Belarus Review by iSANS — September 15, 2025 

According to Ukrainian monitoring channels, between 8 and 14 September at least 52 Russian unmanned aerial vehicles (both strike drones and decoys of various types) were recorded in Belarusian airspace. Most of them later flew into Ukrainian territory. Unofficial reports suggest that at least two drones were shot down by the Belarusian Armed Forces on 9 and 10 September respectively. It is known that Belarusian Air Force units on duty were deployed to search for and intercept the aircraft.

Particular attention was drawn to the incursion on the night of 9–10 September, when at least 21 Russian drones entered Polish airspace. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk stated that, for the first time, a significant number of these drones had come from Belarusian territory. Ukrainian monitoring channels reported that from the evening of 9 September until the morning of 10 September around 29 Russian drones entered Belarus. They crossed different sections of the Belarus–Ukraine border, with most flying through the Brahin district of Homiel region and the Malaryta district of Brest region. Of these 29 drones: 12 subsequently flew into Ukraine, three into Poland, two into Lithuania, and 14 went missing without further information (of which up to four may also have flown into Poland).

On 10 September, Chief of the General Staff of the Belarusian Armed Forces Pavel Muraveika stated that during the night-time drone exchanges between Russia and Ukraine, Belarusian military tracked aircraft that had gone off course due to electronic warfare measures. Some of them were destroyed, while information about “unidentified aerial vehicles” approaching Polish and Lithuanian territory was shared with the armed forces of those countries. Later, the Chief of the Polish General Staff Wiesław Kukuła confirmed Muraveika’s statement regarding information exchange on drone flights.

On 8 September, a Facebook account linked to the Libyan National Army (LNA) reported that the 87th LNA Special Forces Battalion had completed a combat training course in Belarus. The one-year programme reportedly included counterterrorism training, sniper skills, mortar fire, and urban assault. Earlier, in March, it was reported that another LNA unit — the 36th Special Forces Battalion — had also completed training in Belarus. This indicates that the training of Libyan military personnel in Belarus has become systematic.

On 9 September, the Belarusian Railway Workers’ Community reported that on 5 September a Russian military train arrived in Viciebsk from Smolensk. It consisted of seven carriages (their type was not specified). Given the departure and arrival stations, it can be assumed that the train may have transported personnel of the 144th Motor Rifle Division (military unit 23060), based in Smolensk and its surroundings. However, there are no grounds to claim that the train delivered Russian servicemen specifically to participate in the “Zapad-2025” exercises.

Between 9 and 10 September, a joint mobilisation training was held at military commissariats in Viciebsk region. According to the regional commissariat, the exercise focused on “management of replenishment (loss compensation) in an operation of the regional grouping of forces.” Training involved sessions with the administrations of mobilisation facilities as well as practical drills.

On 10 September, Radio Svoboda (Ukrainian Service) published an investigation into the construction of military infrastructure in Belarus. Of particular interest was information about a new military facility in Minsk region, reported publicly for the first time. Journalists stated that construction began in June 2024 on the site of the former military town No. 25 “Pavlovka,” near the settlement of Pavlovka in Slutsk district. The total construction area already exceeds two square kilometres. The facility consists of four parts — one main zone (the largest by area) and three smaller ones — all connected by roads. Construction is ongoing and remains active. It cannot be ruled out that the site is intended for deployment of the “Oreshnik” missile system, or alternatively for units of the so-called Southern Operational Command.

Also on 10 September, the State Border Committee announced the opening of a new border post “Asarevichy” in Brahin district, Homiel region. The unit was formed in 2017 and previously operated from a barge and modular facilities. The new facility is presented as part of systematic development of border infrastructure on the Ukrainian direction. The authorities reported that three more new posts will be completed by the end of the year. Since 2022, at least 10 border posts have been built or reconstructed in Homiel region alone.

On 11 September, the press service of the Internal Troops announced that servicemen of the 5th and 7th Police Brigades had taken part in the “Groza-2025” exercises between 9 and 10 September. The drills focused on protecting transport infrastructure facilities and countering illegal armed groups. Personnel trained in command and control of units under conditions of heightened terrorist threat.

