Belarus Review by iSANS — January 12, 2026 

According to Ukrainian monitoring channels, between 22 December and 11 January, Belarusian airspace recorded flights of 44 Russian and 4 Ukrainian UAVs. There were no reports of any of them being shot down or crashing. On 6 January, in an interview on VoenTV, Air Force and Air Defence commander Andrei Lukyanovich stated that in 2025, Belarusian forces destroyed 43 fixed-wing UAVs. He did not specify the origin of the downed drones.

On 24 December, Belarusian Defence Minister Viktar Khrenin said that in December, servicemen of the 336th Multiple Launch Rocket Artillery Brigade conducted launches from the Polonez-M MLRS. The drills were presumably held at a training range in Russia.

On 26 December, the Belarusian Defence Ministry reported that another batch of Su-30SM2 fighter jets arrived from Russia at one of Belarus’s airfields. Available information indicates that two aircraft arrived at Baranovichi airfield and were assigned to the 61st Fighter Aviation Base. As a result, the base now fields 14 Su-30 family fighters: eight Su-30SM and six Su-30SM2. Based on statements by military officials, further deliveries of Su-30 family aircraft to Belarus are expected.

On 30 December, the military information agency Vayar reported that the 61st Fighter Aviation Base also received two ATZ-8-540 airfield fuel trucks of Belarusian manufacture. Their use, the agency said, will enable full support for Su-30SM2 operations at short notice, sustaining high sortie rates.

On 26 December, the Belarusian Defence Ministry announced that a radar station — the 96L6 all-altitude detector designed to detect and measure target coordinates — had taken up duty “to protect Belarus’s air borders.” The station can detect targets at ranges of up to 300 km, track up to 100 targets simultaneously, and provide target designation.

According to state media, a radar was delivered to the Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment and deployed near the settlements of Skoki and Kaverdyaki in Brest District, approximately eight km from the Polish border. The press release described the new radar’s entry into combat duty as a stage in the re-equipment of Air Force and Air Defence units for S-400 SAM systems.

On 31 December, the ministry additionally reported that another 96L6 radar had been delivered to the 56th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment based in Luninets.

On 30 December, the defence ministries of Belarus and Russia showcased the ceremonial procedure for a road-mobile ground-based missile system “Oreshnik” assuming combat duty in Belarus. Their releases stated that personnel had completed retraining on modern simulators prior to taking up duty. After the system was brought to readiness, a missile battalion began performing combat duty tasks. Conditions for combat duty and accommodation of Russian servicemen were said to have been prepared in advance. Analysis of the published Belarusian and Russian MoD video materials suggests several points:

1.     “Oreshnik” appears to be serviced by Russian Armed Forces personnel. No Belarusian servicemen are visible in the footage. The assumption-of-duty procedure was led by a Russian serviceman, who — according to media reporting — may have been Roman Ostroushko. As of 2021, he reportedly commanded a battalion within Russia’s 54th Missile Division.

2.     The launcher itself was not shown. The video clearly features three vehicles: a Typhoon armoured vehicle providing security, a communications vehicle, and likely a combat-duty support vehicle. The latter two are identical to vehicles used with the Yars missile complex.

3.     The location shown for the combat-duty ceremony appears to be the Krychau airfield in Mogilev Region. On 26 December, US researchers at Middlebury College published a satellite image of Krychau airfield. Infrastructure works linked to “Oreshnik” reportedly began there in early August 2025, including the construction of a rail spur and several administrative buildings; construction is ongoing. Comparing the satellite image with the MoD video frames supports the conclusion that the ceremony took place at Krychau airfield.

Despite official statements, without additional verification it is not possible to confirm with full certainty that “Oreshnik” has been deployed in Belarus, as the launcher was not shown in the released materials. A scenario also remains plausible in which “Oreshnik” is periodically deployed from Russia into Belarus for combat duty and subsequently returned to Russia.

On 31 December, the 2026 State Investment Programme was approved. The document extended financing through 2028 for the construction of a military garrison and a training range in Gomel Region, although the funding had originally been planned through 2027. The garrison has been under construction in Gomel District since 2023 for the newly formed 37th Air Assault Brigade. There have been no reports so far that construction of the training range has begun. The programme also includes, in the interests of the Belarusian Defence Ministry, an item marked “For official use,” the contents of which remain unknown.

