Belarus Review by iSANS — November 3, 2025 

According to Ukrainian monitoring channels, between 27 October and 2 November, at least one Russian drone was detected operating in Belarusian airspace. There were no reports of its crash or interception.

During the week, a series of statements were made concerning the deployment of Russian tactical nuclear weapons and the “Oreshnik” missile system in Belarus. On 28 October, speaking at the 3rd Minsk International Conference on Eurasian Security, Alyaksandr Lukashenka described the deployment as a “response measure to regional escalation and current threats.” “Let’s step back from this escalation — then the talk about the Oreshnik will stop. We are not threatening anyone; we are simply ensuring our security,” he said. That same day, his spokesperson Natallia Eismant announced that preparations for the Oreshnik’s deployment were nearly complete and that the system would be placed on combat duty in December.

On 31 October, Lukashenka commented further on the stationing of tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus. He claimed that Belarus had exchanged older warheads for newer ones from Russia, adding that while nuclear maintenance is costly, Moscow provides assistance. “We are training on how to use it — both with aircraft and missile systems. We do not hide this,” he said. Lukashenka reiterated plans to put the Oreshnik missile complex on combat duty in December, warning that Belarus and Russia “could strike if necessary.” “I want them [foreign opponents] to understand — if things go bad, we can strike. We’ll sit down with Putin, make the decision, and strike. So don’t provoke us,” he said.

Between 28 and 31 October, Minsk hosted the 25th Belarus–Russia Intergovernmental Commission on Military-Technical Cooperation. According to Belarus’s State Authority for Military Industry, the parties signed a final protocol outlining plans to deepen defence-industrial cooperation, harmonise positions on key cooperation issues, and introduce mechanisms for oversight of implementation.

On 29 October, the Belarusian Ministry of Defence reported that representatives of the military medical departments of the Belarusian and Vietnamese defence ministries held a working meeting in Minsk. The sides discussed military medical support systems, medical logistics, personnel training, and prospects for bilateral cooperation. The Vietnamese delegation also visited the 432nd Central Military Clinical Medical Centre to observe Belarus’s military healthcare practices.

Also on 29 October, Defence Minister Viktar Khrenin presided over a meeting reviewing the joint Belarus–Russia strategic exercise “Zapad-2025.” He evaluated the performance of personnel at all levels — from strategic to tactical — and emphasised the need to draw lessons from the manoeuvres and define future development priorities for the Belarusian Armed Forces. Distinguished servicemen received awards; no further details were released.

On 30 October, the Defence Ministry reported that a combat training session had been held at the Lepel training ground for officers of operational training directorates. Participants studied modern combat methods, including the use and countering of drones, tactical medicine, and combat in urban and wooded areas. According to Major General Uladzimir Bely, head of the General Directorate of Combat Training, special focus was given to drone operations and countermeasures. He noted that by 2025, almost all Belarusian training grounds had been equipped to train troops in drone warfare.

On 30 October, the BELPOL initiative reported that the SVT Plant, a subsidiary of the Belarusian company Amkodor, has been engaged in maintenance and repair of equipment for Russian strategic missile systems — specifically the R-36M “Satan” and P-135 complexes — citing a 2023 report from Russia’s 1281st Defence Ministry Representative Office.

On 31 October, on the sidelines of the CIS Defence Ministers’ Council, Defence Minister Viktar Khrenin met with his Russian counterpart Andrey Belousov. The two officials “synchronised positions” on key areas of military cooperation. No additional details were disclosed.

Belarus’s weekly foreign-policy agenda combined a sharper foreign-policy line from the Lukashenka regime with renewed attempts to cast Minsk as a “dialogue platform,” alongside escalated hybrid pressure on Lithuania.

