Belarus Review by iSANS — June 29, 2026 

According to Ukrainian monitoring channels, 12 Russian drones were detected in Belarusian airspace between 22 and 28 June 2026. Belarusian Air Force aircraft on alert duty were scrambled almost daily in response to their presence. No confirmed reports of drones crashing or being shot down were recorded during the week. At the same time, according to media reports, a drone was observed over Homiel during the night of 26 June and may have exploded. This information has not been officially confirmed.

From 22 June, relay stations on Belarusian territory that, according to the Ukrainian side, had been assisting Russian strike drones in attacking targets in Ukraine ceased operating. This was stated by Volodymyr Zelenskyy on 24 June. He added that it remained unclear whether the relay stations had been dismantled or merely switched off.

On the same day, Ukrainian State Border Guard Service spokesperson Andrii Demchenko reported that the intensity of Russian strike drone flights through Chernihiv Region had declined for approximately one week. In addition, there had been no recent mass flights of Shahed drones along the Belarusian-Ukrainian border. The Border Guard Service did not specify the reasons for these changes. Unofficial reports suggested that interruptions in the operation of relay stations in Belarus had also occurred previously, making it premature to draw firm conclusions regarding the reasons for their current shutdown.

On 25 June, a ceremonial graduation for officers of the General Staff Faculty of the Military Academy was held, the Belarusian Ministry of Defence reported. In 2026, the faculty graduated 133 officers. Addressing the ceremony, Defence Minister Viktar Khrenin stressed that the primary focus of future service should be on training subordinate officers: “If an officer is properly trained, then his personnel will also be properly trained.”

On 25 June, Volodymyr Zelenskyy published a map of road and military infrastructure currently being constructed or modernised in the immediate vicinity of the Belarusian-Ukrainian border. “Along our state border in Belarus, construction of road infrastructure is nearing completion, as are ammunition depots and fuel storage facilities, which have no obvious purpose other than military use. <…> We know that Russian documents consider these facilities specifically in the context of the objectives of the so-called ‘special military operation’,” the statement said.

The publication referred to five military facilities: the 1405th Artillery Ammunition Depot (Asipovichy District), the 2766th Fuel Depot (Zhlobin District), a military camp and training ground for the 37th Air Assault Brigade (Homiel District), a joint Russian-Belarusian training and combat centre for the Oreshnik missile system (Klimavichy District), and an ammunition production plant (Slutsk District). It should be noted that all of these facilities were already publicly known. Many have been under construction or modernisation for several years, and the relevant works have been documented on numerous occasions.

The statement also referred to seven transport infrastructure projects — six bridges and one road interchange — in Brest and Homiel regions. The construction and reconstruction of most of these projects is primarily explained by existing transport requirements. In most cases, the works address structures in poor or deteriorating condition, long-standing traffic restrictions, insufficient load capacity, the seasonal nature of ferry crossings, or increasing road traffic.

No build-up of strike forces, military units, personnel or equipment has been observed in the immediate vicinity of the Belarusian-Ukrainian border, Ukrainian State Border Guard Service spokesperson Andrii Demchenko stated on 26 June. According to him, the number of Belarusian units deployed on the Ukrainian direction since 2022 has not increased, although they are periodically rotated. At the same time, Russian influence over Belarus remains. Military infrastructure, including training grounds and bases that could potentially accommodate personnel, continues to develop deeper inside the country. Ukraine therefore continues to strengthen its defensive capabilities and prepare for possible changes in the security situation.

Colonel Maksim Hakotsin was appointed Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Belarusian Armed Forces and Chief of the Main Operational Directorate, the Belarusian Ministry of Defence announced on 25 June. Before his appointment, Hakotsin served as head of the Fourth Directorate of the Main Operational Directorate of the General Staff. The post had previously been held by Siarhei Lahadziuk, who was dismissed on 6 May 2026 and transferred to the reserve upon reaching the retirement age.

Representatives of the State Supervision Directorate of the Main Military Inspectorate of the Belarusian Armed Forces held a working meeting in Minsk with representatives of the Main Directorate for Control and Supervisory Activities of the Russian Ministry of Defence, the Belarusian military news agency Vayar reported on 26 June. The parties discussed the safe storage of ammunition and the safe operation of hazardous industrial and potentially dangerous facilities. The meeting took place within the framework of bilateral military cooperation.

