Belarus Review by iSANS — May 11, 2026 

According to Ukrainian monitoring channels, one Russian UAV flight was recorded in Belarusian airspace between 4 and 10 May. During the week, sorties by the on-duty aviation assets of the AF RB to intercept drones were also recorded. No reports of UAV crashes or shootdowns were received.

One of the tank battalions of the 11th Mechanised Brigade completed training in Russia. The Ministry of Defence reported this on 4 May. According to a serviceman from the battalion, the training was centred on T-72B3 tanks, since the unit is being re-equipped with upgraded T-72BM2 tanks featuring a similar fire-control system. It was also noted that all instructors training the Belarusian servicemen had experience from the war in Ukraine and taught skills “needed on the line of combat contact”.

On 4 May, the Telegram channel “Operatyvnyi inform” reported that Russian forces had begun exercises in Belarus involving Tu-95MS and Tu-160 strategic bomber aircraft, as well as MiG-31K interceptor fighters. According to the channel, the Russian side planned to redeploy several MiG-31K aircraft capable of carrying Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles to Belarus during the exercises. Confirmation of this information could not be found in official Russian sources or media. According to available information, no arrivals of Russian aviation in Belarus were recorded between 4 and 10 May.

A training exercise with territorial defence reservists of the Lida District in Hrodna Region is being held from 5 to 29 May. The Ministry of Defence reported this. The exercise includes the mobilisation of reservists and their preparation for territorial defence tasks, as well as refresher training for commanders in unit management. The main focus will be on cooperation between territorial defence units, internal affairs bodies and the people’s militia. Protection of personnel and critical facilities from drones will also be practised. Around 150 reservists were called up for the exercise.

On 6 May, Major General Siarhei Lahadziuk, head of the Main Operational Directorate of the General Staff, was dismissed from his post. The Ministry of Defence reported this. According to the ministry’s press release, he was discharged into the reserve upon reaching retirement age, with the right to wear military uniform and insignia.

According to open sources, Lahadziuk had served in the Main Operational Directorate of the General Staff since at least 2019. He initially headed the 1st Directorate and later — from at least March 2022 — became head of the Main Operational Directorate. One of his most notable public statements was made in December 2024, when he described the deployment of the Oreshnik missile system in Belarus as a response to U.S. and German plans to deploy intermediate-range missiles in Europe.

On 6 May, Sputnik Belarus published a report from the Hdzien border outpost in Homiel Region, which guards more than 15 km of the border with Ukraine. The overall situation in the sector was described as outwardly calm but tense. “The sharpness has subsided, but tension has become the normal state. There were provocations in 2022–2023; now it is quieter, but there is still no calm,” the outpost commander stated. According to him, Ukrainian border patrols try to conceal themselves and avoid “being seen”, while no “military personnel or mercenaries” have been observed at the border. The report stated that the Ukrainian side continues to conduct reconnaissance, including with drones. The outpost commander noted that in early and late 2025, incursions by Ukrainian multirotor and fixed-wing UAVs into Belarusian territory had been recorded. No such incidents were observed in the outpost’s sector in 2026.

On 8 May, the Belarusian Investigative Center published an investigation into supplies by Belarusian companies to Russian arms manufacturers. The BIC analysed supply data involving 58 Belarusian companies and 41 enterprises of the Russian military-industrial complex. According to the investigation, from February 2022 to August 2025, the value of these supplies amounted to at least $1.2 billion and had doubled by 2024 compared to 2022. Among the key suppliers named were the Minsk Wheel Tractor Plant, Peleng, OKB TSP, Horizont, Integral and others. Their products are used, or may be used, in the production chains of Russian missile systems, armoured vehicles, air defence systems and aviation.

JSC “KB Radar” has completed assembly of the first serial-produced Rodnik-3D three-coordinate radar station designed to detect low-altitude aerial targets. The State Authority for Military Industry reported this on 9 May. The “compact and mobile” station is reportedly capable of detecting small multirotor drones at distances of up to 7 km and fixed-wing UAVs at up to 12 km. A key feature of the system is its versatility: the radar can be mounted both on mobile chassis for deployment from unprepared positions and on stationary masts as part of critical infrastructure protection systems.

Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya visited Armenia, where she took part in the European Political Community Summit and the Yerevan Dialogue forum as an invited representative of Belarusian democratic forces. This was her first official visit to the country. The summit in Yerevan was attended by the leaders of France, United Kingdom, Ukraine, Italy, EU leadership, and, for the first time, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney. Tsikhanouskaya stated that her task was to keep Belarus at the centre of European attention and noted that she was representing Belarus at EPC summits for the fifth time. On the sidelines of the forum, she held meetings with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan, describing the meetings as a sign that relations between Armenia and democratic Belarus had reached “a new level”. She also held talks with French President Emmanuel Macron, Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico, and Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney, during which support for democratic forces, strategic dialogue, and a possible visit by Tsikhanouskaya to Ottawa were discussed. As part of the Yerevan Dialogue, Tsikhanouskaya also spoke at a panel on hybrid threats and artificial intelligence, where she stated that technology companies should define whether they support democracy or assist dictatorships and called for a stronger response to transnational repression.

On 5 May, the Belarusian Foreign Ministry summoned Armenian chargé d’affaires Artur Sargsyan and handed him a note of protest over what it described as “unfriendly actions” by Armenia. Formally, the reason was not specified, but the escalation followed Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya’s participation in the European Political Community summit in Yerevan and remarks by Armenian parliamentary speaker Alen Simonyan, who described Belarus as “a province of Russia”. According to Tsikhanouskaya’s Office, Armenia also refused to extradite members of her team under interstate wanted procedures during the visit to Yerevan.

The central focus of Lukashenka’s activities during the period was the commemoration of the 81st anniversary of victory in the Great Patriotic War (the Eastern Front of the Second World War).

On 9 May, Lukashenka took part in a wreath-laying ceremony at the Victory Monument in Minsk together with his three sons, senior officials, representatives of the security structures, pro-regime organisations and the diplomatic corps. Unlike the anniversary celebrations of 2025, Minsk did not hold a military parade, limiting the event to a ceremony, anthem, fireworks, a march by the honour guard company and a theatrical performance. This was likely also connected to an effort not to outshine the comparatively modest parade in Moscow, as had effectively happened in 2025. In his speech, Lukashenka’s anti-Western rhetoric was milder than in his Victory Day addresses of 2020–2025. The harshest passage was directed more broadly against attempts to revise historical memory: “And even if fascism now has a different face — polished and refined — this changes nothing in essence… Our enemy is the revanchists, the direct and ideological descendants of the SS, the Banderites and the Forest Brothers” (9 May).

On 8–9 May, Lukashenka was on a working visit to Russia at the invitation of Vladimir Putin. Talks were held in the Kremlin on 8 May, during which the sides discussed bilateral issues, the regional situation and economic cooperation. Lukashenka stated that trade turnover between Belarus and Russia was approaching $60 billion and that there were no serious disputes between the countries apart from “one or two” issues for the governments to resolve. During his press conference, Putin also highlighted the scale of trade turnover with Belarus as “phenomenal”: “Our trade turnover with Belarus exceeds 50 billion dollars. A country with just over 10 million people — and look at that turnover.” The meeting was followed by a working dinner later joined by the leaders of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. On 9 May, Lukashenka arrived at Red Square together with Putin and attended the Victory Day parade, after which he joined other delegation leaders in laying flowers at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier. Other foreign guests included the leaders of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Laos, as well as the King of Malaysia. After the parade, Lukashenka positively assessed the shortened format of the event and stated that “even if they had not invited me”, he would still have come to “his own Red Square”.