On 30 October, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya took part in the Paris Peace Forum, calling for systemic support to independent Belarusian media and civil society. She met with the leadership of the International Fund for Public Interest Media (IFPIM), which — with the involvement of Belarusian democratic forces — launched a Sweden-funded assistance programme for exiled journalists, and discussed with France’s Foreign Minister and the management of Radio France Internationale (RFI) the creation of a Belarusian-language editorial team in RFI. Among her key priorities, Tsikhanouskaya highlighted the release of political prisoners, support for independent media, coordination of EU–US policies and preserving open borders and visa channels for Belarusians. She also met with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, expressing gratitude for his invitation to the Euronest meeting, reaffirming solidarity with Armenia and supporting its European integration efforts.

On the evening of 29 October, Tsikhanouskaya attended a formal dinner hosted by President Emmanuel Macron at the Élysée Palace — an event reserved for high-level guests of the French head of state. Her participation was viewed as a gesture of solidarity with Belarusian society and recognition of the democratic movement’s legitimacy.

In her address, Tsikhanouskaya stressed that Belarusians had “won the 2020 election,” while the regime “clings to power through repression and Kremlin’s support.” She warned that holding talks with the regime without ensuring irreversible change would be “a mistake.” Belarus, drawn into the war through the regime, remains “a platform for aggression,” and without its liberation, the European security architecture will remain vulnerable.

On 31 October, during a working trip to the Vitsebsk region, Alyaksandr Lukashenka escalated his foreign policy rhetoric, seeking to shift responsibility for recent security incidents onto Western counterparts. Commenting on Lithuania’s closure of its border with Belarus following reports of meteorological balloons carrying contraband cigarettes, Lukashenka acknowledged that such launches had taken place but claimed they were organised by “Lithuanian citizens deprived of their livelihoods by their own authorities.” Accusing neighbouring countries of “provoking crime” and “breaking living ties,” he rejected calls for an official apology, stating: “The Americans demanded an apology — I told them to go to hell.”

At the same time, Lukashenka announced the suspension of negotiations with Poland on the exchange of detained persons, including imprisoned journalist Andrzej Poczobut, asserting that Warsaw had “backed away from agreements in solidarity with Lithuania,” prompting Minsk to “put the process to a pause.” The Polish Foreign Ministry declined to comment on Lukashenka’s remarks about the collapse of negotiations on the Poczobut exchange.

Among other statements, Lukashenka claimed that Raman Pratasevich, the opposition journalist arrested after the forced landing of a Ryanair flight in Minsk in 2021, was “an officer of the Belarusian intelligence service.” Pratasevich issued a brief confirmation, though the regime provided no verifiable evidence. The claim drew widespread attention for its implausibility — implying that the authorities had diverted an international passenger flight merely to “extract their own agent.” Pro-Kremlin sources reacted cautiously: the Telegram channel Nezygar described Lukashenka as “indulging in provocations,” noting that if the claim were true, Minsk would have to explain the alleged intelligence links with Ukraine’s Azov Battalion, Komsomolskaya Pravda, Gazprombank, and businessman Dmitry Mazepin.

On 28 October, at the 3rd Minsk International Conference on Eurasian Security, the regime continued efforts to reposition itself as a “platform for dialogue” and even a mediator between the Global South and the West. Calls to uphold the principle of “indivisible security” were echoed by Lukashenka, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, and China’s Special Envoy for Eurasian Affairs Sun Linjiang. Other participants included Hungary’s Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó and DPRK Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui. Delegations from more than 40 countries attended, though Lithuania’s border closure complicated logistics and became one of the event’s central topics.

Lukashenka’s address alternated between hardline and conciliatory rhetoric, mixing threats and accusations against the West with appeals for “dialogue.” He accused Western nations of losing the ability to communicate and outlined four initiatives through which Minsk claims to see a path toward restarting regional security discussions:

·      Humanitarian protection — a ban on all sanctions targeting food and medicines.

·      International infrastructure — creation of mechanisms for data exchange and mutual guarantees on the integrity of pipelines, internet cables, and nuclear power plants.

·      Migration — development of a “global deal” on migration, with unified vetting procedures and measures against human trafficking.

·      Artificial intelligence — international coordination on AI principles to prevent its militarisation.

