Belarus Review by iSANS — September 30, 2025 

According to Ukrainian monitoring channels, at least two Russian drones were detected in Belarusian airspace between 22 and 28 September. No reports were made of the drones being shot down or crashing. Ukraine’s Air Force stated that from the evening of 22 September to the morning of 29 September, Russia launched into Ukraine around 1,337 drones of various types.

On 22 September, the Belarusian Railway Workers Community reported that between 1 and 17 September, ammunition from the stockpiles of Russia’s Main Missile and Artillery Directorate had been delivered to Belarusian Armed Forces depots. Although these shipments coincided with the Zapad-2025 exercises, the Community emphasised that they were unrelated to the drills. At least two military trains arrived in Belarus: the first reached Osipovichi I station, reportedly carrying 275–300 tons of ammunition for the 1405th artillery depot (military unit 42707); the second reached the Tsentrolit station, delivering an estimated 1,000–1,070 tons of ammunition for the 1393rd artillery depot (military unit 52208).

On 25 September it was reported that, between 1 and 17 September, empty wagons were dispatched from Russian Railways stations to Belarusian depots for loading with ammunition for subsequent shipment back to Russia. At least 66 wagons were placed for loading during this period: 30 open wagons and 36 covered wagons. The list of stations and depots receiving the empty wagons included:

— Bronaya Gora station, 46th Missile and Ammunition Depot (military unit 67878) — 11 wagons (5 open, 6 covered);
— Dobrush station, 43rd Missile and Ammunition Depot (military unit 11724) — 17 wagons (10 open, 7 covered);
— Bobr station, 391st Artillery Ammunition Depot (military unit 29253) — 17 wagons (10 open, 7 covered);
— Tsentrolit station, 1393rd Artillery Ammunition Depot (military unit 52208) — 21 wagons (16 covered, 5 open).

Preliminary reports indicate that the dispatch of empty wagons for loading ammunition is ongoing.

All of the above depots had already been used in 2022–2023 for supplying ammunition to the Russian Armed Forces. In July 2025, Aliaksandr Lukashenka admitted in an interview with Time magazine that Belarus had provided ammunition to Russia: “I will say it absolutely openly: when we helped Russia, it was quite a lot (what can I say — with ammunition and so on),” he noted.

On 23 September, the Belarusian Ministry of Defense reported the return of the second train, carrying personnel of the 120th Mechanized Brigade, which had participated in Zapad-2025 in Russia. Photos indicated that the 355th Separate Tank Battalion of the brigade had returned to its permanent base.

From 23 to 25 September, command-staff exercises were held as part of territorial defence training in the Maladzyechna district. Reservists, Interior Ministry personnel, and members of the people’s militia were involved. The drills included the defence and protection of facilities, countering sabotage and reconnaissance groups, and the implementation of martial law measures. A distinctive feature of the exercises was training in managing territorial forces reinforced with artillery units.

On 24 September, the Belarusian Ministry of Defence announced that William George, the UK defence attaché to Belarus, had been accredited with the ministry. This accreditation followed an almost five-year gap. In November 2020, UK Deputy Ambassador Lisa Thumwood and military attaché Timothy White-Boycott had been declared persona non grata in Belarus.

On 25 September, responding to journalists’ questions about the deployment of the Oreshnik missile system in Belarus, Aliaksandr Lukashenka said: “It is already on the way. Everything will be fine.”

The following day, 26 September, Foreign Minister Maksim Ryzhankou addressed a high-level plenary meeting at the UN Headquarters in New York, dedicated to the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons.In a press release published on the Foreign Ministry’s website, Ryzhankou stated that Belarus’s actions – including the deployment of Russian tactical nuclear weapons and Oreshnik ballistic missiles – were defensive and aimed solely at protecting sovereignty. While the deployment of nuclear weapons in Belarus had previously been reported as a fait accompli, this was the first time Oreshnik was presented in such terms. However, during the live broadcast of his speech, Ryzhankou actually said: “For these same purposes, Russian Oreshnik ballistic missiles will be deployed on the territory of Belarus.” In other words, he did not claim that the system had already been deployed.

