Belarus Review by iSANS — February 23, 2026 

According to Ukrainian monitoring channels, between 16 and 22 February eight UAV flights were recorded in Belarus’s airspace: three Russian and five Ukrainian. Belarusian Air Force on-duty aviation troops were involved in interception efforts. There were no reports of the UAVs being shot down or crashing.

From 16 February, the AF RB launched another phase of a combat readiness inspection. Command elements, as well as a number of formations and units of the Western Operational Command, were brought to combat readiness as part of an inspection conducted by the Ministry of Defence, the ministry reported. The inspection includes a call-up of reservists; the number was not specified.

The MoD stated that the inspection is intended to assess combat and mobilization readiness, commanders’ ability to control subordinate units, and the condition of weapons and military equipment. Reservists are expected to refresh their skills during the process. Particular emphasis is placed on improving unit survivability under actions by simulated sabotage/reconnaissance groups and UAVs of a notional adversary.

During the week, media reported reservists being called up for training assemblies to a range of units, including the 6th Mechanized Brigade, the 557th Engineer Brigade, the 74th Signals Regiment, and other units of the Grodno garrison.

According to media reporting, Belarusian social media saw a wave of complaints about how the call-up is being conducted. People reported that summonses are often delivered only hours before reporting time (sometimes “same-day”), and described poor organisation of the process. Reservists and their relatives said they had to remain at assembly points for 10–18 hours – sometimes late into the night or until morning – without clear information and with issues related to food and water. Participants in the discussion also claimed that family circumstances are often not accepted as grounds for exemption.

In response to the social media complaints, the MoD argued that the army is testing citizens’ ability to report promptly and units’ ability to be rapidly manned – something that, it said, cannot be assessed if people are warned in advance.

On 18 February, Aliaksandr Lukashenka heard a report from State Secretary of the Security Council Aliaksandr Valfovich on the progress of the ongoing combat readiness inspection of the AF RB, according to BelTA. Valfovich said the inspection is based on lessons from the war in Ukraine. The inspected military units were subjected to actions by a simulated adversary – Internal Troops units. Valfovich stated that the Internal Troops performed well in terms of personnel training, noting motivation and professional preparedness.

Summing up interim results, Valfovich said the servicemen performed “quite decent” (at a solid level), while noting that shortcomings exist and will be analysed. He added that the inspection is not yet complete and that a number of additional units will be checked to enable an assessment across all branches of the AF RB, including aviation, air defence, and other service branches.

On 19 February, Head of the Department for International Military Cooperation Valery Ravenka held his annual briefing, the MoD press service reported. The stated purpose was to inform representatives of foreign armed forces accredited to the Belarusian MoD about current issues of military policy and the development of the AF RB.

Speaking about the military-political environment, Revenka stated that NATO continues to transform from a defensive alliance into an instrument of pressure and intimidation. He added that the European Union is also increasingly advocating strengthening its status as a military-political actor. “In our region, the role of nuclear deterrence is increasing again, as is that of medium-range high-precision non-nuclear weapons. All this means a shift from peaceful coexistence to the concept of prolonged confrontation,” Revenka said.

On the prospects for international military cooperation, Revenka outlined the following Belarusian priorities: maintaining strategic-level cooperation with Russia; multilateral military cooperation within the CSTO, CIS, and SCO; bilateral cooperation with partner states; development of a strategic partnership with China; military cooperation with countries in the Middle East, Africa, South and Southeast Asia, and Latin America; as well as restoring constructive engagement with countries of the European region and the United States.

After the briefing, Revenka said the event also covered the activities of military attachés accredited in Belarus. According to him, despite the fact that attachés “live here, see that it is quiet and calm, see our situation and the peaceful life of the people,” they present information about Belarus “not in an entirely constructive way.” The Belarusian side therefore asked them to “cover objectively the situation in our state in a way that would enable decisions to build relations with the Republic of Belarus.”

On 20 February, the Ministry of Defence reported a ceremonial assembly and festive concert dedicated to the Day of Defenders of the Fatherland and the Armed Forces.