On 12 September, joint Belarusian–Russian strategic exercises “Zapad-2025” began. Chief of the General Staff Pavel Muraveika highlighted their features: extensive use of electronic warfare systems, drones, robotic platforms, survivability measures, unit control continuity, active jamming, and artificial intelligence to support decision-making and coordination. Scenarios also include dispersal, camouflage, and preservation of command posts using terrain and civilian infrastructure. The main actions are taking place at the Barysau training ground, where Russian tank units practised indirect fire from concealed positions and defensive responses to air attacks, while motor rifle units carried out a river crossing over the Biarezina. Exercises also unfolded at the Lesishcha training ground (Slutsk district), which hosts the command post of the North-Western Operational Command, where troops trained in the protection and defence of a chemically hazardous facility against simulated enemy air strikes. At the Ministry of Emergency Situations’ “Svetlaya Roshcha” training ground (Barysau district), a tactical episode simulated blocking and eliminating an illegal armed group that had seized part of an aircraft repair plant. Officials noted that such facilities contain underground tunnels, an extensive building network, and various shelters, allowing defenders to erect barricades and obstacles that significantly complicate operations. Exercises are being held simultaneously in Russia and will conclude on 16 September.

On 12 September, the Belarusian Ministry of Defence issued a statement by Defence Minister Viktar Khrenin that the 140th Repair Plant, in cooperation with the Russian Uralvagonzavod corporation, is carrying out overhaul and modernisation of two tank battalions (62 T-72 tanks) to the T-72BM2 standard. In September 2024, Khrenin had reported that 30 tanks were undergoing modernisation. This suggests that modernisation of those vehicles has not been completed, while work has also begun on another full battalion set. Importantly, Uralvagonzavod is now directly involved, although one year ago officials did not mention its participation. In November 2022, State Military-Industrial Committee head Dzmitry Pantus stated that serial modernisation of T-72BM2 tanks for the Belarusian Armed Forces would begin in 2023. In February 2023, he specified that 20–30 modernised tanks would be delivered annually. However, as of September 2025, there have been no reports of modernised tanks being supplied to the Belarusian army.

On 10–11 September, a US delegation visited Belarus, consisting of presidential envoy John Coale and State Department representative Christopher Smith. On the side of the Lukashenka regime, the talks involved KGB chairman Ivan Tertel (who organised and accompanied the delegation) and Belarus’s permanent representative to the UN in New York Valentyn Rybakou (responsible for diplomatic contacts and translation during the meetings). During the talks, Lukashenka raised the issue of political hostages as part of a potential “global deal,” while repeating his long-standing claim that there are “no political articles” in Belarusian law and that convictions are “non-political in nature.” He broadened the agenda to include regional security and economic issues, underlining allied relations with Russia and expressing readiness to discuss humanitarian steps under the condition that released individuals would be deported outside the country. The US position was described as a course of gradual normalisation of bilateral relations — “one step at a time” — without interference in Lukashenka’s relations with Vladimir Putin. Priorities cited by the American side included the return of the US Embassy to Minsk, the development of trade, and the establishment of “working relations.” During the meeting, US envoy J. Cole announced that Washington would lift sanctions on Belavia. This was presented as the first step towards normalisation and was directly tied to the release of 52 political prisoners later that day

Following the two-day negotiations, Lukashenka’s regime agreed to release and deport to Lithuania 52 prisoners — 38 Belarusian citizens and 14 foreign nationals. Among them were many political prisoners, including such prominent figures as veteran opposition politician Mikalai Statkevich, Radio Svaboda journalist Ihar Losik, anarchist Mikalai Dziadok, and philosopher Uladzimir Matskevich. The lists of those released were formed by the Belarusian side. Most deportees were reported to be in poor physical condition, with emerging information about mistreatment. For example, Ilya Dubouski was reportedly forced to cut off his own tattoo depicting the national Belarusian emblem Pahonia. Some political prisoners were deported without passports.

One prisoner — former 2010 presidential candidate Mikalai Statkevich — refused to leave Belarus. He spent some time in the transit zone at the Kamenny Loh border crossing with Lithuania. According to witnesses, his motivation was that “he will leave only when Belarus is free from Lukashenka’s rule, and for now he wishes to remain with his people in any circumstances.” According to sources cited by Nasha Niva, Statkevich is currently held in Hlybokaye prison. For the past two years and seven months, he had been kept incommunicado in the same facility.

