Belarus Review by iSANS — October 27, 2025 

According to Ukrainian monitoring channels, at least three Russian drones were detected in Belarusian airspace between 20 and 26 October. No reports were made of crashes or interceptions.

On 20 October, the Belarusian Ministry of Defence announced the start of an official visit to Vietnam by Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces Pavel Muraveika. On the first day of the visit, Muraveika held talks with his Vietnamese counterpart Nguyen Tan Cuong. The sides discussed military cooperation in detail and emphasised the importance of moving to a qualitatively new level — a strategic partnership. The head of the Belarusian military delegation also met with Vietnam’s Minister of National Defence Phan Van Giang. Both sides confirmed their interest in strengthening close ties. During the visit, Muraveika toured the Viettel military-industrial holding, the air defence and air force command, and other military units.

From 20 to 24 October, the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) conducted exercises in Tajikistan: (1) Indestructible Brotherhood 2025 with the participation of CSTO peacekeeping forces, and (2) Barrier 2025 involving joint radiation, chemical and biological protection, and medical support units. Belarus was represented by a peacekeeping company from the 103rd Airborne Brigade and Interior Ministry units — the Special Purpose Police Detachment of the Minsk City Executive Committee and the “Lynx” special forces unit. The total number of participants was around 1,500. During Indestructible Brotherhood 2025, units carried out a peacekeeping operation on the territory of a notional CSTO member state, implementing ceasefire control and ensuring compliance with truce conditions between opposing sides. Barrier 2025 focused on responding to and eliminating sources of biological threats.

On 20 October, Aliaksandr Lukashenka signed Law No. 101-Z “On Amendments to Laws on Criminal and Administrative Liability.” The document introduces administrative liability (Article 18.38 of the Code of Administrative Offences) for the illegal import, possession, circulation, use, or manufacture of civilian drones or model aircraft. Repeated violations within one year after an administrative penalty entail criminal liability (Article 300-1 of the Criminal Code). It is worth noting that since the sabotage at the Machulishchy airfield in February 2023 — when a Russian A-50 long-range radar aircraft was damaged by a drone — the Belarusian authorities have consistently tightened control over the use of unmanned aerial vehicles.

Amendments were also introduced to Article 31 of the Law “On Military Duty and Military Service.” Citizens suspected or accused of draft evasion (Article 435 of the Criminal Code) are now subject to conscription if they voluntarily declare to the investigating authorities their readiness to fulfil their military service obligations. Previously, the law prohibited the conscription of persons under criminal prosecution. The new provision allows individuals to avoid criminal liability for draft evasion if they perform military service. A similar clause was incorporated into the Criminal Code as early as February 2025.

On 20 October, the Belarusian Ministry of Defence announced that, as part of bilateral military cooperation, a training group from Iran’s Supreme National Defence University had arrived in Belarus for a study visit. The delegation included students of the national defence course and members of the teaching and research staff.

On 21 October, it was reported that a Belarusian delegation led by the Chairman of the State Authority for Military Industry (SAMI), Dzmitry Pantus, had arrived in Iran to attend the 11th session of the Joint Belarus–Iran Intergovernmental Commission on Military-Technical Cooperation. Following the meeting, a protocol was signed, described as a solid foundation for the long-term development of bilateral cooperation in the military-technical field.

Pantus also held talks with Iran’s Minister of Defence and Armed Forces Logistics Aziz Nasirzadeh and his deputy for logistics, Masoud Oraei. The sides noted the successful implementation of existing agreements and reaffirmed their mutual readiness to expand partnership. Reports mentioned a number of closed-door meetings and visits to defence-industrial enterprises that were not disclosed publicly.

On 22 October, the Belarusian Ministry of Defence announced that Deputy Head of the Main Directorate for Ideological Work Aliaksei Titski had met with a delegation from Myanmar to discuss cooperation in the information sphere. Titski stated that cooperation between Belarus and Myanmar “will continue to develop and strengthen,” calling the current year a “breakthrough” in bilateral relations. The Myanmar delegation visited the VoenTV television company, the Vayar Military Information Agency, and the Military Academy.