On 7 May, the Minsk City Executive Committee refused permission for a separate “Immortal Regiment” march in Minsk, after which organisers called on participants to bring portraits of relatives to the Victory Monument for the flower-laying ceremony. Earlier, pro-Russian activist Andrei Gerashchenko had advocated holding the event in Minsk, regional centres and major cities, proposing to integrate it into the official “Belarus Remembers” campaign as confirmation of the “unity of Russia and Belarus” in commemorating Victory Day. Despite the refusal in Minsk, on 9 May pro-Russian structures succeeded in organising “Immortal Regiment” columns in several regional cities as part of official “Belarus Remembers” marches. Such events were reported by the Russian Embassy, Russian consulates-general and “Russian Houses” in Hrodna, Vitebsk, Brest, Gomel and Mogilev. In Minsk, Russian diplomats and activists also appeared at Victory Square carrying “Immortal Regiment” banners. Belarusian propaganda outlets, however, did not mention the campaign separately. “Immortal Regiment” marches also took place in most Western European countries, the United States, China, Japan and elsewhere.

On 10 May, Lukashenka congratulated citizens on the Day of the State Flag, State Emblem and State Anthem. In his address, he described the state symbols as reflecting an “independent and sovereign” Belarus, its historical path, traditions and patriotic unity.

On 5 May, Lukashenka held a meeting with the leadership of the Council of Ministers and separately received a report from Prime Minister Aliaksandr Turchyn. The discussions focused on draft decisions concerning the cement industry, the Svetlahorsk Pulp and Board Mill, and the incorporation of the Orsha Meat Processing Plant and its supply base into the Dziarzhynski agro-industrial complex. Lukashenka criticised the growing number of requests for subsidies, restructuring and state support, stating that such a trend “concerns” him. A separate topic in Turchyn’s report was the preparation of “detailed materials” for an upcoming meeting with Vladimir Putin.

A limited de-escalation is being observed in the crisis on the Belarusian-Lithuanian border. At the same time, the overall situation along Belarus’s borders remains asymmetrical. In particular, the issue of Lithuanian trucks detained in Belarus is approaching resolution. According to the State Customs Committee, almost 1,700 Lithuanian trucks have already left the country, with just over 200 remaining — around 12% of the original number. Minsk expects to close the issue by the end of May. Smuggling channels continue operating as usual. On 7 May, for example, another drone carrying 850 packs of cigarettes was intercepted. Since the beginning of the year, Lithuania has detained 17 cigarette-carrying drones. At the same time, zero attempts to cross border illegally were recorded on the Polish border between 1 and 7 May, with no such attempts observed since 17 April (according to Straż Graniczna data). The main direction of pressure remains Latvia, where 485 attempts at illegal crossing of the border were recorded during the same period, including a peak of 141 on 7 May (according to Valsts robežsardze data).

On 12 May, a Council of Europe information point for Belarusians is to open in Vilnius with the participation of Lithuanian Foreign Minister Kęstutis Budrys, Council of Europe Secretary General Alain Berset and the leader of Belarusian democratic forces Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya. The information point will be located at the Martynas Mažvydas National Library of Lithuania and accredited by the Lithuanian Foreign Ministry. To a certain extent, support for “approved” Belarusian infrastructure balances the increasingly restrictive measures against Belarusians in Lithuania.

Belarusian Foreign Minister Maksim Ryzhankou stated that Minsk was ready for gradual normalisation of relations with Poland and proposed launching consultations at the level of deputy ministers or special representatives in order to conduct a comprehensive review of bilateral relations. According to him, Belarus is interested in restoring transport, logistics and cross-border cooperation, including railway traffic and border crossing points, since “both sides would benefit” from this. Ryzhankou stressed that “the ball is on the Polish side”, adding that Warsaw had previously put forward a number of conditions but that “today all questions have been removed”=. The statement followed the “5 for 5” exchange and the release of Andrzej Poczobut. In effect, Ryzhankou partly mirrored the position of Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski, who on 28 April, after Poczobut’s release, had also spoken of the possibility of a new stage in relations while noting that “the initiative lies on Aliaksandr Lukashenka’s side” and cautioning against expectations of a rapid breakthrough, recalling previous short-lived periods of “thaw” in relations between Minsk and Warsaw.

