Belarus Review by iSANS — March 30, 2026 

Belarus Review by iSANS — March 30, 2026
Photo: Ministry of Defence
  1. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
  2. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
  3. HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE

MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

According to Ukrainian monitoring channels, between 23 and 29 March at least 49 UAV flights were recorded in Belarusian airspace. The majority were Ukrainian UAVs transiting through eastern regions of Belarus en route to strike targets in Russia.

On the night of 23 March, during a Ukrainian attack on Russia’s Leningrad region, at least 14 UAVs entered Belarusian airspace over the Mahiliou region. Some of these drones were reportedly heard between 01:00 and 03:30 over Minsk, Mahiliou, Orsha, and Hrodna.

Throughout the week, on-duty aviation assets of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus (AF RB) were repeatedly deployed to intercept UAVs. There were reports of both destruction and crashes. For example, on 24 March, a Russian UAV fell into a garden in a settlement in the Loeu district, near the Ukrainian border, but did not detonate; it was later removed by specialised services.

On 23 March, the Minister of Defence of Kyrgyzstan, Ruslan Mukambetov, arrived in Belarus on an official visit, according to the Belarusian Ministry of Defence. On 24 March, talks were held between Viktar Khrenin and Mukambetov. Khrenin stated that cooperation between Minsk and Bishkek is open in nature and based on stable bilateral ties, and that it is “successfully developing.” Mukambetov, in turn, noted that Kyrgyzstan is interested in continuing the exchange of experience and intends to expand cooperation in areas of mutual interest. During the visit, the Kyrgyz delegation also visited the General Staff Faculty of the Military Academy and the 927th Centre for Training and Use of UAV Systems.

Servicemen of the 92nd Rocket Artillery Regiment used the 1V228B “Arba” artillery fire control command vehicle during exercises, as reported on 24 March by the unit’s Telegram channel. The system is designed to automate key tasks of artillery command and control, including data exchange, communications with higher headquarters and subordinate units, as well as optical reconnaissance and UAV control. This indicates that the 1V228B “Arba” has likely been introduced into service with the regiment.

Flight-tactical exercises were conducted with UAV units of the Special Operations Forces, according to Telegram channels of the 5th, 38th, and 103rd brigades. The exercises focused on covert UAV control, aerial reconnaissance, and strike operations using FPV drones and quadcopters against personnel and equipment of a simulated adversary. The drills also tested modern UAV tactics and measures to ensure operator survivability.

From 24 to 26 March, under the leadership of Chief of the General Staff Pavel Muraveika, a training exercise on the command and control of territorial defence forces was conducted. Its objective was to improve the practical skills of officials responsible for organising and managing the formation of territorial troops.

According to Muraveika, the exercise simulated a complex operational environment, taking into account developments in Europe, updated provisions of the national defence plan, and modern threats and characteristics of regular forces in contemporary conflicts. He also noted that while Belarus previously had experience in forming territorial defence units at the level of one or two regions, this exercise involved all six regions and the city of Minsk simultaneously.

On 25 March, Chief of the General Staff Pavel Muraveika made a number of statements regarding the ongoing comprehensive exercises with the troops of the Western Operational Command, as reported by the Ministry of Defence. According to him, several experiments were conducted during the exercise. In particular, the task was set to significantly reduce the time required to prepare a defensive operation. Although the planned twofold reduction was not achieved, the timeframe was reduced by 40–60%.

The exercise also tested a new command-and-control model, based on a cluster principle for deploying command posts, equipping them with information protection and data transmission systems, and the widespread use of dispersed communication networks. According to Muraveika, this approach “proved effective”: even with significant disruption affecting up to half of its elements, the system remained stable and continued to ensure troop management. He also noted that new types of weapons and military equipment in service with the Armed Forces demonstrated their effectiveness and operational reliability during the exercise.

According to the Ministry of Defence, during the active phase of the exercise on 25 March, units of the 6th Mechanized Brigade halted the advance of a superior simulated adversary, inflicted losses, and disrupted its offensive. Brigade reconnaissance units, including UAV operators, timely detected enemy manoeuvres and key forces, enabling a pre-emptive strike. Subsequent actions by mechanised, tank, artillery, and infantry units allowed the troops to fully halt the offensive, restore positions along the forward line of defence, and transition to a counterattack.

