Belarus Review by iSANS — November 17, 2025 

According to Ukrainian monitoring channels, between 10 and 16 November at least three Russian drones were detected in Belarusian airspace. No crashes or interceptions were reported. All overflights occurred during the night of 14 November, coinciding with Russia’s large-scale drone attack on Ukraine. According to Ukraine’s Air Force, a total of 430 drones of various types were used in the strike.

On 10 November, at a meeting on finalising the 2026–2030 Socio-Economic Development Programme, Aliaksandr Lukashenka said that Belarus “possesses tactical nuclear weapons” thanks to its close relations with Russia, and that the Oreshnik missile system would enter combat duty in December. He stressed that systems such as Burevestnik and Poseidon were unnecessary for Belarus because their deployment “does not require being on the frontline.”

Lukashenka also stated that strengthening defence capability involves “classified issues,” including the tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Belarus. He said he would not disclose their quantity, locations or other details, noting only that they are stored securely and have undergone servicing in Russia. He claimed that he could “tomorrow” take journalists to the storage site to film everything, including the deployment area of the nuclear weapons — but added that “we don’t need that.”

Lukashenka separately addressed the Oreshnik missile complex, describing it as a mobile system that will rotate among several pre-designated locations and be able to strike if necessary. As with nuclear weapons, he said no specific details would be released.

On 12 November, according to Russian information agency TASS, Aleksei Polishchuk of the Russian Foreign Ministry said Moscow had received no requests from Minsk regarding the possible transfer of the Burevestnik missile. Should such a request be submitted, it would be reviewed by military specialists, and the final decision would be taken by the political and military leadership of both countries “in the spirit of allied cooperation.”

On 12 November, the Telegram channel of the Northwestern Operational Command reported that the 814th Technical Support Centre (Unit 32377) had received four Russian-made MTO-UB1 maintenance workshops. These mobile workshops provide technical assistance to crews for labour-intensive maintenance and repair of armoured vehicles in field conditions. The systems support servicing of T-72 tanks of various modifications, BMP-1 and BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicles, APCs, trucks and other equipment. In 2024, similar deliveries to units of the Special Operations Forces were reported.

On 16 November, the programme “Arsenal” aired an interview with Viachaslau Starkou, head of the Radiation, Chemical, Biological Protection (RCB Defence) and Ecology Directorate of the General Staff. Starkou spoke about ongoing development of RCB units, noting the active use of drones for radiation reconnaissance, aerosol screening and delivery of incendiary mixtures, as well as improvements in flamethrower unit tactics. Re-equipment continues with new radiation-control devices, biological and chemical protection gear, and automated command-and-control systems.

He also announced that in 2026, Belarus will host “Barrier-2026,” a specialised CSTO exercise involving joint RCB Defence and medical support formations.

On 14 November, the State Authority for Military Industry (SAMI) reported the conclusion of the 11th session of the Joint Belarus-Cuba Commission on Military-Technical Cooperation in Havana. The sides discussed international and regional security and agreed to further strengthen bilateral defence-industrial cooperation. On the next day, 15 November, SAMI announced that its delegation had arrived in Caracas for the third meeting of the Belarus-Venezuela working group on military-technical cooperation. The parties outlined concrete steps to deepen cooperation and signed a final protocol setting out “new vectors of joint work.”

On 15 November, 1,200 conscripts drafted into the Internal Troops took the military oath, according to the Internal Troops’ press service. Published data indicate no anomalies in the 2025 recruitment cycle: the number of conscripts drafted during the autumn call-up is consistent with levels over the past 20 years. In other words, there is no trend toward expanding the Internal Troops through increased conscription.

On 12–13 November, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya paid a working visit to London, a key step in deepening contacts between the Belarusian democratic forces and UK political institutions. In meetings with Europe Minister Stephen Doughty, Conservative Party Chair Kemi Badenoch, Shadow Minister Priti Patel, Chair of the All-Party Parliamentary Group for Democratic Belarus Wendy Morton, and Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee Emily Thornberry, the UK reaffirmed its firm stance toward the Lukashenka regime and its readiness to expand support for Belarusian civil society. Discussions covered the development of a bilateral consultative track, the work of the International Humanitarian Fund for Victims of Repression, and possible solutions for Belarusians facing documentation issues, including recognition of expired passports. Tsikhanouskaya also presented the #WeStandBYyou international programme and proposed making it more practice-oriented.

