Belarus Review by iSANS — July 28, 2025 

Between 21 and 27 July, Ukrainian monitoring channels reported the presence of at least four Russian drones in Belarusian airspace, including strike drones of the Shahed type and Geran-type decoys. All subsequently crossed into Ukrainian territory.

On 23 July, the Belarusian Ministry of Defence reported that Chief of the General Staff Paval Muraveika conducted a site reconnaissance for the upcoming Zapad-2025 joint exercises. The inspection took place at the 227th Borisovsky Combined Arms Training Ground, according to footage published by VoenTV.

Muraveika stated that Belarus had completed the final reconnaissance phase and was ready to receive forces and begin the drills on schedule. He described the relocation of the exercises deeper into Belarus as a “stabilising measure” intended to reassure the international community. Muraveika also left open the possibility of relocating some units closer to the Polish and Lithuanian borders during the exercise. He cited Poland’s plans to hold divisional-level drills near Hrodna and Białowieża Forest and Lithuania’s redeployment of its Iron Wolf Brigade to the Pabradė training ground. “Under these conditions, we reserve the right to shift certain units to train exclusively defensive scenarios, including in the areas I have outlined,” he said. This aligns with a statement made by Defence Cooperation Department Head Valery Revenka in late May, who announced that Belarus would conduct a company-level tactical exercise near Hrodna (at the Hozhski training ground) in response to Poland’s planned Żelazny Obrońca exercise.

Muraveika also confirmed that Belarus will invite observers from Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) countries, as well as accredited military attachés and Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) members under the Vienna Document.

Muraveika outlined key features of Zapad-2025:

First, he emphasised that the exercises are “strictly defensive in nature” and aimed at ensuring the security of the Union State: “We deliberately excluded any offensive scenarios from the plan and concept of the exercise.”

Second, he noted that the troop count had been “virtually halved” compared to previous editions: “This reflects a reduction in geographic scope and a narrowing of focus on certain directions we had initially planned to explore.”

Third, he highlighted the use of modern military technologies: “The drills will incorporate all recent advances in modern warfare – including unmanned aerial systems, electronic warfare assets, various robotic and automated platforms, as well as modern air defence and counter-UAV tactics.”

Between 23 and 25 July, the Belarusian Ministry of Defence conducted brigade-level tactical exercises involving the 8^th Radio-Technical Brigade under the command of Air Force and Air Defence Chief of Radio-Technical Troops Aliaksandr Varabiou. The exercises focused on detecting simulated enemy aerial targets and rapidly relaying data to anti-aircraft missile units and aviation. Particular emphasis was placed on countering UAVs and diversion-reconnaissance groups, as well as on mobility and concealment of radar systems. According to Varabiou, the exercises incorporated the most advanced operational experience and were conducted across Brest, Hrodna, and Minsk regions. “During the exercise, personnel are testing new forms of command and control deployment, taking into account lessons from the armed conflict between [Iran and Israel]. In real time, they are learning new tactical techniques to improve combat performance, particularly manoeuvrability and survivability under potential high-precision weapon and drone attacks,” he stated.

On 24 July, the Ministry reported that cadets of the Military Medical Institute at the Belarusian State Medical University took part in the “Pomoshch-2025” special training session at the “Belaya Luzha” Military Academy training centre. The exercise included battlefield evacuation and first aid in so-called red zones, medical triage, and extractions from BMP-2 and T-72B vehicles. Notably, the “Podorozhnik” mobile field dressing station – recently delivered to the 432^nd Special Operations Medical Unit – was used for the first time.

On 25 July, the Belarusian Railway Workers’ Community reported active preparations for the transporting of Russian troops to Belarus by rail for the upcoming “Zapad-2025” joint exercises. Belarusian and Russian military transport authorities, together with Belarusian Railways, are coordinating logistics. While specific schedules and volumes remain undisclosed, the Community indicated that rail convoys carrying Russian forces are expected to begin arriving in Belarus within weeks.

On the same day, the Telegram channel of the Asipovichy Garrison reported that training continues in the 336^th Rocket Artillery Brigade. Soldiers from the 77^th Separate Rocket Artillery Battalion are conducting field exercises focused on tactical coordination and high professional standards. The battalion operates “Polonez” multiple-launch rocket systems.

