Belarus Review by iSANS — January 26, 2026 

According to Ukrainian monitoring channels, between 19 and 25 January nine Russian drones were recorded in Belarusian airspace. Belarusian Air Force quick-reaction aircraft were scrambled to intercept them. There were no reports of any drones being shot down or crashing.

On 19 January, the Belarusian Defence Ministry reported that a delegation led by Chief of the General Staff Pavel Muraveika arrived in Qatar to take part in the DIMDEX 2026 international arms and military equipment exhibition. On the margins, Muraveika met with the UAE Chief of the General Staff Issa Saif Al Mazroui (who visited Belarus in October 2025), as well as Qatar’s defence minister and Chief of the General Staff. The meetings reportedly identified priority areas and possible next steps for developing bilateral military cooperation.

On 21 January, the “Skhemy” project (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s Ukrainian service) reported that an air-defence system resembling a Tor surface-to-air missile system appeared at the Mazyr Oil Refinery in August 2025. The report said earthen positions (berms) had been prepared on the refinery site to deploy the system. It is worth noting that the redeployment of Belarusian air-defence assets to cover the refinery was first reported in April 2024, after public statements from  Ukraine about the need to strike the facility, which supplies products to Russia.

On 22 January, Poland’s Operational Command of the Armed Forces reported increased activity by small drones in the Poland–Belarus border area on the evening of 21 January. No threat to Poland’s airspace security was identified. The statement added that such incidents are viewed as elements of Belarus’s hybrid activity. No further details were provided.

On 23 January, Belarus’s Defence Ministry reported that the 19th Mechanised Brigade had been brought to combat readiness at peacetime manning levels (i.e., without mobilisation of reservists). According to the Lepelski krai outlet, a “large-scale readiness inspection of duty forces” is being conducted in the brigade from 15 to 30 January by the North-West Operational Command. State Security Council Secretary Aliaksandar Valfovich said the distinctive feature of the current inspection is that Aliaksandr Lukashenka is personally ordering units to combat readiness. He described a “new system” whereby the President’s order is delivered directly—bypassing the Defence Ministry—through the State Security Council Secretary to the unit commander. The inspection includes readiness checks within set time limits, after which units will conduct marches along unfamiliar routes to training areas. A mechanised battalion moved first; on 24 January, tank and reconnaissance battalions were added, and troops’ physical fitness is also being assessed. (For context: a wider combat-readiness inspection of the Belarusian Armed Forces began on 16 January, with the 969th Tank Reserve Base inspected first.)

On 23 January, the head of the Defence Ministry’s Department for International Military Cooperation, Valery Ravenka, held an accreditation meeting with the new defence attaché at the Vietnamese Embassy in Belarus, Cao Ngoc Ha. The sides discussed military cooperation, describing relations as constructive and noting “significant progress”, and clarified the procedure for implementing activities in 2026.

On 24 January, the Flagstok outlet published a report on the construction of a military training range in Homiel region. Construction has begun near the Yakimovka railway station in the Rechytsa district. The plan to build a range in Homiel region first became known in 2023. The range is intended for the 37th Air Assault Brigade being formed in the Homiel district; the Yakimovka area was cited as a likely location as early as December 2023.

On 25 January, Ukraine’s President Vladimir Zelenskyy stated that Russian drone operators operate against Ukraine from Belarusian territory and that communications necessary for strikes are supported from Belarus. This was not his first such statement: on 26 December 2025, Zelensky claimed Russia uses Belarusian territory to bypass Ukraine’s air-defence system and guide drones towards targets in western regions. He alleged that strike-support equipment is placed in Belarusian settlements, including on the roofs of residential buildings.

On 26 January, BELPOL published, as part of an investigation, a photo of a transport-launch container for the Ukrainian-made Korsar anti-tank guided missile system. BELPOL claims the photo was taken at the base of the KGB’s Alfa special unit in Belarus in November 2022. The investigators suggest the system may have been captured in Ukraine earlier in 2022, which could indicate Alfa’s involvement in combat operations during Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. BELPOL representative Uladzimir Zhyhar told media that the group is checking the hypothesis that Belarusian units took part in hostilities in Ukraine, estimating the likelihood at “60–40” in favour; he argued that the system “could not” have been in Belarus otherwise (it was not purchased and was not a Russian “gift”), citing sources.

