Belarus Review by iSANS — September 2, 2025 

According to Ukrainian monitoring channels, between 4 and 31 August at least 27 Russian drones (combat and simulator types) were recorded in Belarusian airspace. Belarusian Air Force units were deployed to track and intercept them.

Several drone crashes were reported. On the evening of 3 August, a drone fell in Rechytsa; it did not resemble a Russian “Shahed.” Unofficial reports indicated that on 28 August, a Russian drone crashed and exploded in the Smaliavichy district, approximately 20 kilometres from Minsk. No casualties or destruction were recorded. In addition, on the night of 30 August, another drone fell between Marjina Horka and Babruisk.

On 16 August, Commander of the Air Force and Air Defence Andrei Lukyanovich stated that from 1 January to 16 August 2025, more than 300 drones had entered Belarusian airspace. Ukrainian monitoring channels reported around 359 Russian drones crossing into Belarus during the same period, of which at least 19 fell or were downed by the Belarusian Armed Forces. Independent estimates therefore differ only slightly from official figures.

On 6 August, the Belarusian Ministry of Defence reported the arrival of the first train with Russian servicemen and equipment for participation in the “Zapad-2025” exercises. Analysis of photos and videos showed that the train arrived at Barysau station, near the 227th Barysau training ground, where the main phase of the drills is scheduled to take place. Approximately 150 Russian servicemen and at least 35 vehicles (including command-and-staff and cargo trucks) from the 4th Guards Kantemirovskaya Tank Division (military unit 19612), part of the 1st Tank Army of the Moscow Military District, arrived in Belarus.

On the same day, another Russian military contingent arrived in Belarus to prepare for and participate in CSTO exercises. Published photos and videos confirmed that the train arrived at Losvida station in the Viciebsk region. Around 100 servicemen and 32 vehicles (fuel tankers, cargo trucks, and others) from the 71st Motor Rifle Division (military unit 08275) were identified.

On 12 August, Valery Ravenka, Head of the Department for International Military Cooperation of the Belarusian Ministry of Defence, briefed the media on the upcoming “Zapad-2025” strategic joint exercises. According to him, the manoeuvres will take place from 12 to 16 September under the theme “Use of force groupings to ensure the military security of the Union State.” The declared overall aim is to test the ability of Belarus and Russia to safeguard the “Union State’s” military security and readiness to repel possible aggression. Planned training elements include: 1) repelling enemy air attacks; 2) conducting defensive combat, defeating an adversary that has penetrated defensive lines, and restoring territorial integrity; 3) providing air support to ground operations; 4) countering illegal armed groups and enemy sabotage and reconnaissance units.

On 13 August, Belarusian Defence Minister Viktar Khrenin announced that the “Zapad-2025” drills would include planning for the use of nuclear weapons and the “Oreshnik” missile system. Fortified areas will be involved in the exercises; according to the minister, in two of the five fortified districts, troops will conduct training. These are the Valkevysk and Smarhon directions in the Hrodna region, corresponding to the Polish and Lithuanian axes.

On 14 August, the Ministry of Defence reported the arrival of two additional Su-30SM2 fighter aircraft at the Baranavichy air base from Russia. The aircraft, with tail numbers “11” and “12,” were delivered to the 61st Fighter Air Base. With this, a full squadron of Su-30SM/SM2 jets has been established, comprising eight Su-30SM and four Su-30SM2 aircraft. On 16 August, Commander of the Air Force and Air Defence Andrei Lukyanovich stated that Belarus would receive four more Su-30SM2 aircraft in 2025.

On 21 August, a meeting on missile production was held in Belarus. Following the session, State Secretary of the Security Council Aliaksandar Valfovich said that discussions were underway regarding the potential arming of the “Polonez” multiple launch rocket system with nuclear warheads. He also referred to the possible integration of “Oreshnik” technologies into joint missile projects with Russia, stressing that cooperation with Moscow aimed at developing a modern missile.