On 11 September 2025, the US Department of the Treasury (OFAC) issued General License 11, allowing financial and commercial transactions with the Belarusian state airline Belavia and its subsidiaries. In practice, this easing of restrictions means that US companies and citizens may now legally settle payments with the carrier in US dollars, sell tickets to it, and provide related services. This removed key barriers that had blocked Belavia from participating in the international financial system and from obtaining maintenance at foreign airports. However, the license explicitly noted that it does not override restrictions imposed by other regulators. Exports of aircraft, engines, spare parts, software, and related services remain subject to the US Department of Commerce’s Export Administration Regulations (EAR) and the State Department’s International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). Such licences are rarely granted to Belarus, meaning that full-scale maintenance of the airline’s fleet on Belarusian infrastructure remains blocked. Restrictions by the European Union also remain in force.

On 11 September, Poland announced the unilateral closure of its border with Belarus in connection with the “Zapad-2025” strategic exercises. The last vehicle crossed the Terespol border checkpoint on 12 September, after which both passenger and cargo traffic by road and rail was halted. Polish officials indicated that the closure may remain in force until Warsaw “feels secure.” In response, Belarusian Foreign Minister Maksim Ryzhankou accused Poland of having “dealt a blow to relations with other countries.” According to the Polish Border Guard, the number of illegal crossing attempts, which had decreased at the start of September, is again on the rise, with 340 attempts registered between 12 and 14 September. The closure caused widespread concern among ordinary Belarusians both inside the country and across the EU.

The situation of political prisoners remained the central theme of democratic leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya’s activities during the week. She attended a welcome meeting of Belarusian political prisoners in Vilnius and held a press conference with several recently released detainees. Tsikhanouskaya also met with officials from the European Commission and the European External Action Service, where she discussed urgent support programmes for released detainees and human rights initiatives, EU sanctions policy, and assistance for media, civil society, and cultural projects. Preparations for a needs assessment of Belarusian civil society to be presented at a meeting with EU representatives on 8 October were also discussed during the meeting.. Tsikhanouskaya thanked the EU for its consistent and principled policy, stressing that democratic forces highly value this cooperation and regard European integration as a priority for Belarus. She underlined that, against the background of possible further releases, it was essential to provide timely and adequate assistance to all political prisoners.

Tsikhanouskaya also addressed the situation in and around Belarus in the broader context of European and regional security. On 11 September, she took part in a discussion at Vilnius University together with Lithuanian Foreign Minister Kęstutis Budrys, stressing the need to strengthen Belarusian society and identity, build democratic institutions in exile, and prepare reforms and experts for a democratic transition. She rejected the notion of trading values for pragmatism in dealing with Lukashenka, arguing that only a principled approach is realistic. On 15 September, Tsikhanouskaya spoke at the First European Forum for Freedom and Democracy in Italy, highlighting the repression inside Belarus, attempts at Russification, and the importance of unity and resilience in society. She noted that democratic change requires contributions from every citizen and urged international partners to keep Belarus high on the agenda, stressing that the country is “at the centre of the crisis and may be part of the solution.” She also expressed gratitude to US President Donald Trump for recent releases but emphasised that deported political prisoners were not genuinely free, as they were forced to leave Belarus.

According to the Dissidentby initiative, at the end of August, political prisoner Mikita Zalatarou cut his wrists. Zalatarou is serving his sentence in Colony No. 8, in Orsha. He was rushed to hospital, where he received stitches. “Mikita is alive, but his condition is of serious concern,” Dissidentby wrote last week, and demanded his immediate release. Zalatarou was detained in 2020, when he was 16 years old, on charges of organising mass riots, illegal actions against objects whose harmful effects are based on the use of flammable substances, and violence or the threat of violence against law enforcement officers. He was sentenced to five years of imprisonment in an educational colony. In 2021, he was charged with “assaulting a colony employee” and his sentence was extended by another year and a half. In 2022, Zalatarou was transferred to the Zhodzina Prison on a strict regime, and was later additionally sentenced to a year for allegedly disobeying the administration of the correctional institution. Zalatarou is known to suffer from epilepsy. The repression also affected his family. His father Mikhail Lapunou was repeatedly arrested for “spreading extremist materials”. In 2023, when the KGB recognised the “Homel for Mikita Zalatarou” chat as an “extremist formation”, Mikhail Lapunou was convicted of participating in the chat on charges of involvement in an “extremist formation”.