On July 27, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya released a statement marking the 35^th anniversary of the Declaration of Sovereignty adopted by the Belarusian parliament on 27 July 1990. She reminded Belarusians that independence must be actively defended and cannot be taken for granted. In her message, Tsikhanouskaya emphasised that Belarus under a pro-Kremlin regime is diverging from the vision outlined in 1990 and called on citizens to continue striving for a sovereign, democratic state governed by the will of the people.

A controversy unfolded in Lithuania after MP Vytautas Sinica, founding member and vice-chair of far-right party “National Alliance” and the first parliament member elected from this party, called for the de-accreditation of the Belarusian Democracy Representation Office headed by Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya. Sinica accused the Office of undermining Lithuanian interests and promoting “an alternative Belarus” on Lithuanian soil. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania rejected the proposal, affirming that the Representation continues to play an essential role in coordinating democratic forces and must remain accredited. Tsikhanouskaya’s Office issued a formal statement reiterating its commitment to strong bilateral relations and rejecting “Litvinism” or any territorial claims.

According to Reform.news, on July 17, the International Court of Justice published new procedural deadlines in the case filed by Lithuania against Belarus on 19 May 2025 over alleged large-scale smuggling of irregular migrants in the course of the state-engineered migration crisis. Belarus has until 19 January 2026 to submit a memorandum concerning the Court’s jurisdiction and the admissibility of the application, while Lithuania must respond to it by 20 July 2026. The Court also confirmed the appointment of official representatives by both sides, Ričard Dzikovič for Lithuania and Andrei Papkou for Belarus. Lithuania is seeking €200 million in damages, arguing that the Belarusian regime violated international obligations and deliberately used irregular migration to apply political pressure on the EU.

On July 23, an exchange of prisoners between Russia and Ukraine took place at the Belarus–Ukraine border. Each side released 250 individuals as part of a broader agreement first reached in Istanbul on 2 June. According to both Ukrainian and Russian authorities, this was the ninth such exchange in the current series. Reports indicate that a number of the returned prisoners had spent over three years in captivity. Belarus provided logistical and medical assistance to the prisoners. The exchange was confirmed by both Kremlin representative Vladimir Medinsky and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

On July 23, Iranian parliamentary representatives confirmed that President Masoud Pezeshkian is planning an official visit to Belarus in the near future. The delegation noted that preparations were underway for new joint educational and scientific programmes, as well as a direct air link between the two countries. The Iranian side described the visit as a turning point in bilateral relations, suggesting the Belarusian regime continues to invest in ties with non-Western partners amid ongoing international isolation.

On July 25, the German Ministry of the Interior confirmed the temporary suspension of humanitarian visas for Belarusian and Russian citizens under Section 22(2) of the German Residence Act. The measure is linked to the coalition agreement between the ruling parties on tightening migration policy and limiting special admission programmes. As the Interior Ministry of Germany stated, the government is currently discussing which exactly programmes will be reduced. For the time being, the reception of foreigners for humanitarian reasons has been suspended. According to official data, Germany has issued 267 humanitarian visas to Belarusians since 2020. Those already residing in Germany will be able to extend their residency permits under existing regulations.

On July 24, the Estonian government approved a proposal from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to make sanctions against 273 Belarusian regime officials, including Aliaksandr Lukashenka, permanent. The original restrictions, introduced in 2020 and renewed multiple times, now have indefinite legal status. Commenting on the decision, Lukashenka’s press secretary Natalia Eismant told TASS: “I can tell you exactly how the president reacted to this ‘loud’ news. He literally said: ‘I have, unfortunately, never been to Estonia… And since these sanctions were introduced, I keep wondering – will I survive?’” The Belarusian regime dismissed the decision with irony, while Estonia signalled that it considers long-term pressure a cornerstone of its Belarus policy.