Nevertheless, several Belarusian and Ukrainian outlets, citing Russian state media (RIA Novosti and TASS), reported that Oreshnik was already in Belarus. Updated versions of those publications, however, state: “will be deployed.” This suggests the possibility of a deliberate information provocation.

From 22 to 26 September, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya held a series of meetings on the margins of the 80th UN General Assembly (with presidents and ministers from several EU states, the U.S. Special Envoy on Ukraine and Russia, and the President of the European Council). She spoke at an EU roundtable on accountability and the rule of law in Belarus, calling to support Lithuania’s filing with the ICC, to hold an Arria-formula meeting of the UN Security Council, and to adopt a Third Committee resolution; she also participated in the WPL Future Positive Convening and a Concordia 2025 panel on media freedom, and delivered the Václav Havel Lecture in Chicago.

In parallel, the II Congress on Political Prisoners (Warsaw/Poznań) gathered diplomats and NGOs to discuss coordination on releases, support for vulnerable groups, and documentation of torture. Writer and lawyer Maksim Znak received the Václav Havel “Disturbing the Peace” Prize.

On 26 September, Lukashenka and Vladimir Putin held more than five hours of talks in the Kremlin. According to their statements, they reached “a five-year gas” understanding, discussed additional nuclear capacity in Belarus (including via unused funds from the BelNPP credit), and the “protection of the common market”. Lukashenka said “good proposals” for Kyiv were “on the table”; he separately promoted Belarus’s readiness, together with Rosatom, to build nuclear power plants abroad and addressed an offer on this subject to Armenia. The day before, he hinted at having a ‘message from the Americans’ to pass on to Putin, later describing the meeting as a search for joint steps “to survive in these difficult times”.

On 27 September, Foreign Minister Maksim Ryzhankou used UNGA platforms to accuse the West of “manipulating the green agenda” and of “hegemony”; he repeated the claim that sanctions hinder Belarus’s climate goals and called to “end unlawful unilateral measures”, linking them to states’ financial resilience. At the SDG summit, he said “conflicts and colour revolutions” were the result of Western policy, insisting development aid should not depend on donors’ political preferences.

On 26 September, Lukashenka’s Administration announced that the next session of the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly (ABPA) would be held at year-end to consider a final five-year socio-economic programme. Earlier, Lukashenka had flagged April 2025 as the date of the session, but this did not occur; the revised Constitution requires the ABPA to meet “at least once a year” (without specifying from which date the period is counted). Independent experts note the ABPA’s decorative character and vague practical remit.

On 23 September, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk announced the reopening of road and rail crossings on the border of Poland and Belarus that had been closed since 12 September due to the “Zapad-2025” drills and heightened threats; the decision took effect at 00:00 on 25 September. Warsaw reserved the right to close the crossings again if tensions rise. Polish business associations and logistics firms reported significant losses over the two-week shutdown (difficulties returning roughly 1.4 thousand lorries and 1.5 thousand trailers, higher costs, forced rerouting via Lithuania/Latvia, and inflated transport quotes).

On 25 June, near the Mazyr Cancer Clinic, in front of doctors and patients, security forces detained Iryna Levina. Her persecution was political in nature. Levina was held in Homel SIZO No. 3, where her health deteriorated sharply. To avoid death in the pre-trial detention centre, she was released. After her release, she received medical treatment in Mozyr and Homel. According to the Homel Regional Cancer Clinic, the only way to save her life is an urgent bone marrow transplant. Levina received a referral to the Minsk Scientific and Practical Centre for Surgery, Transplantation and Haematology, where the operation was scheduled for 7 October. Such treatment requires a long hospital stay, up to a year, both before and after surgery. To travel to Minsk, Levina requires the official permission from the investigator responsible for her case. However, authorities have not provided her with this permission. Levina does not dare to go to Minsk without permission, as she is terrified of the possibility of returning to jail. Without the operation, Iryna’s life is in danger.

