Belarus Review by iSANS — January 19, 2026 

According to Ukrainian monitoring channels, between 12 and 18 January, 10 drones were recorded in Belarusian airspace — nine Russian and one Ukrainian. There were no reports of any of the drones being shot down or crashing.

On 12 January, Aliaksandr Lukashenka approved decisions governing the protection of the state border in 2026 by the border service and the Belarusian Armed Forces. Such decisions are traditionally approved at the start of each year and detail tasks related to border security; the documents are non-public and are not published in open sources. During the event, Lukashenka acknowledged the problem of drones entering Belarusian airspace. He said Belarus is operating in a difficult environment and is “practically surrounded by military units”. The eastern direction (the border with Russia) is “a bit easier”, but the war in Ukraine has created risks there as well, since it is “unknown from where… drones may fly in”. He stressed the need to pay special attention to responding to incursions and destroying drones: “Let’s be frank — we have not yet learned to respond to all these incursions 100%, and we have not learned to destroy them 100%. I don’t know whether 100% is possible. But we must strive for it.”

A Belarusian military delegation led by Valery Revenka, head of the Defence Ministry’s Department for International Military Cooperation, paid a working visit to Myanmar. On 13 January, Revenka met Myanmar’s defence minister Maung Maung Aye, where the sides expressed their intention to sign a bilateral military cooperation agreement during the forthcoming visit of Myanmar’s defence minister to Belarus. They also discussed cooperation on military technologies and personnel training in the two countries’ armed forces. Revenko additionally met Zaw Myo Tin, Quartermaster General of Myanmar’s Armed Forces; the sides agreed to organise contacts between Belarusian industry representatives and relevant units of Myanmar’s armed forces.

From 13 to 16 January, under the leadership of Chief of the General Staff Pavel Muraveika, Belarus conducted a joint staff exercise. The stated aim was to develop an optimal procedure for employing force groupings under one possible scenario of escalation directly linked to threats to Belarus’s military security. No further details were provided. Such activities are typical at the beginning of the Belarusian Armed Forces’ training year: in January 2025, a joint staff exercise of the Joint Command of the regional grouping of forces took place, and in January 2024, a joint staff exercise of the Belarusian Armed Forces was held.

On 14 January, the Belarusian Railway Workers’ Community published material on the deployment of the “Oreshnik” missile system in Belarus. Based on available rail-transport data, a Russian Armed Forces unit with equipment reportedly arrived at the Krychev airfield between 18 and 20 December 2025. Infrastructure construction for “Oreshnik” is underway at the airfield. However, the train reportedly did not include launchers for the system. The authors cite indirect indications: (1) no information about the movement of oversized cargo from Russia to Belarus in November–December 2025 (a launcher would likely qualify as oversized); (2) no reports of Belarusian Railway management duty arrangements that are typically associated with the transit of oversized cargo.

On 16 January, on Lukashenka’s instructions, a readiness inspection of the Belarusian Armed Forces began. State Secretary of the Security Council Aliaksandar Valfovich described it as a snap, comprehensive inspection to be conducted in several stages, incorporating Russia’s experience from the war in Ukraine and its implementation in the troops. Among the issues to be tested are the protection of military facilities and counter-drone measures. The first unit inspected was a technical support formation storing various armoured vehicles — the 969th Tank Reserve Base (military unit 42715), located in Urechye (Lyuban district). The base reportedly stores and services more than 75% of the Belarusian Armed Forces’ tracked and wheeled combat vehicles. Valfovich said the inspection would assess how quickly different armoured systems can be taken out of storage within the required timeframes. Nine items (tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and armoured personnel carriers) were taken off storage; according to state media, five vehicles were taken off storage within three hours, and all the equipment within four hours. The activities concluded with a control run of about 20 km.

Also on 16 January, Valfovich commented on claims that Belarus does not have the “Oreshnik” missile system. He called the rumours “good”, linking them to operational concealment. He said Belarus is “confident that we have this weapon, and we of course hope it will never be needed”. “It’s good they don’t see this ‘Oreshnik’, and it’s right that they don’t see it,” he said.

On 16 January, during the readiness inspection at the 969th Tank Reserve Base, a photo report by the Belarusian Telegraph Agency showed new BTR-82A armoured personnel carriers in storage facilities. These Russian-made vehicles (Arzamas Machine-Building Plant) have been in service with the Belarusian Armed Forces since 2021 and with the internal troops since 2026. The footage likely indicates a new batch of BTR-82A intended for delivery to the troops. The Belarusian Defence Ministry last publicly reported deliveries of BTR-82A in September 2024, without naming the recipient unit.