It is also worth recalling that in late October 2022, during a senior-command gathering of the Belarusian Armed Forces, an exhibition displayed foreign-made ATGMs—Javelin, NLAW and Panzerfaust 3—reported as captured by Russian forces in Ukraine and provided to Belarusian counterparts for study. There are also known instances of Belarus’s internal troops receiving a captured Ukrainian Kozak-5 armoured vehicle.

From 19 to 22 January 2026, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya took part in the World Economic Forum in Davos. On 20 January, she attended the official WEF opening dinner, which brought together heads of state and government, ministers, and leaders of major global companies. On 21 January, she spoke as a panellist at the WEF briefing “Can Russia Sustain a Wartime Economy?”, where participants discussed the resilience of Russia’s “war economy” model, the effects of sanctions, technology and financial restrictions, and how the war impacts Belarus and regional security. On 22 January, Tsikhanouskaya participated in the official WEF programme panel “Is Democracy Under Threat?” and in two closed roundtables with state leaders and global business figures (“A New Era of Geopolitical Uncertainty” — managing intensifying competition and seeking stability; and “Europe’s New Geopolitical Strategy” — Europe’s strategic priorities, partnerships, and long-term security).

Separately, on 22 January, she spoke at a closed dinner discussion “Faith in Action: Leading the Spirit of Dialogue,” where she addressed a link between faith, dignity, and freedom, as well as repression against religious communities in Belarus. As she put it: “Freedom is not an abstract concept. People fight and die for it — in Belarus, in Ukraine, in Iran…”

In her interventions, Tsikhanouskaya emphasised Belarus as a factor in European security: while the regime is drawing the country into Russia’s military orbit, democratic forces offer an alternative based on restoring sovereign policymaking and European rules. A key quote from her remarks: “Democracy does not emerge on its own. It must be constantly worked on and defended every day… this is the responsibility of everyone — civil society, business, the media, every individual.” On the margins of the forum, Tsikhanouskaya met with the President of the UN General Assembly, the President of Armenia, the Prime Minister of Moldova, the Prime Minister of the Czech Republic, the Vice-Chancellor of Germany, as well as foreign ministers of Romania, Norway, Singapore, Spain, Canada, and other countries.

On the evening of 25 January in Vilnius, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy held a bilateral meeting with Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, head of the United Transitional Cabinet. The meeting was framed as a standalone diplomatic engagement — a face-to-face conversation rather than a brief exchange on the sidelines. Tsikhanouskaya expressed support for Ukraine “on behalf of Belarusians” and specifically thanked Kyiv for its principled approach of distinguishing Belarusian society from the Lukashenka regime. The discussion also covered the participation of Belarusian volunteers and activists fighting on Ukraine’s side; the fate of Belarusians convicted in Belarus for assisting Ukraine (including partisans); the issue of captured Belarusian volunteer fighters and the need for efforts to secure their release and protection. A separate focus was political prisoners, including the ongoing release process and the possibility of further humanitarian steps with the involvement of the Ukrainian side and partners. Linked to this were sanctions policy and coordination with European and US partners — how to increase pressure on the regime without closing space for releasing people and reducing repression. Tsikhanouskaya proposed appointing a Ukrainian special envoy for Belarus as a permanent coordination channel. Zelenskyy, for his part, invited Tsikhanouskaya to visit Kyiv.

On 25 January 2026, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and First Lady Olena Zelenska arrived in Vilnius to take part in events marking the anniversary of the January Uprising of 1863–1864. In his speech in Vilnius, Zelenskyy explicitly highlighted Belarus in three dimensions: the contribution of Belarusians to Ukraine’s defence, his assessment of the role of the Lukashenka regime, and Belarus’s European future (Link 1, link 2).

