Belarus Review by iSANS — September 7, 2026 

According to Ukrainian monitoring channels, 78 drones were recorded in Belarusian airspace between 10 August and 6 September 2026, of which 76 were Russian and two Ukrainian. There were no reports of any of the aircraft being destroyed or crashing on Belarusian territory.

In addition to drones, on the night of 22 August Ukrainian monitoring channels recorded a Russian cruise missile entering Belarusian airspace, designated in their reports as “Banderol”. The missile manoeuvred over the Homiel region for several hours, with monitoring channels tracking it in the areas of Mazyr, Naroulia, Pietrykau, Yelsk and Kapatkievichy, and reporting that it flew over the Mazyr Oil Refinery and Mazyr airport. A Su-30 fighter jet was scrambled from Baranavichy airfield to intercept it. There were reports that the missile might have crashed near Kapatkievichy after running out of fuel, but the target was subsequently detected in the air again. The Belarusian authorities issued no official comment.

On 10 August, Special Operations Forces personnel departed for China to participate in the joint Belarusian-Chinese tactical exercise “Swift Eagle 2026” at a PLA Airborne Forces training ground in Hubei Province, according to the Belarusian Defence Ministry. During the exercise, contingents from the two countries practised firing various types of weapons, operations in urban terrain, high-altitude training involving rope descents, and assault operations. During the final phase, troops parachuted from helicopters and stormed an urban area, eliminating a simulated terrorist group. The closing ceremony took place on 24 August, and the personnel returned to Belarus on 25 August.

From 11 to 13 August, a tactical-special exercise involving reconnaissance, electronic warfare, fire support and air defence forces and assets of the Western Operational Command took place in the Hrodna and Brest regions; units began deploying to the exercise areas on 10 August. According to the Defence Ministry and the Operational Command’s channel, the exercise involved the 74th Separate Communications Regiment, the 48th Separate Electronic Warfare Battalion, units of the 111th Guards Artillery Brigade equipped with Uragan multiple-launch rocket systems, and Osa surface-to-air missile crews. The troops practised locating a simulated sabotage and reconnaissance group using the new Klen short-range reconnaissance radar and the Panacea automated command-and-control system. By 15 August, the units had returned to their permanent bases.

On 13 August, the Western Operational Command reported that the Stena system, designed to counter small, slow and low-flying targets and developed by AGAT — Control Systems, had entered service with the Armed Forces. The system is intended to protect critical infrastructure as well as fixed and mobile positions against unmanned aerial vehicles.

On 13 August, representatives of the missile and artillery forces of the Belarusian and Vietnamese armed forces held a working meeting in Hanoi. The sides exchanged experience in organising combat training, while the Belarusian delegation visited an artillery officer school and the 45th Artillery Brigade. The Belarusian Defence Ministry reported the meeting.

On 19 August, a Belarusian military delegation headed by Chief of the Department of International Military Cooperation Major General Valery Ravenka was on a working visit to Bangkok, according to the Defence Ministry. Talks were held on developing military cooperation, and a visit to a Thai defence industry enterprise was planned.

In mid-August, scheduled reservist training was under way in several formations. More than 200 reservists from the Mahiliou and Homiel regions arrived at the 11th Separate Guards Mechanised Brigade (military unit 33933), while combat coordination training was also conducted at the 815th Technical Support Centre and the 841st Guards Artillery Group. This was reported by VoenTV and the Western Operational Command’s channel. Separately, employees of agricultural enterprises were called up for training with Special Operations Forces and transport troops. On 19 August, the Defence Ministry explicitly linked these call-ups to shortcomings identified during the harvesting campaign — “the harvest revealed shortcomings — military training will reveal the potential”. Training for this category of reservists continued until the end of the reporting period.

On 18 August, a bilateral battalion-level tactical exercise involving mechanised battalions of the 6th (military unit 05733) and 11th Separate Guards Mechanised Brigades of the Western Operational Command began in the Brest and Hrodna regions. The manoeuvres continued into the following week, according to the Defence Ministry.