Following the active phase of the exercise, Minister of Defence Viktar Khrenin provided an initial assessment. He stated that the exercise scenario was based on the current military-political environment and that the manoeuvres were conducted under conditions closely approximating real combat. At the same time, he emphasised the purely defensive nature of the exercise, stating that Belarus has “no enemies,” but that the armed forces are ready to respond decisively to any hostile actions.

Khrenin also noted that the results of the inspection would be further analysed, including under the supervision of Aliaksandr Lukashenka, and described the preliminary assessment as “unequivocally positive.” At the same time, he stressed that in the context of a tense situation at Belarus’s borders and globally, it is necessary not to reduce the pace of efforts to ensure military security. Concluding his remarks, Khrenin stated that the country’s main security resource is not “nuclear weapons or the ‘Oreshnik’ system,” but “our people.”

Following the completion of the exercise, units began returning to their permanent deployment locations.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

Between 25 and 28 March, the Belarusian diaspora held events marking Freedom Day — the 108th anniversary of the proclamation of the Belarusian People’s Republic — primarily in Vilnius and Warsaw. In a video address, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya described Freedom Day as both joyful and unfinished: she referred to the release of some political prisoners but stressed that the struggle would continue until all are freed and repression ends. On 28 March, Tsikhanouskaya took part in a march and rally in Warsaw, where, according to media reports, several hundred participants carried a 330-metre white-red-white flag. In her speech, she focused on the issue of political prisoners and called for a full political amnesty. Overall, the central theme of Tsikhanouskaya’s public messaging during Freedom Day events was the demand for the release of all individuals imprisoned on political grounds and an end to repression by the regime.

On 25–26 March, Aliaksandr Lukashenka paid the first-ever official visit to North Korea, at the invitation of Kim Jong Un. The central event was the leaders’ talks and the signing on 26 March of an interstate Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation, described by the North Korean side as a new legal foundation for bilateral relations. In addition, a package of framework agreements and memoranda was signed in the fields of education, culture, healthcare, agriculture, information, and sport, as well as through the Belarusian Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the foreign ministries. The sides agreed to open embassies and to organise a return visit by Kim Jong Un to Belarus. Educational exchanges were also agreed through the Ministry of Education. The public agenda did not include agreements on military cooperation, labour migration, or other sanctions-sensitive areas. At the same time, North Korean media reported the presence in the delegation of Minister of Industry Andrei Kuznetsov, which was not mentioned in Belarusian official coverage. This suggests that the discussions may have included a broader practical agenda, including industrial and agricultural cooperation. According to independent estimates, bilateral trade between Belarus and North Korea ranges from USD 0.5–1 million. Additional attention was drawn to the presentation of a Belarusian VSK rifle by Lukashenka to Kim Jong Un, which added a symbolic security dimension to the visit. Handing over the rifle, Lukashenka explained: “just in case any enemies turn up.” In return, the North Korean dictator presented his Belarusian counterpart a sabre. Overall, the visit produced a limited but tangible political and legal outcome, establishing a new formal basis for relations, while the economic and practical impact remains largely at the level of declared intentions.

U.S. President’s Special Envoy for Belarus John Coale outlined in detail the mechanics of the special negotiation channel between Minsk and Washington on the release of political prisoners at a conference of the McCain Institute. According to Coale, the basis of this channel is a direct exchange: the release of prisoners in return for a phased sanctions relief, as, in his words, around 80% of U.S. sanctions against Belarus were introduced in connection with political prisoners. He stated that he maintains regular contact with Belarus’s Permanent Representative to the UN, Valiantsin Rybakou, meeting him once every one to two weeks, and described his own contacts with Aliaksandr Lukashenka as informal and personalised. According to Coale, following the first releases, Donald Trump established personal contact with Lukashenka, which, in his assessment, facilitated further agreements.

Coale also placed discussions with Minsk on issues affecting Lithuania and Poland within this framework, including the cessation of meteorological balloon launches and the settlement of specific border-related issues. Coale suggested that, if the current dynamics are maintained, it may be possible to secure the release of all political prisoners by the end of 2026. At the same time, he indicated that Washington is applying broader political pressure, linking Lukashenka’s behaviour to his desire to exit international isolation.