On July 24, Belarusian Finance Minister Yury Seliverstau confirmed that Belarus and Russia negotiated on financial cooperation on the sidelines of an international conference in Gorno-Altaysk, Russia. The discussion reportedly included new loans, refinancing of existing debts, and direct budgetary assistance. The statement underscored Minsk’s continued financial dependence on Moscow and the prioritisation of energy and investment funding to sustain domestic liquidity.

On July 25, the Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church adopted a resolution mandating that all canonical institutions of the Belarusian Exarchate include the terms “Russian Orthodox Church” or “Moscow Patriarchate” in their official legal and public names. This decision applies not only to the Belarusian Exarchate but also to the Church’s Metropolitan Districts in Kazakhstan and Central Asia. The instruction came in response to observed deviations from this naming convention – reportedly during re-registration procedures of religious institutions in Belarus – and reflects Moscow’s tightening control over ecclesiastical branding. The Synod emphasized that failure to comply will require rectification to align with the official status of these jurisdictions within the Moscow Patriarchate. According to Christian Vision, the term “Belarusian Orthodox Church”, without reference to Moscow, has long been standard usage in Belarus, unlike in Ukraine, where such distinctions served to differentiate the UOC-MP from other jurisdictions. Notably, no alternative Orthodox church currently operates in Belarus. The new ruling also contradicts the Statute of the Russian Orthodox Church, which explicitly recognizes “the Belarusian Orthodox Church” as an alternative official designation for the Belarusian Exarchate (Chapter XIII, Article 15). Observers interpret the move as a response to growing autonomist tendencies within the Belarusian Church and as part of broader institutional tensions between Minsk and Moscow.

On July 25, Aliaksandr Lukashenka signed a Decree No 290 assigning each district executive committee head personal responsibility for one of the country’s most unprofitable agricultural enterprises. Regional authorities must designate one loss-making farm per district, and the corresponding district head will be held accountable for improving its performance. Financial incentives are offered for improvement, while failure will result in the removal of performance-related bonuses. In some cases, the official may be reassigned to manage the underperforming entity. The move reflects the regime’s increased pressure on local executives and the politicisation of agricultural management.

On July 25, the pro-regime political party Belaya Rus announced the creation of a youth movement called Iskra. According to party chair Volha Chamadanava, the initiative aims to recruit young members into the party structure and create a pool of ideological and managerial staff. State agency BelTA identified Ivan Kvashko as the likely leader of the new organisation. Iskra is expected to engage in applied political education and strategic messaging among pro-regime youth networks.

In May 2025, up to 50 people were detained in the Brest pre-trial detention centre in connection with the Belarusian Hajun case. According to BYSOL co-founder Andrei Stryzhak, the detention terms of the defendants in the case are being extended due to its complexity. Earlier, “Viasna” Human Rights Centre reported that there were at least 26 detainees in the case. At least six trials have already taken place. The Belarusian Hajun was recognised as an “extremist formation” in 2022, and, therefore, criminal liability is imposed for reporting to the project under Article 361-4 of the Criminal Code (“assistance to extremist activities”).

In June 2025, Viktar Mekka, an IT specialist, was sentenced in Minsk to two years of imprisonment for “calling for actions aimed at harming the national security of Belarus”. Mekka had more than ten years of experience as an operator of laser and milling equipment. In recent years, he had been developing computer games for Dota 2. Mekka was arrested on 6 February 2025, and was held in a pretrial detention centre for four months before the trial.

Trials of people detained in connection with the “yard chats” criminal case are beginning. Some trials have already started, while others are scheduled for the near future. In the autumn of 2024, a wave of arrests swept through all regions of Belarus in connection with this case. At the same time, the KGB recognised the “Order” initiative, which included several yard chats, as an “extremist formation”.

Mikita Samaryn, a political prisoner, was sentenced to six years of imprisonment in a high-security colony in Hrodna. He was tried for “violence against a policeman” and “malicious disobedience”. Before the trial, Samaryn was held in Prison No. 1, and, for some time, he was kept in a punishment cell and held incommunicado. In 2021, Samaryn was tried for spraying gas during a protest action and was sentenced to four years of restriction of liberty on the charge of “violence against a policeman”. This sentence was later changed to two and a half years of imprisonment. Samaryn did not attend the appeal hearing and went into hiding until March 2025, when he was arrested.