In the UK Parliament, Tsikhanouskaya spoke at the panel “The Fight for Freedom in Eastern Europe” alongside Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis, Sir William Browder and MPs. She thanked the United Kingdom for its support, recalled the anniversary of Raman Bandarenka’s death, and urged the international community to step up pressure on the regime, support Lithuania’s initiatives in international courts, and strengthen accountability for abuses committed by Belarusian security forces. Stressing that “Belarus is not Russia,” she noted that European security is impossible without democratic change in Belarus and that genuine elections will once again confirm the Belarusian public’s demand for transformation.

The hybrid Lithuanian–Belarusian crisis continues, triggered when Lithuania closed its border on 27 October, officially citing the flight of smuggler meteorological balloons and disruptions to operations at Vilnius and Kaunas airports. Minsk’s strategy is to shift the dispute into the political–diplomatic domain: Lukashenka instructed the Foreign Ministry to launch talks with Vilnius and seek the full restoration of all border checkpoints under bilateral agreements, insisting that anti-smuggling issues be addressed only after normalisation of inter-agency cooperation. Press Secretary Natallia Eismant and the Foreign Ministry have stated readiness to negotiate “at any moment and without preconditions” (11–12 November), and a briefing was organised for EU and EAEU ambassadors (12 November). In parallel, Minsk stepped up economic pressure: more than 1,300 Lithuanian trucks were moved to paid parking areas “until the border reopens,” with Lithuanian carriers having paid around €5 million. In total, roughly 4,500 Lithuanian trucks and trailers remain in Belarus.

Lithuania, in turn, is pursuing a pressure-based strategy. Foreign Minister Kęstutis Budrys accuses Minsk of posing a “NATO security threat” and is pushing for a new EU sanctions package , while Prime Minister Inga Ruginienė said on 12 November that Belarus is “showing no goodwill,” though she confirmed receiving a letter proposing talks (). The Interior Ministry is taking a somewhat more pragmatic approach, allowing for technical-level arrangements between border services and noting “certain movement” from Minsk.

At present, Vilnius has indicated that the two closed crossings could be reopened before 30 November, provided the security situation stabilises.

Tsikhanouskaya’s Office fully backed Vilnius’s refusal to engage in political dialogue.

On 17 November, Poland reopened two previously closed border points with Belarus — Kuźnica–Białostocka / Bruzgi and Bobrowniki / Berestavitsa. After several weeks of closure amid Lithuania’s border shutdown, the decision restores traffic partially: Kuźnica reopened to passenger vehicles (except buses), while Bobrowniki reopened to cars, buses and trucks registered in EU/EFTA countries and Switzerland. Coordinated meetings between border and customs services took place before reopening; Belarus declared its infrastructure fully ready. Minsk called the decision a constructive step that could revive border trade, stressing that “the current situation on the border serves neither Belarus nor the European Union.” Poland’s Foreign Ministry framed the move as a gesture to border communities, with Deputy Foreign Minister Marcin Bosacki noting that talks with Minsk “must remain non-public” and recalling that both Polish and US contacts with Belarus are traditionally conditional, aimed at reducing tensions and securing political prisoners’ release.

According to Poland’s Border Guard, migration pressure at the Belarus–Poland frontier has dropped sharply. Between 10 and 16 November, daily attempted crossings ranged from 3 to 40. Low levels of hybrid activity have persisted since 10 October, consistent with Minsk’s broader pattern of reducing controlled migration flows amid diplomatic manoeuvring.

On 14 November, the regime confirmed its plans to build a third reactor at the Belarusian Nuclear Power Plant (BelNPP) — effectively launching the station’s second phase in Astravets. Deputy Prime Minister Viktar Karankevich announced the decision following a meeting with Lukashenka. Construction of the third unit will proceed in parallel with site surveys in Mahiliou Region, which is being considered as a potential location for a separate second nuclear plant should electricity demand rise. Opening the meeting, Lukashenka again presented nuclear energy as a strategic success, highlighting reduced gas dependence and the “rightness of the chosen path” amid a global “renaissance of nuclear power.” When discussing how to utilise the new capacity, he promoted demand-stimulating measures: economy-wide electrification, electric transport, electric heating in residential construction, and even cryptocurrency mining — which, he said, could become “a way of moving away from the dollar.” Lukashenka claimed political support from Moscow, obtained during his meeting with Vladimir Putin at the “World Nuclear Week” on 26 September 2025, and demanded a final government decision on expanding the nuclear programme.