On 8 January, Interior Minister Ivan Kubrakou announced the launch of a readiness inspection of Internal Troops units and selected Interior Ministry units for “operations under special conditions.” Among other elements, the inspection assessed special-purpose units’ readiness to counter sabotage and reconnaissance groups and illegal armed formations.
On 9 January, Internal Troops commander Mikalai Karpiankou provided further details, published by the Interior Ministry press service. He described the inspection as notable for its surprise element and scale: activities took place across Belarus, including all districts bordering Ukraine where Internal Troops units are deployed. Attention was paid to the use of drones and counter-drone measures. According to the Interior Ministry press service, the inspection concluded on 10 January.

On 9 January, the Interior Ministry press service released a video from the Internal Troops readiness inspection. The footage showed, among other equipment, Russian-made BTR-82A armoured personnel carriers. This is the first time such vehicles have been publicly demonstrated as part of the Internal Troops, suggesting that BTR-82A APCs have entered their inventory.

On 6 January, Maksim Valfovich, Chief of Staff of the 120th Mechanised Brigade, outlined training priorities for the new training year, according to the Belarusian Defence Ministry. Speaking about UAV operator training, he said that whereas in the 2024/2025 training year units trained 2–3 drone operators each, at present up to 90% of servicemen in mechanised, tank, and artillery units reportedly have UAV operator skills. Tactical training continues to focus on small-group drills in marshy and forest-marsh terrain. Interagency coordination is being actively practised with other security structures, including the Border Service and the Internal Troops (both at the border and in fortified areas). Field accommodation arrangements have also changed: instead of tents, personnel are now housed in dugouts and adapted basements.

On 9 January, Colonel Aliaksandr Ilyukevich was appointed Commander of the Belarusian Armed Forces’ Special Operations Forces. Major General Vadzim Dzenisenka, who had held the post for 12 years (since 11 January 2014), was discharged from military service into the reserve upon reaching the retirement age. Prior to the appointment, Ilyukevich served as First Deputy Commander of the Special Operations Forces and had previously commanded the 38th Air Assault Brigade.

On 11 January, in an interview on VoenTV, Air Force and Air Defence commander Andrei Lukyanovich stated that in 2025, Belarusian forces received transporter-erector-launchers (TELs) for the S-400 air defence system. He did not specify the number of vehicles or the units that received them. The TEL is an element of the S-400 system. In February 2024, it was reported that the Belarusian Armed Forces possessed a regimental S-400 set (two SAM battalions).

On 31 December, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya and the Belarusian democratic forces delivered a New Year address to Belarusians. The speech was structured around a personal metaphor of “what to take into the new year and what to leave behind.” Tsikhanouskaya urged audiences to leave behind internal quarrels within the democratic camp, mutual grievances and fragmentation, as well as “lies from TV screens,” militarisation, repression, and “legislation” incompatible with the rule of law. She named “hope” as the key word of the year, stressing that “miracles” do not happen on their own and must be “created by people.” The practical message centred on “building bridges” and maintaining unity between those inside Belarus and the diaspora. An emotional highlight was a message from political prisoners released on 13 December — Maria Kalesnikava and Pavel Seviarynets. Pavel Latushka addressed civil servants separately.

Aliaksandr Lukashenka, in turn, opted for a “state-consolidating” tone in his New Year address. He emphasised a “peaceful and secure future,” thanked “workers” and “people in uniform,” and asserted the country’s ability to withstand external pressure. He contrasted “building” with attempts by opponents “to divide us.” A symbolic element was the announcement of 2026 as the “Year of the Belarusian Woman.” Against the backdrop of the familiar post-Soviet practice of “thematic years,” the choice sounded unusual and was received ambivalently: alongside positive reactions, critics pointed to the harsh treatment of women political prisoners in Belarusian detention facilities.