On 10 May, US President Donald Trump stated that the United States had helped secure the release of three Polish and two Moldovan detainees, including Andrzej Poczobut, as part of an exchange on the Belarusian-Polish border. He highlighted the role of special envoy John Coale and wrote: “Thank you to Aliaksandr Lukashenka for his cooperation and friendship. Very nice!”.

On 7 May, the IOC Executive Board lifted its previous 2022–2023 recommendations restricting the participation of Belarusian athletes in international competitions, including team tournaments and protective measures. The International Olympic Committee explained the decision by the principle that athletes should not be restricted because of the actions of their governments, and also by the fact that Belarusian athletes had competed since 2023 as individual neutral athletes at international tournaments, the 2024 Olympics and the 2026 Winter Olympics without incidents. An additional factor was the start of the qualification period for the 2028 Olympics in Los Angeles and the 2028 Winter Youth Games. The decision applies only to Belarus: according to the IOC, the National Olympic Committee of Belarus remains “in good standing” and complies with the Olympic Charter. Restrictions against Russia were not lifted, since the Russian Olympic Committee remains suspended, while the IOC also pointed to concerns regarding the Russian anti-doping system following new data being examined by World Anti-Doping Agency.

The Belarusian PEN published a new analytical overview on the state of Belarusian culture in the first quarter of 2026. It concluded that politically motivated persecution of cultural figures and criminalisation of cultural activities in general and literary creativity in particular continued. The release of another group of political prisoners took place against the background of new arrests. Among the most notable cultural repressions were unprecedented pressure on independent publishers and booksellers: detentions, interrogations, administrative arrests and criminal prosecution; suspension of the activities of the publishing house Technalohija; recognition of the Kamunikat.org foundation, as well as the publishing houses Gutenberg, Logvinau and Yanushkevich, which legally publish Belarusian books abroad, as “extremist groups”. Criminal prosecution and administrative pressure have affected a wide range of cultural figures.

“Viasna” Human Rights Centre published an overview of the human rights situation in Belarus in April 2026. It stated that human rights remain in a state of deep crisis: state terror and repression against dissidents, political opponents, participants in protest initiatives, journalists, and human rights defenders show no sign of abating. There are no grounds to speak of a systemic improvement in the human rights situation in recent months. Repression indicators remain at a high level comparable to previous years: the number of political prisoners stands at the level of late 2021, repression of all kinds continues unabated, and lists and registries that serve as the starting point for the persecution of regime opponents and dissidents are being expanded at a rapid pace. Civil society organisations have sustained irreparable damage: all opposition parties and political organisations have been dissolved and have no prospect of resuming activities in Belarus in the near future; human rights organisations and other civic initiatives deemed unacceptable by the regime have been dissolved or forced abroad. The regime openly carries out deportations and transnational repression on political grounds. Torture and acts of prohibited treatment remain uninvestigated and are ongoing. As of the end of April 2026, 835 political prisoners were held in detention facilities in Belarus, including 115 women. The number of former political prisoners stands at 3,813. Human rights defenders have registered at least 122 political prisoners who are particularly vulnerable due to health issues, age, or the conditions of their detention. In April, human rights defenders recognised 36 individuals as political prisoners.

The Swedish International Liberal Centre foundation was recognised as an “extremist organisation” in Belarus. The decision was made by the Supreme Court on 23 April. The foundation supports activists in authoritarian countries, helping them in their struggle for democracy, human rights and civil society. SILC operates in Eastern Europe, North Africa and Latin America. Its headquarters are located in Stockholm. As of April 2026, 345 “extremist formations” and seven “extremist organisations” were designated in Belarus.