On 14 November, it emerged that the Belarusian service of the Current Time television channel, a project of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), was being fully shut down — one of the key independent Russian-language media outlets serving Belarus. According to the Belarusian Association  of Journalists (BAJ), half of the staff ended work the same day, with the remainder to be dismissed shortly. The closure is part of RFE/RL’s large-scale restructuring following US President Donald Trump’s 14 March decree dissolving USAGM and terminating its grant programmes, including funding for RFE/RL. General Director Pavel Butorin said the closure was triggered by “critical resource-optimisation reforms,” and the outlet is unable to offer alternative positions to staff. Current Time Belarus, created in 2023 specifically for Belarus’s Russian-speaking audience and temporarily suspended in spring 2025 due to financial constraints, is now ending operations entirely.

On 11 November, “Viasna” Human Rights Centre reported that at least 122 people had been taken into custody in connection with the Belarusian Hajun case. “The total number of detainees is much higher. Detentions are still taking place across Belarus. It is known that some detainees are released on bail pending trial. Trials are held every day. The defendants in the case are sentenced to both restriction of freedom with referral to an open-type correctional facility and imprisonment. The case files of some individuals were transferred from Minsk to regional courts,” “Viasna”  reported.

Photographer Daria Puchyla was tried in 2025 on charges of “facilitating extremist activities”. The details of the case are unknown. In January and February 2024, Puchyla was looking for a job as a web designer in Warsaw. Her last Instagram post was published in December 2024. She was last active on the VKontakte social network on 7 February 2025. It was at this time that the arrests in connection with the Belarusian Hajun case began.

At least 35 people from Smarhon, Navagrudak, Vaukavysk, and other cities were convicted in the “yard chats” case, “Viasna” Human Rights Centre reported. At least 33 political prisoners involved in the case, including 25 women, are in custody. Some of them are women of retirement age, have serious illnesses, or have minor children. Some of the defendants in the case have escaped from Belarus. According to the prosecution, the coalition of yard chats called “Order” allegedly aimed to “seize power in Belarus unconstitutionally”, as well as “influence mass public consciousness”. It was claimed that chats participants were engaged in “undermining the information sovereignty of the country”, creating protest sentiments and splitting society into supporters and opponents of the government. The investigation called the yard chats “underground communities” with “informal leaders” among the most active participants. It was revealed that some of detained chats participants had been monitored for almost a year. The investigation materials include dozens of intercepted Zoom conferences, recordings of telephone conversations and online meetings, which, according to the investigation, indicated “planning coordination activities”. Arrests in the “yard chats” case took place across Belarus last autumn. Criminal cases were opened against dozens of people on charges of “conspiracy or other actions aimed at seizing state power” and “creating or participating in an extremist formation”.

On 13 November, Belarusian human rights activists recognised 14 people as political prisoners. They were imprisoned or convicted in connection with their interaction with “extremist formations”, “Viasna” Human Rights Centre reported. On 14 November, nine more people were recognised as political prisoners. As of 14 November, 1,255 people in Belarus have the status of political prisoners.

An author of the Belarusian version of Wikipedia was sentenced to two years of imprisonment on charges of discrediting Belarus. He was also fined 300 basic units (12,600 rubles or approximately 3,200 Euro). According to the Prosecutor General’s Office, he “posted 25 open-access text messages on the Wikipedia internet resource containing deliberately false information, including about historical facts and state symbols of the Republic of Belarus, presidential elections and republican referendums, the activities of state authorities and paramilitary organisations, and the legal status of citizens” between 2020 and 2025. At the trial, the accused fully admitted his guilt.

