Belarus Review by iSANS — February 09, 2026 

According to Ukrainian monitoring channels, between 2 and 8 February at least 16 Russian drones were recorded flying in Belarusian airspace. On-duty aviation forces of the Belarusian Armed Forces were scrambled to intercept them. There were no reports of any drones being shot down or crashing.

On 3 February, during a meeting on the development of the Vitebsk region, Aliaksandr Lukashenka explained why the snap combat-readiness inspection of the Belarusian Armed Forces had been ordered directly, without prior notification of the Ministry of Defence or the General Staff. “Our ‘fugitives’—both inside and outside the country—are saying: ‘Ah, he doesn’t trust the defence minister, he doesn’t trust the General Staff.’ I trust everyone. But this is a snap inspection conducted by the commander-in-chief. And I want to see how the General Staff and the Ministry of Defence act under such a sudden check,” Lukashenka said.

The comprehensive combat-readiness inspection of the Belarusian Armed Forces, launched on 26 January under the leadership of the Chief of the General Staff, continued. The Ministry of Defence provided updates on its progress. On 2 February, it was reported that “one of the units of the Western Operational Command,” the 6th Mechanised Brigade, had been brought to readiness to carry out assigned tasks.

On 3 February, Defence Minister Viktar Khrenin arrived at the site of a readiness inspection of one of the brigade’s units. Personnel were tasked with preparing weapons and military equipment for redeployment to new areas, where combat training activities would be conducted. Based on published photos and videos, Khrenin visited the Hozhsky training ground, and the 78th Independent Mechanised Battalion was involved in the inspection. On 4–5 February, the battalion reportedly conducted a march to its designated concentration area. On 3 February, the brigade’s reconnaissance battalion also carried out a march to assigned areas and subsequently arrived at the Chepelevo training ground in the Slonim district. On 4 February, the 52nd Independent Tank Battalion began moving to its designated area. According to one serviceman, the battalion was tasked with conducting a march to a training ground using a combined method.

That same day, the commander of the Western Operational Command, Vadzim Surau, stated that “mobilisation resources” were planned to be assigned to the 6th Mechanised Brigade. Military commissariats in the Hrodna region began notifying, assembling, and dispatching reservists to the brigade. The number of reservists being called up has not been disclosed.

In parallel, throughout the week, training continued at the Obuz-Lesnovsky training ground for reservists called up during the inspection. They underwent instruction in core combat training subjects. Published photos and videos suggest that a mobilisation deployment of a motorised rifle unit is taking place at the training ground.

On 2 February, the Ministry of Defence reported that the final stage of a camouflage experiment was under way at the Borisovsky training ground. The summer and autumn phases of the experiment had been conducted at various training grounds across the country, including during the Zapad-2025 exercise. Tactical camouflage measures aimed at concealing and simulating military equipment in the infrared and radar spectra are being carried out by engineering and camouflage units of the North-Western Operational Command under the supervision of representatives of the General Staff. Drone operators and Mi-8 helicopter crews are also involved. Results from the final stage are being compiled and analysed by military research institutes from Belarus and Russia.

On 3 February, the commander of the 377th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment of the Belarusian Armed Forces told state media that the regiment’s personnel had undergone retraining at Russian training centres on operating S-400 air defence systems and that the unit is ready to receive new systems into service. In 2015, the regiment was re-equipped with S-300PS systems, which remain in service to this day.

On 4 February, a combat-readiness inspection was conducted at the 72nd Joint Training Centre. The event took place as part of the inspection ordered by Aliaksandr Lukashenka on 16 January.

According to State Secretary of the Security Council Aliaksandar Valfovich, the inspection was carried out in one of the units where equipment intended for wartime-formed military units is kept in storage. It was planned to remove two to three items from each subunit – tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, trucks, and other equipment. Representatives of the State Control Committee also took part in the inspection. Valfovich noted that a preliminary assessment showed that servicemen had approached the preservation and storage of equipment responsibly. He also provided a preliminary assessment of earlier inspections of the 19th Mechanised Brigade and the 969th Tank Reserve Base: “There are shortcomings; they will be analysed further and reviewed. […] We alternate inspections of combat units with units where equipment is kept in storage,” he said.