On 3 September 2025, political prisoner Andrei Podnebenny died in the colony. He was sentenced to 16 years and eight months of imprisonment and served his sentence in Colony No. 15 in Mahileu. Andrei Podnebenny was a Russian citizen, but he lived in Belarus since he was six years old. In 2021, he was accused of setting fire to the car of the head of the Department of Corrections, puncturing the wheels of 39 trolleybuses, and creating and administering a Telegram channel and Telegram chat, recognised as “extremist formations”. He was tried behind closed doors. The cause of death of Podnebenny was asphyxiation; other circumstances are unknown. The law enforcement agencies have not commented on the incident. This is the ninth death of a political prisoner in prison in Belarus. According to human rights activist Leanid Sudalenka, it is difficult to comment on the circumstances of Podnebenny’s death. However, it should be noted that “suffocation” is usually mentioned as a cause of death in cases of suicide. “Whether he did it himself or was helped to do it is unknown. To speak more precisely, an investigation is needed, which is impossible in modern Belarus,” Sudalenka concluded.

Human rights activists issued a statement in connection with the death of Andrei Podnebenny. The statement was signed by “Viasna” Human Rights Centre, the Belarusian Helsinki Committee, the Belarusian PEN, and the “Belarusian House of Human Rights”. “At the moment, the circumstances of Andrei Podnebenny’s death have not been reliably investigated. However, according to preliminary information, he was subjected to ill-treatment at the institution of the Department of Corrections of the Ministry of Internal Affairs,” human rights activists noted. The statement claimed that Belarus is not fulfilling its obligations in the field of the right to life and that every death of a political prisoner in prison is “the result of a systemic state policy of inhumane treatment of people based on political motives”. Human rights activists demanded that the Prosecutor General’s Office and the Investigative Committee open a criminal case into the death of Andrei Podnebenny, conduct an objective and comprehensive investigation and inform the public about its results. They also demanded that the public be informed about the results of the investigation into the deaths of other political prisoners, that adequate medical and psychological assistance be provided in places of forced detention, and that prison officials comply with the Constitution of Belarus and international obligations to ensure the protection of life and health of persons deprived of liberty and in isolation.

On 4 September, the day the YouTube channel Platforma 375 was recognised as an “extremist formation,” journalist Kiryl Paznyak, who was recognised as involved in it, was detained. The decision to recognise the channel as “extremist” was made by the KGB. The channel and its TikTok accounts were included in the “List of Organisations, Formations, and Individual Entrepreneurs Involved in Extremist Activities” on 11 September. Platforma 375 became the 311^th “extremist formation”. Two days before the KGB’s decision, on 2 September, the Partyzanski District Court of Minsk recognised the channel as “extremist materials”.

On 5 September, activist Valyantsina Navumava was detained in Hrodna. According to human rights activists, Navumava remains in custody. It is known that a criminal case was opened against her, probably on charges of defamation against Lukashenka. Human rights activists do not rule out the possibility of other charges. Navumava was a member of the leftist “Spraviedlivy Mir” (Just World) party. In 2017, she was fined in an administrative case for participating in a “non-parasite” rally.

The KGB added nine more people to the list of “persons involved in terrorist activities”. Among those added to the list were three political prisoners. The updated document, dated 4 September, but published in a special KGB Telegram channel on 9 September , now includes 1,456 positions.

Former Belsat TV staff member Ales Lyubyanchuk was arrested again. He had fully served his three-year prison term and was released six months ago. Ales Lyubyanchuk collaborated with Belsat until 2020, and was subjected to administrative arrest for his work at post-election protests. When work in Belarus became impossible, he retired from journalism, but remained in the country. Lyubyanchuk was arrested in May 2022. He was charged with participation in an “extremist group” for his collaboration with Belsat and sentenced to three years of imprisonment. The reason for his new arrest is still unknown.