Former employee of the ONT state TV channel, political prisoner Dzmitryi Semchanka, was released. This was reported by human rights activists and confirmed by his wife, Yulia Semchanka. Dzmitryi Semchanka was detained in September 2022. He was found guilty of deliberate actions aimed at inciting social hostility and discord based on social affiliation in March 2023. He was sentenced to three years of imprisonment. The prosecution claimed that between 2020-2022, Semchanka “posted publications in various Telegram channels and chat rooms aimed at forming public hostility and hatred towards law enforcement officers, military personnel, and government officials”. Semchanka pleaded guilty at the trial. However, he explained that he had always been a proponent of dialogue and had never called for violence.

During a visit to China by a delegation of the Belarusian Ministry of Internal Affairs, Interior Minister Ivan Kubrakou stated that Belarus was interested in China’s experience in combating extremism and illegal migration, as well as in video surveillance. “We are interested in studying your experience in combating transnational organised crime, extremism and terrorism, drug trafficking, illegal migration, ensuring public order during major socio-political and sporting events, as well as the activities of units engaged in video surveillance and video analytics. New models of personal video recorders are of particular interest to us,” Kubrakou said.

Following the cleansing of the media space, the liquidation of dozens of civil society organisations, and the political persecution of thousands of people, the Belarusian regime moved on to a new phase of social control — “silent” repression. As Viasna’s lawyer Pavel Sapelka noted, covering up the facts of persecution has become part of government policy. People are being persecuted quietly, without high-profile verdicts or show trials. According to Sapelka, this new tactic emerged after the invitation of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to Belarus and the start of U.S. diplomatic efforts. The regime aims to make the repression less visible, “restore the external facade of ‘normality’, avoid attracting the attention of the international community, and create an external impression of stability,” Sapelka commented. People are being intimidated into silence. The main methods include threats of criminal cases, job deprivation, and being forced to remain silent after being released, Sapelka said. Repression has become commonplace, and it is dangerous that people are beginning to accept it as a “new normal”. “The repression has not stopped, it has moved into another phase,” Sapelka stressed and called for help in documenting instances of repression.

On 23 July, Belarusian human rights activists recognised 20 more people as political prisoners. They were accused or convicted in connection with the recognition of protest initiatives as extremist formations. The number of political prisoners as of 23 July 2025, is 1,157. On 25 July, eight more people were recognised as political prisoners. The decision was made in connection with information about charges being filed, detention, sentencing, and referral to serve their sentences on charges of group actions grossly violating public order and mass riots.

As of 25 July 2025, at least 110 political prisoners have been transferred to prisons from colonies since 2020, and 68 have been sentenced to additional terms, “Viasna” Human Rights Centre reported. Political prisoners are accused of violations of order and transferred to a prison regime, or new cases are initiated against them for “malicious disobedience to the demands of the administration”. Political prisoner Yury Kavaleu was assigned to compulsory treatment in a psychiatric hospital three days before his release. “Viasna” knows the names of 178 political prisoners who, for far-fetched reasons, were punished for “violating order”, of whom 110 were transferred to prison, which considerably worsened the conditions of their detention. Until 2020, only two political prisoners, Dzmitry Dashkevich in 2012 and Mikalai Dziadok in 2015, were convicted for “malicious disobedience to the demands of the administration”. Since 2020, several dozen people have been convicted under this charge, including Dzmitry Dashkevich. Some were sentenced to between six months and two years of additional imprisonment. The results of 20 trials are still unknown. 15 people have been tried under this charge repeatedly, including political prisoner Victoria Kulsha, who was tried four times.

According to the decision of the prosecutor of the Mahileu region, access to the websites of Human Rights Defenders against Torture (protivpytok.org) and the Memorial PZK (memopzk.org) was blocked. The initiative Human Rights Defenders against Torture unites Belarusian human rights defenders and lawyers dealing with the problem of torture in Belarus. The Russian project the Memorial PZK collects information about politically motivated criminal prosecutions and compiles lists of Russian political prisoners. The prosecutor’s office claimed that the websites violated Belarusian media law and disseminated false information about the political situation in Belarus.