From 25 to 29 August, operational-specialised exercises of Belarusian military communications troops were held. The drills focused on maintaining combat readiness and improving the capacity of communication forces and systems to ensure effective command and control. A distinctive feature of the exercises was the testing of new methods for employing communication assets with the use of aircraft and drones. At the final stage, a communications system was deployed in preparation for “Zapad-2025.”

The Belarusian military newspaper Vo Slavu Rodiny reported on 26 August that Russian troops participating in “Zapad-2025” had already arrived in Belarus. According to the deputy head of the ideological department of the Northwestern Operational Command, “the forces that will take part in ‘Zapad-2025’ are already here, on the Barysau training ground.” This statement suggests that no further Russian ground units beyond those which arrived on 6 August are expected.

On 31 August, Chief of the General Staff Pavel Muraveika addressed reports regarding the drills and the use of tactical nuclear weapons. He stated: “The planning of all types of weapons is envisaged within the framework of the exercises. As for use — one cannot employ what threatens the entire world, global security. But we will learn how to plan it.”

On the same day, Belarus launched joint exercises with the CSTO Collective Rapid Reaction Forces, including “Interaction-2025,” “Search-2025,” and “Echelon-2025.” Contingents from Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Tajikistan arrived in Belarus to participate. The exercises are being held at the Liepiel and Losvida training grounds in the Viciebsk region. Russian participation includes servicemen from the 71st Motor Rifle Division and the 98th Airborne Division. According to the joint press centre, “a key feature of these drills in 2025 is their close alignment with the concept of the joint strategic exercise of the Armed Forces of Belarus and Russia, ‘Zapad-2025.’” Muraveika also noted that the Belarusian contingent was the largest, represented by the 103rd Airborne Brigade and units of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

On 7 August, Aliaksandr Lukashenka held a meeting on the activities of the State Security Committee (KGB). The discussion focused on “improving” the agency’s work in the context of the “lessons of 2020” and “external pressure from Poland and the Baltic states”. Lukashenka stressed the need to strengthen the cyber component, digital control, and offensive intelligence operations, including activities outside Belarus. He ruled out staff expansion, instead emphasising incentive-based remuneration and cost rationalisation. Participants included figures with KGB background such as Andrei Shved, Ihar Siarheyenka, Valery Vakulchyk, and Aliaksandr Neviarouski, suggesting a system of checks within the security bloc’s management.

On 8 August, Lukashenka gave an interview to Time magazine in which he highlighted the role of security services and Belarus’s Permanent Mission to the UN in maintaining a diplomatic channel with the United States. He expressed readiness to engage in political prisoner exchanges, supported the idea of an “air truce” in Ukraine and proposed Minsk as a venue for negotiations on ending the war in Ukraine. Lukashenka claimed to have held a phone conversation with Donald Trump on 15 August, followed by contact with the U.S. President’s former representative John Coale. On 17 August, Trump thanked Lukashenka for releasing several prisoners and expressed hope for further steps in this direction. Despite public scepticism regarding normalisation with the West, the Belarusian side continues to present itself as a technical mediator without altering domestic policies.

On 18 August, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya welcomed Trump’s phone call to  Lukashenka as part of “an important humanitarian mission to free our people and stop the repression,” urging the U.S. to ensure that those released are able to remain in Belarus or return safely, and stressing that repression must end as the first step toward de-escalation.

On 9–10 August, more than 420 participants, including 36 diplomats, gathered in Warsaw for the New Belarus Conference. Key outcomes included new appointments (such as Pavel Barkouski as Representative for National Revival), adoption of strategic papers (including the Red Paper on Security), and resolutions demanding the release of political prisoners, withdrawal of foreign troops and nuclear weapons, integration into the European security system, referral of the Belarus situation to the ICC, and preparation of a roadmap for EU accession.