Key quotations:

On Belarusians as a nation and Belarusian volunteers:

“I want to address the people of Belarus separately: you are a European nation that will stand together with all our peoples in a united, free Europe… I thank all Belarusian volunteers who are fighting for our independence in Ukraine and for the historic chance for their own state.”

On the regime, the lessons of 2020, and the risks from Moscow:

“Belarus is still forced to exist as a Russian general-governorate… There was a chance in 2020 to change this—and I am confident there will be another chance. But at that time, the support for Belarusians was simply insufficient, and now we all feel how much more difficult, costly, and dangerous it has become for everyone because of Belarus’s dependence on Moscow… Russia is using Belarus as a testing ground for blackmail…

Operators of Russian Shahed-type attack drones operate against Ukraine, including from Belarusian territory. Communications for the strikes are supported from Belarusian territory. Russia is using Belarus as a testing ground for blackmailing Europe and the world with ‘Oreshnik’ systems. Belarusian industry is working for Russia’s war, and trade links help Putin purchase the components needed to build threats against all of us in Europe.”

On Belarus’s future on a European trajectory

“I very much want us to always remain together — Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Poles… with us also the representatives of a free Belarus. And this sends a very clear message to everyone: the day will come when Belarus will be with us in Europe — as the people of Belarus truly deserve.”

Earlier, on 24 January, at the invitation of the Chancellery of Polish President Karol Nawrocki, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, together with Lithuanian President Gitanas Nausėda and a number of Belarusian politicians, took part in a ceremony commemorating participants of the Kalinouski Uprising of 1863–1864. The event was held in Warsaw on the grounds of the Warsaw Citadel.

On 19 January 2026, the Belarusian Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that it had received a personal letter from US President Donald Trump addressed to Aliaksandr Lukashenka, proposing that Belarus become a founding member of a new international organisation – the “Board of Peace” – in the context of efforts to resolve the situation in the Gaza Strip and possibly address other conflicts. On 20 January, Lukashenka publicly signed and sent a letter to US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, agreeing to be bound by the organisation’s charter. In his comments, Lukashenka downplayed reports of a possible USD 1 billion contribution, stating that ordinary membership does not require payment and that such a large sum is mentioned only as a condition for extending status – and even then, “if you work well,” it could allegedly be avoided. He also noted that his interest was linked less to the Middle East than to Ukraine and attempts to “influence the Ukrainian leadership.” Notably, Trump’s invitation letter does indeed refer to the possibility of expanding the organisation’s mandate, mentioning “global conflict” and “a bold new approach.”

On 22 January, on the sidelines of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Belarus’s Ambassador to Switzerland Aliaksandr Hanevich took part in the ceremony approving the Charter of the “Board of Peace”. In its explanations, the Belarusian Ministry of Foreign Affairs stressed that Minsk is ready to “play an active role” in shaping a “new architecture of global and regional security” based on “mutual respect” and “consideration of national interests”. Minsk also attempted to put the “Board of Peace” on the OSCE agenda, describing it as a “new-type platform” free from “bloc discipline”, “sanctions blackmail”, and “ideological exclusivity”. The Ministry further emphasised that Minsk does not view the “Board of Peace” as an alternative to existing institutions (the UN, the OSCE), but rather as an attempt to restore “trust” and the ability to “reach agreements”. No readiness was voiced to use the “Board of Peace” to address Belarus’s domestic political conflict.

Assessments by independent commentators are more sceptical. Analysts argue that the project appears personalised and transactional, with a risk regarding its legitimacy  – and therefore vulnerable to reputational failures and ad hoc decision-making.

Latvia’s Constitution Protection Bureau (SAB), in its annual report, noted that in the medium and long term Moscow seeks to establish full control over Belarus’s domestic political processes in order to reduce the risk of “unplanned changes” to the regime and a potential shift in Minsk’s foreign policy. Against this backdrop, SAB argues, Russia is becoming increasingly sensitive even to minimal attempts by the Belarusian authorities to pursue an independent line. The report explicitly identifies the Union State as the infrastructure enabling this influence: it is through the Union State that deeper coordination (including between foreign policy agencies) and the implementation of integration programmes are advancing. In SAB’s logic, this is not a one-off campaign but a durable “insurance” mechanism for the Kremlin against political uncertainty in Belarus—an attempt to turn union mechanisms into an instrument for managing internal dynamics.