In comments to the media, Defence Minister Viktar Khrenin noted that the AF RB are “as powerful and strong as ever in military-technical terms.” He argued that this strength is not only due to “the Oreshnik missile system or tactical nuclear weapons being deployed on our territory,” but also because “we have people who are always ready to fall in,” and because “there is a clear understanding that today, on the battlefield, everything is decided by the officer and the soldier.” He added that readiness to defend the country in Belarus is nationwide in character, and that the army is “65% contract-based.”

In his speech at the event, Khrenin also accused the leadership of Poland and the Baltic states of “provocative activity near the borders of the Union State.” “While they provoke us, dig trenches, increase the size of their armed forces, and modernise military infrastructure, we on the other side of the border are building a peaceful life,” he said.

According to Khrenin, more than 200 new types of weapons, military and special equipment are procured annually for AF RB needs. Within the existing force structure, organisational changes are underway and the combat component is being strengthened. In 2025, a new branch of special troops – unmanned aviation – was created, and its reconnaissance and strike capabilities are developing intensively.

On 20 February, the international intelligence community InformNapalm published a piece on how operators of Russian strike UAVs use Belarusian infrastructure to conduct strikes against Ukraine. According to the publication, in the second half of 2025, Russia began actively using civilian infrastructure – particularly mobile communications towers in Belarus – to route its drones. This reportedly enabled a more stable signal and strikes on targets in northern and western regions of Ukraine. In some cases, UAVs allegedly entered the airspace of certain NATO countries (referring to UAV incursions into Poland on the night of 9–10 September).

Previously, it had been reported that Russian UAVs are equipped with modems using SIM cards from a Russian operator, with mandatory roaming enabled in Belarus. Russian operators’ SIM cards do not operate in Ukraine under roaming. However, by raising antennas on border-area mobile base stations in Russia and Belarus, Russian UAVs reportedly obtain a data transmission channel extending several dozen kilometres into Ukraine.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has repeatedly made similar claims about the use of Belarusian infrastructure to support control of Russian drones.

On 18–20 February, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya visited Geneva and Vienna, where she participated in events held within the framework of the winter session of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and the International Summit on Human Rights and Democracy, and addressed a joint plenary meeting of the three main OSCE committees. In her remarks, she emphasized support for Ukraine and the need to stop Russian aggression, stating: “Belarus is not Russia. We stand with Ukraine. We are a proud European nation with our own culture and identity.” Tsikhanouskaya argued that the outcome of the war would also shape Belarus’s future, outlining two scenarios: further consolidation of the ruling regime and increasing subjugation of the country to Russia’s control or restoration of independence and a return to democratic development. She drew particular attention to the situation of more than 1,200 political prisoners, describing developments in the country as a “political and legal default,” and urged the international community not to normalise relations with the regime, to seek the unconditional release of all detainees, and to intensify sanctions against those responsible for repression. In Geneva, Tsikhanouskaya also briefed EU ambassadors to the UN Human Rights Council, discussing humanitarian support for the released prisoners and their families, protection of Belarusians in exile, and preparations for a “Belarus after dictatorship.” She stressed that “without a free and democratic Belarus, there will be no long-term security in Europe,” and called on partners to prepare for inevitable change.

On 17 February, Aliaksandr Lukashenka received the government’s report for 2025, during which he outlined several notable trends in foreign policy and the economy. Overall, the meeting conveyed similar messages to a comparable event a year earlier, but the challenges appeared more acute. First, more rigid foreign policy rhetoric was articulated: “We are squeezed from East and West,” and “we have no friends — our best friends are our competitors.” In effect, Lukashenka acknowledged that the Russian market is no longer viewed as an unconditional stabilizer. Second, multi-vectorism was revived as a political and economic principle, with long-term interest in relations with the European Union underlined: “Our multi-vectorism stems from the economy… Europe cannot be disregarded.”

The key leitmotif of the meeting was exports as the central pillar of the economic model’s sustainability. Lukashenka demanded to “urgently stop the decline in industry and clear warehouses,” to place enterprises under “manual control,” and to tighten responsibility for unpaid deliveries. At the same time, he acknowledged limitations in the Russian direction, noting that “our main ally is in a difficult situation,” and that sales have declined “in every second” Russian region.

Domestically, Lukashenka delivered sharp assessments of the Council of Ministers’ performance: “every year, a third of instructions are marked ‘not fulfilled,’” the government “has not become a powerful analytical headquarters,” and together with the National Bank it remains in a state of “macro-euphoria.”