Describing his conversation with Lukashenka about the “Peace Council” and Belarus’s place in the international system, Coale used the following metaphor: “I do not know how high school works in your country, but in ours it looks like this. You come to lunch, and there is the table of the cool kids… And there is the table of the losers — and that is where you are. You are there with Cuba. You are there with Iran, you are there with Venezuela and others. Putin is not there because he was not invited to the school at all.” In Coale’s account, it is precisely the combination of personal contact, sanctions bargaining and foreign policy pressure that allows Washington to keep this channel operational and secure further releases.

Against this background, on 30 March, Donald Trump announced on Truth Social that, following negotiations between his envoy John Coale and Lukashenka, an additional group of 250 political prisoners had been released, bringing the total number released since May 2025 to over 500. He also thanked Lukashenka for this step and expressed expectations of a personal meeting within the framework of the “Peace Council”.

On 26 March, the U.S. Treasury formally implemented another stage of sanctions relief in relation to Belarus following the release of 250 political prisoners after the 19 March negotiations. The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced the lifting of sanctions on Belaruskali, the Belarusian Potash Company, and the affiliated Ukrainian company Agrorozkvit, removing them from the SDN list. General License No. 14 was also issued, authorising transactions involving Belinvestbank and a number of related entities. In addition, OFAC, in coordination with the U.S. State Department, revoked Directive 1 with respect to the Belarusian Ministry of Finance and the Development Bank, stating that previous restrictions were no longer justified. At the same time, previously issued General License No. 13 was archived as no longer relevant.

On 25 March, Melania Trump publicly refuted, via Breitbart News, Lukashenka’s claim that she had allegedly asked him to pass to Vladimir Putin a list of Ukrainian children separated from their families. According to her, all communications on this issue were conducted strictly directly — between herself, her authorised representative, and Russian and Ukrainian officials — without any intermediaries. The rebuttal demonstrated that, within the framework of the special track with the United States, Minsk continues to face clear limitations and areas where Lukashenka is not permitted to position himself as a mediator.

Meanwhile, the hybrid crisis between Belarus and Lithuania has entered a new phase. A limited de-escalation is taking place; however, Lithuania is tactically manoeuvring, maintaining firm resistance both to Washington’s political line and to attempts by Minsk to shift the crisis into a framework of direct dialogue. In effect, the parameters of a possible future dialogue lie at the core of the current disagreements.

On 20 March, following talks with a U.S. delegation, Aliaksandr Lukashenka announced the start of the return of Lithuanian trucks and a reduction in storage fees in Belarus. On 23 March, the State Customs Committee confirmed the beginning of the removal of more than 1,900 vehicles. By 29 March, 272 trucks had been returned to Lithuania.

Against this background, U.S. mediation intensified. On 27 March, U.S. Special Envoy John Coale openly advocated launching Belarusian–Lithuanian contacts at the level of deputy ministers and restoring the transit of potash fertilisers through Lithuania.

Lithuania, for its part, formally allowed technical contacts, but links them to the cessation of so-called “hybrid actions” and the return of trucks without additional charges. President Gitanas Nausėda stressed that without “goodwill” from Minsk, political dialogue is impossible, and that the EU sanctions regime is not subject to revision. Indicative is also the assessment by presidential adviser Matulionis of a “coercive attempt to draw [Lithuania] into dialogue”, reflecting concerns about diplomatic pressure.

Notably, on 30 March Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya called on the United States not to exert pressure on Vilnius regarding sanctions, effectively supporting Lithuania’s hard line.

Minsk, for its part, declares readiness for dialogue without preconditions, describing Vilnius’s demands as “artificial ultimatums”.

Incidents at the border continue but remain at a background level. On 23 March, Lithuanian border guards detained 11 migrants, with facilitation reportedly observed from the Belarusian side — including damage to barriers and escorting of the group. On 26 March, the largest attempted illegal crossing since the beginning of the year was recorded — 29 individuals using elements of camouflage, alongside another incident involving a meteorological balloon delivering around 1,500 packs of cigarettes into Lithuania.

As a result, as previously projected, the crisis has not been fully resolved. It is shifting into a negotiation phase marked by competing positions. Minsk seeks to exchange de-escalation for political dialogue; Vilnius aims to preserve sanctions and avoid concessions; Washington seeks to reduce regional tensions while maintaining its mediation channel.

Against this background, on the border with Poland, only four attempts of illegal border crossing were recorded between 22 and 29 March, according to Straż Graniczna. At the same time, on 28 March, two meteorological balloons carrying contraband cigarettes fell near Warsaw.