On 31 October, Alyaksandr Lukashenka signed a decree banning the use of Belarusian territory by freight trucks and trailers registered in several EU countries, including Poland and Lithuania. The restrictions, effective through the end of 2027, also apply to Polish passenger vehicles engaged in international transport. Following Lithuania’s border closure, around 5,000 Lithuanian trucks and trailers remain stranded on Belarusian territory without permission to leave. Unlike Warsaw, Minsk announced no exemptions, creating a potential risk of vehicle confiscation.

Against this backdrop, Lithuania reported 275 attempts at illegal border crossings in October — the highest figure in six months — though the flow stopped completely on 1–2 November. Border activity on the Polish side has also decreased. The combination of transport restrictions and controlled migration suggests the continuation of Minsk’s hybrid pressure tactics against EU neighbours.

On 30 October, the International Strategic Action Network for Security (iSANS) released a new public opinion survey, indicating growing patriotism and declining anti-American attitudes, even among regime supporters. Eighty-four percent of respondents described themselves as patriots (+15 pp over the past decade), while only 14% viewed the United States as a threat (–10 pp in two years). Russia and China remain Belarus’s primary geopolitical reference points, yet integrationist sentiment toward Moscow is weakening, giving way to more pragmatic rather than ideological motivations. According to iSANS, the rise in national self-awareness is visible not only among pro-democratic Belarusians but also within the regime’s own patriotic discourse — signalling a gradual societal shift away from the “one nation with Russia” narrative.

As human rights defenders reported last week, Pinsk resident Andrei Kuzmyanchuk was convicted in absentia for participating in protest actions in 2020. The court found him guilty of “participating in mass riots, which resulted in direct violence against individuals, pogroms, and destruction of property” and sentenced him to four years of imprisonment in a high-security colony. Kuzmyanchuk was added to the “terrorist list”.

The Supreme Court considered an appeal against the verdict handed down to Mikalai Katsalapau, co-founder of the Wargaming company. The appeal was rejected, and the verdict was upheld. The verdict was handed down at the beginning of October. Katsalapau was sentenced in absentia to 13 years of imprisonment in a high-security colony. He also received a huge fine of 50,000 base units (2,100,000 rubles or more than 530,000 Euro). He was found guilty of financing extremist and terrorist activities. Propagandists claimed that Katsalapau had transferred hundreds of thousands of dollars in cryptocurrency to “extremist” and “terrorist” funds.

On 29 October, eight more Belarusians were added to the list of “organisations and individuals involved in terrorist activities”. There are now 1,400 people on the list, 658 of them Belarusians.

On 29 October, the Minsk City Court considered a case against businessman and former Honorary Consul of Belarus in Mexico Yury Marozau. He was sentenced to five years of imprisonment in a high-security colony for participating in protest actions and aiding extremist activities. The essence of the charges brought against Marozau is unknown. His wife Maryna was recently sentenced to two years of imprisonment on charges of organising and participating in actions grossly violating public order. On 17 October, she was added to the list of “extremists”.

On 29 October, human rights defenders recognised 12 people as political prisoners. They were imprisoned or convicted for interaction with “extremist formations”, as well as for insulting Lukashenka, slandering Lukashenka, discrediting Belarus, and insulting a government representative. On 30 October, human rights defenders recognised five more people as political prisoners. As of 30 October, the number of political prisoners in Belarus is 1,254.

Vasil Krauchuk was extradited to Belarus after being detained in Russia, “Viasna” Human Rights Centre reported. According to human rights defenders, Krauchuk is currently held in “one of the Belarusian pre-trial detention centres.” On 17 October, it was reported that Krauchuk was detained in St. Petersburg. It was noted that he was on the interstate wanted list and that the St. Petersburg police informed the Interior Ministry of Belarus about the detention. Earlier, on 7 February 2022, Krauchuk was sentenced by a court in Pinsk to two years of restriction of liberty for insulting a government official. The basis for the charges was a humorous comment in the Telegram channel “Karateli Belarusi” (Executioners of Belarus) regarding an employee of the Juvenile Affairs Inspectorate. After the verdict, Krauchuk left Belarus.