Trials for participation in the 2020 protest actions are continuing in Dzyarzhynsk. Last week, three people were convicted on charges of organisation and preparation of actions grossly violating public order, or active participation in them (Article 342 of the Criminal Code) and sentenced to a restriction of freedom. The exact sentences are not known. Human rights activists noted that the trials under this charge have been “put on the assembly line”, which is due to the fact that the statute of limitations for prosecution under this charge will soon expire.

Yaraslau Stseshik, a journalist for the Belsat TV channel, is wanted in Belarus and Russia. “Friends, I am wanted in Belarus and Russia. Perhaps also internationally. They came to the home of my loved ones. The criminal case is either for extremism or terrorism, but in fact for my work as a journalist and presenter for Belsat. Keep this in mind, be careful,” he wrote on Facebook.

The Ministry of Information has added the Facebook page “Asatsiyatsiya Palitvyaznyay Belarus” to the list of “extremist materials”. The Belarusian authorities regularly use accusations of extremism to fight political opponents and dissent in general.

The Ministry of Internal Affairs added 14 more people to the list of “persons involved in extremist activities”. It now includes the younger brother of political prisoner Ihar Losik, political prisoner Mikita Losik, who recently left the country. There are 5,559 people in the list.

Sofia Bachurynskaya, a 70-year-old Homel resident, was sentenced to imprisonment on charges of “insulting Lukashenka”, “slandering Lukashenka”, “insulting a government official”, and “joining an extremist group”. The nature of the charges is unknown, but they were probably based on her comments on Telegram. Bachurynskaya was added to the list of “extremists”. She is currently the oldest woman behind bars persecuted for political reasons.

A pulmonologist with 30 years experience, Alena Rudaya, was convicted in the Minsk City Court. She was found guilty of “calling for harm to the national security of Belarus”, “joining an extremist group”, and “insulting Lukashenka”. The minimum penalty that she could face was four years of imprisonment. Rudaya is included in the list of “extremists”.

Belarus joined the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in 2015. In 2025 Belarus ranked 32^nd out of 167 in the Sustainable Development Report. On 18 July, the authorities presented a national report at the UN forum in New York. Human rights activists presented an alternative report, criticising the state report as distorting the situation in the country. The official report highlighted a decrease in the crime rate and did not contain a word about political prisoners. The human rights defenders reported that over the past five years, more than 65,000 people have been subjected to arbitrary detention. The state report stated that Belarus is one of the countries with the lowest infant mortality rate. Human rights activists reminded readers that the COVID-19 pandemic was hidden behind fake data, and the official mortality figures were underestimated by 14 times. The authorities emphasised that women occupy more than 40% of the seats in Parliament. The alternative report stated that there were no independent elections in the country. It also stressed that repressive measures are being intensified in Belarus, and a law on fines for “gay propaganda” is being prepared.

During the reporting period, Belarusian officials and pro-regime media figures continued their rhetorical attacks on countries they define as the “collective West.” Early in the week, Aliaksandr Lukashenka stated that Belarus had no intention of “knocking on closed doors,” claiming that Minsk had “withdrawn its diplomatic missions” from the West and was expanding its presence “where we are welcome – above all, in our Russia.”

In an interview with Pervyi Informatsionnyi TV channel, Belarusian Foreign Minister Maksim Ryzhankou spoke about his participation in the XVII BRICS summit in Rio de Janeiro. He argued that many international mechanisms “no longer work” and that international law was being “brazenly violated in favour of certain states” – a development that, in his view, led to the emergence of groupings like SCO and BRICS. Ryzhankou also pushed back against recent claims by U.S. President Donald Trump that BRICS pursues an anti-American agenda, stating: “BRICS is not directed against anyone, neither the U.S. nor the collective West. These countries came together in response to the stagnation of existing frameworks, in an attempt to resolve global issues on their own.” He further commented on BRICS discussions about alternative payment systems, alleging that the West exerts control over other countries through the dominance of the U.S. dollar and euro: “If you act politically out of line, they cut you off from payment systems, and your economy is paralysed.” Ryzhankou again criticised Western sanctions against Russia and Belarus, arguing that legal remedies are impossible due to domestic laws in the EU and U.S. that block judicial review of sanctions-related claims.