On 14 November, the Ministry of Internal Affairs added 26 more people to the “List of Citizens of the Republic of Belarus, Foreign Citizens or Stateless Persons Involved in Extremist Activities”. Among them are psychologists Tatsiana Minets and Alesya Vyaroukina, who were sentenced to two years of imprisonment in the “yard chats” case, Yaraslau Khromchankau, a defendant in the Belarusian Hajun case, as well as four former employees of the Baranavichi independent newspaper Intex-Press, Natallia Syamenavich, Mikita Pyatrouski, Ruslan Ravyaka and Lyudmila Zelenkova, who were convicted on charges of  “facilitating extremist activities” in August 2025. There are now 5,989 names on the list.

A new analytical report on the state of Belarusian culture from January to September 2025 was published on the website of the Belarusian PEN Centre. The overview was prepared based on generalised information collected by the monitoring group of the Belarusian PEN from open sources, through personal contacts and direct communication with cultural figures. It is noted that a total of 979 violations of cultural rights and human rights of cultural figures were recorded during the January to September period. As of 30 September 2025, out of 1,197 political prisoners in Belarus, at least 94 were representatives of the cultural sector. At least 151 cultural figures are serving sentences in places of incarceration (colonies, prisons, pre-trial detention centres) or in open-type facilities and home confinement. The designation of cultural materials and social media accounts of cultural figures as “extremist materials” was the most frequent violation recorded in the monitoring (272 cases). Censorship, including through the list of printed publications “banned from distribution in Belarus”, ranked second (182 cases). Violations of the right to a fair trial and access to justice were the third most common type of abuse (101 cases). Criminal cases were initiated against 66 cultural figures, with one in three cases concerning the persecution of political exiles. At least 49 cultural figures have been prosecuted, including three tried in absentia. At least 40 cultural figures were subjected to arbitrary detentions or arrests, two of whom were detained twice. Administrative punishment was reported against 19 individuals from the cultural sector. At least four former political prisoners – cultural figures who emigrated after receiving sentences of restricted freedom in an open-type facility or in home confinement – were tried in absentia, with their initial sentences replaced by harsher ones. Additional 37 cultural figures were included in the list of citizens, foreign nationals, and stateless persons involved in “extremist activities”, and nine more were added to the list of organisations and individuals associated with “terrorist activities”. Courts issued rulings on the forced liquidation of seven culture-related NGOs. The Ministry of Information added 31 books (documentary, historical, and fiction literature) to the National List of Extremist Materials. The list of printed publications deemed capable of “harming national security” was expanded by 138 new entries.

Aksana Kolb, the former editor-in-chief of the newspaper Novy Chas who lives now in exile, became a defendant in a new criminal case. In late 2023, the Investigative Committee in the Brest region opened a case against her on charges of “facilitating extremist activities” and “organising actions that grossly violate public order”. According to Kolb, she learned about the nature of the charges only on 11 November 2025, after a call from an employee of the Frunzenski police department in Minsk. She also discovered that the Valozhinski District Court had increased the severity of sentence  previously imposed on her for “organising and preparing actions that grossly violate public order or actively participating in them”. Instead of two and a half years of restriction of freedom, she was sentenced to one year, one month and three days of imprisonment. Kolb noted that police officers and the Investigative Committee “searched for her for almost two years” at addresses in Minsk and Valozhyn, and summoned her relatives in Lida. The police officer who called her asked if she planned to apply to the Return Commission or return to Belarus independently. Kolb replied that she intended to return, but “not under this government”.

On 11 November, political prisoner, journalist and activist of the Polish minority in Belarus Andrzej Poczobut was awarded Poland’s oldest and highest state award, the Order of the White Eagle, by the President of Poland. During the ceremony at the Presidential Palace, President Karol Nawrocki stressed that Andrzej Poczobut remains a prisoner of the totalitarian system in Belarus. Nawrocki called him a symbol of perseverance and commitment to the values that are important to him. “This award in absentia to Andrzej Poczobut is important both for me as president and for the whole of Poland, because it sends a clear signal that Poland will always stand up for its sons, those who live for Poland, who fight for their native language and for whom the value of Polishness is worth suffering for in a Belarusian prison,” said Nawrocki. A photo projection of Andrzej Poczobut appeared on the Presidential Palace in Warsaw.