On 20 August, Prime Minister Aliaksandr Turchyn announced the completion of the draft forecast for socio-economic development in 2026. The document envisages GDP growth of 2.8%, inflation of up to 7%, and exports exceeding 3%. Particular attention is given to expanding exports to CIS markets, industrial robotics, domestic tourism, and construction of rental housing. Subsidised loan programmes within the “regional initiative” framework were confirmed. The forecast is based on a “balanced growth” scenario while maintaining state control over key sectors of the economy.

On 25 August, Belarusian democratic leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya issued a statement on Belarus’s Independence Restoration Day. She underlined the historical significance of 25 August 1991, when the Declaration of State Sovereignty was granted constitutional status. Tsikhanouskaya emphasised that independence remains a core value for Belarusian society and called for resistance against attempts by the regime to undermine it. She urged those working in state institutions not to become complicit in policies leading to the erosion of sovereignty. Independence Day was framed as a moment of unity and a symbol of the democratic alternative to the existing system.

On 29 August, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya addressed EU foreign ministers during an informal Gymnich meeting in Copenhagen, attended by all 27 EU member states as well as the UK, Norway, and Iceland. She stressed that Siarhei Tsikhanouski’s recent release was the result of coordinated transatlantic pressure rather than a “miracle,” reminded that over 1,300 political prisoners remain behind bars, and urged continued sanctions against Lukashenka. Tsikhanouskaya called on Europe to prepare for a post-Lukashenka transition, support Belarusian civil society, and treat assistance as an investment in European security. For the first time since his release, Siarhei Tsikhanouski also spoke to European diplomats, describing his imprisonment as “a modern-day Gulag” and appealing for support and rehabilitation for political prisoners and their families.

On 1 September, Lukashenka participated in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Tianjin, China, including a “SCO+” session. The summit adopted the SCO Development Strategy until 2035, outlining the goal of institutionalising long-term cooperation mechanisms. In his speech, Lukashenka backed Chinese initiatives such as settlements in national currencies, the creation of an SCO Development Bank, coordination with the Eurasian Economic Union in logistics, and development of humanitarian platforms. He focused primarily on “multipolarity,” “sovereignty,” and “indivisible security.” Belarus was presented as a European member of the organisation and a “responsible partner.” among other decisions, the summit approved the establishment of a Universal Security Centre in Tashkent, incorporating an Information Security Centre and an anti-organised crime unit in Bishkek. Lukashenka was also invited to attend as a guest the military parade in Beijing marking the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II, where a Belarusian unit will take part in the procession.

On 5 August, the Investigative Committee announced new criminal cases on charges of facilitating extremist activities against Belarusians who participated in protest actions abroad that took place on 25 March 2025 (Freedom Day). It was stated that 207 people living in Poland, the United States, Lithuania, Canada, and the United Kingdom had been identified. “During the investigation of the criminal case, the objects of the defendants’ property in Belarus were identified. Orders have been issued to conduct searches and seize property. The issue of launching a special procedure mechanism is being considered,” said Syarhei Kabakovich, an official representative of the Investigative Committee. On the same day, a statement by Ruslan Uarankau, a spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was published. According to him, the Chargé d’Affaires of Poland was summoned to the Ministry and was handed a note due to the holding of the “New Belarus” conference in Warsaw on 9-10 August and a march dedicated to the anniversary of the 2020 “elections”. Political analyst Aliaksandr Klaskouski commented that this note demonstrated the regime’s irritation with protest actions and events abroad. He drew attention to threats against participants in solidarity actions abroad. “The regime practices transnational repression, trials of the leaders of the democratic forces in absentia, seizure of property, and pressure on relatives. This is a desire to suppress the political activity of opponents of the regime abroad,” he said.

Human rights activists reported new tactics of the security forces against former political prisoners and activists living abroad. The security officers are trying to find out about the life and activities of political emigrants with the help of their relatives and friends who have remained in Belarus. Former political prisoners are contacted by their friends or neighbours from Belarus, with whom they have not had contact for a long time, and who try to find out news about political circles and how they can join various political structures. In addition, representatives of the KGB continue to write directly to exiles and invite them to “talk on beneficial terms”.