Last week, it became known that Artsem Syamenau, a 34-year-old Peleng employee, was convicted of “calling for damage to Belarus”. He could face up to 12 years of imprisonment. It is unknown when he was arrested, but he was online on social media in November 2024. The verdict and the nature of the case remain unknown. Syamenau was added to the list of “terrorists” compiled by the KGB.

The case of the “concert organisers” which is related to the OrgBY chat, was recently recognised as an “extremist formation”. According to a chat participant, who is currently in exile, the chat was created in the first half of 2020 solely to coordinate the work of professionals in the field. Participants shared experiences and gave each other advice in it. In 2021, conversations there stopped. However, the chat, found on the phone of one detainee, led to visits by security officers to other participants, who were identified and who remained in Belarus. It is reported that the Kvitki.by management is already at large, as they began cooperating with the investigation. Illya Pyatrouski and Valery Kalesnikau from Blackout Studio remain behind bars. Maksim Prykhodouski, head of the Palace of the Republic, is still absent from his workplace, though listed as Director. Alyaksandr Manyshau from Atom Entertainment is also “consistently offline since early September”.

In addition to Article 342 of the Criminal Code (participation in actions grossly violating public order), some of those detained for participating in protests were recently charged with Article 293 of the Criminal Code (participation in mass riots), “Viasna” Human Rights Centre reported. Under Article 293, the person may face imprisonment from five to 15 years for “organising mass riots” and from three to nine years for “participating” in them. The status of limitation under this Article is longer than under the Article 342 of the Criminal Code. Earlier, human rights activists learned that at least seven Belarusians have been released from responsibility under Article 342 of the Criminal Code due to the expiration of the statute of limitations for prosecution. Despite their release from responsibility, they were still added to the Ministry of Internal Affairs’ “list of extremists”.

On 23 September, Belarusian human rights activists published a statement recognising 15 people as political prisoners. Among them was Polish citizen, monk Grzegorz Havel. The Carmelite monk was detained in September and charged with espionage. A story was shown on Belarusian television claiming that he was allegedly trying to obtain information about the “Zapad-2025” military exercise.

Later that day, Belarusian human rights activists  recognised five more people as political prisoners. On 26 September, nine more people were recognised as political prisoners. Human rights defenders became aware of their detention and imprisonment in connection with their interaction with “extremist groups”. As of this date, according to “Viasna” Human Rights Centre, 1,301 people have the status of political prisoners.

On 24 September, Belarusian human rights activists recognised 19 people as former political prisoners. They were imprisoned for exercising freedom of expression and freedom of assembly, and have now been released without rehabilitation or compensation for the damage caused.

The BYSOL foundation will pay out the funds raised to support prisoners released on 11 September in full. This was stated by the foundation after criticism of the decision to reserve part of the more than 110,000 Euro raised. “We took into account the comments and criticism, and analysed the previous BYSOL decision once again. Initially, we planned to pay the total amount set in the campaign announcement, 50,000 Euro, to those released on 11 September. The remaining funds, 60,000 Euro, were supposed to be reserved for subsequent groups of those to be released. Unfortunately, these plans were not explicitly stated in the text of the announcement. We recognise this mistake and understand that many donated after the goal of 50,000 Euro had already been reached, so that assistance for those released would be greater. We are ready to start payments in the near future without unnecessary procedures and formalities. The entire amount will be divided among 52 people and paid to the released political prisoners,” BYSOL said in a statement.

The Homel Regional Court sentenced Viyaletta Maishuk to three years of imprisonment in absentia. Maishuk was tried on two politically motivated charges: creating an extremist group or participating in it and insulting Lukashenka. The Ministry of Internal Affairs reported that Maishuk was allegedly involved in an “extremist formation” of the “Homel — Stary Aerodrom” chat.