On 27 March, Belstat reported that Belarus’s population stood at 9,056,080 as of 1 January 2026, having decreased by 53,200 over the year. Population numbers include citizens residing abroad. The decline continues amid a prolonged demographic downturn. Since 2020, the country has recorded historically low birth rates, currently at around 59,000 births annually. According to available estimates, the birth rate in Belarus is approximately 6.5 births per 1,000 inhabitants, significantly below the global average. In a broader comparative context, Belarus’s demographic trajectory appears unfavourable: according to the United Nations, Europe, North America, Australia and New Zealand are expected to see an overall population decline of 29% by 2100, while Belarus is projected to shrink by 52%. At the same time, in terms of current depopulation rates, Belarus generally follows demographic trends observed in neighbouring countries.

On 24 March, the “House of Representatives” adopted in the first reading a draft law on a digital Belarusian rouble, establishing the legal framework for launching a new form of non-cash money held in digital accounts at the National Bank. The regulator intends to use the digital rouble to simplify cross-border settlements, strengthen control over the movement of budget funds, and introduce new payment mechanisms. This step fits into a broader course by Minsk to expand digital financial instruments: on 16 January, Aliaksandr Lukashenka signed Decree No. 19 creating conditions for the operation of crypto banks in Belarus. Taken together, these measures indicate a growing effort by the state to develop alternative financial infrastructure. In this area, Minsk is significantly driven by the EU and U.S. sanctions regime, which complicates settlements, imports and cross-border payments.

HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE

After the latest waves of pardons, the number of officially recognised political prisoners in Belarus, even if not for long, has dropped below 900, a figure that has not been recorded for more than four years. Despite the releases, the human rights community noted that the repression in the country has not stopped. Human rights defenders are appealing to report cases of persecution that are still unknown to the general public. This is necessary to accurately record the scale of repression and provide support to those who remain behind bars.

On 24 March, Belarusian human rights organisations published a statement recognising six more people as political prisoners. Human rights defenders are calling for the release of these individuals, as well as all other political prisoners, and an end to the repressions. On 25 March, nine more people were recognised as political prisoners. These included the defendants in the “yard chats” case, who were sentenced to imprisonment terms ranging from eight to nine years under the charge of conspiracy “to seize state power”. On 26 March, 12 more people were recognised as political prisoners. Among them was Syarhei Ryabtsau, the founder of the Belarusian rental portals kdv.by and tutkut.by. He was convicted under the charge of “facilitation of extremist activities.” According to Viasna” Human Rights Centre, 910 people currently have the status of political prisoners in Belarus.

On 26 March, 78 more people were granted the status of “former political prisoner”, according to Viasna” Human Rights Centre. Human rights activists noted that the facts of politically motivated persecution are often only revealed on the eve of or after the release of another victim of repression, which prevents these individuals from being recognised as political prisoners.

On 20 March, in Minsk the verdict was announced for Vadzim Krivasheyeu, the former Director of the Republican Centre for Olympic Freestyle Training, who was tried in absentia. The court found him guilty of abuse of power or official authority, conspiracy or other actions committed with the aim to seize state power, calls for the use of sanctions or other actions harmful to national security, and the creation or participation in an extremist formation. Krivasheyeu was sentenced to 12 years of imprisonment in a high-security prison. He was also ordered to pay 1,000 basic units (45,000 roubles or approximately 13,000 Euro) of fines. In addition, he was banned from holding positions related to organisational, managerial, and administrative duties for five years. In September 2020, Krivasheyeu was dismissed from his position as Director of the Republican Centre for Olympic Freestyle Training for Freestyle Skiing for “poor ideological work in the team”. This happened after famous freestyle skiers Alyaksandra Ramanouskaya and Dzmitry Dachynski, as well as the national team coach Mikalai Kazeka, expressed their dissatisfaction with the violence committed by security forces in response to the protests of 9-11 August 2020.

Political scientist Volha Kharlamava was arrested on charges of high treason. She was detained at the end of June 2025 and placed in custody in a pre-trial detention centre. Human rights defenders recognised her as a political prisoner. Kharlamava was an analyst for the Media IQ project and often commented on events in Belarus for various Belarusian and foreign media outlets.