On 24 July, the state news agency BelTA – a key mouthpiece of the Lukashenka regime – joined the Communication Partnership Programme for the Global South, an international initiative initiated by China and led by Xinhua, the official information agency of the Chinese government. At the signing ceremony with Xinhua director Fu Hua in Zhengzhou, BelTA’s head Iryna Akulovich used the occasion to contrast the Global South with the West: “The Global South is about responsibility, unlike the ‘rights’-based approach of the collective West. Responsibility for building a just world where national identity and culture are respected.”

In the SB TV programme Letuchka, propagandist Yauhen Horyn accused Western countries of fuelling militarism through a cyclical narrative of fear: “It’s a national pastime to find an enemy, scare the population, and ask for money for tanks.” He dismissed the idea of a possibility of a Russian military attack on the EU as absurd and claimed that defence spending primarily benefits arms contractors and opportunistic politicians.

Some regime voices claimed that the “collective West” is fracturing. Andrei Bahadzel, a senior officer from the General Staff Faculty of the Belarusian Military Academy, praised the U.S. for “shifting the burden of the European crisis onto Europe.” He described Donald Trump as a mere “stage decoration,” arguing that nothing had changed in U.S. policy and likening the shift to “offering the same beads in a different colour.” Notably, some pro-regime commentators expressed concern about Russia and Belarus’s growing military expenditures. On Pervyi Informatsionnyi’s “Editor’s Club” show, political commentator Vadzim Baravik stated that “we have been brought to war in Europe,” comparing NATO defence spending (5% of GDP) with Russia’s 8% war budget. He proposed finding a compromise through “special services and other tools” to change the government in Kyiv – calling it “the only chance” to avoid further escalation.

Top Belarusian defence officials also commented on the upcoming Zapad-2025 military exercise. Bahadzel urged observers not to interpret the decision to move the drills deeper into Belarusian territory as a sign of weakness. In a parallel statement, Chief of the General Staff Pavel Muraveika described the move as a “de-escalatory step” aimed at calming the international community.

Lukashenka-aligned propagandists also commented on domestic developments in Ukraine, portraying them as a direct result of Western manipulation. Yury Uvarau of Minskaya Prauda described a new Ukrainian law limiting the powers of National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) and Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAP) as a sign of the “Kyiv regime’s agony,” claiming internal factions were engaged in a final, no-holds-barred battle. Regime expert Aliaksandr Shpakouski alleged that NABU and SAP were created by the EU and U.S. to control the Ukrainian government and accused Zelenskyy’s circle of widespread corruption in the handling of Western aid. Political commentator Andrei Lazutkin argued that these institutions were aligned with the U.S. Democratic Party and monitored Ukrainian elites on its behalf. He praised Zelenskyy for dismantling them, suggesting this aligned better with Donald Trump’s interests. State TV anchor Kseniya Lebiadzeva went further, declaring that Ukraine had become “an American colony” and describing NABU as “a parallel structure that answers not even to the Ukrainian president.”

On July 23–26, the American pop singer Jason Derulo visited Belarus, met with Prime Minister Aliaksandr Turchyn and National Olympic Committee chairman Viktar Lukashenka, and filmed a promotional video for a luxury residential complex near Minsk. Investigative reporting by Zerkalo suggests the visit was orchestrated by Turkish businessman Mustafa Egemen Şener, who co-owns the development and is linked to the H Casino network. The appearance was leveraged as soft power imagery, though the project itself is reportedly affiliated with Lukashenka’s inner circle and long-standing real estate interests. The promotional campaign included aerial footage of upscale villas near the Minsk Lake and social media posts by Derulo, highlighting the regime’s continued efforts to attract visibility through celebrity engagements. The Belarusian regime is actively using Derulo’s visit for information purposes and appears to be leveraging his presence to promote legitimacy and portray a degree of informal engagement with the United States.

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Best regards,
iSANS team