In early August, there were several cases recorded in Mahileu region where police officers came to relatives of activists and former political prisoners who had left the country to take genetic material (saliva). The reason given was the formation of a DNA database so that, if necessary, people abroad “can be identified”. However, the true motives of these actions are not clear. According to human rights defenders, this practice exists in different cities of Belarus.

On the anniversary of the start of protests against 2020 election fraud, “Viasna” Human Rights Centre published statistics on mass repression in Belarus. Over the past five years, more than 100,000 cases of repression have been recorded – searches, short- and long-term detentions, and interrogations. The number of political prisoners increased 47-fold during this period, from 25 to 1,187 at the present moment. A total of 4,064 people have been granted political prisoner status since August 2020, 776 of whom are women. At least 206 political prisoners behind bars are at particular risk. Eight political prisoners died in custody. Almost 3,000 people have the status of former political prisoners, more than 1,620 of whom have fully served their sentences. In five years, not a single criminal case has been opened regarding torture and deaths of protesters and political prisoners.

The Ministry of Justice stripped Sviatlana Harbatok of her lawyer’s licence “due to insufficient qualifications”. Harbatok was previously a defender of the well-known anarchist Mikalai Dziadok and Uladzimir Kniha, who was tried in the “Tsikhanouski case”. The persecution of lawyers representing political prisoners in Belarus is systemic. Since 2020, at least 141 lawyers have lost their licenses. Over the past four years, at least 11 lawyers have been prosecuted, and some still remain in custody.

Lawyer Syarhei Khlystau was convicted in Homel on political charges. He was charged with inciting hostility and calling for harm to the national security of Belarus. The exact verdict is unknown. At the same time, Khlystau was already added to the list of “extremists”. It was indicated that he is already serving his sentence.

The “Belarusian Association of Human Rights Lawyers» was added to the list of “extremist formations” by the KGB on 18 August. Lawyers Dzmitry Laeuski and Maryia Kolesava-Hudzilina were named as involved in the formation. There are now 307 positions on the list on the website of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The Belarusian Association of Human Rights Lawyers was established outside Belarus in April 2023. It brought together professionals who were deprived of the right to practise their profession in Belarus and were forced to leave the country. The organisation’s online resources have the status of “extremist materials.“

In mid-August, Belarusian political exiles whose passports had expired began receiving letters from the Belarusian authorities at addresses of their places of residence in Belarus. The letters stated that exiles need to visit the migration department and replace their passports. Otherwise, they face a fine of up to four basic units (about 45 Euro).

The Minsk City Court convicted Yauhen Krasnianski, who was accused of high treason and evading payment of insurance premiums, resulting in particularly large-scale damage. On the first charge, he was sentenced to seven years of imprisonment in a high-security colony, and on the second, to six months of imprisonment, as well as a fine of 25,000 rubles (about 6,700 Euro). The criminal case related to a sociological study on COVID in Belarus, produced by Krasnianski. The Investigative Committee reported that “it was prepared for foreign organisations and contained deliberately false information about the country’s health policy regarding the measures taken to combat coronavirus infection”. Human rights activists noted that two women were detained along with Yauhen Krasnianski. The sentences of these women are unknown.

The trial in the case of the “pismo.bel” initiative in Minsk ended. Aliaksandr Mazur and Pavel Karanyukhin were each sentenced to three and a half years of imprisonment in a high-security colony. Aliaksandr Lykshyn was sentenced to three years and seven months of imprisonment. All three were also fined 1,000 basic units (approximately 11,300 Euro). “Pismo.bel” is a service for sending letters to prisoners. Only 10% of the letters were intended for political prisoners.