Also on 22 October, the Ministry of Defence reported that a demonstration battalion-level tactical exercise was held at the Hozhski training ground under the command of the Western Operational Command. The exercise involved one of the battalions of the 6th Mechanised Brigade and focused on defensive operations, coordination, and comprehensive support during the preparation and conduct of defensive combat. The training included the use of drones, counter-battery fire tactics, ammunition supply under FPV-drone attacks, and the management of attached artillery units.

From 23 October, conscription for compulsory military service began in Belarus. In October–November, about 10,000 individuals are to be sent to the Armed Forces, internal troops, border service, and the State Security Committee. Around 500 more are to be called up for reserve service. On 24 October, Defence Minister Viktar Khrenin cited a higher figure of approximately 12,000, apparently including both regular conscripts (≈10,500) and citizens opting for contract service instead of compulsory service (≈1,500).

On 24 October, the State Authority for Military Industry announced that the 17th meeting of the Belarus–Myanmar Commission on Military-Technical Cooperation had taken place in Minsk. The session addressed plans to expand cooperation in the modernisation and production of military equipment. A separate topic concerned the training of military specialists from Myanmar in Belarus for the needs of its armed forces and defence industry. A protocol was signed at the end of the meeting, formalising the agreements reached.

On 22–23 October, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya paid a visit to the European Parliament in Strasbourg — a key event in the development of contacts between the Belarusian democratic forces and EU institutions. During the visit, Tsikhanouskaya and Siarhei Tsikhanouski took part in the European Parliament’s plenary session, where the democratic leader congratulated the 2025 Sakharov Prize laureates — Andrzej Poczobut (Belarus) and Mzia Amaghlobeli (Georgia) — and stressed that Belarus “remains occupied, silenced, and used as a platform for aggression,” yet Belarusians continue their resistance. In her meetings with representatives of the main political groups — Renew Europe, the Greens, the Social Democrats, and the European People’s Party — Tsikhanouskaya urged the EU to maintain focus on Belarus, to support political prisoners and their families, and to develop a dual-track strategy — European and American. She underlined that Belarus’s future lies “in the European quarter, not in Moscow’s sphere of influence,” and called on MEPs to strengthen Belarus’s visibility within the Parliament’s structures.

At the same plenary session, Siarhei Tsikhanouski also addressed members of the European Parliament, calling for continued pressure on the Lukashenka regime and for solidarity with imprisoned Belarusians. His participation was widely seen as symbolic — marking his first public appearance in the European Parliament since his release from prison and departure from Belarus.

On 23 October, the European Union adopted its 19th package of sanctions against Russia, which simultaneously became the 14th package of restrictive measures against Belarus. The new measures aim to harmonise the sanctions regimes of the two countries and prevent circumvention through Belarusian jurisdiction. The official documents (including Decisions 2025/2038–2041) explicitly cite the internal situation in Belarus as an independent ground for sanctions, alongside the Lukashenka regime’s involvement in Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. The updated lists add two Belarusian officials — Belneftekhim Chairman Ilya Ikan and Horizont CEO Yury Predko — as well as three legal entities (JSC Holography Industry, ICT Horizont, and Horizont Holding). The package introduces new trade restrictions on dual-use goods, electronic components, rangefinders, chemical precursors, and materials for industrial and construction use. Imports of all acyclic hydrocarbons for oil refining are banned (with temporary exemptions for Hungary). In the services sector, the sanctions prohibit the provision of software, space and navigation services, artificial intelligence solutions, and high-performance or quantum computing technologies to Belarusian state entities. The financial section imposes restrictions on operations by subsidiaries of Russian banks in Belarus (VTB Belarus, BelVEB, Belgazprombank, Alfa-Bank, BPS-Sberbank) and bans the operation of Belarusian and resident companies in the fintech and cryptoasset sectors without a special licence. The package also extends sanctions to intermediaries in third countries — including Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, the UAE, and Hong Kong — involved in Russian payment schemes.