According to Belstat, for 2025 the nominal accrued average salary in December reached 3,112.7 BYN (around USD 1,095), up 6.1% year-on-year. The median indicator, which better reflects a “typical” salary, stood at 2,081.7 BYN (around USD 715). This gap between the mean and the median highlights sectoral and regional distortions. Wage dynamics continue to underpin the current growth model. Analysts at the Eurasian Development Bank link Belarus’s 1.3% growth to “strong domestic demand”, amid weakness in industry. At the same time, external trade imbalances are widening: National Bank data for January–November 2025 show exports of goods and services up 2.7% (USD 46.5 bn), while imports grew faster—up 3.6% (to USD 47.85 bn). As a result, the trade deficit increased 1.5 times to USD 1.31 bn.

The dynamics in the hybrid crisis on the Belarus–Lithuania border remain unchanged. On 24–25 January, disruptions emerged in the processing of freight traffic. Lithuania suspended the entry of lorries at Medininkai (Kamenny Loh on the Belarusian side) due to problems with customs software; cars and buses continued to pass as normal. The next day, Lithuania still had not fully restored its systems: at Benyakoni, no trucks were accepted after 15:00, with 45 vehicles in the queue; at Kamenny Loh, processing continued partly “manually”, with around 140 lorries waiting to exit. In parallel, Lithuania is increasing pressure on Belarusians inside the country: the Migration Department reported that in 2025, 1,634 Belarusian citizens were classified as threats to national security (598 in 2024). Reports also pointed to mass refusals and cancellations of residence permits.

On the Poland–Belarus border, attempts by irregular migrants to cross are extremely rare. Beyond the general de-escalation observed since 10 October 2025, an additional factor has been unusually low temperatures.

Over the past five years, the Prosecutor’s office of the Minsk region has sent more than 1,400 applications for recognising information products as “extremist materials”, the Prosecutor’s Office press service reported. In 2025, 334 such applications were sent to the courts. As was noted, “popular online platforms with a large audience,” i.e. YouTube, Telegram and Instagram, were mainly monitored. Criminal cases were initiated against some people who belonged to chat rooms and groups that were recognised as “extremist”.

On 15 January, the KGB recognised Free Belarus Center as an “extremist formation”, and it was added to the corresponding list on the website of the Ministry of Internal Affairs on January 20. The list mentions the initiative’s Facebook, Telegram, Instagram pages, as well as a YouTube channel. Free Belarus Center provides legal and psychological assistance. The initiative has offices in Warsaw and Kyiv. It supported the evacuation of Belarusians to safer places in Ukraine and beyond after the outbreak of Russia’s war against Ukraine in February 2022. Currently, there are 325 positions in the “list of organisations, formations, and individual entrepreneurs involved in extremist activities” which is jointly maintained by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the KGB.

“Viasna” Human Rights Centre reported that as of 20 January, at least 22 foreigners convicted on political grounds were being held in detention in Belarus. In total, at least 100 foreign citizens have been convicted on politically motivated charges since 2020. Currently, 61 foreigners have the status of “former political prisoner”. At least 29 foreigners were pardoned and expelled from Belarus. Among those in custody are citizens of Russia, Ukraine, Lithuania, France, Latvia, and Poland. They were accused of “intelligence activity,” “espionage,” “promotion of extremist activities,” “calls for sanctions,” “participation in actions grossly violating public order,” “discrediting Belarus,” “acts of terrorism,” and even “international terrorism.” Human rights activists noted that since the beginning of the full-scale war, pressure on Ukrainians has increased. They are accused of “espionage,” “intelligence activity,” “sabotage,” and collaboration with the Security Service of Ukraine.