The Supreme Court rejected Anton Matolka’s appeal against the sentence in absentia handed down to him in June. On 3 June, the Hrodna Regional Court sentenced him in absentia to 20 years of imprisonment and a fine of 2,000 basic units (approximately 22,500 Euro). He was accused of high treason, organising mass riots, and group actions that grossly violate public order, calling for the seizure of power, discrediting Belarus, insulting and slandering Lukashenka, inciting discord, and other charges. Anton Matolka filed an appeal, trying to challenge not only the verdict, but also the practice of in absentia trials.

On 26 August, human rights activists recognised journalists Aleh Suprunyuk and Pavel Dabravolski as political prisoners. Human rights activists demanded the immediate release of Suprunyuk, Dabravolski, and other political prisoners; the abandonment of criminal prosecution as an instrument of pressure on freedom of expression and other rights and freedoms; and the immediate cessation of political repression.

Minsk businessman Hennadz Saurytski, his wife Iryna, and their youngest daughter Viyaletta were sentenced to five years of imprisonment each for a video message against violence by the security forces. The court considered the video to be “incitement of social hostility and discord”. Iryna and Viyaletta were detained in February 2024, and Hennadz in September. They were sentenced in 2024, but the information about the trial became known only last week.

The Homel Regional Court sentenced Andrei Stryzhak, co-founder of BYSOL, and Aliaksei Lyavonchyk, founder of BY_Help, in absentia. They were sentenced to 18 years of imprisonment in a high-security colony and fined 6,000 basic units (approximatly 67,475 Euro) each. Stryzhak and Lyavonchyk were charged with creating an “extremist” formation, financing “extremist” activities, calling for sanctions, discrediting Belarus, threatening to commit a terrorist act, and promoting terrorism.

Special proceedings have been launched against four participants of the “Chestnyje Liudi” (Honest People) initiative, Alena Zhivahlod, Zaryna Sarokina, Aleh Davydchik, and Tsimafei Malakhouski. They are accused of creating an “extremist” group, insulting Lukashenka, inciting hostility, slandering Lukashenka, discrediting Belarus, and calling for action against national security. The “Chestnyje Liudi” initiative was founded in the summer of 2020. It documented violations of electoral laws and electoral fraud. In February 2022, the KGB recognised it as an “extremist formation”.

On 26 August, the Minsk City Court began considering in absentia the case of Mikalai Katsalapau, co-owner of Wargaming IT company. He was charged with “financing extremist activities” and “financing terrorist activities”. In April, a story appeared on Belarusian state television that a criminal case was opened against Katsalapau for transferring hundreds of thousands of dollars in the form of cryptocurrencies to allegedly extremist and terrorist and military organisations for several years. In 2023, the KGB added Katsalapau to the “terrorist list”.

Since the beginning of 2025, more than 250 people have been detained in the Homel region alone in connection with the case of Belarusian Hajun. There is no official information about the number of detainees, the approximate figure was determined by the “Flagshtok” media by contacting friends and relatives of the defendants. There may be more than a thousand people on detention lists. Mass detentions are also taking place in the Hrodna region. The exact number of detainees is unknown.

On 29 August, the Ministry of Internal Affairs added 14 more people to the “List of citizens of the Republic of Belarus, foreign citizens or stateless persons involved in extremist activities”. Thirteen of them were convicted under article 342 of the Criminal Code for participation in protests. There are now 5,677 names on the list.

The report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Belarus to the 80^th session of the UN General Assembly was published. In his report, Nils Muižnieks examined the human rights situation in Belarus in the areas of labour and employment. He focused on discrimination, forced and compulsory labour, and the right to form and join trade unions. In addition to highlighting long-term, deeply rooted problems, the Special Rapporteur showed how the ongoing large-scale crackdown on civil and political rights since the presidential elections of 2020 has led to multiple violations of economic and social rights in the areas of employment and labour. Nils Muižnieks concluded that Belarus engages in a systematic practice of violating human rights in labour and employment.