On 11 September, 52 prisoners, most of whom were political prisoners were released from custody and forcibly transported to Lithuania. The release took place as a result of a meeting between Lukashenka and an American delegation, including President Trump’s representative John Cole. The full list of 52 released prisoners is already available. Among those released were veteran opposition politician and candidate in 2010 presidenial elections Mikalai Statkevich, journalist and blogger Ihar Losik, philosopher Uladzimir Matskevich, anarchist Mikola Dziadok, activist Zmitser Dashkevich, a group of journalists from Belsat TV channel and 14 foreign citizens. Many well-known political prisoners, including Ales Bialiatsky, Maryna Zolotava, Andrei Alyaksandrau, Dzmitry Navazhylau, Andrzej Poczobut, Katsyaryna Andreeva, Ihar Ilyash, Viktar Babaryka, and Maryja Kalesnikava were not among those released. Several released political prisoners said that before they were deported from Belarus, KGB officers took away their passports. They tore up the passport of Mikola Dziadok. Instead of passports, the released political prisoners were given temporary A4 papers, which do not have the features of a full-fledged identity document. “People were stripped of their national passports and forcibly deported. This is not only a gross humiliation of human dignity, but also a violation of basic human rights and norms of international law. Belarus, as a signatory to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, is obliged to ensure freedom of movement and respect the right to citizenship”, said Leanid Marozau, legal adviser to Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya.

Mikalai Statkevich refused to leave Belarus on 11 September during the deportation of released political prisoners, spent several hours in the neutral zone, and returned to the territory of Belarus. According to Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, his whereabouts are currently unknown. With reference to his wife Maryna Adamovich, former political prisoner Syarhei Martzaleu reported that Statkevich was not at home, and circumstances indicated that he had been arrested again.

On 11 September, eight more people were recognised as political prisoners, “Viasna” Human Rights Centre reported. Most of them were charged with “slander” and “insults” against Lukashenka. Two people were sent for compulsory psychiatric treatment. On 12 September, human rights activists recognised nine more people as political prisoners. The number of political prisoners as of 12 September was 1,168.

On 12 September, the BYSOL solidarity foundation announced an urgent fundraising campaign of 50,000 Euro for political prisoners released and deported from Belarus. In two days, 101,504 Euro has already been collected. The fundraising continues.

The European Federation of Journalists (EFJ) welcomed the release of 52 political prisoners, including nine journalists, by the Belarusian authorities. The EFJ noted that there are still 27 journalists in prison in Belarus, including prominent journalists Andrzej Poczobut, Katsiaryna Andreeva, and Andrei Aliaksandrau. The EFJ demanded their immediate release. “We are obviously delighted that our colleagues have been released after being unjustly imprisoned on false charges by Lukashenka’s regime,” said EFJ President Maja Sever. – “But we cannot be satisfied with this half-measure. Together with the Belarusian Association of Journalists and our Polish affiliates, we demand the immediate release of the 27 journalists who remain imprisoned in Belarus, as well as hundreds of other innocent citizens.”

Poland is making efforts to free the Carmelite monk Grzegorz Havel, who has been detained in Belarus allegedly for espionage. This was stated by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Radosław Sikorski. “If everything depended on us, Polish prisoners in Belarus would have been released long ago. But, unfortunately, everything depends on the dictator,” he said. Sikorski also recalled that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had repeatedly warned Poles not to travel to Belarus. “There are countries like Belarus and Russia that just take hostages, and we don’t always have the opportunity for an exchange,” he said.

Victims of human rights violations in Belarus are in desperate need of truth, justice and reparations, the Group of Independent Experts on the Human Rights Situation in Belarus, established by the Human Rights Council, said in a new report titled “Closing the Accountability Gap for Human Rights Violations and Related Crimes in Belarus” which detailed options for accountability. In its report, the Group determined that the Belarusian authorities systematically failed to investigate, prosecute and punish human rights violations and crimes against humanity committed since the 2020 presidential election, spurring a culture of impunity. “With a judiciary in the hands of the executive, the systematic punishment of lawyers, systemic fair trial rights violations and the promotion of alleged perpetrators, Belarus clearly demonstrated its inability and unwillingness to prosecute international crimes under its jurisdiction,” said Karinna Moskalenko, chair of the Group. – “For that reason and for now, the impetus for accountability must come from the international community.” The experts stressed that pursuing justice and accountability at the international level and in third-country states are not two options excluding each other, nor do they bar any future judicial proceedings in Belarus. “When the day after the reign of President Lukashenko comes, bolstering domestic proceedings inside Belarus will be crucial to restore Belarusians’ trust in their own national institutions, in particular the judiciary,” said Monika Płatek, an expert member of the Group. – “We encourage all relevant stakeholders to consider all those options as complementary, and to continue documenting evidence for future accountability processes.”