On 27 June, the Military Academy held the ceremonial graduation of its 70th class of officers, the Belarusian Ministry of Defence reported. In 2026, more than 400 young specialists graduated from the academy. Speaking to journalists, Defence Minister Viktar Khrenin focused in particular on military education. According to him, training programmes have been substantially revised in recent years, with more than 70% of instructional time now devoted to practical training. The academy’s facilities include specialised classrooms and modern simulators. Khrenin also emphasised that the Belarusian system of military education remains in demand abroad, with foreign military personnel currently studying at the academy.

On 22 June, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya addressed the graduating class of the College of Europe in Natolin, near Warsaw. In her speech, she spoke about the future of Belarus and Europe, Russia’s war against Ukraine, and Belarus’s role in European security. “There will be no secure Europe without a free Belarus,” Tsikhanouskaya said, stressing that Belarus remains an important element of Russia’s war machine but could also become its “weak link”. The College leadership, in turn, emphasised that it would continue to provide scholarships for Belarusian students.

On 25 June, amid rising tensions with Ukraine, Lukashenka stated that he had recently received representatives of Volodymyr Zelenskyy in Minsk and had conveyed a warning to the Ukrainian leadership through them. According to Lukashenka, any attempt to draw Belarus into the war would mean that “the nature of the war would change instantly”. He added that Kyiv had “received the answer” and understood the consequences of such an escalation. At the same time, Lukashenka again stressed that Belarus had no intention of entering the war, rejected claims that Russia was pressuring Minsk to do so, and said that he had discussed the matter with Vladimir Putin on numerous occasions. He nevertheless reaffirmed Belarus’s alliance commitments to Moscow, stating that “in any situation we will stand alongside Russia”. Lukashenka also called on Ukraine to abandon ultimatums and return to negotiations, saying that Minsk needed “peace and only peace”, but with security guarantees for both Russia and Belarus. Later, Dmitry Peskov confirmed that Lukashenka had not passed any messages from Volodymyr Zelenskyy to Vladimir Putin, although he noted that the existing communication channels between Moscow and Kyiv “should remain in the shadows”. The statements came in response to Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s warnings about possible strikes against facilities in Belarus linked to support for Russian military operations.

Shortly afterwards, Lukashenka departed on an extended foreign trip. His first destination was Russia, followed by China, with visits to other Southeast Asian countries also announced (according to unofficial reports, Indonesia and Vietnam).

On 26–27 June, Lukashenka visited Russia, where he held lengthy closed-door talks with Vladimir Putin at the Valdai residence. At least two rounds of negotiations were reported — one in a one-on-one format and another with the participation of delegations. According to the Kremlin, the discussions covered bilateral trade and economic cooperation, implementation of Union State programmes, international affairs, the situation surrounding Ukraine and regional security. No joint statements, press conference or document signing followed the meeting. Earlier, on 15 June, Lukashenka met Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in Minsk. During those talks, the Russian side sharply criticised peace proposals by Germany, France and the United Kingdom, describing them as an “ultimatum”. Against this backdrop, the Valdai meeting was likely intended to align Russian and Belarusian positions amid Lukashenka’s increasingly active contacts with the United States, France, Ukraine and Poland. Despite increasingly confrontational Russian rhetoric towards the West and Ukraine, the talks produced no public signals suggesting that Minsk was prepared for further military escalation. Ahead of the visit, Lukashenka had also instructed the Belarusian government to resolve as many outstanding issues with Russia as possible, noting that his meetings with Putin usually focus on “what governments have failed to resolve”. The economic agenda remained centred on growing Belarusian exports (bilateral trade approaching USD 60 billion), industrial cooperation, technological sovereignty projects, access for Belarusian products to the Russian market, and the Belarus–Russia Regions Forum recently held in Minsk.

On 25 June, the day before Lukashenka’s visit to Russia, the Russian propaganda Telegram channel Yezh (in Russian ЕЖ), part of the Nezygar network linked to the Russian Presidential Administration and Margarita Simonyan, published what it claimed was an intercepted conversation involving Belarusian Foreign Minister Maksim Ryzhankou. The recording allegedly concerned a deal with an American investor that would provide Minsk with new political opportunities, with the participants claiming that “the price does not matter”. The authenticity of the recording has not been verified, while the video itself appears likely to be fabricated: the audio and video are not synchronised, and the nature of the conversation does not correspond to either Ryzhankou’s position or his communication style. The publication reflected continuing concern among parts of the Russian political establishment about the development of Belarusian-American dialogue.