On 5 January, during a report by Belarus’s ambassador to Russia Aliaksandr Rahozhnik, the authorities publicly confirmed that Belarus and Russia had reached agreements on gas supplies. Officials said the deal was at the “signing stage,” that the terms would be “no worse than before 2026,” that no sharp rise in tariffs was expected, and that businesses would operate in “comfortable conditions.” At the same time, the regime avoided specifics — price, formula, and supply period were not disclosed and were replaced by evaluative wording. The price may have been adjusted in line with rising domestic prices in Russia (around ~10%), but the absence of parameters prevents verification. In any case, even a moderate increase heightens the sensitivity of the tariff agenda, given that the Government Programme for 2025–2029 explicitly provides for reducing and then eliminating subsidies for housing-and-communal services and transport.

Lukashenka’s reaction to developments in Venezuela went beyond a routine comment. In a speech at the “For Spiritual Revival” award ceremony, he used the Venezuelan case as a warning to his own elites and security services, describing the causes of the events as “collusion,” “betrayal,” and “bribery” in Maduro’s inner circle. He argued that any “Venezuelan scenario” in Belarus is impossible because “everything is provided,” roles are distributed, and the system is prepared for emergencies, including a hypothetical absence of the president. Russian pro-Kremlin Telegram channel Nezygar responded critically, interpreting Lukashenka’s statements as reflecting his fears about elite loyalty and accusing him of fighting a “pro-Russian influence party”; it also highlighted Minsk’s gains from warmer ties with the United States. The commentary appears aimed at pressuring Lukashenka and increasing his nervousness amid the Kremlin’s search for ways to compensate for foreign-policy setbacks and to project “toughness.” Lukashenka did not comment on protests in Iran, despite recent contacts with the Iranian leadership and statements about “fully friendly” relations.

For a more detailed overview, we recommend the report on the propaganda narratives promoted by Lukashenko’s regime regarding the fall of Maduro’s government.

The intensity of the hybrid crisis on the Belarus–Lithuania border has declined, primarily due to a reduction in launches of smuggling-related meteorological balloons. However, high uncertainty persists over Lithuanian trucks that have remained on Belarusian territory since November 2025, blocked there by the Lukashenka regime in retaliation for the closure of border crossing. The issue of resuming Belarusian potash transit via Lithuania has also entered the agenda.

Linava, Lithuania’s national road hauliers’ association, publicly demanded a “clear, official and transparent decision” from the Lithuanian government, citing the lack of reliable information on the actual return of vehicles and accusing the cabinet of issuing declarative statements. Linava also announced that it is filing a collective lawsuit against the Lithuanian government.

Against this backdrop, Vilnius is sending mixed signals regarding the potential resumption of Belarusian potash transit through Lithuanian ports amid the US easing of sanctions against the Lukashenka regime. President Gitanas Nausėda stated there are no grounds to restore fertiliser transit, linking his stance to the EU sanctions regime and citing the migration crisis, aviation-related incidents, and Minsk’s alliance with Moscow. He also said these approaches are coordinated with Poland and Latvia. Nausėda described the “efforts of allies and law enforcement agencies” as key to stabilising the border situation and signalled readiness only for technical-level talks with Minsk. At the same time, Prime Minister Inga Ruginienė said Lithuania is prepared to consider a US request related to potash transit.

In parallel, Lithuania’s Foreign Ministry initiated the extension of national restrictive measures against Russian and Belarusian citizens until the end of 2027, presenting them as an “insurance policy” in case the EU revises its sanctions approach.

Minsk has largely refrained from public commentary on Lithuania during this period; its earlier line centred on resolving the crisis through diplomatic negotiations. At the same time, during the approval of decisions on protecting the State Border in 2026, Lukashenka emphasized that “the situation is not getting calmer,” “if you look at the map, we are surrounded by military units on all sides,” and “we have not learned to respond 100% to drone incursions from Ukrainian territory.”

The situation on the Belarus–Poland border remains stable. Poland’s Border Guard reports isolated attempts at irregular crossings by migrants, typically ranging from 0 to 5 per day.

On 22 December 2025, human rights defenders recognised 23 more people as political prisoners. They were convicted or detained for allegedly insulting Aliaksandr Lukashenka, calling for actions aimed at harming the national security of the Republic of Belarus, and interacting with extremist formations. On 23 December, human rights defenders recognised ten more people as political prisoners. As of 23 December 2025, the number of political prisoners in Belarus was 1,135.