A regular meeting of the Commission on Return was held in Minsk. It was chaired by the Prosecutor General of Belarus, Andrei Shved. “In their appeals, citizens declare their desire to return to their homeland, lead a law-abiding lifestyle, and respect national symbols and traditions,” the Prosecutor General’s Office said in a press release. Applicants will be informed about the presence or absence of criminal cases, administrative proceedings, or unexecuted administrative arrest orders against them. The Commission for the Return was established in early February 2023 by decree of Aliaksandr Lukashenka. It was designed to consider the appeals of Belarusians who would want to return to Belarus but were afraid to do so due to repression. The Commission also determines the conditions for the return of citizens to the country.

Kiryll Krautsou, the founder of the “Chyrvony Kastrychnik” art village, became a defendant in the Belarusian Hajun case. He was taken into custody on charges of “facilitating extremist activities” in June 2025. It is assumed that more than 250 people have been detained in the Homel region in this case. The detentions of those who sent messages to the Belarusian Hajun monitoring project have been ongoing for several months.

The Ministry of Internal Affairs has added 33 more people to the “List of citizens of the Republic of Belarus, foreign citizens or stateless persons involved in extremist activities”. Among them was blogger Anton Matolka, who was sentenced to 20 years of imprisonment in absentia on 3 June. He was found guilty in high treason, organising mass riots and group actions that grossly violate public order, calling for the seizure of power, discrediting Belarus, insulting and slandering Lukashenka, inciting discord, and other crimes. Matolka is wanted. There are 5,817 names on the list now.

The KGB has updated the list of “persons involved in terrorist activities”, adding 11 people to it. Among them were well-known civic activists Andrei Stryzhak and Aliaksei Lyavonchik, who, in May 2025, were sentenced in absentia to 18 years of imprisonment in a high-security colony.

In early September, political prisoner Andrzej Poczobut was nominated for the European Parliament’s 2025 Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought. Poczobut was nominated by the European People’s Party and the European Conservatives and Reformers factions. It was noted that Andrzej Poczobut is a journalist, essayist, blogger and an activist of the Polish minority in Belarus, known for his criticism of Aliaksandr Lukashenka’s regime and has become a symbolic figure in the struggle for freedom and democracy in the country. Poczobut has been repeatedly arrested by the authorities. Detained in 2021, he was sentenced to eight years of imprisonment. He has at times been held in solitary confinement without adequate medical treatment. His current condition is unknown, and his family is denied any visits.

The International Strategic Action Network for Security (iSANS) has released its newest research report, “Transnational Repression in Belarus: A Brutal Tool of the Persecution of Dissent by the Lukashenka Regime”. The report aims to examine the scope of transnational repression (TNR) perpetrated by the Lukashenka regime and to classify the diverse mechanisms employed to silence its opponents forced to flee Belarus due to political persecution. The production of the report was necessitated by the recent escalation in the Lukashenka regime’s use of TNR practices, the increasing variety of instruments employed, and the inconsistent response from the international community to TNR-related human rights violations affecting Belarusians in exile, which underscores the absence of a comprehensive understanding of the regime’s TNR activities. The research underpinning this report drew on a wide range of sources, including hundreds of reports of human rights violations, with the vast majority of the data pertaining to the period after 2020. Information was also collected on the use of TNR tools by the Putin regime to highlight symmetries and synergies in the practices of both regimes. The report concludes with detailed recommendations to intergovernmental bodies and states that are based on the need for urgent action and are grounded in a consolidated approach to TNR, which combines the goals of protecting the human rights of victims of repression and safeguarding state sovereignty.