It is worth noting that, for the purpose of organising mobilisation deployment, the structure of the 72nd Joint Training Centre includes at least three operational-mobilisation sections. These are specialised structures used to deploy Belarusian Armed Forces units during wartime. For example, in 2018 they were used to deploy the 37th Mechanised Brigade, and in early 2025 they were involved in mobilisation drills with the call-up of several thousand reservists.

On 4 February, Radio Svaboda published an investigation into the air-defence cover of the Mozyr oil refining complex. Based on satellite imagery analysis, journalists concluded that at the turn of 2024–2025, four earthen rampart positions were constructed around the facility for the deployment of surface-to-air missile systems. Two positions are located south of the plant, one to the east, and one to the north-east. The number of ramparts corresponds to a battery set of the Tor-M2K air defence system. The redeployment of Tor-M2K systems of the Belarusian Armed Forces to protect the plant was first reported in April 2024. The decision followed Ukrainian public statements about the need to strike the facility, which supplies its products to Russia. Air defence of the site is provided by Belarusian military personnel on a rotational basis.

On 5 February, Uladzimir Safonau was appointed Chief of Staff – First Deputy Commander of the Special Operations Forces of the Belarusian Armed Forces. Prior to the appointment, he commanded the 103rd Airborne Brigade. His predecessor, Aliaksandr Ilyukevich, was appointed Commander of the Special Operations Forces in January 2026.

On 6 February, a meeting of the board of the State Military-Industrial Committee was held, summarising results for 2025 and setting tasks for 2026. According to the Committee’s press service, more than 5,200 units of new weapons, military and special equipment, auxiliary equipment, as well as around 75,000 units of ammunition were delivered to the Belarusian Armed Forces in 2025. Over the year, 16 domestically produced systems were formally adopted into service. These included the “PANACEA” automated command-and-control system for a battalion tactical group, the BTR V2 armoured personnel carrier, the Redut-223 command-and-staff vehicle, the unguided 122-mm rocket 9M22Zh, and a range of electronic warfare systems.

The Committee’s chairman Dzmitry Pantus stated that the geography of exports had expanded to seven additional countries and now covers 65 states, which, according to him, allowed Belarus to reach a “record export level.” He also noted that investment volumes increased 3.6 times compared to 2024.

At the meeting of the State Military-Industrial Committee, officials said that by the end of March a new programme for the development of missile production in Belarus is expected to be adopted, including “a large number of new products.” Active work is under way on a short-range air defence missile system and new munitions for various types of grenade launchers. The emergence of a missile-and-gun air defence system for countering drones is also not ruled out in the near term. Another priority area is the development of electronic warfare capabilities. In the “very near future,” Belarus also plans to expand the range of missiles that can be used by the Polonez multiple-launch rocket system.

On 6 February, the Office of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya announced an expansion of its presence in Poland and the start of Tsikhanouskaya’s work from Warsaw. The statement noted that the Office will operate in two cities—Warsaw and Vilnius. Part of the team will relocate to Poland, including Chief Adviser Franak Viačorka and Senior Adviser Aliaksandr Dabrovolski. The Vilnius office will retain its registration and diplomatic accreditation; Denis Kuchynski has been appointed its head. Following the move, Tsikhanouskaya held meetings in Warsaw with representatives of the Belarusian diaspora and civic initiatives, former political prisoners, members of the Coordination Council, as well as meetings with Viktar Babaryka and his team, and with Paval Latushka and the NAU team.

On 7 February in Warsaw, Tsikhanouskaya took part in public hearings of the Coordination Council, held as a report by the Head of the United Transitional Cabinet followed by a Q&A session. The hearings were public and streamed on the Coordination Council’s official YouTube channel. According to Tsikhanouskaya’s Office, discussions covered the results of the democratic forces’ work plan and priorities for 2026–2027, including the activities of the Cabinet and the Office, elections to the Coordination Council, support for political prisoners, sanctions policy and strengthening international pressure on the Lukashenka regime, as well as international legal and other foreign-policy tracks. Tsikhanouskaya answered more than 60 questions; the hearings lasted nearly five hours.

On 3 February, a working meeting between Tsikhanouskaya and Viktar Babaryka took place—their first in-person meeting since his release. Tsikhanouskaya’s Office reported that they discussed the current agenda, possible steps for various democratic actors, approaches to shaping a shared vision for Belarus’s future, and strategic issues.