Aliaksandr Karneeu from Maladechna was convicted in absentia in November 2024 on charges of violence or threat of violence against a police officer. The court sentenced him to three years of high-security imprisonment and awarded compensation for moral damage in the amount of 2,500 rubles (approximately 750 Euro). He lived in Poland, but returned to Belarus for an unknown reason. There, he was retried on charges of facilitating “extremist activities” and sentenced to five and a half years of imprisonment and a fine of 42,000 rubles (approximately 12,630 Euro). As reported in the state newspaper in December 2025, the criminal case was related to the organisation “Dapamoha”, which was recognised as an “extremist formation”. “Karneeu assisted the extremist activities of the extremist formation ‘Dapamoha’ in organising the illegal departure from the Republic of Belarus of persons brought to criminal and administrative responsibility for crimes and offenses of an extremist nature,” the article said. In April 2026, Karneeu was added to the “list of extremists”.

Mikita Yemyalyanau, a political prisoner and anarchist, served his sentence in full and was released in the spring of 2026. He was detained in October 2019 and convicted of attacks on the buildings of SIZO-1 and the Minsk City Court in Minsk as a sign of solidarity with political prisoners. Initially, he was sentenced to seven years of imprisonment, but after an appeal, the term was reduced to four years. In May 2020, Yemyalyanau was transferred to a prison regime. In March 2022, he was convicted for “malicious disobedience to the requirements of the correctional institution administration”, a charge often applied to prisoners who refused to cooperate with the prison administration. In March 2023, he was again transferred to prison regime. Throughout his incarceration, he was constantly subjected to pressure. He often ended up in a punishment cell, where he was kept in isolation for dozens of days. He was deprived of visits by his family, his correspondence was restricted and his personal belongings were seized. In response to the harsh conditions of detention, he protested by hunger strikes and refusing to comply with the demands of the administration. He was also regularly punished for minor violations. Three months before his release, in February 2025, he was again tried under the charge of “malicious disobedience to the demands of the correctional institution administration” and was sentenced to another year of imprisonment. He was released in the spring of 2026, having fully served the sentence imposed by the court.

Political prisoner Ihar Salavey was released. He served his entire term of six years of imprisonment. He was detained on 3 September 2020 in the case of “mass riots” in Pinsk. The court of the Moscow district of Brest sentenced him to six years of imprisonment in a high-security colony for participating in mass riots. In January 2022, his regime was changed to a strict prison regime for two years, allegedly for systematic misconduct. After these two years, Salavey was returned to the colony, but in early 2025 he was sent back to prison, where he waited for the end of his term.

Two more political prisoners were prosecuted on charges of malicious disobedience to the colony administration. Siarhei Kanavalau, who was sentenced to 15 years of imprisonment in 2022 for “preparing for a terrorist attack” and “inciting social hatred,” was convicted for the second time under this charge. On 17 April, the court in correctional colony No. 14 in Navasady sentenced him to two additional years of imprisonment. In Babruisk, Ilya Verameeu from Homel, who is serving a six and a half year sentence for calling for resistance at the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, was recently convicted under the same charge. The sentence is still unknown. According to former political prisoners and human rights defenders, the scheme of reporting on far-fetched violations, which turn into new criminal cases on charges of malicious disobedience to the colony administration, has become a mechanism for permanent prolongation of detention.

Political prisoner Uladzimir Kniha will be tried for the third time for “malicious disobedience to the colony administration” on 20 May in the Mazyr district court. He was detained on 4 June 2020 and sentenced to four years of imprisonment on charges of organising and preparing actions that grossly violate public order, or actively participating in them as well as violence or threatening to use violence against an employee of the internal affairs bodies. In 2023, he was convicted for the first time on charges of malicious disobedience to the colony administration and an additional year of imprisonment was added to his term. In 2025, he was sentenced again to yet another year of imprisonment. Since September 2023, he has been held incommunicado, placed in a chamber type room, deprived of parcels, visits and calls. Uladzimir Kniha was a defendant in the “Tsikhanouski case”, a volunteer of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya’s team, and a former law enforcement officer.