On 20 August, a bilateral tactical exercise involving a separate mechanised battalion of the 120th Separate Guards Mechanised Brigade (military unit 04147) took place at the 227th Combined Arms Training Ground and in areas of the Barysau district, according to the Defence Ministry.

On 24 August, on Lukashenka’s instructions, a combat readiness inspection of a centrally subordinated artillery brigade began. State Secretary of the Security Council Lieutenant General Aliaksandar Valfovich handed the Defence Minister an order to bring the formation to readiness; Valfovich later identified it as the 51st Artillery Brigade (military unit 12147). The brigade is being mobilised, with individual units brought up to wartime strength, while opposing-force troops are also involved. A stated feature of the inspection is the involvement of the entire command hierarchy — from the Defence Minister to unit commanders. From 26 August, a personnel reception point operated at the brigade to process arriving reservists. On 30 August, according to VoenTV, a new phase began, with the formation ordered to deploy to designated areas and conduct fire missions. According to the Defence Ministry, training for reserve officers — with particular emphasis on the use of drones and counter-drone measures — continued at least until 3 September.

From 25 August to 10 September, the Armed Forces are conducting an operational-tactical exercise involving branches of the Air Force and Air Defence Forces under the command of Deputy Commander Mikhail Matrosov. During the first phase in Belarus, surface-to-air missile regiments and radio-technical brigades practised repelling strikes under conditions of active electronic interference and engaging low-flying targets. On 28 August, the 8th Radio-Technical Brigade (military unit 29969) loaded equipment onto railway trains, and on 5 September Belarusian personnel arrived at Russia’s Ashuluk training ground for the second phase, involving live-fire exercises. The Belarusian Defence Ministry reported these activities.

From 25 to 29 August, the 11th Separate Guards Mechanised Brigade conducted a tactical exercise launched by Western Operational Command commander Major General Vadim Surov. According to the Operational Command’s channel, units practised air defence cover, crossing a water obstacle, checkpoint duties and blocking sabotage and reconnaissance groups, while medical personnel practised evacuating wounded personnel to beds at a district hospital. Small Granit-02 unmanned ground systems were tested for the first time at company and platoon level; FPV drones, hexacopters and the Redut electronic warfare system were also widely used.

From 25 to 27 August, a tactical-special exercise involving military commandant units was held under the supervision of Colonel Dmitry Zhukovsky, head of the Troop Service Directorate. Military commandant offices and the canine training centre participated in the manoeuvres, practising law enforcement, road safety, reconnaissance using UAVs and countering enemy drones. The Belarusian Defence Ministry reported the exercise.

From 25 August, training assemblies for territorial defence reservists were held in the Biarezina and Chervien districts of the Minsk region; from 26 August in the Vaukavysk district; and from 1 September in Homiel, the Svietlahorsk and Aktsiabrski districts of the Homiel region, and Minsk’s Zavodski district. This was reported by the Defence Ministry and military commissariats.

On 26–28 August, joint mobilisation drills were held at military commissariats in the Vitsebsk region, followed by similar drills at military commissariats in the Brest region on 27–28 August. The activities included notification procedures, verification of reserve officers’ attendance and the formation of teams, according to the military commissariats’ Telegram channels.

On 25 August, the 90th Separate Special Search Battalion of the Russian Armed Forces arrived in Hrodna for joint field search operations with the 52nd Separate Specialised Search Battalion of the Belarusian Armed Forces. The work continued until 4 September in the Hrodna district and at Fortification Site No. 1 in Hrodna. According to the Defence Ministry, the remains of seven Red Army servicemen were discovered.

On 27 August, a repair centre for Tor surface-to-air missile systems was opened in Belarus at the 2566th Radio-Electronic Armament Repair Plant in cooperation with Russia’s Almaz-Antey corporation. Air Force and Air Defence Forces Commander Major General Andrei Lukyanovich attended the opening ceremony, according to the Defence Ministry.