A rally of the Belarusian opposition, “Freedom March”, took place in Warsaw on 9 August, on the fifth anniversary of the presidential “elections”, after which mass protests began in Belarus. The Palace of Culture and the Silesian-Dombrowski Bridge were illuminated in the colours of the national Belarusian flag “as a sign of solidarity with Belarusians,” as stated by the Warsaw City Hall.

President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Marcos Perestrello, issued a statement on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the protests against the rigged 2020 presidential elections. “The NATO Parliamentary Assembly will never back down from its firm position in supporting those who are fighting for a free, sovereign, and democratic Belarus,” he assured.

The annual country report of the U.S. Department of State (2024 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Belarus) stated that there were no significant changes in the human rights situation in Belarus during 2024. Significant human rights issues included credible reports of torture; involuntary or coercive medical or psychological practices; arbitrary arrest or detention; transnational repression, including cooperation with another country to carry out acts of transnational repression; serious abuses in a conflict related to Belarus’ complicity in Russia’s war against Ukraine; serious restrictions on freedom of expression and media freedom, including violence or threats of violence against journalists, unjustified arrests or prosecutions of journalists, censorship, and serious restrictions on the internet; trafficking in persons, including forced labour; prohibiting independent trade unions and systematic restrictions on workers’ freedom of association; and violence or threats against labour activists or union members. The government took no credible steps or actions to identify and punish officials who committed human rights abuses.

On 15 August, a group of UN experts, including Nils Muižnieks, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Belarus; Ben Saul, Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism; Alice Jill Edwards, Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; Margaret Satterthwaite, Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers; Laura Nyirinkindi, Chair, Claudia Flores, Vice-Chair, Dorothy Estrada Tanck, Ivana Krstić, and Haina Lu, Working group on discrimination against women and girls; and Ganna Yudkivska, Chair-Rapporteur, Matthew Gillett, Vice-Chair on Communications, Miriam Estrada Castillo, Vice-Chair on Follow-Up, Mumba Malila, and Ethan Hee-Seok Shin, the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, called on authorities in Belarus to promptly and efficiently investigate the alleged ill-treatment of prisoners convicted on terrorism and extremism related charges. “We call on Belarusian authorities to immediately launch a thorough and impartial investigation into the alleged ill-treatment of these prisoners and take all possible measures to safeguard their health and personal integrity, including considering granting them pardons or commutations of their sentences to non-custodial penalties,” the experts said. “The Belarusian counter-terrorism and anti-extremism legal framework remains a matter of persistent concern,” they stressed, – “We keep receiving allegations of people being convicted on terrorism and extremism charges and being added to official public lists of terrorists and extremists in retaliation for their exercise of civil and political rights, without any due process and effective remedies to challenge these decisions.” Experts reiterated their call for Belarusian authorities to bring their counter-terrorism and anti-extremism legal framework and law-enforcement practice in line with their obligations under international human rights law.

Last week, the International Committee for the Investigation of Torture in Belarus released a report on the special procedure mechanism. This was the first study that systematically analysed how the special procedure mechanism works and provided a legal assessment of the procedure. The mechanism was introduced in Belarus in 2022. It includes investigation and trials in absentia, in which a person can be found guilty and sentenced, even if they were not present in the country, was not notified of the hearing, and did not have the opportunity to defend themselves. The authors of the report concluded that the institution of a special procedure can be qualified as a form of institutionalised persecution with signs of crimes against humanity within the meaning of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.

The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women has registered a complaint from Respect-Protect-Fulfill initiative about discrimination against Victoryja Kulsha and called on Belarus to urgently take measures to protect her. The UN Committee had previously taken similar measures for Palina Sharenda-Panasyuk and Maryja Kalesnikava. The Committee called on Belarus to provide Victoryja with “access to a full medical examination and psychological support in order to prevent irreparable damage to her life, health, and psychological stability, as well as to provide her with appropriate conditions of detention”.