On 26 June, Belarus announced an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council in connection with the 17 June attack on a bus carrying Belarusian citizens in Russia’s Bryansk Region. The meeting was initiated by Minsk with Russian support, despite Belarus not being a member of the Security Council. Earlier, on 22 June, contrary to expectations, the Belarusian delegation did not participate in the Security Council meeting on Ukraine. Minsk is now seeking to shape the agenda itself, intending to call for an international investigation into the incident and raise statements by the Ukrainian leadership concerning possible strikes against targets in Belarus.

On 23 June, European Commission spokesperson Anita Hipper commented on Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s ultimatum regarding the dismantling of relay stations in Belarus, stating that “Ukraine has the right to defend itself”. She also reiterated the EU’s position that Belarus continues to facilitate Russian aggression against Ukraine and noted the European Union’s readiness to take further measures against the Lukashenka regime should the Belarusian authorities continue such actions.

The Belarusian-Lithuanian confrontation has become an established long-term framework encompassing sanctions, legal proceedings, aviation security, migration and disputes over the future of political and economic relations with Belarus. Lithuania continues to dismantle the model of neighbourhood relations. On 15 June, the Seimas considered denunciation of the bilateral agreement on local border traffic, while on 25 June Lithuania extended no-fly zones along the Belarusian border until 1 January 2027. The legal dimension has also gained additional significance. On 26 June, the Belarusian Ministry of Foreign Affairs outlined its position regarding Lithuania’s case before the International Court of Justice, describing it as part of “legal aggression” and challenging both the Court’s jurisdiction and the admissibility of the application, as well as Lithuania’s attempt to bring the concept of the “instrumentalisation of migration” within the scope of the UN Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants. At the same time, Minsk left the door open for negotiations, stating that the dispute “requires dialogue”.

Lithuania’s domestic political line has likewise remained unchanged. On 16 June, President Gitanas Nausėda supported tougher sanctions against Belarus and Russia, while on 29 June the new candidate for prime minister, Mindaugas Sinkevičius, declined to disclose his position on the future of potash sanctions, stressing instead the importance of relations with the United States.

The situation on the Polish and Latvian borders remains highly asymmetrical. Between 10 and 28 June, Poland recorded five attempted illegal border crossings (according to the Straż Graniczna), while Latvia recorded 1,570 attempts (according to the Valsts robežsardze).

Against this backdrop, managed tension has continued along the Belarusian-Ukrainian border. On 24 June, the CSTO stated that the situation had deteriorated, linking this to statements by Kyiv and regular flights of Ukrainian drones towards Russia. At the same time, Minsk attempted to soften the atmosphere by proposing, on 25 June, a seasonal simplified border-crossing regime for residents of Ukraine’s border areas wishing to collect mushrooms and berries in the Almani Marshes area. Ukraine’s State Border Guard Service responded that the border remained dangerous because of minefields and explosive barriers and that no changes would be introduced while Belarus continued to support Russia. Minsk is therefore combining signals of good neighbourliness with demonstrations of readiness to respond to perceived threats.

On 25 June, Belarus’s Permanent Representative to the OSCE, Andrei Dapkiunas, delivered one of the harshest statements by Belarusian diplomacy since the beginning of Russia’s war against Ukraine and arguably the most confrontational public remarks of his diplomatic career. Commenting on Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s ultimatum, he described the Ukrainian leader as “Mr Bean on crack”, urged Western countries to “keep their Kyiv pets under control”, and warned that strikes against facilities in Belarus could create a precedent for the use of force against states providing military assistance to Ukraine. Later that day, the state news agencies BELTA and SB. Belarus Segodnya removed the text of the speech from their websites without explanation. The publications were likely withdrawn because the statement was no longer aligned with the rapidly evolving Belarusian-Ukrainian agenda.