European diplomats working in Minsk issued a joint statement on the fourth anniversary of Raman Bandarenka’s death. “On 12 November 2020, Raman Bandarenka died at the hands of the Belarusian regime. Almost four years later, political prisoner Dmitry Shlethauer died in a Belarusian colony. Since 2020, seven political prisoners have died in Belarusian prisons. Too many lives have been cut short. We remember these victims and call for the immediate and unconditional release of all political prisoners,” the German Embassy in Minsk said in a statement. It was co-signed by the embassies of Slovakia, Great Britain, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania, Sweden, the Netherlands, Austria, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Ireland. The US Embassy joined them. Raman Bandarenka was at the “Changes Square” in Minsk on 11 November  2020, when a group of unknown people started to cut the protest ribbons there. While trying to stop this attack, he received several blows from unknown attackers, was loaded onto a bus and taken to the Central police department, and from there to the hospital with a traumatic brain injury. On 12 November  2020, Bandarenka died in hospital.

On 13 November , the International Committee for the Investigation of Torture in Belarus released a public inquiry into torture and ill-treatment in Colony No. 1 in Navapalotsk. The authors studied 13 interviews with former convicts who served their sentences there from February 2021 to January 2025. Colony No. 1 is designed for 1,500 people. About 30% of them are political prisoners, including politician Viktar Babaryka, journalists Andrzej Poczobut and Andrei Alyaksandrau. The report described the methods of punishing political prisoners. One of the most brutal periods for them is the quarantine upon arrival at the colony, during which, according to the authors of the report, political prisoners are restricted from sleeping and eating, while cold weather is used to create unbearable conditions of detention. According to former prisoners, there was “endless bullying by staff and prisoners cooperating with the administration; conditions of detention were bordering on torture”.

Belarusian opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya and her husband Syarhei Tsikhanousky became laureates of the Sergei Magnitsky Prize 2025 in the category “Outstanding Opposition Politicians”. The award ceremony took place in London on 13 November. The award was presented to Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya by Russian opposition politician Vladimir Kara-Murza. Upon receiving the award, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya said that she dedicated it to all Belarusian political prisoners, among whom she listed human rights activist and Nobel Peace Prize laureate Ales Bialiatski, politicians Maryja Kalesnikava and Mikalai Statkevich, journalists Katsyaryna Andreeva and Andrzej Poczobut.

iSANS released a detailed analytical review tracing how Belarusian propaganda has reframed political prisoners from “ordinary criminals” to a bargaining chip in Minsk’s dealings with the West. Drawing on extensive media monitoring, the report shows that despite the regime’s persistent denial of the existence of political prisoners, propaganda simultaneously demonises detainees as “extremists,” dehumanises them through practices such as the use of yellow tags, and instrumentalises their fate in negotiations. Since the first limited releases in August 2024, official rhetoric has increasingly normalised the idea of piecemeal prisoners release in exchange for partial lifting of sanctions by the EU and the United States, presenting pardons as the personal benevolence of Lukashenka while discrediting democratic forces as allegedly uninterested in freeing prisoners. The study identifies three core narratives: denial, transactional logic, and claims that the opposition has no influence — all forming part of a broader strategy to legitimise the regime and weaponise repression in diplomatic dialogue.

Another iSANS study examines the accelerating militarisation of Belarus’s education system, which by 2025 has evolved from isolated initiatives into a comprehensive, state-driven model of military-patriotic indoctrination. The report documents the rapid institutionalisation of militarised elements at all levels of education — from the introduction of military-patriotic coordinators in schools and the spread of law-enforcement-oriented institutions to UAV-training programmes, militarised tournaments, and targeted recruitment into “power ministries.” While pre-school education remains only partially affected, primary and secondary schooling have been systematically reshaped to integrate military rituals, security-service involvement, and ideological instruction. iSANS concludes that the education system is now an integral tool for replenishing Belarus’s security apparatus and cultivating a generation ideologically aligned with the regime, reinforcing its long-term authoritarian resilience.

Note from the editors: We do not provide links to publications in official and propagandistic sources belonging to the Lukashenka regime or affiliated with the regime. If you are interested in obtaining such a link for research or investigation purposes, please contact us at info@isans.org

Best regards, iSANS team