On 23 September, a group of UN independent experts, including Nils Muižnieks, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Belarus; Gabriella Citroni, Chair-Rapporteur, Grażyna Baranowska, Vice-Chair, Aua Baldé, Ana Lorena Delgadillo Pérez, and Mohammed Al-Obaidi, Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances; Ganna Yudkivska, Chair-Rapporteur, Matthew Gillett, Vice-Chair on Communications, Miriam Estrada Castillo, Vice-Chair on Follow-Up, and Mumba Malila, Working Group on arbitrary detention; Ben Saul, Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism; and Claudia Mahler, Independent Expert on the enjoyment of all human rights by older persons, strongly denounced the attempted deportation from Belarus on 11 September and the subsequent disappearance of Mikalai Statkevich, veteran opposition politician and candidate in the 2010 presidential elections. “There are solid reasons to believe that Statkevich is a victim of enforced disappearance and arbitrary detention. We call on Belarus to provide information about his fate and whereabouts, as well as on his state of health,” the experts said. “The attempted expulsion of Mikalai Statkevich from his country violates Article 12 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, ratified by Belarus on 12 November 1973,” the experts said. “It also cannot be excluded that we are dealing with a possible crime under international law,” they said, recalling a pending referral by the Republic of Lithuania to the International Criminal Court about alleged crimes against humanity of deportation and persecution on political grounds committed by Belarusian authorities since 2020. The experts noted that they had repeatedly urged Belarus to amend its anti-extremism legal framework to bring it in line with international human rights standards and called on authorities to end ill-treatment of prisoners convicted on extremism charges.

Belarusian writer and lawyer Maksim Znak became the winner of the prestigious award “For Disturbing the Peace”, which is presented annually to a brave writer in danger by the Vaclav Havel Center in New York. This award recognises writers and creators who show courage in defending truth and freedom. Earlier, in 2021, Belarusian poet Dzmitry Strotsau received it.

On 25 September, the birthday of  the chair of the Human Rights Centre “Viasna” Ales Bialiatski, the Chair of the Bureau of the European Parliament Delegation for Relations with Belarus, Małgorzata Gosiewska, as well as her deputies, MEPs Tomas Tobé and Michał Kobosko, issued a statement in which they commented that Ales Bialiatski is a man whose life embodies courage, resilience, and unwavering dedication to the cause of freedom and human dignity. For more than four decades, Ales Bialiatski has been at the forefront of Belarus’ struggle for democracy, inspiring not only his compatriots but also countless people across Europe and around the world. They noted that the Parliament has consistently demanded his release, condemned repression against civil society, and expressed solidarity with all political prisoners in Belarus, and once again demanded the immediate and unconditional release of Ales Bialiatski, along with all other political prisoners. “The ongoing persecution, inhuman treatment, and silencing of Belarus’ democratic voices are unacceptable,” the statement concluded.

The People’s Anti-Crisis Management has called for the release of Nobel Peace Prize laureate Ales Bialiatski, who recently turned 63, and hundreds more political prisoners. John Cole, Deputy Assistant to US President Donald Trump, stated he was “working on it” on the X network on 28 September.

The situation in Belarus and the responsibility of the regime were discussed on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly. The delegation of the European Union to the United Nations, together with Denmark, Germany, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and the Office of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, held a round table “Time for Responsibility and Justice: A Threat to the Rule of Law in Belarus”. The event was attended by more than 40 representatives of the Foreign Ministries of Denmark, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Iceland, Germany, and other countries. During the meeting, a number of reports were presented, including the iSANS’ report on transnational repression in Belarus. In his remarks, the head of iSANS Human Rights and Rule of Law Unit Yuri Dzhibladze emphasised that the repression in Belarus is not just continuing, but is expanding, intensifying, and evolving. After destroying all opposition, NGOs, and independent media inside the country and silencing the most active opponents in custody with the help of incommunicado detention, Lukashenka has intensified transnational repression to supress the voice of his exiled critics. This type of repression is underestimated, and states and intergovernmental organisations lack awareness of the scale of the threat and a response strategy necessary to combat this phenomenon. Meanwhile, it is important to understand that transnational repression constitutes crimes against humanity, and therefore it is necessary to seek its inclusion in the future investigation of the International Criminal Court, and, accordingly, to submit new referrals to the ICC in this regard. Dzhibladze noted the passivity of states other than Lithuania in using international justice mechanisms and called on them to file lawsuits with the International Court of Justice, submit their referrals to the ICC, and address problems in applying the principle of universal jurisdiction at the national level.