On 26–27 October, the Lithuanian government announced the temporary closure of its border with Belarus for an indefinite period in response to an increase in launches of balloons and weather probes carrying contraband from Belarusian territory, which violated Lithuanian airspace and temporarily disrupted operations at Vilnius Airport. Prime Minister Inga Ruginiene stated that exemptions would remain only for diplomats, diplomatic mail, and returning EU citizens. According to her, the decision is aimed at countering “hybrid attacks” and will be accompanied by the deployment of the armed forces, authorised to shoot down such objects. At the same time, the Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was instructed to coordinate with the EU on a new package of sanctions against Minsk and to strengthen cooperation with Poland and Latvia. Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya supported Lithuania’s measures, saying that the Lukashenka regime “has turned smuggling into an instrument of hybrid warfare against Europe” and that “profits from the illegal export of cigarettes go not to criminal groups but directly into the regime’s pockets.”

Aliaksandr Lukashenka avoided commenting on the recent escalation between Russia and the United States, instead focusing demonstratively on domestic issues. On 24 October, he held a meeting in the Vitsebsk region, sharply criticising local authorities and describing the situation as “disastrous.” He said that the level of irresponsibility “from top to bottom” was unacceptable and noted that livestock mortality had increased by 140% year-on-year. Lukashenka also pointed to declining production despite nominal income growth and demanded that regional leaders “restore order immediately.” He paid particular attention to low wages in the region and the widening gap with other parts of the country.

On 27 October, Lukashenka met in Minsk with Cardinal Claudio Gugerotti, Prefect of the Dicastery for the Eastern Churches of the Vatican, who arrived to mark the 100th anniversary of the Pinsk Diocese. Lukashenka thanked the Cardinal for his visit, proposed discussing bilateral relations with the Holy See, and declared that “Belarus is open to dialogue with representatives of all faiths.” He expressed personal sympathy toward Gugerotti, who previously served as Apostolic Nuncio to Belarus, and invited him to “visit more often,” promising to resolve visa-related issues. The Cardinal, in turn, noted the “openness and hope of Belarusian society” and stressed the importance of dialogue in Europe. The visit continued Minsk’s “soft” diplomatic engagement with the Catholic Church following the invitation extended to the Pope to visit Belarus in 2026.

In October, Belarus significantly increased its fuel supplies to the Russian market. According to Russia’s National Exchange Agency, sales of Belarusian gasoline on the St. Petersburg International Mercantile Exchange reached 24,700 tonnes in the first 20 days of October — more than 30 times higher than during the same period in 2024. The surge in imports was linked to fuel shortages in Russia caused by Ukrainian drone strikes and refinery accidents. Belarusian gasoline was also cheaper than Russian fuel due to domestic price regulation.

Last week, it became known that, on 5 September, the anarchist political prisoner Alyaksei Halauko was convicted on charges of malicious disobedience to the demands of the colony administration. He was sentenced to additional six months of imprisonment. Halauko was detained in March 2021 in the case of anarchists. He was charged with creating and leading a criminal organisation, creating and participating in an extremist formation, desecration of buildings and damaging property, and acts grossly violating public order. In September 2022, Halauko was sentenced to 12 years of imprisonment in a high-security colony. He was also fined 700 basic units (approximately 60,000 Euro).

Ihar Brodka, an ex-employee of the Ministry of Emergency Situations from Smilavichi, was convicted on charges of high treason and assistance to “extremist activities”. The exact actions he was accused of are unknown, but the charges may be related to the case of Belarusian Hajun. In early February 2025, the chatbot of the Belarusian Hajun Telegram channel was hacked by security forces, who gained access to the personal data of Belarusians who sent information there.

Pavel Dabravolski, a journalist detained in January, is accused of “high treason”. He faces up to 15 years of imprisonment. According to available information, the charge is related to his professional activities. Dabravolski has worked for both Belarusian and foreign media, including the Ukrainian edition of NV.ua. According to public information from Dabravolski’s social media accounts, after leaving Belarus at the end of 2021, he travelled to various countries, including Iran and Russia, and visited South America. In October 2024, he returned to Minsk. On 26 August, the human rights community recognised Dabravolski as a political prisoner.