On 23 December 2025, Belarusian human rights activists issued a statement regarding the expulsion of released political prisoners from Belarus. They welcomed the steps taken by the Belarusian authorities to free 175 people. However, they expressed serious concern about how these releases were implemented. “The released persons were forcibly displaced to the borders of neighboring states, namely the Belarusian-Lithuanian and Belarusian-Ukrainian borders. Some of the released persons reported that they were transported with bags on their heads and handcuffed. All this was carried out in violation of basic procedural guarantees of freedom, without providing legal protection, including access to necessary documents and legal assistance,” the statement said. “Such forced expulsion of released political prisoners deprives them, in whole or in part, of a number of basic rights, without which normal life is impossible. In particular, the rights related to family relations, property, housing, labor rights, the right to health, the right to social security and other rights are being violated,” the human rights activists said. They called on the authorities of Belarus to respect and unconditionally observe the rights of citizens enshrined in the Constitution and international treaties to which Belarus is a party; stop the practice of forced expulsion of citizens of Belarus after their release; and provide released people with documents as well as provide those who have already been forcibly expelled with the opportunity to return safely to Belarus, and those who are planned to be released in the future –  the right to freely choose their place of residence.

“Viasna” Human Rights Centre issued a report on the situation with political prisoners in Belarus in 2025. According to human rights activists, it remained critical despite the mass pardons: against the background of releases of several groups of political prisoners, cases of forced expulsion from the country, continued repression, isolation of prisoners, and deaths in places of detention were recorded. According to “Viasna”, as of 23 December, 1,135 political prisoners were held in places of detention, 968 of them men and 168 women. Among the prisoners were 28 media representatives, three human rights defenders, 21 doctors, as well as 16 lawyers and members of the bar. 509 people received the status of political prisoners in 2025. Human rights activists were aware of at least 164 political prisoners at high risk. Among them were at least 56 people with serious illnesses, seven people with disabilities, 26 people over the age of 60, and ten people with mental disorders. At least 20 families were held in places of detention. Since 2020, more than 1,700 people have fully served their sentences and been released. At least 300 of them were released in 2025. During 2025, 342 people were pardoned. Among those released were the head and founder of “Viasna” Human Rights Centre, Nobel Peace Prize laureate Ales Bialiatski, as well as human rights activist Uladzimir Labkovich, Maksim Znak, Alena Hnauk, Viktar Babaryka and Maryja Kalesnikava, who had previously been held incommunicado for prolonged periods of time. 189 political prisoners were forcibly expelled from Belarus after their release. Mikalai Statkevich refused to leave the country and was put back in custody. Human rights activists classify the practice of “release on the condition of departure” as an instrument of political pressure contrary to the Constitution and international norms. Despite the release of a number of foreign citizens, the Belarusian authorities continue to prosecute foreigners. As of 23 December, according to “Viasna”, at least 20 foreign citizens remain in detention in Belarus. The practice of isolating political prisoners from the outside world also continues. At least four political prisoners are being held incommunicado, without contact with relatives and lawyers: Alyaksandr Aranovich, Uladzimir Kniha, Mikalai Statkevich and Alyaksandr Frantskevich. In 2025, two deaths of political prisoners in prison became known. At the beginning of the year, Valyantsin Shtermer, who was serving his term in Shklou colony No. 17, died. The exact date and circumstances of his death remain unknown. In September, Andrei Padnyabenny, a Russian citizen who was sentenced to 16 years and eight months of imprisonment, died in Mahileu colony No. 15. The cause of his death was suffocation – he hanged himself in a punishment cell. Human rights defenders noted that all the figures may be higher due to the unavailability of complete information.

In 2025, at least 1,254 people were tried in political criminal cases in Belarus, “Viasna” Human Rights Centre reported. Of the 1,254 convicts, 72% (899) were men and 28% (355) were women. 45 people had reached retirement age. The cases against 30 people were investigated under special procedure (in absentia). The most common type of punishment under politically motivated criminal charges was restriction of freedom without referral to a correctional institution. 555 convicts were sentenced to such punishment. 42 convicts were sentenced to restriction of freedom with referral to a correctional institution. At least 306 people were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment. The most frequent charge in political trials remained participation in protest actions. 643 people were convicted under this charge.