Lukashenka also rejected criticism from the Belarusian opposition in exile, underscoring that his political messaging is aimed primarily at the domestic audience.

The meeting ultimately reflected risks to the implementation of the 2026–2030 five-year plan amid a real slowdown already visible at the beginning of 2026 and accumulated structural constraints. No clear pathway out of the export-industrial impasse was proposed. Instead, emphasis was placed on pressure on implementers, manual governance, and directive expansion of foreign economic geography.

Key data:
GDP 2025 – 101.3% (plan: 104%).
GDP (January 2026) – 98.8% year-on-year.
Industry: H2 2025 – 98.2%. January 2026 – minus 3.4%.
Increase in inventories – USD 875 million (BYN 2.5 billion); total goods in stock – USD 3.3 billion (BYN 12 billion).
Real wages – 109% against labor productivity of 101%.

On 19 February, Aliaksandr Lukashenka met with Chairperson of the Senate of Zimbabwe Mabel Memory Chinomona. The key issue discussed was a proposal to construct a port in Mozambique. Lukashenka stated: “We urgently need a foothold on the southeastern coast of the African continent. This means that together with Zimbabwe we should work on building a port in your neighbouring country — Mozambique. If we implement this idea jointly with Mozambique and Zimbabwe, we could also restore railway communication through your neighbour to Zimbabwe.”

On the same day, it became known that Belarus did not participate in the inaugural meeting of the Board of Peace in Washington, DC, on 19 February 2026, convened by Donald Trump. According to the Belarusian Foreign Ministry, the country was to be represented by Foreign Minister Maxim Ryzhankou. “However, despite completing all required procedures on our side, visas for the Belarusian delegation were not issued,” the ministry’s press service stated. Instead, Ryzhankou attended a literary event in Minsk dedicated to the International Mother Language Day and the Year of Belarusian Women. The absence of Belarus at the table occurred amid rising tensions around Iran and ahead of Lukashenka’s planned visit to Moscow on 26 February for the session of the Supreme State Council of the Union State.

On 20 February 2026, Ukraine imposed personal sanctions on Lukashenka in response to his “assistance in the killing of Ukrainians,” as stated by Volodymyr Zelenskyy on 18 February via Telegram. According to the presidential decree published on the official website, sanctions against Lukashenka include asset freezes, a complete ban on trade operations and transit through Ukrainian territory, revocation of state awards, a travel ban, prohibition on investment, privatization and economic cooperation, and termination of financial, trade, cultural and other ties. Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya welcomed what she described as Ukraine’s “decisive sanctions against dictator Lukashenka for his direct role in Russia’s war.”

The hybrid crisis on the Lithuania–Belarus border remains in a positional phase. Minsk has not publicly proposed new settlement approaches and continues to apply pressure. Lithuania, for its part, is further shifting the issue from bilateral channels into the international legal and sanctions domain. Smuggling activity persists, and there are no signs of change regarding the Lithuanian trucks detained in Belarus.

On 19 February, Lithuanian President Gitanas Nausėda stated that the EU would on 23 February “extend individual and sectoral sanctions” against Belarus for another year, citing the situation of political prisoners, Belarus’s “complicity in the war,” meteorological balloon incidents, and the detention of trucks. A similar statement was made by Lithuanian Foreign Minister Kęstutis Budrys, who announced an “expansion of measures against Belarus” within the framework of the EU’s 20th sanctions package. He also referred to work related to “Belarus’s promises to the United States” concerning the balloons, stating that Lithuania is informing “the American side about the consequences of warming relations.”

On 18 February, Lithuania submitted a package of evidence to International Civil Aviation Organization regarding the meteorological balloon incidents, seeking an international assessment and the creation of a potential basis for future sanctions decisions.

At the operational level, further interceptions of smuggling balloons continue to be recorded. On 18 February, Lithuanian authorities intercepted 13,500 packs of cigarettes across several districts; all balloons were equipped with GPS trackers. At the same time, Lithuania’s Ministry of Defence is testing systems for the “neutralization of meteorological balloons at the altitudes of 5–6 km,” preparing for systematic countermeasures.