On 8 February, Aliaksandr Lukashenka and Russian President Vladimir Putin held a phone call. According to official statements, the central topic was preparation for a meeting of the Supreme State Council of the Union State, including timing, agenda, and organisational matters, as well as a number of current Belarus–Russia issues with an emphasis on joint projects. International issues and regional developments were also discussed.

Earlier, on 6 February, Union State Secretary of State Sergey Glazyev said the Supreme State Council meeting is scheduled for 25 February in Moscow. The agenda is expected to include results of implementing the Union State Treaty priorities, preparation of new Union programmes (“roadmaps”) for 2027–2029, and consideration of decisions on cross-border movement between Belarusian and Russian regions. These issues had previously been discussed at a Union Council of Ministers meeting at prime-ministerial level.

On 9 February, Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service claimed that the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Poland were allegedly “amassing forces and resources” to “destabilise the situation” and achieve a change of the constitutional order in Belarus. According to the statement, these countries also intend to “form a resource of people ‘angry at A. Lukashenka’” in connection with the “presidential elections” scheduled for 2030. The statement was preceded by a series of publications in regime-aligned propaganda critically targeting the very idea of a “round table” between the authorities and the opposition, and more broadly opposing discussions of dialogue between elites. In particular, on 29 January Raman Pratasevich publicly claimed that calls for dialogue were allegedly a cover for preparations to destabilise the situation ahead of 2030. The topic was also taken up by pro-Russian pro-government propagandists (including Azaronak and Higin), who traditionally resorted to offensive rhetoric against supporters of dialogue. At the same time, the question of the feasibility of dialogue also features on the agenda of the democratic forces, where it continues to provoke extensive heated debate.

On 5 February, talks were held in Belarus between Ukraine’s Ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets and Russia’s Human Rights Commissioner Tatyana Moskalkova. According to Moskalkova, since the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ operation in Russia’s Kursk region (August 2024), 165 civilians from the Kursk region had been forcibly moved to Ukraine, with 10 allegedly still remaining there. The same day, Ukraine and Russia carried out their first prisoner exchange of 2026 in a 157-for-157 format, which media reports say took place via Belarusian territory.

The hybrid crisis on the Belarus–Lithuania border remains in a positional phase. At the same time, localised escalations continue in the form of flights by smuggling contraband goods in meteorological balloons, while the political and diplomatic track remains effectively frozen.

On 3 February, Lithuanian Prime Minister Inga Ruginienė publicly stated that she sees no meeting of preconditions for a “thaw” in relations with Minsk, stressing Lithuania’s rejection of the “language of force” employed by Belarus and linking any stabilisation to an end to pressure through balloons and stranded freight trucks. The same day, during a meeting with Maryja Kalesnikava, Ruginienė underlined ongoing coordination with the US Special Envoy for Belarus John Coale on the release of political prisoners and regional security, pointing to the continued role of external mediation. Also on 3 February, Lithuanian President Gitanas Nausėda confirmed his intention to seek an extension of EU sanctions against Belarus, directly linking this to the ongoing “hybrid attacks” and Minsk’s role as an ally of Russia.

Lithuania’s road hauliers’ association Linava plans to appeal to the European Commission for assistance in resolving the crisis involving trucks stranded in Belarus since November 2025. According to the association, vehicles belonging to 149 companies – 1,071 units in total (575 semi-trailers and 496 tractor units) – remain detained in Belarus.

At the operational level, Lithuania’s border service reported three interceptions of contraband goods on 5 February (7,400 packs of cigarettes seized) and the detention of two individuals. On 7 February, a 2026 record was registered: seven interceptions in a single day (12,700 packs). Since the beginning of the year, authorities have reported 40 incidents (attempts at smuggling of 108,000 packs) and 23 detainees.

Domestic developments in Lithuania also include a tougher approach toward the Belarusian diaspora. On 6 February, the Migration Department reported issuing 41 orders for Belarusian citizens to leave the country in January, as well as five deportations.

In contrast to regular statements from the Lithuanian side, Minsk has made almost no new public comments. The Belarusian position – “ready for dialogue, but no official proposals received” – has not been updated since 16 December 2025.