Political prisoner Zhanna Abramchyk is in a serious physical and psychological condition. She was tried under two criminal charges, one of which was “insulting the head of Akrestsina Detention Centre”. The exact sentence is unknown. Abramchyk, who is 60 years old, has two brain aneurysms, which cause her to have seizures. She is taking heavy medication. During the investigation, she was under house arrest, but when the verdict was announced in 2024, she was taken into custody in the courtroom despite her severe seizures and health condition.

Political prisoner Stsiapan Latypau attempted to commit suicide for the third time, Viasna” Human Rights Centre reported. In July 2025, he was transferred from Mahileu Prison No. 4 to Correctional Facility No. 22 “Volchye Nory” (Wolf Holes), where he was immediately placed in a punishment cell and then in a cell-type room. There, Latypau cut his veins, and was subsequently treated with stitches. It is known that during his imprisonment, he requested solitary confinement. According to Viasna”, there was no power socket in the cell, and only boiling water was provided twice a day. In September 2025, Latypau was transferred back to prison regime. He allegedly stated that he saw no purpose in life and could not endure another term in prison regime. Latypau was detained in September 2020. On 16 August 2021, he was sentenced to eight years and six months of imprisonment in a strict regime colony for participating in protests, “resisting police officers”, and “fraud committed on a large scale”. Latypau did not admit guilt in any of the charges. Leanid Marozau, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya’s Advisor on Legal Affairs, described Stsiapan Latypau’s third suicide attempt as a natural consequence of the deliberate destruction of human dignity in Belarusian prisons. “Stsiapan Latypau’s story is yet another tragic episode and a terrible example of the systematic abuse faced by political prisoners in Belarus…punishment cell, cell-type room, prison regime, constant pressure, deprivation of communication with loved ones, lack of basic conditions, humiliation, isolation, and endless punishments – all of this is used as a tool for psychological and physical abuse,” he said. He recalled that recently released political prisoners have spoken about the torture, cold, and complete isolation that can lead to a loss of purpose in life. Marozau also referred to the testimonies of former political prisoners Maksim Sennik and Valiantsin Stefanovich, as well as Nobel Peace Prize laureate Ales Bialiatski, who emphasised that the prison system in Belarus was designed not for detention, but for the suppression and destruction of individuals.

Journalist and Polish community activist Andrzej Poczobut was detained five years ago, on 25 March 2021, and two years later, he was sentenced to eight years of imprisonment. For three years he has been held without possibility to receive parcels, phone calls, or visits, in complete isolation, in a cell with a temperature of 9 degrees Celsius in winter. Several unrelated sources confirmed that Poczobut’s name was on the list of political prisoners whose release was requested by the United States, but each time, the Belarusian authorities removed his name. A “well-informed source” informed the Polish newspaper Rzeczpospolita that one of the conditions of Poczobut’s release is the resumption of political dialogue at a high level. Belarusian propagandist, Yury Vaskrasenski, has repeatedly stated that Poczobut could be released if Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski came to pick him up in person.

On 23 March, the Investigative Committee threatened Belarusians abroad with criminal prosecution and confiscation of property for participating in rallies in celebration of Freedom Day on 25 March. The agency stated that Freedom Day is being used by “extremist groups and their foreign handlers” to discredit Belarus in the international arena. “The main goals of such actions remain unchanged: creating the appearance of mass protests, creating a negative information background around the Republic of Belarus, trying to involve citizens who have left the country in illegal activities, and attracting further financial resources for extremist activities,” the Investigative Committee said in a press release. In August 2025, the Investigative Committee announced that it had identified 207 participants in foreign protests on Freedom Day in Poland, the United States, Lithuania, Canada, and the United Kingdom. They were recognised as suspects in facilitating “extremist” activities, and their property was seized. 25 March marks the anniversary of the 1918 proclamation of the independence of the Belarusian People’s Republic, the first national state of Belarusians, where the official flag was white-red-white, the emblem was the “Pagonia”, and the official language was Belarusian. During the Soviet era, Freedom Day was celebrated in secret. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, it briefly became a public holiday; however, the Lukashenka regime banned it. Thereafter, the white-red-white flag and the “Pagonia” emblem became symbols of the opposition to the regime and the protest movement.