Between 18 and 20 February, irregular migration activity briefly re-emerged along the Belarusian border. Poland recorded 13 attempted crossings on 18 February. Two days later, on 20 February, Lithuania detained nine individuals on its section. After a month-long lull and against a near-zero baseline in January–February (0–1 attempts per day), the episode suggests the hybrid pressure channel remains in reserve and is being selectively tested.

The possibility of shifting the pressure point from Lithuania to Poland could push the regime to revisit the migration instrument. Yet this option appears disadvantageous for Minsk and its potential benefits are highly uncertain.

On 16 February, Belarusian human rights defenders issued a statement recognising eight more people as political prisoners. They have been imprisoned or convicted for interacting with “extremist groups.” Human rights defenders are calling for the release of these individuals, as well as all other political prisoners, and for an end to repression.

Political prisoner Tatsiana Kaneuskaya, who had been a representative of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya during the 2020 presidential campaign, has fully served her sentence under a political charge and has been released. In 2020, she was accused of participating in mass riots and the seizure of buildings. Kaneuskaya was tried along with other representatives of Tsikhanouskaya – Yury Ulasau, Dzmitri Ivashkau and Aliaksandr Shabalin, and in 2021 was sentenced to six years of imprisonment. She was repeatedly placed in a punishment cell and in a cell-type confinement. In 2022, she was transferred to a prison regime in Mahileu, but afterwards she was transferred back to colony No. 4 in Homel. According to human rights defenders, she had been limited in receiving visits and parcels, and suffered health problems. As Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya stated in her speech at the Women’s Progress Dialogue international workshop in Berlin, “more than 170 Belarusian women remain political prisoners. Many of them took part in protest actions in 2020. Others were arrested for protesting against the war in 2022. In prison, they face repression, ill-treatment, beatings, and torture. They have fewer rights than ordinary prisoners.” Tsikhanouskaya called for international solidarity with regard to their release.

On 17 February, four people were convicted in the Minsk City Court in the BYSOL case. The defendants were charged with participation in an “extremist” formation. One of the women was also charged with participating in acts grossly violating public order, “Viasna” Human Rights Centre reported. According to investigators, the accused were BYSOL couriers — “their tasks included receiving and transferring money to other members of the formation, distributing it for the needs of participants in illegal protest and extremist activities”. Two of them were sentenced to two years of imprisonment, and one other person was sentenced to three years of imprisonment. The woman, who was additionally accused of participating in the protests, was sentenced to three years of imprisonment. In addition, each of them was sentenced to a fine of 500 basic units (22,500 rubles or approximately 6,700 Euro). BYSOL stated that they had never had a “courier network”. It noted that they do not create underground structures, do not form “groups” within the country and do not organise the transfer of cash through individuals. According to BYSOL, statements to the contrary “do not correspond to reality and have no relation to their activities”.

In 2025, the Minsk prosecutor’s office issued 34 orders banning the sale of books deemed “extremist”. Several more orders have been issued since the beginning of 2026. At the request of the prosecutors, all such publications were excluded from sale.

On 17-18 February, mass arrests of publishers and distributors of books took place in Minsk. During the searches, the phones of all those present in apartments and offices were checked. The searches and detentions were not isolated incidents, but systematic and planned. Security forces targeted both employees of existing and previously closed publishing houses, both the heads of publishing houses and ordinary employees. Entrepreneurs engaged in the distribution of books were also searched and arrested. It is not yet clear what exactly they were accused of. In recent months, arrests took place in several other communities of various types in Minsk and the regions. Judging by the incoming information, security forces were looking for evidence of financing from solidarity funds or connections with Belarusians abroad. On 21 February, it was reported that the first private publishing house in Belarus, Technalohija, had suspended its work

Andrei Kim, the founder of the Kinokong project, was detained in Minsk. According to the telegram channel “Svyashenny Belavud” (Sacred Belavud), it happened in the middle of the last week. The reasons for the detention are unknown. Kinokong is a Belarusian film project and distributor with the slogan “Kino pa-Belarusku”, founded by Kim in September 2012. The initiative engaged in professional translation and dubbing of films, cartoons, trailers and videos into the Belarusian language, and also organised film screenings in different cities of the country. The project has become one of the most well-known initiatives for popularising Belarusian dubbing and has made world cinema accessible to viewers in the Belarusian language.