At the same time, on 26–27 June Belarus once again served as a venue for Russian-Ukrainian humanitarian contacts. On 26 June, Russia and Ukraine conducted a prisoner-of-war exchange under the “160 for 160” formula. Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced that 160 Ukrainian defenders had returned home, stating that “all of them had been held captive since 2022”, and added: “We must bring everyone back — both military personnel and civilians.” Zelenskyy did not mention Belarus’s role in facilitating the exchange. The following day, seven civilians from each side were exchanged at the Novaya Huta border crossing on the Belarusian-Ukrainian border. Russian Human Rights Commissioner Yana Lantratova stated that the exchange resulted from agreements reached three weeks earlier during her first meeting in Belarus with Ukrainian Human Rights Commissioner Dmytro Lubinets. The parties also confirmed their intention to continue mutual visits to prisoners of war, exchange documentation, conduct humanitarian missions, and cooperate in locating and returning missing persons and other civilians.

On 22 June, KGB updated the list of “persons involved in terrorist activities”, adding 21 people. Among them is Aliaksandr Lyubianchuk, a former journalist who was convicted twice. In 2022, he was sentenced to three years of imprisonment under the charge of participation in an “extremist formation.” He was released in early 2025, but detained again in the “Belarusian Hajun” case in September. Lyubianchuk was released in May 2026 after serving his second term.

On 26 June, the Ministry of Internal Affairs added 17 more people to the “List of citizens of the Republic of Belarus, foreign citizens or stateless persons involved in extremist activities.” The list now contains 6,745 names.

Belarusian human rights defenders published a statement recognising eleven more people as political prisoners. They called for their immediate release, as well as the release of all political prisoners and an end to political repression.

On 25 June, the Ministry of Internal Affairs recognised the ABA Together (Association of Belarusians in America) as an “extremist formation”. The ABA Together is a non-profit organisation uniting Belarusians across the United States. It has become the 373rd “extremist” organisation on the list of extremist groups.

At least 117 cultural figures have been repressed in Belarus since 2020. This was reported by the Belarusskaya Rada Kultury in its monitoring overview. According to their data, about 10 percent of political prisoners are linked to the cultural sphere. From 2020 to mid-2026, the authorities sentenced 82 people associated with the culture to imprisonment or restriction of freedom, and eight more are currently under investigation. In 27 more cases, the verdict is unknown.

“Viasna” Human Rights Centre published updated information on the repression of military servicemen. At least 68 military personnel have been criminally prosecuted since 2020, with 27 currently in prison. Of those, 24 are serving their sentences, two were sentenced to restriction of freedom, and one is awaiting trial in custody. At least 10 servicemen were convicted under the charge of high treason. The longest known term is 21 years of imprisonment. Human rights defenders reported cases of torture, ill-treatment and beatings of detainees, as well as pressure on prisoners through relatives. Some of the military servicemen were stripped of their military ranks by Lukashenka’s decrees.

Since 2020, more than 2,000 organisations that supported children, people with disabilities, seriously ill patients, victims of violence and other vulnerable groups have been liquidated in Belarus. After their liquidation, the assistance did not stop completely, but took other forms. Some of the initiatives continued to work from abroad. Some projects have registered in neighboring countries and are trying to help Belarusians remotely. Others exist as informal volunteer networks. Fundraising is increasingly taking place through social media, personal contacts, and private initiatives. One-time solutions appear in place of a stable system. This allows one to solve some of the issues, but does not replace full-fledged assistance. The experts emphasised that large pro-government structures such as the Red Cross, the Fond Mira, and the Belarusski Detski Fond could not replace the organisations that the authorities had liquidated. The system of forced charitable donations created by the state, when persecuted people are offered to “donate” an amount that is many times higher than the value of the donation they transferred to an “extremist formation” in order to avoid criminal prosecution, does not solve the problem. “The funds come not as a result of the development of charity and social solidarity, but through a mechanism of pressure and fear,” says Volha Velichka, former Director of the Hrodna children’s hospice. “Moreover, the money is being sent to the state organisations, while independent ones that used to provide targeted assistance have been liquidated,” she noted.