Dmitry Sivko, a Latvian citizen, was tried under the charge of insulting a government official. By a court decision, he was sent for compulsory treatment to a psychiatric hospital with enhanced supervision, “Viasna” Human Rights Centre reported. The case was considered in 2022 in the court of the Zheleznadarozhny district of Homel. The exact location of Sivko is currently unknown.

Aliaksandr Herasimenka, a resident of Mazyr, was sentenced by the Homel Regional Court to four and a half years of imprisonment under the charge of facilitating “extremist activities.” He was tried in the Belarusian Hajun case. Herasimenka was detained in the summer of 2025. Prior to the trial, he was held in Homel pre-trial detention centre No. 3.

The “amateur radio case” has been unfolding in Belarus since last year. Belarusian state television reported on the detention of seven defendants in the case, owners of amateur radio stations. They were accused of “intercepting state secrets,” including the broadcasts of the military and security forces. According to investigators and propagandists, the detainees allegedly worked under the guise of “radio companies” and, due to the fact that they had access to radio frequencies, they listened to important conversations, including military communications at military airfields and air defense positions in Belarus, as well as conversations by employees of the Ministry of Defense of Belarus, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the security forces. The story on the television claimed that the defendants in the case received detailed information about Lukashenka’s travel routes. According to the story, the group was allegedly created with financial support from outside, however, the source of this assistance was not specified. The Belarusian security forces, the story stated, classified the actions of radio amateurs as “high treason” and “espionage”. The punishment under these charges may include life imprisonment or even death penalty.

On 20 January, Belarusian human rights defenders recognised 14 more people as political prisoners. Among them were Mikita Krasko, Vyacheslau Byanko and Andrei Repety, who were detained in the “amateur radio case”. As of 20 January, there were 1,158 political prisoners in Belarus.

On January 23, human rights activists recognised Yanina Paznyak, the daughter of journalist Kiryll Paznyak, as a political prisoner. In September 2025, the YouTube channel Platforma 375 was recognised as an “extremist formation”. The KGB named Kiryll Paznyak as being involved in activities related to the channel. He was arrested and placed in custody. On the same day, his daughter Yanina was detained. She was charged with collaborating with an “extremist formation”. She is currently in custody.

One of the women political prisoners in the Homel colony is pregnant and is about to give birth. Ex-political prisoner Maryna Zolatava, editor-in-chief of the Tut.by media, wrote on her social media that Natallia Levaya, an illustrator from Brest, is due to give birth around March, but her pregnancy and future childbirth are taking place in the conditions of the Homel women’s colony. Zolatava stressed that prisoners are forced to spend at least two hours a day outside in the cold of minus14 degrees Celsius during inspections and moving to work. Many have only canvas boots with paper pads, which do not protect them from the cold. Levaya lived and worked in Poland after February 2022, but decided to return to Belarus in December 2023. According to her friends, she missed her homeland, and paid to the authorities “in multiples the donations she made in 2020 and received a confirmation about it from the KGB”. Nevertheless, she was detained at the border and, in June 2024, was sentenced to six years of imprisonment for “financing an extremist formation”, financing “extremist activities”, as well as “financing participation in military operations on the territory of a foreign state”. In October 2024, she was added to the “list of extremists”.

On 22 January, the Vitsebsk Regional Court handed down sentences in absentia to the founders and participants of the Chestnyje liudi (Honest People) initiative, created in 2020 to combat electoral fraud. Alena Zhivahlod was sentenced to ten years of imprisonment with a fine of 1,500 basic units (approximately 19,600 Euro). Zarina Sorokina, Aleh Davydchyk and Tsimafey Malakhouski each were sentenced to eight years of imprisonment with a fine of 900 basic units (approximately 11,800 Euro). They were convicted of creating an “extremist” formation, insulting Lukashenka, inciting hostility, slandering Lukashenka, discrediting Belarus, and calling for action against national security.

On 23 January, the Ministry of Internal Affairs added nine more people to the “list of citizens of the Republic of Belarus, foreign citizens or stateless persons involved in extremist activities”. There are now 6,214 names on the list.