The Second Congress on Belarusian Political Prisoners will be held in Poland in September. The congress will last two days, the first day will be held in Warsaw, and the second day will be held in Poznan. The purpose of the congress is to join forces and coordinate efforts to support political prisoners and their families. The event is organised by the Office of the Democratic Forces of Belarus in the Czech Republic in cooperation with the Office of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, the United Transitional Cabinet, and partner organisations, with the support of the Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung Foundation.

In August, one of the key topics promoted by Belarusian state media and propagandists was the phone call between U.S. President Donald Trump and Aliaksandr Lukashenka. The call was framed as a major diplomatic breakthrough and a personal victory for Lukashenka. Senior military official Andrei Bahadzel suggested on state television that the conversation “at one point” even overshadowed the Trump–Putin talks in Alaska, adding that “the regional architecture of international relations and security today cannot be built without Belarus.”

Propagandist Ryhor Azaronak expressed enthusiasm at what he described as recognition of Belarus as an “important player at the table of equals” alongside Russia, China, and the United States — a status he claimed only a “world-class leader” such as Lukashenka could achieve. He further suggested that Minsk could once again become a venue for a new Ukraine summit: “Once the Russian lands were united by Kyiv, then this mission was carried out by Moscow, and now the word lies with Minsk. With this mission — that of a peacemaker, a Slavic leader, and the antithesis of disintegration — Aliaksandr Lukashenka has come to power.”

State broadcaster ONT declared that the Trump call had “stirred the entire planet.” Pro-government economic commentator Aliaksei Audonin argued that the U.S. president reached out to Lukashenka to “learn the leader’s view and understanding of processes unfolding in Eastern Europe in military, political, economic, and financial terms,” and even “to hear Moscow’s position first-hand,” claiming that some American officials and analysts had “often misled him.”

On 24 August, Lukashenka congratulated the people of Ukraine on their Independence Day. Despite having allowed Russian forces to invade Ukraine from Belarusian territory and launch missile strikes against Ukraine from Belarusian territory and airspace in 2022, he stated that “living side by side in peace and harmony has always been the destiny of the Belarusian and Ukrainian peoples,” lamenting that “external forces” were pulling the two countries apart. Echoing this statement, propagandist Azaronak urged Belarus to “demonstrate another path” for Ukraine — one of alliance with “brotherly Russia,” which, in his words, would bring benefits “economically, in security, and in state-building.” He framed the West’s goal since the time of Zbigniew Brzezinski as to “detach, divide, and sow hatred,” whereas “our task is to bring love. This is our approach — Russian, the approach of Lukashenka and Putin. And the Ukrainian people will return to their home, and together we will heal the wounds.”

In late August, Lukashenka’s visit to China was the central theme for state media and propagandists. He met with Chinese leader Xi Jinping and took part in the SCO summit in Tianjin. In an interview with China Media Group, Lukashenka stated that Belarus was “learning from China in all areas” and that certain practices should be “taken and adapted” to the Belarusian context. According to him, the U.S. had raised questions about Belarus–China cooperation, to which he responded that Beijing “never closed its doors to Minsk, unlike Washington.” He added: “We will never betray our relations and our friendship with the Chinese people and with the Chinese state, with my friend Xi Jinping. During this sanctions period, when the collective West has imposed cannibalistic sanctions on us, it would have been very difficult if we had not had Russia and China.” Lukashenka also suggested that the SCO should long ago have introduced its own currency for international settlements or rely on the Chinese yuan for that purpose.

In an interview with the official Chinese news agency Xinhua, Lukashenka praised Xi Jinping as a leader who “guides China on the path of evolutionary development without revolutions, upheavals, or destruction of what previous generations painstakingly created,” contrasting this with those who attempt to “bring democracy with bombs and sanctions.” He expressed hope for “continued fruitful cooperation with China as one of the undisputed leaders of the Global South and the entire world.”