Against this backdrop, the “balloon” phenomenon has also spread to Poland. According to Poland’s Border Guard, around 1.75 million cigarettes were seized in January, with an estimated value of approximately PLN 1.78 million (about USD 0.5 million). At the same time, attempts by irregular migrants to cross the Polish–Belarusian border between 1 and 8 February were virtually absent, limited to isolated cases. By comparison, during the same period in 2025, 15–30 crossing attempts per day were recorded. This sharp decline cannot be explained solely by seasonality or weather and points to a deliberate reduction on the part of the Belarusian authorities.

On 2 February 2026, Aliaksandr Lukashenka met with Brazil’s ambassador in Minsk, Bernard Klingl, and stated his support for incumbent Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in the upcoming elections, while calling for more active bilateral cooperation. According to Lukashenka’s press service, he argued that relations should be developed “more intensively” and “without unnecessary complications,” focusing on the economic agenda and identifying areas of mutual interest. He also claimed that a number of “mutually beneficial issues” had previously failed to materialise and proposed outlining further steps. The same day, Ambassador Klingl said Brazil intends to increase purchases of Belarusian potash fertilisers. He added that supplies of Belarusian agricultural machinery and the establishment of assembly facilities were discussed. On Brazil’s side, possible cooperation in aviation and a resumption of Belarus’ interaction with the Embraer aircraft production company were mentioned, while noting that prospects depend on the broader “political context”.

The intensification of contacts between Minsk and Brasília comes against the backdrop of the US Treasury’s issuance of OFAC General License No. 13, allowing limited transactions with Belaruskali and related entities under the Belarus sanctions regime. In January–November 2025, Belarus–Brazil trade turnover reached USD 766 million (+25%), with Belarusian exports exceeding USD 700 million. According to Brazilian statistics, imports of fertilisers from Belarus have declined sharply in recent years due to sanctions: USD 568 million (2019), USD 349 million (2023), USD 44 million (2024), with supplies remaining minimal in 2025. Reports of potential engagement with Embraer appeared after Belavia announced on 28 November 2025 that it was exploring plans to purchase three to five new aircraft.

Last week, political prisoners across the country were summoned to the administration of the correctional institution where they are serving their sentences and questioned about their plans for life after possible release. There are at least four known institutions where political prisoners were interrogated on the subject en masse, including institutions for those who have been convicted for the first time, those for repeat offenders, and institutions where persons sentenced to restriction of freedom with a referral to a correctional institution are serving their sentences. The main question of these conversations was whether an individual wanted to go abroad or stay in Belarus after the release. Both those who would be released relatively soon and those who still have long sentences to serve were interviewed. There was no evidence of pressure regarding a choice between these two options. Experts interpret this development as a possible sign of preparations to a release of the next group of political prisoners. Speaking to journalists a few weeks ago, U.S. Special Envoy for Belarus John Coale stated that negotiations were continuing and he had hopes that a much larger group of political prisoners would be released soon, possibly “a thousand or more”. Lukashenka, in his turn, had suggested earlier that other states were welcome to take as many prisoners from Belarus as they wanted. The Lukashenka regime has been widely criticised for deporting all previously released political prisoners in 2024-2025, not giving them any choice, depriving most of the forcibly exiled individuals of their passports, and not providing them wih official papers confirming their pardon.

“Viasna” Human Rights Centre noted that the release of political prisoners as a result of negotiations between the United States and the Lukashenka regime did not lead to an improvement in the situation. The security forces continued to detain people, who then received prison sentences and were subjected to inhuman treatment in custody. Due to the expiration of the statute of limitations on a number of “political” articles of the Criminal Code, the authorities were taking various additional steps to punish opponents of the regime. In particular, protesters were put on the wanted list, administrative proceedings were initiated and people were added to the lists of “extremists”.

The law on fingerprinting was changed. The amendments were approved by Aliaksandr Lukashenka on 2 February. Among those who will have to be fingerprinted are foreigners and stateless persons who undergo border control when crossing the state border of Belarus, persons subject to deportation, expulsion or transfer to another state under international readmission agreements, persons included in the lists of “undesirable” persons, as well as those “in respect of whom the border service authorities have decided to carry out fingerprint registration in the interests of national security”. Citizens of Belarus who obtained citizenship or a residence permit from another country, as well as those who have been permanently abroad and are registered at the consulate, or who have received “another document from a foreign state granting the right to benefits and other advantages due to political, religious views or nationality” (such documents include, for example, a Pole’s Card) have also been included in the list of persons subject to mandatory fingerprint registration in Belarus. Refusal to undergo mandatory fingerprinting may result in administrative liability. The amended law expanded the list of government agencies that can perform fingerprinting and access its data. The list presently includes courts, law enforcement bodies, criminal prosecution bodies, border guards, as well as “other agencies engaged in operational investigative activities”. According to Lukashenka’s press service, these changes will “contribute to the timely identification of risks, challenges, threats to national security, and the neutralisation of their internal and external sources”.