During December, “Viasna” recorded more than 80 cases of politically motivated repression, including detentions, searches and interrogations. Pressure was exerted not only inside the country, but also outside: Belarusians abroad reported contacts by law enforcement agencies, attempts at psychological pressure and inducement to return to Belarus.

Data on repression in the media sector was presented on 26 December by the Belarusian Association of Journalists. It reported that there had been 12 arrests of media representatives, 34 searches and inspections of premises in 2025. More than 100 cases of in absentia prosecution of journalists were recorded. 42 media projects were recognised as “extremist formations”. 28 media workers remain behind bars.

On 31 December, the Ministry of Internal Affairs added 22 people to the “List of persons involved in extremist activities”. There are currently 6,149 names on the list. 1,341 names were added to the list in 2025.

On 23 December, the Ministry of Information updated the list of “extremist materials”. In particular, the website of “Viasna” Human Rights Centre containing a list of political prisoners was included. For the first time in 2026, the Ministry of Information updated the list of «extremist materials» on 5 January. Two resources were added to it.

At the end of December 2025, it became known that Volha Sitnik, the editor of the Belarusian Wikipedia, was sentenced to restriction of freedom without referral to a correctional institution and released from custody. Sitnik was detained in spring of 2025, when a raid on the editors of the Belarusian Wikipedia began. Sitnik has been the administrator of the Belarusian Wikipedia since 2010.

On 28 December, the Mirontsavy family was detained as part of a criminal case. The mother, Lukerya Mirontsava, and one of her daughters, Veranika, are currently in Pre-trial Detention Center no. 1. Earlier, other members of the family had been persecuted. In August 2020, sisters Victoryja, Anastasia and Alyaksandra stood up for citizens who were beaten by riot police during mass protests. After the start wof mass repression, Alyaksandra managed to leave the country, while Victoryja and Anastasia were detained in October 2020. As a result, Victoryja was sentenced to two and a half years of imprisonment, and Anastasia was sentenced to two years of imprisonment. In 2022, the two sisters were released after fully serving their sentences.

Dzmitser Ilyukhin, the former first secretary of the Belarusian Embassy in the United States, was convicted on charges of “facilitating extremist activities”. The verdict was handed down by the Minsk City Court and entered into force in December 2025. Ilyukhin was detained about a year ago. He is currently serving his sentence in a colony. During the 2020 election, Ilyukhin was a member of the electoral commission in Ottawa. According to the official protocol, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya won at his polling station. She received 321 votes (91%) compared with 21 votes for Lukashenka (6%).

On 30 December 2025, Aliaksandr Lukashenka signed a decree pardoning 22 more people. There were 15 women and seven men among them. The names of the pardoned prisoners have not yet been disclosed, however, it is known that there are no Poles among them. This was announced by the press secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland, Maciej Wewiór. Among those pardoned, 20 people were convicted of extremist crimes. All of them allegedly applied for clemency on their own, “pleaded guilty and expressed remorse”. It is unknown how many of those pardoned were political prisoners recognised by human rights defenders. One of those pardoned was sentenced to limitation of freedom without a referral to a correctional institution and such people are not included in the list of political prisoners, since they are not in custody.

Dzyanis Kuchinski, diplomatic adviser to Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, reported the intensification of transnational repression. “Almost every day, KGB officers contact employees of Tsikhanouskaya’s Office, threaten their relatives in Belarus and commit cyber attacks. Threats are received both personally by Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya and her office staff. Lukashenka’s propaganda has also increased pressure on the entire democratic community,” he said.

A criminal case was opened in absentia against the priest Alyaksandr Kukhta, a well-known Belarusian priest and author of the “Batushka otvetit” (The priest will answer) YouTube channel, for facilitating “extremist” activities. Kukhta condemned the repression in 2020 and opposed Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. In early 2022, he left Belarus for Lithuania, and in April 2023 it became known that he had been accepted into the Orthodox Church of Constantinople (Ecumenical Patriarchate). In October 2025, Kukhta announced that he was leading BYSOL fundraising for the needs of specific people. According to the Christianskaya Visia initiative, 92 Christian priests were subjected to repression in Belarus from autumn 2020 to 29 November 2025.

