but an accurate reflection of reality” and claiming that the Belarusian ruler had found himself “at the epicentre of global political life.” Yury Yarmalinski of the regime-affiliated Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies called Belarus’s SCO accession a “conscious, civilisational choice in favour of the progressive global majority,” led by ambitious rising powers of the Global South and East “that are shaping and will continue to shape the future world order.” At the same time, he stressed that Minsk remained open to Western countries: the thesis of “integration of integrations from Lisbon to Vladivostok” had “not lost relevance, only the accents have shifted.” According to Yarmalinski, Belarus merely demands a “mutually respectful, equal dialogue, without mentoring, preconditions, or attempts to impose alien values.”

Commentator Andrei Lazutkin in Minskaya Prauda argued that the key element of the summit was the India–China–Russia dynamic, claiming that Donald Trump had gifted Moscow and Beijing an advantage by imposing a “predatory tariff” on India, prompting China to invite New Delhi into the “community of shared destiny for humankind” and its governance model. He suggested that Western influence must be “removed from Asia and Africa,” while raising living standards and expanding developing-country markets so that “any war would become meaningless and prohibitively costly.”

Pro-government expert Vadzim Yalfimau advanced the narrative of a “new Big Three” consisting of Beijing, Minsk, and Moscow. He spoke of the “fantastic friendship of the Dragon, the Bear, and the Bison,” and predicted that India’s “Elephant” would soon join them. Propagandist Ryhor Azaronak focused on glorifying “strong and decisive personalities” — including Lukashenka, Kim, Xi, Putin, Modi, and Erdoğan — whom he called the figures now “shaping the fate of the planet.” He mocked Trump for having published a “pitiful and envious post” and claimed that the American leader “wants to be in their company but still has growing to do.” Yauhen Pustavoy insisted that the SCO summit was not a conspiracy against Trump but “a natural historical process” and “a response to Western arrogance.” He contrasted Trump’s “tariffs and his attempts to secure a Nobel peace title” with Xi’s red-carpet diplomacy, and praised Lukashenka as the man who had “opened China to Belarus even before the rise of the Middle Kingdom.” Aliaksandr Chorny argued that the SCO summit and the parade served as a psychological message to the West, and to the United States in particular: although the US was not mentioned directly in the context of the “injustice of the current system,” “everyone understood that a challenge had been voiced to American foreign policy.”

iSANS notes that the state news agency BelTA distorted Donald Trump’s 5 September remarks in its Russian translation. In an Oval Office press exchange, Trump praised Lukashenka for releasing 16 “hostages” and said that Washington and Minsk were negotiating the release of about 1,400 more. BelTA published a fragment of the video but claimed Trump had spoken of “convicts” rather than “hostages.”

Regime propagandists amplified these claims. Writing in SB. Belarus Segodnya, Andrei Mukavozchyk dismissed von der Leyen’s promises to stand “side by side with the Poles,” arguing that “old Europe” has no intention of treating Poland and the Baltic states as sovereign actors. In Minskaya Pravda, Andrei Lazutkin alleged that Warsaw exploits the “legend” of Belarus conducting hybrid warfare by directing migrant flows in order to secure constant EU funds for NATO’s eastern flank. Columnist Mikalai Tsiahnikou continued this line, accusing Poland and the Baltic states of deliberately ignoring Minsk’s proposals for dialogue and of spreading the “threat from the East” narrative to justify NATO deployments and additional military assistance. He claimed that NATO’s defensive drills are in fact part of a coordinated strategy to rehearse for a large-scale conflict, while the Union State supposedly demonstrates “openness and readiness for dialogue.”

Note from the editors: We do not provide links to publications in official and propagandistic sources belonging to the Lukashenka regime or affiliated with the regime. If you are interested in obtaining such a link for research or investigation purposes, please contact us at info@isans.org

Best regards, iSANS team

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