Human rights defenders analysed the actions of the Belarusian security forces in 2025. They note that the authorities have strengthened control over citizens and expanded repressive measures. The new restrictions cover those who have left the country or have connections with other countries. A person’s communication with someone based in another country is increasingly becoming a reason for pressure from the state. The new measures affect not only those who have left, but also those who continue to live in Belarus. Human rights activists warn of a systemic tightening of control and another step towards isolating residents of Belarus. People are increasingly being persecuted not for specific actions, but for the very fact of having a connection with a foreign state, be it foreign citizenship or a residence permit. Such a connection is gradually becoming a separate ground for discrimination, the Belarusian Helsinki Committee noted. At the end of 2025, it was proposed to take fingerprints from citizens of Belarus who live in the country but have a second citizenship or residence permit abroad, as well as from citizens who have officially registered permanent residence abroad. It was also proposed to expand the list of personal data that are transferred to the state when an individual is crossing the border. Human rights defenders called such measures the restoration of the Soviet-style “iron curtain” and a move towards totalitarian governance. It was noted that law enforcement agencies were given the extra-judicial right to block websites, as well as disconnect people from the Internet and mobile communications, if they consider that there is “information about an identified violation of the law, the causes and conditions conducive to the commission of a crime”. The powers of the army and the grounds for the imposition of martial law were also expanded.

A year ago, on 5 February 2025, the bot of the Belarusian Hajun telegram channel was hacked by Belarus security services. Soon after, a wave of mass arrests began across the country, which eventually developed into one of the largest political criminal cases in Belarus. As of 5 February  2026, “Viasna” Human Rights Centre knew the names of 175 confirmed defendants in this case, including those who were detained or already convicted for reporting on the movement of Russian military equipment to an Belarusian Hajun’s bot. Detentions and trials in this case occur weekly and have not stopped to this day. The practice of punishments has changed over the year. In the beginning, the defendants in the case were more often sentenced to imprisonment, now they are often sentenced to restriction of freedom without referral to an open-type correctional institution. In addition, the authorities have offered to stop criminal prosecution for some detainees in exchange for “voluntary” donations to government institutions. Since September 2025, the Ministry of Internal Affairs has started adding people convicted of facilitating extremist activities to the “list of extremists” en masse. The vast majority of these people were involved in the “Belarusian Hajun case”. Since the beginning of 2026 alone, 69 people convicted on this charge have been added to the list.

The Investigative Committee launched a special procedure (in absentia) investigation against Aliaksandr Zubryk, born in 1997. He was accused of inciting discord, participating in actions grossly violating public order, insulting Lukashenka, insulting a representative of the government, and abusing state symbols. The Investigative Committee asked Zubryk to attend the district department of the Investigative Committee in Lida. Zubryk was detained for comments in the “Lida dla zhyzni CHAT” (Lida for Life) and was released on bail pending trial, after which he left Belarus. He was put on the wanted list in July 2022.

The Investigative Committee launched a special procedure investigation against Stanislau Prygodzich. He was accused of inciting racial, national, religious or other social hostility or discord, creating or participating in an extremist group, insulting the president, including the one who has terminated his powers, insulting a government official, and discrediting the Republic of Belarus. He was invited to attend the office of the Investigative Committee in Homel.

Heating was turned off in Ivatsevichi colony No. 22 “Volchji nory” (Wolf Holes) where a large group of political prisoners is held. According to human rights defenders, after February frosts, when the temperature dropped to minus 25 degrees centigrade, the pipeline system in the colony ruptured.

A new criminal case has been opened against the famous writer Sasha Filipenka. He was accused of calling for action against national security. The reason for his persecution was his interview with the YouTube channel “Obychnoye Utro” (Ordinary Morning). Under the new charge, he faces imprisonment for a term of five to seven years; his home in Belarus was searched. Filipenka lives abroad. In February 2025, a criminal case had already been opened against him under the charge of incitement to hostility.