Natallia Nepachalovich, an engineer from Kalodzishchi, was convicted of “facilitating extremist activities”. Nepachalovich had lived and built a career in Russia for a long time. In Moscow, she worked as a senior engineer at Alfa-Bank. Later, she returned to Belarus and settled in Kalodzishchi, near Minsk. She was arrested last year and placed in pre-trial detention. This year, she was convicted of “facilitating extremist activities”. The exact sentence is unknown, but it is a restriction of freedom.

The charges against Mazyr human rights activist Uladzimir Tselyapun have become known. He is charged with “facilitating extremist activities” and slandering Lukashenka. The 70-year-old Tselyapun was detained around 10 April. He is in Homel pre-trial detention centre No. 3.

Mikalai Vitkouski, a public activist from Naroulia, was sentenced in the Mohileu Regional Court. He was found guilty of high treason and sentenced to ten years of imprisonment. The trial was held behind closed doors. Vitkouski is a public activist from Naroulia, a member of the “Narodnaya Hramada” party, which was liquidated by the authorities. Last September, he disappeared from his home, and only in November it became known that he was being held in pre-trial detention centre No. 4 in Mahileu. On 17 December 2025, he was recognised as a political prisoner.

Former political prisoner, journalist and Polish community activist Andrzej Poczobut plans to return to Belarus. When asked what would happen if he was sent back to prison, he replied: “I will take it. It’s hard, Nelson Mandela was in prison for so many years, the soldiers of the Armia Krajowa were in prison”. Poczobut confirmed once again that during the prisoner exchange, he asked the KGB officers about the possibility for him to return to Belarus and received a positive answer. An official from the Lukashenka administration, who came to convince Poczobut to agree to the prisoners exchange, personally confirmed that he will have the opportunity to return to Belarus.

The BYSOL foundation launched an annual fundraising for the children of political prisoners and former political prisoners. It is timed to coincide with Children’s Day and the beginning of summer holidays. The initial goal is to collect 10,000 Euro, but it may change depending on the number of received applications for assistance. It is planned to pay 100 Euro to each child under the age of 16. Applications for assistance are accepted from 5 May to 31 May. Both parents residing in Belarus and abroad can submit an application.

On 5 May, Belarusian human rights organisations published a statement recognising seven more people as political prisoners. They have been charged or sentenced on charges of group actions grossly violating public order. Human rights defenders demand the release of these people and an end to their criminal prosecution. On 7 May, nine more people were recognised as political prisoners. The number of political prisoners in Belarus as of 7 May 2026 is 848.

In Homel, former political prisoners were summoned to the police department for “preventive conversations”. “Conversations” were often conducted by people in civilian clothes who did not introduce themselves. Ex-political prisoners were asked about their political  beliefs and personal lives: how did the person vote, how did he relate to the current government, did he hold grudges, did he receive help from abroad, whether he had relatives in other countries. At the end of the conversation, the ex-political prisoners were asked to sign a paper confirming that a “preventive conversation” had taken place.

On 6 May, “Viasna” Human Rights Centre became aware of more than ten searches in homes of candidates from several factions who are running for the Coordination Council for the first time. The searches were conducted within the framework of investigative activities under a case initiated on charges of participating in an extremist group, high treason, conspiracy to seize power, and calls for sanctions. Relatives of the candidates were interrogated during the searches. Some of them were pressured to force their loved ones to leave their factions on the eve of the elections. The elections to the Coordination Council are scheduled to take place from 11 to 17 May. Earlier, the KGB recognised a number of Coordination Council electoral lists as “extremist formations”. In 2024, the KGB also recognised Coordination Council electoral lists as “extremist formations”. On 7 May, the Coordination Council reported on searches and interrogations of relatives of a number of candidates from the Evropejski Vybor (European Choice) list.

On 8 May, the Ministry of Internal Affairs added another 25 people to the “list of persons involved in extremist activities”. There are now 6,603 items in the list.

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