On 21 October, Belarusian human rights activists recognised 14 more people as political prisoners. The are known to have been detained or convicted on charges of collaborating with “extremist formations”. The number of political prisoners in Belarus as of 21 October stands at 1,247.

On 21 October, the Hrodna Regional Court announced the verdict for five political prisoners from Navagrudak: Tattiana Palubok, Volha Alyashkevich, Ihar Khinevich, and the couple Alyaksandr and Iryna Lebedz. They were detained on 31 October 2024, when those who, according to the authorities, were involved in “yard chats” were detained across the country. Human rights activists believe that the residents of Navagrudak were detained for participation in the Telegram chat “Partisans of Navagrudak”. They were found guilty of “creating or participating in an extremist formation” and sentenced to two and a half years of imprisonment each, along with fines of 800 basic units (approximately 8,500 Euro).

On 24 October, the names of three more Belarusians who were sentenced to imprisonment terms in the “yard chats case” became known. These were Maryna Petrazhytskaya, Anastasia Sikirytskaya, and Anastasia Harchakova. In July 2025, they were sentenced to two years of imprisonment and fined with 800 basic units (approximately 8,500 euros) for “creating an extremist formation”. On 29 October 2024, the KGB designated the “Order” yard coalition, which allegedly consisted of nine local chats, as an extremist formation. Thereafter, mass arrests took place across the country. Criminal cases have been initiated against dozens of people on charges of conspiracy or other actions aimed at seizing power and creating or participating in an extremist formation. According to human rights activists, some of the defendants are outside the country, while dozens of others remain in custody. The first mass trials in this case began in July 2025.

The Investigative Committee launched a special procedure against Dzmitry Banit, who is accused of inciting hostility; slander; illegal actions with personal data; violence or threats of violence against an employee of the internal affairs authorities; and insulting a government official. He is required to attend the Baranovichi Interdistrict Department of the Investigative Committee.

The Investigative Committee launched a special (in absentia) procedure against Vadzim Kryvasheev. In September 2020, he was dismissed from his position as freestyle director of the Republican Olympic Training Centre for “poor ideological teamwork”. Kryvasheev was a sports representative for the National Anti-Crisis Management. He is accused of abuse of power or official authority; conspiracy or other actions aimed at seizing power; calls for the imposition of sanctions or other actions harmful to national security; creation or participation in an extremist formation. Kryvasheev is required to attend the Office of the Investigative Committee in Minsk.

On 22 October, the Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought of the European Parliament was awarded to Andrzej Poczobut, a Belarusian journalist, activist of the Union of Poles of Belarus, and political prisoner. He was sentenced to eight years of imprisonment and declared a “terrorist” and an “extremist”. Andrzej Poczobut was nominated for this award by the European Conservatives and Reformists Group of Members of the European Parliament. Małgorzata Gosiewska, Head of the Delegation for Relations with Belarus, stated that Poczobut is “a symbol of Belarus and Belarusians who are fighting for fundamental rights, for democracy, for freedom of speech, for civil liberties, and a normal state”. She noted that receiving the award increases the chances that Andrzej Poczobut will be released. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk commented that the liberation of Poczobut is the top priority for Warsaw. “Andrzej Poczobut is the first on our list of expectations. I do not exclude the possibility that this is why they do not want to release him,” he said. “This award is an important sign of support for those who are behind bars today. It is also a signal to the authorities that the democratic world sees their desire for freedom and does not ignore injustice,” commented Belarusian democratic leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya.