On 6 February, the Ministry of Internal Affairs added 35 more people to the “List of citizens of the Republic of Belarus, foreign citizens or stateless persons involved in extremist activities.” Among others, Maksim Shukanau, a 37-year-old blogger from Mazyr, was added to the list, as well as 19 other people convicted of “facilitating extremist activities.” Last year, Shukanau was sentenced to four years of imprisonment on charges of organising and preparing actions that grossly violate public order, facilitating extremist activities, and being a member of an extremist group. His father, Ihar Shukanau, an employee of the Mazyr Oil Refinery’s computer science and communications laboratory, and his fiancée, Palina Zyl, an activist and blogger from Mazyr, are also behind bars.

The investigation of the criminal case against journalist Pavel Dabravolski was completed. The case materials were transferred to the Minsk City Court. The trial is expected to begin at the end of February. Dabravolski was charged with high treason. In the fall, he was transferred from the KGB pre-trial detention center to pre-trial detention center No. 1 in Kalyadzichi. Dabravolski is a former journalist for Naviny.by. He left Belarus in 2021, but returned to Minsk in October 2024. He was detained in January 2025.

TG House, a Belarusian NGO working to protect the rights of transgender people, published a report on the results of monitoring of repression and discrimination against the LGBTQ+ community in Belarus in 2025. As noted in the report, last year the state policy was characterised by a further tightening of discriminatory and repressive measures. This includes the adoption and preparation of new regulations, as well as the expansion of law enforcement mechanisms aimed at limiting the visibility of LGBTQ+ people, interfering in their private life and suppressing all forms of self-expression. TG House also recorded an increase in the number of covert harassment, “including fake dates through dating apps, preventive interrogations, pressure on relatives, doxing, and attempts to persuade people into cooperation” with the authorities. It was noted that the situation of transgender people has deteriorated.

At the hearing of the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission of the U.S. House of Representatives, which took place in Washington on 3 February, it was repeatedly noted that a humanitarian dialogue on the release of Belarusian political prisoners is a way to save lives, not a way to legitimise Aliaksandr Lukashenka. U.S. lawmakers, representatives of the Belarusian democratic forces and human rights defenders noted that despite the release of some political prisoners in 2025, more than a thousand people remain behind bars, and repression continues. Siarhei Tikhanousky, politician and former political prisoner, urged everyone not to forget about those who are still in prisons. “Our task is to achieve the release of all, not just those whom Lukashenka is ready to give,” he stressed. Diplomatic adviser to Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya Dzianis Kuchinski noted that Belarus has become not only a place of internal tragedy, but also a threat to its neighbors. Speaking about the situation inside the country, Kuchinski stressed that the conditions of detention of political prisoners are deteriorating. He mentioned the practice of putting people in a punishment cell at extremely low temperatures. Kuchinski proposed five steps to be taken by the United States: to continue to seek the release of all prisoners, expand emergency humanitarian assistance, support democratic institutions (Tsikhanouskaya’s Office, the United Transitional Cabinet, and the Coordination Council), maintain sanctions pressure with clear conditions for their removal, and adopt a new “Act on Democracy in Belarus.” The Director of Freedom House in Lithuania, Vitis Yurkonis, focused on the difficult situation of those who were formally released, but remain deprived of their rights. He stressed that for many, liberation meant not freedom, but forced exile.

A Polish court refused to extradite a Belarusian citizen wanted on charges of tax crimes. The District Court in Plotsk recognised that the judicial system of Belarus does not ensure the right to a fair trial, and criminal trials against opposition-minded citizens are often demonstrative. For this reason, the court refused to extradite to Minsk a Belarusian citizen wanted on charges of tax crimes. The court concluded that if transferred to the Belarusian authorities, there was a real risk of violating his fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights, including the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment.

The Warsaw authorities promised to support Belarusians on Freedom Day, celebrated on 25 March. “We confirm that we will light up the facade of the Palace of Culture and Science in the colors of free Belarus,” the Mayor’s office said in response to an appeal from Pavel Latushka, Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet and Head of the National Anti-Crisis Management. “We confirm our solidarity with the Belarusian democratic movement and are glad that Freedom Day will be celebrated in Warsaw,” the Warsaw authorities replied.

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