13–15 January, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya was on a visit to Poland. She held a bilateral meeting with Polish President Karol Nawrocki, where the discussions focused on the release of political prisoners (including the case of Andrzej Poczobut), regional security, and coordination with the US administration. Tsikhanouskaya separately underscored the importance of Poland’s support and proposed initiatives for the Belarusian community in Poland (cultural and historical projects, participation in regional formats). She also presented the President with a draft concept for a Belarusian Institute of National Memory. On 15 January, the Belweder Palace hosted the fourth Christmas meeting of the Polish President with the Belarusian democratic community, bringing together more than 150 participants, including recently released political prisoners.

On 17 January, AFP, citing sources within Tsikhanouskaya’s team, reported that Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya and her office were relocating their activities from Vilnius to Warsaw. On 18 January, Zerkalo reported that Tsikhanouskaya had informed Lithuanian MPs of the decision to relocate. Previously, her office had not publicly confirmed a final decision.

According to Belstat, Belarus’s GDP grew by 1.3% in 2025. Economy Minister Yury Chabatar estimated total GDP at around USD 90 billion. Growth momentum slowed toward the end of the year, and the final result fell well short of the official 4.1% target set in the socio-economic development forecast. Growth has been uneven in structure: the slowdown has been driven primarily by a contraction in industry, while consumption and investment continued to grow.

Based on data published for November 2025, the median wage stood at USD 716 (BYN 2,081.7). Among its neighbours, Belarus outperforms only Ukraine: the median wage is around USD 2,000 in Poland and USD 950 in Russia.

On 16 January 2026, Lukashenka signed Decree No. 19 “On Crypto Banks and Certain Control Issues in the Sphere of Digital Tokens”, authorising the establishment of crypto banks (joint-stock companies combining token operations with banking and payment services). Such activity requires both residency in the High-Tech Park and inclusion in the National Bank’s register, with compliance requirements comparable to those for non-bank credit and financial institutions. The stated objective is to strengthen Belarus’s image as a fintech “flagship” and to create a regulated infrastructure for digital assets. At the same time, the initiative is also linked to efforts to circumvent EU and US sanctions. The first to submit letters to the National Bank and the High-Tech Park expressing readiness to participate in crypto-bank projects was the crypto exchange WhiteBird.

On 15 January 2026, Aliaksandr Lukashenka appointed Aliaksandr Rahozhnik, Belarus’s ambassador to Russia, as Chairman of the Vitsebsk Regional Executive Committee. The decision appears to be an attempt to strengthen governance in one of the country’s most socio-economically challenged regions, including through tighter linkage with Russia. The following day, the resignation of the previous regional head, Aliaksandr Subotsin, was formalised; official and media commentary emphasised “burnout” and the high personal cost of regional governance.

On 19 January 2026, Maria Kalesnikava, in an interview with the Financial Times, effectively argued for a more pragmatic approach toward Belarus. In her assessment, isolating Minsk “pushes Belarus closer to Russia,” thereby increasing risks for Europe itself. As an alternative, she suggested considering “humanitarian steps” by the regime in exchange for partial easing of restrictions—such as the release of prisoners and allowing independent media and NGOs—emphasising that “Lukashenka is a pragmatic person” who “understands the language of business.” Politically, this marks an important signal, as diplomatic approaches become part of the discourse articulated by symbolic figures of the democratic movement. At the same time, there is no unified view on the permissibility of dialogue, its conditions, or its desired outcomes.

The intensity of the crisis around the Lithuania–Belarus border continues to decline. Between 12 and 16 January, Lithuania consolidated a hard-line position while accepting US external mediation. The focus of the crisis has shifted to the issue of potential transit of Belarusian potash and the removal of Lithuanian trucks stranded in Belarus.

Lithuanian President Gitanas Nausėda publicly stated that he is drawing a “red line” on the issue of Belarusian potash transit: rejecting any compromises, including linking consent to transit with an increased US military presence. He argued that the sanctions regime is part of EU policy and intends to build a coalition of like-minded partners on this issue, citing contacts with Poland, Latvia, and the German Chancellor. At the same time, Lithuanian Prime Minister Inga Ruginienė explicitly noted that the United States had helped resolve the issue of meteorological balloons. She identified the return of trucks from Belarus as the next priority, adding that potash transit is not yet formally on the agenda.

In turn, on 14 January, the Lithuanian Ministry of the Interior stressed that, in its assessment, lifting the state of emergency would be premature, as it is needed for operational decisions and for involving the army without costs to the population At the same time, the Interior Minister stated that “Belarus and Russia are using Lithuania as a testing ground” for hybrid attacks. Meanwhile, the Lithuanian prosecutor’s office has referred the case of cigarette smuggling using meteorological balloons to court, which can be seen as a signal that the issue is shifting from crisis management to criminal prosecution.

On 15 January, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya held consultations with members of the Lithuanian Seimas (the “For a Democratic Belarus” group) on the sanctions regime, including potash transit, as well as on support for Belarusians in Lithuania.