From 24 to 26 March, authorities restricted access to virtual hosting for users from abroad. “According to the order of the Operational and Analytical Center (OAC), from 20:00 on 24 March to 8:00 on 26 March 2026, Belarusian hosting providers will restrict access to virtual hosting from outside the Republic of Belarus,” the OAC’s notification stated. These measures were taken allegedly due to “threats to information infrastructure facilities and information processed using them”. This was not the first time such restrictions have been imposed. They were applied during the “presidential elections” in January 2026 andthe mass protests in August 2020.

On 25 March, websites of the leader of Belarusian democratic forces,  Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, and the Reform.news media were subjected to a large-scale cyberattack. This led to short-term disruptions in the websites operation, access to them was quickly restored.

On 26 March, Aliaksandr Yaudakh and Vatslau Bagdanovich, who were detained in the book publishers’ case, were released from the KGB detention centre. Dzmitri Kolas and Vatslau Bagdanovich’s daughter, Vyctoryja Bagdanovich, remain behind bars. The mass detentions of Belarusian publishers and book distributors took place in February.

A day earlier, Zmitser Sanko, the editor-in-chief of the Technalohija publishing house, was detained again. It is likely that a criminal case has been opened against him. He was detained in February, but managed to avoid arrest. Sanko is a candidate of biological sciences, a linguist, and one of the founders of the Francysk Skaryna Belarusian Language Society. He has been the editor-in-chief of the Technalohija publishing house for over 30 years. On 31 March, Sanko will turn 76 years old.

The Ministry of Internal Affairs has updated the list of citizens involved in extremist activities. 24 names, were added, including five members of the Kalinouski Regiment who were recently convicted in absentia in Minsk. These include Vadzim Kabanchuk, the former Deputy Commander of the regiment and current Representative for Defence and National Security in the United Transitional Cabinet, the former Commanders of the regiment Pavel Shurmei, Dzyanis Prokharau, Aliaksei Kavalchuk, and Instructor Aliaksei Nazarau. In early March, they were sentenced in absentia to 12 to 25 years of imprisonment, along with heavy fines.

The seized apartment of Hrodna journalist Uladzimir Khilmanovich, who was sentenced in absentia to five years of imprisonment and a fine under “extremist” charges, is to be sold at auction. Khilmanovich received a letter from the enforcement department of the Leninsky District of Hrodna, which stated that his apartment has been valued at 126,000 rubles. The valuation was conducted on 25 February by the local branch of BelYurObespechenie, a Ministry of Justice agency that handles the auction of confiscated and seized property. The auction date has not yet been set. A fine Khilmanovich was sentenced to is 40,000 rubles. The funds remaining after paying the fine should be transferred to a bank account, but Khilmanovich does not have an account with a Belarusian bank. «If I don’t collect the funds remaining after paying the fine, they will be confiscated by the government», said Khilmanovich.

The European Union will continue to support a democratic, sovereign, and independent Belarus. This was stated on X social network by the European External Action Service on 25 March. “On Belarus Freedom Day, we reaffirm the EU’s solidarity with the people of Belarus. Belarusians mark the 1918 declaration of independence and their enduring aspiration for a free and democratic country. The EU will continue to support a democratic, sovereign and independent Belarus”, —read the statement. “On Belarus Freedom Day, we celebrate all those who keep the hope of a future sovereign and democratic Belarus alive. We will continue to support the people of Belarus in their fight for freedom and democracy”, — was stated in a post by the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy on Facebook on the same day. A number of EU member states, including Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, joined the congratulations. Members of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine wished Belarus freedom on the 108th anniversary of the proclamation of the Belarusian People’s Republic from the rostrum of the Ukrainian parliament.

As part of the celebration of Belarusian Freedom Day, which is traditionally held by the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Polish Deputy Foreign Minister Władysław Teofil Bartoszewski emphasised that Poland will do everything possible to resist the situation in which Russia’s neo-imperial and neo-colonial ambitions are encouraged, considering Belarus as part of the Russian world. “We will never agree to this,” he stressed. “The democratic development of Belarus is of fundamental importance for Poland, our region, and Europe, and is a prerequisite for security and development. We don’t want Lukashenka to rule Belarus, and we don’t want the Russians to rule Belarus. We want free Belarusians who will join the European Union and have normal state relations with us,” the deputy minister said.

Note from the editors: We do not provide links to publications in official and propagandistic sources belonging to the Lukashenka regime or affiliated with the regime. If you are interested in obtaining such a link for research or investigation purposes, please contact us at info@isans.org

Best regards, iSANS team

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