Alyaksei Kaidash, a photographer from Mozyr, was sentenced to three years of imprisonment in a high-security colony for facilitating “extremist activities”. The charge was probably related to the Belarusian Hajun case. Kaidash was detained in February 2025. He was initially arrested for 15 days in an administrative case for the distribution of “extremist materials”, and then a criminal case was opened against him. The essence of the charges is unknown.

It became known that photographer Inna Korbut from Naroulya was detained and convicted earlier in 2025 for “facilitating extremist activities”. The prosecution was related to the Belarusian Hajun case. It is known that Korbut was sentenced to restriction of liberty, but the verdict, as well as the exact nature of the charges, remain unknown. It is known that Korbut participated in the “Marathon of Unity”, a state-organised social and cultural event and praised it in a local newspaper.

On 31 October, the owner of the website about Hrodna, s13.ru, Syarhei Chabotska, was sentenced to three and a half years in a high-security colony. Chabotska also received a fine of 1,000 base units (42 thousand rubles or more than 10,000 Euro). He was found guilty of creating or participating in an “extremist formation” and slandering Lukashenka. Before the trial, Chabotska had been held in custody for more than a year. He was detained in October 2024 and sentenced to administrative arrest three times. During this time, the website s13.ru was recognised as “extremist materials” and an “extremist formation”, after which a criminal case was opened against Chabotska.

Political prisoner Syarhei Ramanau was admitted to hospital, where he underwent surgery. According to available information, the operation was planned and passed without complications. He is due to be transferred back to the colony soon. It is noted that Ramanau’s health problems have been known for a long time, but no details are known due to prison censorship. Ramanau was detained while crossing the border of Belarus on the night of 28-29 October 2020. In February 2021, the KGB added him to the list of “persons involved in terrorist activities”. He was also included in the list of those involved in extremist activities. In December  2021, he was sentenced to 20 years of imprisonment in a high-security colony. Later, he was tried three times on charges of “malicious disobedience to the demands of the administration”. His total term of imprisonment is 24 years and 5 months.

The Vitsebsk Regional Court will begin considering the case of four participants of the “Chestnyje liudi” (Honest People) initiative in absentia on 5 November. According to the investigation, which was conducted under a special procedure, “the defendants were members of the extremist group “Chestnyje liudi” and carried out criminal activities on the territory of Belarus, Ukraine, Poland, and Lithuania from July 2020 to September 2025.” The Vitsebsk Region Prosecutor’s Office noted that among the accused was a 34-year-old resident of Minsk, “who acted as one of the leaders of the formation and coordinated the criminal activities of the group,” while the rest of the participants served as managers, coordinators, and heads of various projects. As was previously reported, on 20 August 2025, the Investigative Committee launched an investigation under a special procedure against the participants of the “Chestnyje liudi” initiative Alena Zhivahlod, Zaryna Sarokina, Aleh Davydchik, and Tsimafei Malakhouski. All of them were accused of creating or participating in an extremist group, insulting the president, inciting racial, national, religious, or other social hostility or discord, slandering the president, including one who has terminated their powers, discrediting the Republic of Belarus, and calling for restrictive measures (sanctions) or other actions aimed at harming the national security of the Republic of Belarus. The “Chestnyje liudi” initiative was recognised as an extremist group back in 2022. On 18 June 2025, the KGB added Alena Zhivahlod, Zaryna Sarokina, Aleh Davydchik, and Tsimafei Malakhouski to the list of those involved in the “Chestnyje liudi” “extremist formation”.

Belarus is once again in the bottom third of the global Rule of Law Index. According to the World Justice Project data for 2025, Belarus ranked 105^th out of 143, retaining last year’s position and showing some of the lowest results in the world in terms of restrictions on the powers of government, transparency of governance, and respect for human rights. The Rule of Law Index contains data on eight factors, such as restrictions on the powers of government and openness of governance, corruption, citizens’ rights, order and security, and the justice system. Belarus showed the weakest result in terms of restrictions on the powers of the government — 137^th place. It is also at the end of the ranking in terms of openness of governance (134^th place) and respect for fundamental rights (131^st place). According to the researchers, the deepest failures are recorded in the areas of judicial independence, government turnover, and freedom of expression. The strongest aspects of the Belarusian legal environment remain “order and security” — 41^st place, as well as “absence of  corruption” (60^th place), “civil justice” (60^th place) and “criminal justice” (91^st place).