No statements on the crisis around the Lithuania–Belarus border have been made by the Lukashenka regime during the week. There are no signs of a revision of its previous position (“resolution through political negotiations in any format”).

1990 public associations, trade unions, parties, foundations, non-governmental institutions, and other associations have been closed in Belarus since 2020, according to a review by the human rights organisation Lawtrend. At least 1,220 non-profit organisations were forcibly liquidated, those were mainly public associations, as well as 78 foundations, 11 political parties, eight associations, four trade unions and one religious organisation. Other 770 organisations decided to self-liquidate. As of December 2025, about 1,943 non-profit organisations were registered in Belarus, Lawtrend reported. Compared to 2021, their number has decreased by 45%. Three human rights defenders, dozens of representatives of civil society and religious organisations, 19 representatives of trade unions and the labor movement are currently in custody.

As it became recently known, in August 2024, Syarhei Sandalyuk, the former deputy head of the Department of Corrections of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, who held this position in 2013-2018, and his wife Angela were convicted on charges of organising group actions that grossly violated public order. The court sentenced them to two years of imprisonment. In November 2024, they were tried on a similar charge, and it is not known what punishment was imposed in this case. Syarhei Sandalyuk was included in the list of citizens, foreign citizens and stateless persons involved in “extremist” activities. On 14 January, human rights activists recognised him as a political prisoner along with eight other people. These people were detained and convicted in 2024-2025, and they have been recognised as political prisoners only now.

Aleh Larychau, a well-known street artist and art manager, was detained. The arrest took place back in November, and in December the artist was transferred to a pre-trial detention center within the framework of a politically motivated criminal case. In 2022, the artist had already been detained on an administrative case. Then he was sentenced to 15 days’ detention.

On 15 January, Belarusian human rights activists recognised 14 more people as political prisoners. Aleh Larychau was among them. On 16 January, human rights activists recognised five more people as political prisoners. On that day, according to “Viasna” Human Rights Centre, 1,146 people in Belarus had the status of political prisoners.

The Economic Court of Minsk completed the liquidation of the independent news agency BelaPAN. As a result of the case, more than one million rubles (approximately 290,800 Euro) were added to the punishments of the convicted heads of the media Dzmitry Navazhilau and Andrei Aliaksandrau. The liquidation of BelaPAN began in February 2024 at the initiative of the Prosecutor General’s Office. It was then announced that there had been “repeated and gross violations of tax legislation, as well as legislation on state social insurance” from 2014 to 2021. The press release referred to 590,000 rubles underpaid to the Social Protection Fund and 417,000 rubles underpaid to the tax service. In the BelaPAN case, in 2021, the agency’s ex-deputy director Andrei Aliaksandrau and his wife Iryna Zlobina were detained, and later the head of the agency Dzmitry Navazhilau and the editor-in-chief Iryna Leushina. Andrei Aliaksandrau was sentenced to 14 years of imprisonment, Iryna Zlobina – to nine years of imprisonment, Dzmitry Navazhilau –  to six years of imprisonment, and Iryna Leushina – to four years of imprisonment. Leushina has already served her term and has been released. In 2021, BelaPAN was declared an “extremist formation”.

“Viasna” human rights defenders reported they know the names of 162 people who were detained in the framework of the Belarusian Hajun case. The total number of detainees is believed to be much higher, and the arrests are still taking place throughout the country. Some detainees were released on bail pending trial. Most of the accused were sentenced to restriction of freedom without referral to an institution, but there were also cases where people were sent to a colony.

Dzmitri and Volha Kapuzy from the Drahichinski district were sentenced to 24 and 21 years of imprisonment, respectively, on charges of acts of terrorism and illegal actions with ammunition. They were detained on 16 January 2024. After the arrest, the video “Mopping up. The fight against saboteurs and agents of the security services of Ukraine in Belarus,” was released in which propagandists stated that the couple allegedly worked for the Ukrainian security services. It was claimed that they collected explosives and made caches on the territory of Belarus. During the arrest, Dzmitri was shot and wounded in the thigh. The trial was held behind closed doors. In addition to the terms of imprisonment, Dzmitri and Volha received heavy fines. In the summer of 2025, they were added to the “terrorist list”.

Security forces began to visit the relatives of political prisoners released and expelled from Belarus at the end of 2025. Volha Zazulinskaya, a Representative of the United Transitional Cabinet for Social Policy, reported a recent visit to the parents of one of those expelled: “They offered him to return to Belarus and spend 15 years in prison.” “When the mother [of a former political prisoner] said that ‘you took him out of the country yourself,’ they told her that he had escaped from the colony,” Zazulinskaya said. She drew attention to the unclear legal status of former political prisoners whom the authorities expelled abroad. The release certificates, which are often the only document in their possession, do not specify the grounds for release. In addition, some prisoners were deported without passports.