During a meeting of the OSCE Permanent Council, the United Kingdom and 37 other countries presented a joint statement calling for the immediate release of all political prisoners in Belarus and an end to large-scale repression against civil society, independent media and the opposition. The statement was read out by the representative of Canada on behalf of the “Informal Group of Friends of Democratic Belarus”. Despite the release of several hundred political prisoners since July 2024, thousands of people are still behind bars for political reasons. Many are tortured, isolated, and deprived of medical care. Nine political prisoners have already died in custody. “When some are released, others end up behind bars. This endless cycle must be broken,” the statement read.

Political prisoner, journalist Andrzej Poczobut was nominated for the Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought. The corresponding initiative was put forward by the European Conservatives and Reformists group of members of the European Parliament, which includes the Polish Law and Justice Party. The Andrei Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought is awarded annually by the European Parliament to people and organisations who have made a significant contribution to the protection of human rights.

The Belarusian Investigative Centre has won the Free Media Awards. It was awarded the prize “for in-depth analytical materials and news”, according to the Fritt Ord Foundation. The prize is awarded annually by the Norwegian Fritt Ord Foundation and the German ZEIT-Stiftung to six independent media outlets and journalists from Eastern and Central Europe in recognition of their investigative work in emergency situations.

During the period under review, regime propagandists closely followed the escalation of tensions between Warsaw and Minsk. Their main narrative sought to shift responsibility onto Poland while portraying themselves as defenders of “ordinary people.” This line was consistent with Aliaksandr Lukashenka’s rhetoric, in which he labelled the Polish authorities “savages.”

The propaganda on the Polish direction centred on several themes:

1) Justification of the detention of Polish monk Grzegorz Gaweł. Pro-regime commentator Aliaksandr Shpakouski argued that the use of Catholic clergy by intelligence services for subversive activity against Belarus “is far from the first case in modern history.” He claimed that the “holy man” had been “caught red-handed, admitted guilt, and is cooperating with investigators.” In his version, Warsaw is now seeking to distract attention from its intelligence failure by creating an international scandal.

2) Criticism of Poland’s decision to fully close the border with Belarus. Many propagandists highlighted alleged damage to Chinese interests. On 10 September, Foreign Minister Maksim Ryzhankou called the measure “anti-people,” insisting it would harm “ordinary citizens,” and emphasised that “almost three-quarters of the cargo passing westward across the Belarus–Poland border each month is of Chinese origin. That shows who this decision is really directed against.” He further claimed that Poland had “achieved its goal,” as “Brussels immediately allocated nearly EUR 50 billion” to defend against the supposed Eastern threat, after which Poland and the EU would allegedly “divide up the money.”

Pro-regime expert Piotr Piatrouski linked the move to U.S. influence, alleging that Donald Trump demanded sanctions against Chinese and Indian companies cooperating with Russia. According to him, “the logic is clear: the EU must become a puppet of the United States and cannot cooperate with third countries without its consent. To achieve this, the EU must be cut off from both Russia and China. China is to be forced into unfavourable trade and technology conditions with the U.S., while Russia is to be compelled to accept Washington’s terms on Ukraine and trade.

”Aliaksei Audonin of the regime-affiliated Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies attributed the decision to the interests of “major Anglo-Saxon corporations” that “are fighting for the European market” and “do not want Chinese goods delivered to Europe.”

Propagandist Ryhor Azaronak promoted a conspiracy theory that the EU is implementing a concept of a “free Reich” against the “dictatorial axis of evil,” claiming that “a new Berlin Wall will now run along the Bug River.” He asserted that border closures are the first step toward a “blockade of Kaliningrad,” designed to force Russia to “break through Suwałki” and “open a second front.”

This narrative was supported by Minskaya Pravda columnist Yury Uvarau, who suggested that Lithuanian authorities would soon close their border with Belarus as well: “Thus the Baltic and Polish puppets, to the detriment of their peoples, will fulfil the task set by their masters — to unleash war with Russia. They assume that Russia will not withstand a second front.” 