On 27 October, Nils Muižnieks, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Belarus, presented his latest report at the UN General Assembly. In his report, Muižnieks found pervasive discrimination and harassment based on political motives in both the public and private sectors. He also found unjustified restrictions on access to professions based on political motives and the use of hard, dangerous forced labour for meagre or no pay as a form of punishment for persons unjustly incarcerated. The Special Rapporteur also deplored the wholesale destruction of trade union rights, and detailed violations of workers’ rights. The report followed a two-year engagement of the mandate with the International Labour Organisation, which has put Belarus under enhanced scrutiny under article 33 of its Constitution due to violations of trade unions’ rights. Muižnieks urged Member States not to be misled by recent releases of political prisoners. He recalled that over 1,100 people continue to be detained arbitrarily in Belarus and that some of those released have been deported and had their passports confiscated — leaving them at risk of statelessness and fear of returning to Belarus.

The Embassies of the United Kingdom, Sweden, Germany, Lithuania, and the EU delegation to Belarus called for the release of Belarusian journalists in custody. “Today marks the International Day to End Impunity for Crimes against Journalists. In Belarus, at least 24 journalists are unjustly imprisoned. We call for their release. Hundreds of Belarusian media workers have been subjected to politically motivated persecution, and hundreds have been forced to live in exile. Repression against journalists violates Belarus’ international obligations,” the diplomatic missions said in a statement on 2 November.

The International Strategic Action Network for Security (iSANS) released its new propaganda quarterly analytical report: “We get along with dictatorship just like Adam did with God”. The report covers the main propaganda narratives targeting Belarus in the third quarter of 2025. The main findings of the reports are as follows:

• Belarusian propaganda continues to operate on the basis of total confrontation with the opposition and the West, while simultaneously glorifying Lukashenka as the center of unity and stability for the nation, the union with Russia as a guarantee of security, and rapprochement with China as a civilizational choice. The Belarusian regime’s information campaign is accompanied by harsh militaristic rhetoric and justification of repression against “enemies inside and outside the country.”
• On the domestic political front, propaganda continues to focus on strengthening Lukashenka’s autocratic rule, authority, and personality cult. Propaganda uses ideological holidays as a pretext for expressing gratitude to the ruler.
• In the foreign policy direction, the need for a strategic alliance with Russia and a close partnership with China is being increasingly promoted. The state media enthusiastically places Belarus on a par with these two dictatorial regimes and praises Lukashenka for his ability to negotiate with Putin and Xi Jinping.
• During the last quarter, several groups of political prisoners have been pardoned thanks to direct contact between representatives of the U.S. president and the Belarusian ruler and in exchange for the easing of sanctions. Propagandists celebrated the exchange as a “profitable deal” and called the release of political prisoners “getting rid of trash.”
• The Lukashenka regime continues to provide unconditional support for the Russian aggression against Ukraine, including ideological support. Belarusian propaganda continues to spread extremely hostile narratives towards Ukraine and Ukrainians.
• The propaganda machine has finally decided on Donald Trump’s place and role regarding the war in Ukraine: the American president is not on the side of Russia and Belarus. The state media now write about him with disappointment and irritation.
• At the same time, the regime is increasingly expressing concern about the war that has been going on near the Belarusian border for more than three years and is calling for peace talks. Lukashenka is extremely interested in regaining his status of a “peacemaker” and, with Putin’s permission, is offering himself as a “negotiator,” which is constantly rejected by the Ukrainian side.

Note from the editors: We do not provide links to publications in official and propagandistic sources belonging to the Lukashenka regime or affiliated with the regime. If you are interested in obtaining such a link for research or investigation purposes, please contact us at info@isans.org

Best regards, iSANS team