On 26-27 September, Warsaw hosted the II Congress on Political Prisoners in Belarus #WithoutJustCause, organised by the Office of the Democratic Forces of Belarus in the Czech Republic in cooperation with the Office of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, the United Transitional Cabinet, and partner organisations. It was noted that the repression in Belarus has become “quiet”: the security forces have stopped publishing information about detentions, and Belarusians themselves are afraid to pass information about persecution on to human rights defenders. Even in such circumstances, it can be stated that the number of cases of political persecution that became known has increased compared to the last year. The release of several groups of political prisoners as a result of negotiations between the United States and the Lukashenka regime did not affect the overall situation in the country. There are no grounds to talk about a “thaw» in Belarus.

During the reporting period, anti-Polish rhetoric remained a central theme of propaganda in Belarus. Representatives of the regime actively issued statements that typically contained numerous accusations against the Polish authorities.

Aliaksandr Lukashenka set the tone on 22 September during his meeting with Li Xi, a member of the Standing Committee of the CCP Politburo. He called Poland a “galloping horse” acting “in the interests of other states” and claimed that the border closure could be a “political” or “image-driven” move against China, but not an economic one, since “an empire like China can easily cope with this problem.”

On 23 September, against the backdrop of Poland’s decision to reopen the border, pro-regime propagandists framed the move as a triumph for Belarus and a defeat for Poland, which allegedly achieved nothing with the closure and only created problems in its relations with China.

Propagandist Ryhor Azaronak wrote that China’s foreign minister “put Polish FM Radosław Sikorski on the carpet, leaving him “looking pale,” while Lukashenka’s meeting with Li Xi went “completely differently.” According to him, the “all-weather partnership” between China and Belarus had become even stronger, and Poland reopened the border “without victory.” He added: “For these two weeks, Aliaksandr Lukashenka did not take a single anti-Polish action, while they were fussing and panicking. And now they realised they had no choice but to bow to Batka and open the fence. Because he is a rock. And they — they look like monkeys, honestly.”

Pro-regime analyst Aliaksandr Shpakouski argued: “If this was about damaging China, then clearly the consequences for Poland could have been unacceptable. If Warsaw hoped to pressure Belarus by blackmailing its Chinese partners, this was even more senseless given the strategic nature of relations between Minsk and Beijing.”

His colleague Aliaksei Dzermant suggested that Belarus’s arguments proved more convincing to the Chinese side, given the “special mutual understanding” between Minsk and Beijing. At the same time, he warned that problems with Poland would persist “as long as Euro-Atlanticists rule unchallenged there,” and therefore the “Eurasian side” must develop a “common strategy” toward Poland.

Anton Papou, a columnist for SB. Belarus Today, also claimed that “Warsaw’s inadequate actions were aimed not only at Belarus but also at China.” He argued that the decisions of the Polish ruling class are controlled by “someone hostile to China with enough influence over Nawrocki, Tusk, and others to make the Polish eagle peck at the Chinese dragon at the snap of his fingers,” clearly implying U.S. influence over Poland’s leadership.

At the same time, developments overseas sparked lively interest among regime representatives, prompting them to spread conspiracy theories. Pro-regime military expert Aliaksandr Tsikhanski described the killing of activist Charlie Kirk as “the first shot of a civil war in the United States.” According to him, this was no longer just “cancel culture” or judicial pressure, but “planned operations using sniper weapons,” which suggested the involvement of “highly professional structures.” He argued that the “deep state,” losing control of public discourse amid growing support for the patriotic camp, had abandoned democratic rules and turned to open terror. Tsikhanski claimed that Trump now faced a choice: either accept this new stage of political terror and wait until he or his family were targeted, or “finally launch an open and tough purge of the security apparatus and restore order in a country sliding into real war.”