Pro-government analyst Andrei Lazutkin highlighted that Belarus had “initially pursued a strategic course towards alliance with China,” arguing that Beijing was building “a community of shared human destiny — without wars and trade conflicts, but with cooperation, logistics, and indivisible security.” He predicted that the SCO could eventually become “something like a UN Security Council, where everyone can talk to everyone with China’s mediation,” while the U.S. role in world affairs would diminish and Washington would “sooner or later stop exerting pressure.” According to him, “today China, without joining military blocs, can influence any conflict anywhere in the world, because the phones, drones, microchips, computers, and processors on both sides are likely to be Chinese.” Lazutkin added that dialogue with the U.S. was also necessary, but “better done with a huge China and an even larger SCO behind us.”

Security commentator Aliaksandr Tsishchanka described SCO membership as “a sign of sustainable subjectivity and an open door to an economy without barriers or threats to national security,” contrasting the “comfortable Silk Belt” with what he called “the noose of European integration.”

Propagandist Ryhor Azaronak, one of the key promoters of Lukashenka’s personality cult, used the visit to glorify the ruler’s special relationship with Xi. He approvingly cited the example of Deng Xiaoping’s crackdown on protests, remarking that after “decisive defence of sovereignty” came “investment and technology flows,” since “nobody invests in banana puppet states, only where power is strong and resolute.” Azaronak proclaimed that “the East is gathering and consolidating,” and that Belarus under Lukashenka is “the vanguard of the Great East.”

In the same interview with China Media Group, Lukashenka commented on Donald Trump’s potential role in ending the Russia–Ukraine war. He claimed that the U.S. president “understood Russia’s position,” which he argued was “more important for the future of peace than Ukraine’s.” Lukashenka urged Kyiv “to stop and conclude a peace agreement in order not to lose Ukraine entirely,” thanked Trump for his mediation, and called on him “not to step back” in order to “solve the problem.” He also suggested that the process faced resistance from “European hawks.”

Belarusian propagandists amplified this narrative after the Lukashenka–Trump contact. They became more cautious in their remarks about the U.S. administration while intensifying criticism of Europe, portraying the “collective West” as divided. Columnist Pavel Karnazytski argued that Washington had no interest in maintaining confrontation with Moscow on behalf of a “useless” EU or NATO, and “even less so for Ukraine, which is a stolen territory of Russian civilisation.” He predicted that Europe’s “vassals” would fail to drag Trump into a “lost war.”

His colleague Yury Uvarau, who only a month earlier used insulting language against Trump in state media, moderated his tone, now cautiously questioning Trump’s sincerity. According to him, Trump “could cut off oxygen to the Kyiv regime in two clicks” and should be setting deadlines or threatening the application of sanctions. He suggested that one strike of Trump’s fist on the desk in the Oval Office would make “this entire pack [European leaders and Volodymyr Zelensky] instantly shut up.”

Supporting this view, Yury Vaskrasenski – a pro-regime figure presented as a political analyst – argued that the United States was already a direct participant in the war, pointing to continued satellite activity and weapons deliveries. He called on Washington to stop all arms supplies to Ukraine, “whether for money or free of charge,” and to “join Russia’s efforts to develop a peace settlement plan.”

Pro-government commentator Andrei Lazutkin described Lukashenka as playing “a subtle game,” exploiting what he characterised as the deepest U.S.–EU rift in forty years. He wrote that it was “very advantageous” for the Belarusian authorities to back Trump, including as a way to secure the regime’s victory in the 2030 presidential election: “Because current European policy means war, endless sanctions, logistical isolation, and another attempt at a colour revolution in 2030. For five years we have not seen a single positive signal from the EU. But without the U.S., they cannot rattle sabres, they lack the strength, so they limit themselves to queues at the border. With Trump, however, we have a chance to reconcile seriously, hold proper elections in 2030, and create a configuration for transferring power without American interference. This will be decided by the ruler and the people – but there will be no roundtables with the brazen and the exiled, as Europe demands.”

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Best regards, iSANS team