In a resolution titled “Situation in Belarus, Five Years after the Fraudulent Presidential Elections” (2025/2900(RSP)), approved on 22 October, the European Parliament firmly condemned the repression in Belarus and expressed solidarity with opponents of the Lukashenka regime. Members of the European Parliament demanded the immediate release of all political prisoners and called for compensation and the restoration of their rights. They also deplored the misuse of judicial and law enforcement systems by the authorities to violate human rights. Aliaksandr Lukashenka  is not recognised by Parliament as Belarus’s legitimate president, and MEPs reaffirmed their support for Belarusian democratic forces led by Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya. They warned against Lukashenka’s use of political prisoners as leverage in negotiations with the West, noting that each time prisoners have been released, others have subsequently been detained. MEPs advocated for supporting Belarusian civil society, independent media, students, and exiled professionals through visas, scholarships, grants, and protective measures. They condemned attacks on independent media, the restriction of internet access, and the arrest of journalists. The resolution demanded urgent measures to counter transnational repression by the Belarusian regime, including the misuse of Interpol, and called for protection for exiled Belarusians. The EU and its member states should continue investigating human rights abuses and crimes against humanity in Belarus, and support measures to hold perpetrators accountable, including through international courts. MEPs strongly condemned the Lukashenka regime’s involvement in Russia’s war against Ukraine. The resolution was adopted with 458 votes in favour, 18 against, and 84 abstentions.

The week’s propaganda narratives reinforced Minsk’s portrayal of Lukashenka as a peace-seeking statesman and positioned Belarus as a supposed mediator between “irrational Western hawks” and “reasonable Slavic unity.”

In Minskaya Praŭda, commentator Yauhen Pustavoy argued that Vladimir Putin “also wants peace in Ukraine,” but that it must be “the Russian world,” as “a commander-in-chief cannot stop a successful offensive.” According to Pustavoy, Belarusians need peace in Ukraine “not only out of kinship but also for their own peace of mind.” He maintained that “the road to independence for Kyiv lies through Minsk,” and that those who “deny Ukraine’s existence as a state and culture are enemies of Slavic unity.” “The Ukrainian should not be seen as the antonym of the Russian. The Ukrainian is an independent culture within the pantheon of pan-Slavism. Belarusian, Russian, Ukrainian — they are like German, Dutch, and Belgian, belonging to one civilizational paradigm. Unity through respect for uniqueness — only such a philosophy can end the conflict and allow us to move forward,” he wrote.

Pro-government MP Aleh Haidukevich told Sputnik Belarus that the “enemies of peace” are doing everything to prevent a Trump–Putin meeting, while President Volodymyr Zelensky “refuses to meet and talk with Lukashenka because he hates his own people and his own country.” Propagandist Ryhor Azaronak accused not only the Ukrainian authorities but also the “collective West” of escalation and provocation: “They are blowing up refineries in Hungary and Romania. They are demanding Tomahawks or any other long-range weapons. They are preparing the 20th sanctions package. They are forming an invasion army for Belarus — as a representative of the KGB said at an international forum. They don’t want peace, only death, killing, destruction, annihilation. The Western elite has already lost the ability to live otherwise. They’ve staked everything on war and blood — and if peace ever comes, their own peoples will sweep them away.”

Azaronak claimed that the West knows “the Bandera regime can never win,” but continues the conflict because “the war is a cash cow for the scummy Western elite” — the US military-industrial complex “has made billions,” while Europe “has rearmed itself by disposing of outdated weapons.” He alleged that the recent Budapest summit was deliberately sabotaged and presented Lukashenka as an example of a true peacemaker who “calls for peace, offers to stop, and knows how to do it.” Developing a conspiratorial narrative, Azaronak asserted that US President Trump was “forbidden by the deep state to call Batka”: “The war party threatened Trump that the next shot wouldn’t be into the ear — and he backed off. Let’s hope he’ll come back to us. Meanwhile, no one will save us from our own problems. It is we who must bring Ukraine back into the Slavic fold. Belarus extends a hand — the hand of peace. Zelensky’s hands are busy — with weapons.”

His colleague, Minskaya Praŭda columnist Yury Uvarau, predicted that the Budapest summit “will eventually take place but will not become a step toward peace,” since “Western hawks” are allegedly preparing “a trap”: “Budapest is needed as a symbol of Russia’s violation of the Budapest Memorandum. The new agreement will be designed from the outset for Russia to violate it again — and, as always, Ukraine will assist with provocations.” Uvarau cited Putin as someone who “unlike Trump, does not throw words to the wind” and warned that “Russia’s patience has its limits,” so Washington, London and Brussels “should think about the consequences of their dangerous games.”