Propagandist Ryhor Azaronak advanced another theory, questioning whether Kirk’s killing was “a Reichstag fire.” He described Trump’s return to the presidency as a “right-wing revanche,” but also warned that on the “wave of outrage against liberal abominations,” Trump might “clear the road” for dark forces — “the forces of Valhalla.”

The figure of Donald Trump, his statements and decisions remain a focus for Belarusian propagandists. Commenting on his recent remarks, Kseniya Lebiadzeva called the United States “the world’s main sponsor of terrorism” and urged sanctions against Ukraine, arguing that “war is in its interest.” She also mocked Trump for his criticism of Russia, suggesting he might suffer from bipolar disorder and adding a sneer about him forgetting to take his pills.

Echoing her, pro-regime politician Aleh Haidukevich criticized Trump for calling Russia “a paper tiger.” He argued that Trump needed to accept that the U.S. would no longer control the entire world and should instead “engage in dialogue with China, India, Russia, and Belarus.”

Interestingly, during a 26 September press event in the Kremlin, Lukashenka sought to soften Trump’s earlier statements. He said he understood Trump’s tactics, calling the U.S. leader “a rebel in the best sense of the word.” Lukashenka described himself as a “Trumpist” and added that Vladimir Putin highly respected Trump, which was why they “let some things pass,” such as the “paper tiger” remark.

Andrei Lazutkin, a political commentator for Minskaya Prauda, highlighted Lukashenka’s proposal to “talk” with Ukraine’s president. In his view, although Kyiv calls Belarus a co-aggressor, “the Americans understand” that no drones are launched from Belarus against Ukraine. Therefore, Lukashenka — who insists that “the three Slavic nations must live in peace” — could “speak reasonably with Zelensky and explain the alternatives.” Lazutkin stressed that if Kyiv agreed to talks without intermediaries, it would gain “bonuses.” He also explained that Lukashenka voiced Moscow’s position because this was “his role as a negotiator.” If Putin had said the same things, they would have been seen as an ultimatum, whereas Lukashenka’s words could be perceived as “just musings” — but in fact, they were “a set of very clear signals.”

Lukashenka’s propagandists closely followed the pre-election situation in Moldova. Aliaksandr Shpakouski suggested that the pro-European PAS party had little chance of winning a “mono-majority” and accused the current authorities of preparing to use “administrative resources and the magical voting of the foreign diaspora.” Echoing him, Ryhor Azaronak added that “liberals and Westernizers are like worms” — easy to “let in” once they gain access to power, but impossible to “get rid of.” He lamented that this mistake was allowed in 2020 by the administration of pro-Russian politician Igor Dodon.

Deputy Vadzim Hihin argued that Maia Sandu had been given a “carte blanche” by the EU and U.S. to act against pro-Russian forces: “Administrative pressure, repression, and electoral fraud — all of this may be used. Or rather, has already been used.”

Propagandist Yury Uvarau went further, warning that the situation in “Moldavia” could lead to civil war, since “Romanian citizens entrenched in power, led by Sandu, have tripled political terror in the republic.” Alongside these unsubstantiated accusations against the Moldovan leadership, Lukashenka’s supporters continued praising the Belarusian dictator and his autocratic rule. ONT employee Ihar Tur, in his program “Propaganda”, suggested that power should be judged “by content, not form.” According to him, “democratic institutions like parliaments can be filled with crooks and incompetents,” and therefore the only effective form of government for Slavs is “what is called authoritarianism and dictatorship, when the country has a clearly defined leader.” Such a leader, he argued, must be “moderately kind, moderately harsh, and necessarily just” — a description he said fit Aliaksandr Lukashenka perfectly.

Note from the editors: We do not provide links to publications in official and propagandistic sources belonging to the Lukashenka regime or affiliated with the regime. If you are interested in obtaining such a link for research or investigation purposes, please contact us at info@isans.org

Best regards, iSANS team