3) Propaganda frames Poland as “ungrateful,” alleges a staged provocation. On 10 September and in the following days, regime media amplified a statement by the Chief of the General Staff Pavel Muraveika, who claimed that Belarusian forces had notified their Polish and Lithuanian counterparts “about the approach of unidentified aerial vehicles to their countries’ territories,” which allegedly allowed Poland to “respond promptly to drone activity.” On the eve of the border closure, Aliaksandr Lukashenka himself called the Poles “savages,” declaring: “Everything we could destroy, we shot down — these drones. But some remained. We immediately, as far in advance as possible, informed Poland. And what did we get in return? Listen, like savages. They escalate the situation out of nothing.”

Propagandists echoed Lukashenka in accusing Poland of ingratitude. For example, Liudmila Hladkaya claimed that “Belarus saved Poland,” while the Poles were twisting the situation in order to “strengthen anti-Russian rhetoric, demand sanctions and money, accelerate arms supplies, draw NATO into the conflict, help the globalists drag Trump into the Ukrainian crisis, and distance him from Aliaksandr Lukashenka and Vladimir Putin.” Commentator Andrei Lazutkin openly accused Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk of lying, alleging he had prepared a “script” for Trump: “It seems the scene was staged for one actor, so that he would resolutely condemn Russia, and at the same time provide Kyiv with money and air defence missiles.”

Pro-regime analyst Aliaksei Dzermant asserted that Poland could “use the provocation” to secure additional military support from NATO and the U.S., and to pressure Belarus, Russia, and China by blocking continental transit. He argued that the Polish authorities had received a “green light” from Trump for such actions. Dzermant further suggested that “the Poles are doing everything to ensure that, in addition to Russian nuclear weapons, a Chinese military base also appears in Belarus.”

On the eve of the “Zapad-2025” exercises, regime outlets amplified Defence Ministry statements claiming that the manoeuvres posed no threat to neighbouring states. Kanstantsin Haharyn of SB. Belarus Segodnya wrote: “We never tire of repeating the defensive nature of our exercises, although the decision to reduce troop numbers at ‘Zapad-2025’ and to move the main manoeuvre sites deeper into the country was unanimously ignored by foreign partners, who instead have escalated hysteria.” At the same time, propagandists repeatedly stressed that the drills demonstrated readiness, if necessary, to deliver a “crushing response with all means available in our arsenal.” Pro-regime military expert Aliaksandr Tsishchanka commented that “decisions on the training of the use of nuclear weapons already act as a stop-line along the entire trajectory of possible aggression from NATO’s eastern flank.”

Last week Lukashenka held a meeting with a U.S. delegation, during and after which he expressed readiness for certain steps toward “normalisation of relations with the United States.” Among other things, he declared that he wanted to “stand alongside Trump and assist him in his mission of bringing peace [to Ukraine].” Pro-regime commentator Aliaksandr Shpakouski argued that “if the aim is normalisation of relations, sanctions against the Belarusian potash sector and domestic banking system must be lifted. Washington’s influence could also be used to restore Belarus’s full access to Baltic port infrastructure.”

As part of the arrangements with the U.S. side, 52 detainees — most of them Belarusian political prisoners, whom Donald Trump referred to as “hostages” — were released and deported. Propagandists attempted to frame the event as an unconditional victory for the dictator and a “relief” for the country, which they said had rid itself of “trash unworthy even of Belarusian prisons.” Ryhor Azaronak wrote that the Americans had recognised Lukashenka as the “master of the country” who single-handedly determines domestic policy, and therefore “the hegemon [the U.S.] bows before him.” Commenting on the deportation of former political prisoners, he wrote: “… the best way to deal with enemies of the people is to expel them. Abroad they are not needed even by their own masters, who once considered them harmful to the body. When the body rids itself of helminths, the parasites perish.”

Andrei Lazutkin added that 20 small-scale releases of around 50 people each would be “a much more effective PR story” than a single mass release of 1,000 prisoners, as Trump would be able to “claim successes every few months,” while “Minsk will gain the unfreezing of the U.S. Embassy’s work in Washington and the lifting of sanctions from selected economic entities”.

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