On 23 June, the International Committee for the Investigation of Torture in Belarus released a public investigation report on “Torture and ill-treatment in correctional colony No. 3 in the Vitsebsk region”. This colony is located in the village of Vitsba. The document was prepared on the basis of 29 interviews with former political prisoners who were held in this colony from November 2020 to November 2023. The Committee expressed its hope that the results of the investigation will broaden understanding of the real situation in the country’s closed institutions and serve as a reliable basis for further human rights work. The investigation examines the prisoner’s entire journey in the colony, starting from transportation to the colony and quarantine. It covers living conditions, detention, labour of prisoners, informal prison hierarchy, physical and psychological violence, medical care, and colony staff. The situation of political prisoners is considered in a separate section.

The Dissidentby human rights initiative reported on new attempts by the KGB to recruit Belarusians who have left the country. Attempts have been intensifying in the last six months. Human rights activists are aware of several cases when parents of Belarusians who have left the country were threatened and demanded to give their children’s contacts, referring to their connection with the Centre for New Ideas, recognised as an “extremist formation”. After receiving the contact information, the KGB gets in touch with the person of interest and, through threats, pressure, or “friendly offers,” they try to draw the person into long-term communication. “The main purpose of such contacts is to persuade a person to long-term communication, get as much information as possible and create a situation in which it will be almost impossible to refuse contact,” human rights defenders warned.

KGB officers held talks with former political prisoners in one of the small towns of Belarus. According to “Viasna” Human Rights Centre, KGB officers arrived in the city. They called in people who had been convicted under “extremist” charges, including former political prisoners, and asked them about their contacts with those who are abroad, as well as whether they plan to leave the country. In addition, KGB officers took phones from former political prisoners and connected them to an unidentified device.

On 23 June, the cottage of the in absentia convicted journalist Uladzimir Khilmanovich was auctioned off on the fifth attempt. Two participants competed for the lot. The winner paid 3,242 rubles (approximately 980 Euro). The cottage was first put up for an auction in November 2025. The initial price was 8,400 rubles (approximately 2,539 Euro). At every consecutive auction the price was decreased. Khilmanovich’s apartment in Hrodna is also up for auction. The auction will be held on 30 June. Khilmanovich was sentenced in absentia to five years of imprisonment under charges of facilitating “extremist” activities and participating in an “extremist formation” and fined 1,000 basic units (approximately 13,600 Euro). To pay it, the court decided to auction his property.

Yauhenia, the wife of Vasil Verameychyk, a former volunteer of the Kalinousky Regiment, reported her husband’s serious heart problems in detention. According to an independent doctor’s conclusion, the treatment prescribed to him is usually prescribed to those who have suffered a heart attack or have a very high risk of developing it. However, instead of the planned operation, Verameychyk was placed in a punishment cell, and after that he was transferred to an isolation chamber type room, where the opportunities to receive the necessary medical care are even more limited. Yauhenia said that his problems started back in the pre-trial detention centre. Then Verameychyk complained of symptoms indicating heart problems: chest pain, shortness of breath, dizziness, swelling of the arms and legs. He was not, however, provided with medical care there. According to his relatives, Verameychyk has been included by human rights defenders in the humanitarian list of people in need of urgent release due to his health condition. In 2025, Verameychyk was sentenced to 13 years of imprisonment and sent to serve his sentence in Shklou colony No. 17. There an examination of his heart condition was finally conducted.

The Investigative Committee launched in absentia investigation against Artsem Litvinka. He was invited to attend the office of the Investigative Committee in Minsk. He is accused of inciting discord, calling for sanctions, insulting Lukashenka, and insulting a government official.

New details of the case of Catholic priest Henrikh Akalatovich, who was released a few months ago, were published. They became known from former political prisoners who were next to him in the pre-trial detention centre and the colony. Akalatovich’s arrest took place at a cemetery where the KGB had tricked him into going. They called him and informed him about the death of a woman who needed to be buried according to the Catholic rite. At the same time, two of his parishioners were detained — a man and a woman, who spent about nine months in the KGB pre-trial detention centre and were requested to testify about Akalatovich’s alleged meetings with foreign diplomats. The investigator kept telling him: “If you loved your flock, you would have signed a confession. They are in jail because of you”. As a condition of his release, the KGB proposed Akalatovich to stage a provocation against the apostolic nuncio of the Vatican and other foreign diplomats, primarily Polish ones. Akalatovich refused this. He is keeping silence about the circumstances of his detention and release. That, apparently, was the condition for his release.