Blogger Pavel Spiryn was released after more than five years of imprisonment. Recently, Spirin was in a colony for repeat offenders in Horki. In February 2021, he was sentenced to four and a half years of imprisonment for allegedly inciting hatred. The case concerned two videos on his YouTube channel: a film about anti-drug legislation and the video “The Terrible Secret of the Prosecutor General of Belarus: carte blanche for sadism” about the events of 9 August 2020 when the mass protest actions erupted. In 2024, a month before the end of his term, he was tried again on charge of disobedience to the colony administration, and was convicted to an additional year in colony.

The political prisoner Maria Batalonok, a Lithuanian citizen who was pardoned in 2025, was recognised as an “extremist”, according to the updated “list of extremists” on the website of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The list indicated that Batalonok was serving her sentence, despite the fact that she had been part of a group of political prisoners released and expelled from Belarus to Ukraine on 13 December 2025.

Human rights defenders have become aware of the verdicts in the “Black Nightingales case”. There were seven people involved in the case. The detention of college students in Nyasvizh, Baranavichi, Minsk, and Luninets was reported on state television in April 2024. Propagandists claimed that Trafim Barysau, Syarhei Zhigalyeu, Dzmitser Zakharoshka, Anastasia Klimenka, Alyaksandra Pulinovich and Daniil Harasim were members of the Black Nightingales anarchist group, led by 16-year-old Ukrainian citizen Maria Misyuk. They were charged with acts of terrorism; Harasim was charged under several articles, including high treason. They received sentences ranging from ten to 13 years of imprisonment. Maria Misyuk was released on 22 November as part of a group of political prisoners.

The sentences of three customs officers accused of high treason, participation in an “extremist formation” and incitement to hostility have become known. Chief Inspector of the Customs Service Yauhen Hurinovich was sentenced to 13.5 of imprisonment, Viktar Novik – to 13 years of imprisonment, Uladzimir Zhuromski — to 12 years of imprisonment. The trial was held in 2024. According to human rights defenders, the reason for the persecution was that Hurinovich and his colleagues fought against the smuggling of Belarusian cigarettes into the EU and thereby interfered with smuggling schemes controlled by the Belarusian authorities. Hurinovich, Zhuromski and Novik were detained in 2022. During the arrest, Hurinovich was severely beaten and his back was seriously injured. He was unable to walk for a long time, and had to use a wheelchair and crutches. Due to severe pain, he was sent to the hospital in Kalyadichi several times. For a long time, doctors refused to recognise his disability, but the Mahileu hospital eventually confirmed Hurinovich had a disability. The administration of colony No. 15 where he is currently held, nevertheless forces him to exercise and work on crutches.

The BYSOL solidarity fund summed up the results of its activities in 2025, which “testified to the solidarity of Belarusians, the strength of our community and the ability to work together”. According to preliminary estimates, BYSOL has managed to raise more than 1,250,000 Euro this year. This figure includes personal fundraising campaigns, thematic fundraisings, as well as fundraisings for particular initiatives. In addition, the BYSOL team recorded 140 evacuation cases, both of individuals and entire families. The foundation’s hotline processed more than 2,000 requests of varying complexity over the year.

At the beginning of January, the BYSOL foundation completed a Christmas fundraising for the children of political prisoners. The goal was to collect 27,400 Euro, by 6 January, 27,623 Euro had been collected. “This fundraising was initiated so that the families of political prisoners would receive support, and every child would receive a sign of attention and hope.” BYSOL currently accepts applications from parents who have suffered from repression, and from those who are now taking care of the children of political prisoners.

John Coale, the special envoy of the President of the United States to Belarus, continues to work on the release of political prisoners. He announced this on the social network X in response to a reader’s appeal. During 2025, 342 people were released in Belarus with the help of the United States. They were expelled from the country, many of them without personal documents.

On 9 January, the head of “Viasna” Human Rights Centre, Ales Bialiatski, who was released from a colony in Belarus on 13 December 2025, and who was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize three years ago, visited Oslo (Norway). He was welcomed at the Norwegian Nobel Institute by the head of the Nobel Committee, Jørgen Watne Frydnes, and finally personally received the Nobel Diploma and the badge of the Nobel laureate. According to Bialiatski, the award helped him survive three years in prison.

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