On 19 February, political prisoner, veteran opposition politician and candidate in 2010 presidential elections Mikalai Statkevich was released. The Belarusian authorities had released Statkevich from prison on 11 September 2025 as part of a larger group of political prisoners and tried to expel him to Lithuania, but he refused to leave Belarus, after which he was again deprived of his liberty. All this time, his family did not know where he was. As it turned out later, during that time he had been held in the same colony in Hlybokae, from which he had been released in September. Maryna Adamovich, Statkevich’s wife, said that she had visited the colony three times in recent months and had sent appeals, but had not received any responses from the authorities regarding Statkevich’s whereabouts. On 21 January, Statkevich suffered a stroke and was taken to Minsk. Now he is at home. According to Adamovich, Statkevich’s speech is still impaired. Aliaksandr Lukashenka’s press secretary Natallia Eismont said that Lukashenka “approved the request of Mikalai Statkevich’s relatives” to release him after he suffered a stroke.

On 19 February, political prisoner Natallia Levaya, who is nine months pregnant, was released. According to the press service of Aliaksandr Lukashenka, Levaya was pardoned. Levaya is an illustrator from Brest, who lived in Poland for a while and worked as an artist and production designer. She had probably moved to Poland after the outbreak of the war. She was detained in May 2024 while returning to Belarus. Levaya was found guilty of financing “extremist activities” and sentenced to six years of imprisonment. Last week, propagandists showed a story about Levaya titled “A Chance for the Future.” In the story, Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs Hennadz Kazakevich met with Levaya”s mother and husband, who had come from Brest to the Homel colony, allegedly “to talk, to vouch for their wife and daughter”. Kazakevich explained that the release was dictated not by “political considerations”, but by “concern” and “mercy”. “In an address to the president, Levaya wrote that she was remorseful, asked for leniency, described her plans for life and plans for raising her son in Belarus. Natalia indicated that she was ready to lead a law-abiding lifestyle. The petition with the necessary package of documents was sent immediately to the head of state,” the propagandists claimed in the story. The deputy Head of the Presidential Administration, Volha Chuprys, commented that the pardon was “granted under the condition of law-abiding behaviour”.

On 20 February, the Ministry of Internal Affairs added 22 more people to the “List of citizens of the Republic of Belarus, foreign citizens or stateless persons involved in extremist activities”. Of these, 20 people were convicted of “facilitating extremist activities”. There are now 6,320 names on the list.

On 20 February, eleven people were added by the authorities to the “list of terrorists”, including minors convicted in the “Black Nightingales” case, including the pardoned Ukrainian national Maria Misyuk. Now there are 1,417 people on the list, of whom approximately 700 are Belarusians.

Tor Band’s musician, political prisoner Yauhen Burlo underwent surgery on his leg and now can only move using crutches, reported ex-political prisoner and journalist Ihar Losik. “He had osteoporosis in both legs, and underwent surgery on his right leg, and went through months of agony, because you know how surgery and rehabilitation work in prison. He told me it was hell. He urgently needs to have surgery on his other leg. He can’t walk normally, and imagine what it’s like to live in such a state in a colony,” Losik wrote. He also added that Burlo had been in the KGB detention centre for six months. A year ago, he was told to apply for clemency, but then “they took him back to the colony and did not release him.” In October 2023, Yauhen Burlo was sentenced to eight years of imprisonment and fined 100 basic units (3,700 rubles or approximately 1,100 Euro).

A new criminal case was opened against political prisoner Tsikhan Osipau for the second time for malicious disobedience to the administration of the colony. Osipau was detained on 11 August 2020, during a protest near the Pushkinskaya metro station. The investigation claimed that he had run over five servicemen of the internal troops in a car. He was sentenced to 11 years of imprisonment, and then another seven months of imprisonment were added to this term for disobedience to the administration of the colony. It was reported that Osipau spent more than 200 days in a punishment cell. In the summer of 2024, he was placed in a cell-type room for six months, and after that he was sent to the punishment cell for another two months. He does not receive any letters or parcels. His health is of serious concern. He has problems with food intake, eye pain, rapid heartbeat, blood pressure drops and a weakened immune system. Every day of detention in such conditions can worsen his condition and lead to irreversible consequences.