On 26 June, the Minsk City Court sentenced journalist Kiryll Paznyak to three and a half years of imprisonment and a fine of 550 basic units (24,750 rubles, or approximately 7,500 Euro). His daughter Yanina was also sentenced to imprisonment, but the exact term is not yet known. Both were accused of “discrediting” Belarus and creating an “extremist formation”. Kiryll and his daughter Yanina Paznyak were detained in September 2025, after Kiryll’s YouTube channel Platforma 375 was declared an “extremist formation’. Kiryll Paznyak covered economic and political events in the country on the channel, and in 2021-2022 he moderated online debates between pro-government propagandists and their opponents. Yanina’s fault was that she had registered the channel on TikTok.

On 22 June, the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) Petra Bayr called on the international community not to forget Belarus amid Russia’s war against Ukraine and stated that Europe’s long-term security is impossible without democratic change in both Belarus and Russia. Petra Bayr made these remarks during her opening of the summer session of the PACE. A separate part of her speech was devoted to Belarus. “While the world’s attention is rightly focused on Ukraine, we must not forget Belarus. Authoritarianism counts on exhausting our attention. We must not allow it to succeed,” Bayr said. In her speech, Belarus was presented as one of the key countries whose future will determine the security of Europe as a whole. “We work with democratic forces from Russia and Belarus to help them lay the foundations for future of their countries where human rights and the rule of law are not foreign concepts, but integral components and elements of their identity. But we are doing this for ourselves as well, because European security will not be guaranteed without a democratic Belarus,” she concluded.

On 25 June, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe adopted a resolution titled “Fighting back against transnational repression” (Resolution 2669 (2026)). The resolution stressed that TNR violates the rule of law and state sovereignty, infringes the human rights of the individuals targeted and poses a serious threat to national security, undermines the values and principles of the Council of Europe and is incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights. The PACE stated that only a coordinated international response can adequately counter the threat to national security, human rights and the rule of law posed by transnational repression. It called on all member and observer states, among other things, to enact legislation or introduce other equivalent instruments aimed at preventing and combating TNR, including through the criminalisation of its methods and adoption of a definition of TNR and to prosecute perpetrators of TNR to the fullest extent of the law, including through relevant international criminal justice mechanisms where acts of TNR may amount to international crimes falling within their jurisdiction. The Assembly also formulated a number of recommendations related to Interpol. The final version of the resolution was adopted by a majority vote. Five deputies from Turkey voted against it; some representatives of Italy, Switzerland, Poland, Liechtenstein, and Luxembourg abstained.

The PACE President Petra Bayr appealed to the parliaments of European countries to implement the provisions of the resolution on countering transnational repression. In particular, she referred to the necessity to create modern and secure mechanisms for obtaining internationally recognised documents for people who are denied the opportunity to obtain or renew passports by authoritarian regimes such as in Russia and Belarus.

The PACE Special Rapporteur on political prisoners, member of the Swedish Parliament Azad Rojan stated that she sees no reason to talk about a normalisation of the situation with political prisoners in Belarus, since the list of political prisoners is constantly being updated and people inside the country are under constant pressure.

Belarus is one of the ten worst countries in the world for workers. This conclusion was contained in the Global Rights Index 2026, which was published by the International Trade Union Confederation. The authors of the report claimed that the pressure on workers continues to grow in many countries, but Belarus once again found itself next to Egypt, Nigeria, Turkey and other countries where people are effectively deprived of reliable guarantees for the protection of their labor rights. The study was based on 97 indicators, which were based on the conventions of the International Labour Organisation and international standards in the field of labor rights. The authors analysed whether employees can freely form and join trade unions, whether trade unions operate independently of the state and employers, whether there is a right to collective bargaining and strikes, whether employees have access to a fair trial and other mechanisms to protect their interests. In addition, cases of arrests, dismissals, intimidation and violence against trade union activists, government interference in trade union activities, restrictions on freedom of speech and assembly in labor conflicts, as well as harassment of trade union leaders were taken into account.

Note from the editors: We do not provide links to publications in official and propagandistic sources belonging to the Lukashenka regime or affiliated with the regime. If you are interested in obtaining such a link for research or investigation purposes, please contact us at info@isans.org

Best regards, iSANS team