Neurologist Ruslan Badamshin was sentenced to two and a half years of imprisonment for facilitating extremist activities. His detention became known in August last year. This is his second criminal conviction – in May 2024, he was sentenced to three years of imprisonment for participating in protest actions. In addition, Badamshin was detained five times under administrative charges and served a total of more than 60 days in administrative arrest. His wife, Tatiana Badamshina, who is an endocrinologist, was also tried for participating in the protests. Her sentence remains unknown.

On 15 January, the Ministry of Information updated its list of extremist materials. Among other resources, the social networks of Belarusian communities from Canada, Poland and Georgia were included in it.

On 16 January, the Ministry of Internal Affairs added 30 more people to the “List of citizens of the Republic of Belarus, foreign citizens or stateless persons involved in extremist activities.” Among them was the political prisoner artist Aksana Shaliapina. She was detained in June 2025 and sentenced to three years of imprisonment on 8 December 2025 for supporting political prisoners.

On 17 January, the KGB added three more people to the list of “persons involved in terrorist activities”. There are 1,404 people, of which 666 are Belarusians, on the “terrorist list” at the moment.

The in absentia trial of blogger Maksim Shabutski will begin in the Hrodna District Court on 26 January. The Investigative Committee began a special procedure investigation against him in September 2025. Then it was reported that he was accused of two dozen charges. In particular, Shabutski was charged with creating an “extremist formation” in 2020 consisting of administrators, managers and participants of the “Maksim Shabutski” YouTube channel and the “Shabutski Group” Telegram channel. He was also accused of posting “extremist information materials” on these and other resources belonging to him. In addition, he was charged with participating in the Kalinouski’s Regiment, as well as creating the “Niezavisimyje Belarusy” (Independent Belarusians) bloc for the elections to the Coordination Council and participating in it. The prosecution charged Shabutski with property damages caused to the state in the amount of about 31,000,000 rubles (approximately 9,014,500 Euro).

The in absentia trial of five Kalinouski Regiment volunteers will begin on 28 January  in the Minsk City Court. Those are former deputy commander of the Kalinovski Regiment, and now Representative of the United Transitional Cabinet for Defense and National Security Vadzim Kabanchuk, former regiment commander Pavel Shurmei, fighter Aliaksei Kavalchuk, instructor Aliaksei Nazarau and former commander Dzyanis Prokharau. They were charged under a number of articles of the Criminal Code, including acts of terrorism, incitement to hostility, and discrediting the Republic of Belarus. The Kalinouski Regiment was recognised as a terrorist organisation in Belarus.

On 12 January, the BYSOL solidarity fund reported on the results of the last emergency fundraising for political prisoners released and expelled from Belarus on 13 December 2025. More than 260,000 Euro were collected. Of these, more than 100,000 Euro were collected in just a few hours. More than 4,500 people donated money. The average donation was 55 Euro. There were several donations above 2,000 Euro and more than 15 donations above 1,000 Euro. At the moment, BYSOL has received 99 applications for assistance from those released on 13 December. Payments have been already made in response to seventy applications.

In its turn, the International Humanitarian Fund has already spent 211,615 Euro on the support of more than a hundred political prisoners. As reported, 66,199 Euro were spent on food, 60,862 Euro on housing, 37,619 Euro on clothing, 13,867 Euro on equipment, 10,470 Euro on hygiene products, 5,625 Euro on vitamins and basic medicines, 8,070 Euro on financial assistance, and other expenses amounted to 8,903 Euro. Besides that, Freedom House, BYSOL, the Belarusian Human Rights House, Viasna, Libereco, Pavel Latushka, and many volunteers have supported political prisoners financially as well as with their time and effort.

The UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women registered a complaint from Respect-Protect-Fulfill about discrimination against political prisoner Alena Lazarchyk and adopted interim measures, calling on Belarus to urgently take steps to protect her. The Committee demanded that she be provided with access to medical care in an institution outside the prison, immediate access to a lawyer, and adequate conditions of detention. According to Respect-Protect-Fulfillment, Lazarchyk has health problems, has lost a lot of weight, and also has serious dental problems. She is deprived of parcels, money transfers and calls. Lazarchyk was an activist of the European Belarus opposition group. She was detained on 30 December 2021, put on the terrorist list and sentenced to eight years of imprisonment. The court found her guilty of group actions grossly violating public order, insulting Lukashenka, inciting hostility, and creating an extremist formation. She is being held in correctional colony No. 24 in the Homel region. In April last year, it was reported that she had been sentenced to additional one and a half years of imprisonment for malicious disobedience to the requirements of the correctional institution administration. Earlier, CEDAW adopted similar interim measures in cases of Palina Sharenda-Panasyuk, Maryja Kalesnikava and Victoryja Kulsha.

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Best regards, iSANS team