The health of political prisoner Aleh Loika, pastor of the Church of Evangelical Christians, has seriously deteriorated behind bars, “Viasna” Human Rights Centre reported. According to human rights defenders, his has heart pain, and because of intervertebral hernias, it is difficult for him even to walk. Loika was detained in April 2025 and convicted in the Belarusian Hajun case. He was accused of facilitating extremist activities and sentenced to three and a half years of imprisonment in a high-security prison.

On 21 February, former political prisoner Dzyanis Sakalouski died. He was a cameraman on the Belarus-1 TV channel. Sakalouski worked for Belarusian television for more than ten years, and left Belteleradiocompany shortly after the 2020 elections and the subsequent crackdown on protestors. He was detained on 22 December 2020 in the Belarus Press Club case. He was pardoned and released on 23 August 2021. After his release he left for Germany.

On 20 February, a trial in absentia began against Vadzim Krivasheeu, former Freestyle Director of the Republican Olympic Training Center. In September 2020, he was fired from his post for “poor ideological work in the team”. Krivasheeu was a sports representative in the National Anti-Crisis Management. He was charged with abuse of power or official authority, conspiracy or other actions committed with the aim of seizing power, calls for the application of sanctions or other actions harmful to national security, and creation or participation in an extremist formation.

PEN Belarus has published a new analytical report summarising the state of Belarusian culture in 2025. The report was prepared based on consolidated information collected by PEN Belarus’ monitoring group from open sources, through personal contacts, and via direct communication with cultural figures. Throughout 2025, 1,435 violations of cultural rights and human rights of cultural figures were documented. As of the end of the year, at least 144 representatives of the cultural sphere remained in places of incarceration or under other forms of deprivation or restriction of liberty. It is noted that five years after the mass protests, the regime’s cultural policy in Belarus retains a distinctly repressive character and shows no signs of liberalisation. The restoration of rights has not accompanied releases granted under presidential pardons. On the contrary, the pardon process itself has become a source of further violations, including forced exile and additional restrictions on fundamental freedoms. Persecution for dissent, arrests, denial of the right to a fair trial and freedom of movement, censorship, discrimination and transnational repression remain everyday realities for those working in culture and the arts. Participation in cultural life continues to be treated as grounds for persecution. As a result, opportunities for professional self-realisation have been significantly curtailed, the continuity of cultural processes has been disrupted, and space for critical expression within the country is effectively absent. Ongoing integration of the country with Russia further weakens the Belarusian cultural agency. The authors of the report stressed that the need for international support for cultural workers under pressure or in forced exile remains urgent and requires coordinated efforts by cultural and human rights organisations.

The human rights organisation Respect-Protect-Fulfill, together with an invited gender expert, presented an analytical report on discrimination against women in places of deprivation of liberty in Belarus for 2020-2025. The presentation took place on 17 February  2026. The report was based on interviews with former prisoners. The authors documented discriminatory practices in Belarusian penitentiary institutions and assessed them in terms of compliance with international law. The focus of the study was on inadequate conditions of detention, including lack of hygiene and violation of the right to health, inappropriate treatment and sexualised harassment by staff, the detention of pregnant women and women who have recently given birth, uniforms and forced labour. Special attention was paid to the overlapping forms of discrimination, as well as the lack of effective mechanisms for appealing violations within the framework of national procedures. According to the authors of the report, discriminatory conditions of detention of women in places of detention remain a systemic problem.

The German Embassy in Minsk issued a statement on the release of Mikalai Statkevich. “We welcome Mikalai Statkevich’s release and are glad that he was able to return home to Minsk. We wish him a speedy and successful recovery after his stroke. We continue to demand the release of all political prisoners in Belarus,” it said. The EU Delegation to Belarus also issued a statement. “It is with great relief that the Delegation of the European Union to Belarus has learned about the release of political prisoner Mikalai Statkevich. We understand that Statkevich was faced with a life-threatening medical condition in detention, and we wish him a full and speedy recovery. We also take note of the release of political prisoner Natalia Levaya, who is expecting a baby in March. We call for the immediate and unconditional release of all political prisoners,” the mission said in a statement.

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