In another article, Uvarau mocked Western leaders such as Estonia’s Prime Minister Kaja Kallas, claiming that “only characters like her could come up with rumours about Russia opening a second front in the Baltics.” He called the Baltic states “the Baltic Dying Emirates” — suggesting they are “depopulating mini-emirates” that will soon “beg to be part of Russia.” Citing unnamed “insider sources,” he alleged that the “EU’s foreign intelligence service” was behind recent “drone provocations” in Europe and that a secret sabotage unit had been created “on the personal order of the bribed ‘Bloody Baroness’ Ursula von der Leyen.” According to Uvarau, von der Leyen “receives kickbacks from the US administration regardless of who sits in the White House, as well as from the military-industrial complex,” and “her secret accounts are regularly topped up with ‘bonuses’ from the notorious global backstage.”

Belarusian propagandists actively commented on the actions and statements of the US leader; their rhetoric combined sharp criticism with cautious compliments and calls for cooperation. For example, Yury Uvarau believes that “Trump could lead the world to a nuclear apocalypse.” In his view, during his second term the politician “has elevated falsehood to the position of the main political technology,” “leaves himself a wide field for manoeuvre, and when convenient, accuses the media of lying.” Uvarau argued that “Trump drives threats against Russia to a situation close to the Cuban Missile Crisis, then easily switches to a complimentary rhetoric. Then threats again, blackmail. Then a new round of talk about peace and respect for Russia. Why is this done? I have answered this question more than once. Everything is calculated to increase panic moods. It is one of the old technologies of the global backstage. They implement new projects through chaos and panic.”

Anton Papou, political commentator for SB. Belarus Segodnya, took a more optimistic line, arguing that even after the Budapest summit cancellation and sanctions targeting Rosneft and Lukoil, the US leader does not want to “destroy the progress made in recent months in bilateral relations.” Papou urged “not to dramatise,” noting that a return to “Biden-era” policies — i.e. a rupture of recently established diplomatic contacts and sharp military moves — is not imminent.

Michael Albrecht, a columnist for SB. Belarus Segodnya, suggested that the Nobel Peace Prize was “snatched from under Trump’s nose” by Machado — “a lady who has received at least $4m from NED since 2004,” and described the National Endowment for Democracy as “the very instrument behind all the ‘colour revolutions’ and coups worldwide.” He argued that once US elites spoke of regime change in Caracas, the Nobel Committee awarded a person “whose primary task is to implement that plan and install a puppet regime, as happened in Ukraine.”

Representatives of the Lukashenka information ecosystem continued close monitoring of the activities and statements of his opponents. After the European Parliament awarded the Sakharov Prize to political prisoner Andrzej Poczobut, regime outlets pushed narratives discrediting Poczobut, EU structures and the Prize itself. Ryhor Azaronak wrote: “So — a Polish nationalist, Russophobe and anti-Soviet gets the prize named after… the Creator of the Stalin hydrogen bomb.” He also accused exiled critics of seeking “to mentally sever themselves from Russia” and to “overcome the Soviet Union in the country,” claiming — without evidence — that such opponents orient towards Ukraine and “call for war” in Belarus. Azaronak painted a graphic picture of the alleged goals of these critics — “lunar landscapes instead of cities, destroyed enterprises and land sold to transnational corporations” — and accused them of wanting towns such as Brest, Minsk, Homel, Hrodna, Vitsebsk and Mahiliou to become like Toretsk, Lysychansk, Horlivka and Avdiivka, “so that drones would strike children’s heads as in Donetsk.”

Notably, in a piece published in a state newspaper, Azaronak went further, proposing the extrajudicial execution of “decommunisers” and their burial in Kurapaty (the site near Minsk associated with mass NKVD executions in 1937–40).

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Best regards, iSANS team