Dzmitry Shishkou, the former head of the Mahileu investigative department, was convicted of “facilitating extremist activities”. His name appeared on the updated list of “those involved in extremist activities”. It states that Shishkou is “serving his sentence”. The verdict was passed by the Mahileu Regional Court. The exact verdict is unknown. Shishkou is a former investigator. In 2023, he was dismissed from the Investigative Committee because of “his position”, apparently, critical of the authorities.

The Investigative Committee announced the start of a special procedure (in absentia investigation) against political scientist Dzmitry Balkunets and requested him to attend the Office of the Investigative Committee in Minsk. The case is being investigated under eight charges: conspiracy or other actions committed with the aim of seizing power, calls for sanctions against Belarus, creation of an extremist formation or participation in it, assistance to extremist activities, slander of Lukashenka, insulting Lukashenka, insulting a representative of the government, discrediting Belarus. The special procedure was initiated on 22 January.

Political prisoner Mikalai Autukhovich was sent back to a prison regime for three years after having been held in a colony near Barysau for just a month. This decision was made by a visiting court, hearings of which was held on 20 and 23 January in colony No. 14 in Navasady near Barysau. It is not known for what violations Autukhovich was punished with a new transfer to the prison regime. Autukhovich was transferred to the colony only at the end of 2025 from the Hrodna prison, where he had served his sentence after the verdict. He was detained in December 2020, and in October 2022 he was sentenced to 25 years of imprisonment under 10 articles of the Criminal Code, including “acts of terrorism” and “conspiracy to seize power by unconstitutional means.”. According to the verdict, he had to serve the first five years of his sentence on a prison regime. This is the third imprisonment of Autukhovich. The first one was from October 2005 to January 2008, the second –  from February 2009 to April 2014.

The political prisoners expelled from Belarus are in an uncertain legal status: they have not been formally pardoned or released. The Dissdentby initiative noted that “they do not have any official documents in their hands: no court decision, no release order, no documents on termination of criminal prosecution. In fact, people were taken out of the country without any legal registration of this fact.” “In Belarus, the police and KGB officers continue to search for many of the released and expelled political prisoners at their former place of residence. This means that legally a person can still be considered a person involved in a criminal case,” human rights defenders stressed.

The International Union of Belarusian Writers published a review of violations of language rights in Belarus in the period from 1 July to 31 December 2025. It was noted that despite the formal establishment of the equal status of the Belarusian language in the Constitution and the state’s international legal obligations, in practice the Belarusian language is subjected to systematic marginalisation and discrimination. Its use was consistently restricted in key areas of public life, including education, public administration, the judiciary, penitentiary institutions, state-run cultural institutions, the media, and public space. The examples given in the review indicated that discrimination against the Belarusian language was systemic and multi-level in nature. It was manifested simultaneously in the activities of state bodies, government structures, in the penitentiary system, in the sphere of culture, medicine, education and services, as well as in the public communication of high-ranking officials. The recorded cases indicated not only the absence of effective mechanisms for the protection of language rights, but also the formation of an environment in which the use of the Belarusian language is perceived by authorities as problematic or undesirable and can have negative consequences for individuals who use it. All these cases taken together allowed the authors to conclude that a systemic and institutionalised practice of language discrimination has been formed in the Republic of Belarus, leading to the consistent displacement of the Belarusian language from public, cultural and state life.

The European Union announced a new stage of a programme to support education and professional retraining for Belarusians affected by political repression. The initiative is being implemented within the framework of the Education for Belarusians (formerly EU4Belarus—SALT) programme. The programme was designed for Belarusian citizens over the age of 18 who were subjected to repression after August 2020. At the time of application, the applicant must reside in one of the EU countries, the European Economic Area or the Eastern Partnership States (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine). If a person left Belarus before August 2020, it must be proved that this was due to the repression related to the 2020 presidential election. Each participant can use the programme support only once. The maximum amount of financing is up to 10,000 Euro. These funds can be used to pay for tuition and courses, exams and certifications, recognition of diplomas, driving courses, translation of documents, as well as subscriptions to specialised software and digital platforms — provided that there are no free alternatives. The deadline for applications is 31 March  2026.

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Best regards, iSANS team