On 2 September, the combat readiness inspection ordered by Lukashenka was extended to the Interior Ministry. Valfovich handed Interior Minister Ivan Kubrakou an order to bring the 7th Separate Special Police Brigade of the Internal Troops to combat readiness.

On 3 September, the 83rd Separate Airfield Engineering Regiment underwent a surprise combat readiness inspection on the orders of the Commander of the Air Force and Air Defence Forces, according to the unit’s Telegram channel.

On 3 September, Chief of the CSTO Joint Staff Colonel General Andrei Serdyukov announced that the Indestructible Brotherhood and Barrier exercises would take place in Belarus in October. The year’s central event will be the Interaction 2026 command-and-staff exercise involving the Collective Rapid Reaction Forces. In total, more than 5,000 personnel and around 1,000 pieces of equipment will participate in joint CSTO exercises in 2026.

On 4 September, crews of the 62nd Surface-to-Air Missile Regiment conducted live firing with Osa surface-to-air missile systems at the 174th Air Force and Air Defence Forces Training Ground, marking the final stage of the regiment’s field deployment. The Defence Ministry reported the activity.

On 5 September, the 6th Separate Guards Mechanised Brigade conducted a readiness review and verification march ahead of upcoming exercises. Units of the 48th Separate Electronic Warfare Battalion were also preparing to march to the exercise area, according to Western Operational Command channels.

On 6 September, the joint tactical-special exercise “Forest Brotherhood 2026”, involving reconnaissance units of the Belarusian Special Operations Forces and Kazakhstan’s Air Assault Forces, opened at the Brestski training ground. According to the Defence Ministry, over the following days the troops are to practise reconnaissance and the neutralisation of illegal armed formations in forested and marshy terrain.

On 2–3 September, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya held a series of meetings in Vilnius. On 2 September, she briefed ambassadors and diplomats from 17 EU countries, calling on the EU to maintain pressure on the Lukashenka regime until systemic changes take place and discussing political prisoners, cooperation with Ukraine and the risk of Belarus’s further involvement in Russia’s war. On 3 September, Tsikhanouskaya met Seimas Speaker Juozas Olekas and MPs. The talks covered Lithuania’s forthcoming EU Council presidency, assistance to the released political prisoners, Belarusian driving licences and access to Lithuanian scholarships and education. The sides also reached an agreement in principle on a cooperation memorandum between the Seimas and Belarusian democratic forces and discussed holding a meeting of the Alliance of Parliamentary Groups “For a Democratic Belarus” in Vilnius. The same day, Tsikhanouskaya met Belarusian teachers and education managers working in exile.

On 31 August, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya marked the 35th anniversary of the restoration of Belarus’s independence, stressing the growing threat posed by Russia’s military, economic, information and cultural penetration and calling independence a common interest capable of uniting Belarusians of different political views.

27–29 August, Lukashenka was on a working visit to Russia. The trip followed immediately after the unannounced visit of CIA Director John Ratcliffe to Moscow on 25 August, suggesting that the results of these contacts may also have been discussed during the private part of Lukashenka’s talks with Vladimir Putin. On 29 August, at Novo-Ogaryovo near Moscow, the two sides discussed security and the international agenda, the Union State, growth in bilateral trade of more than 12%, and high-tech cooperation. Lukashenka said that in microelectronics the two sides “today create absolutely everything we need together” and, notably, explained the frequency of his meetings with Putin by saying that the “dynamics of international relations” prompted them to discuss emerging issues regularly — against the backdrop of the renewed negotiating process surrounding Russia’s war against Ukraine. The previous day, 28 August, Lukashenka met with Mikhail Mishustin to discuss industrial cooperation, electronics, aircraft manufacturing and the defence industry. The talks took place amid delays in individual joint projects, including the Osvey aircraft, as well as continuing disagreements over the establishment of common oil and petroleum product markets, whose launch has again been postponed until 2027, while the terms of a common gas market remain under negotiation.

During his visit to Russia, Lukashenka separately stated that Belarus was fulfilling its commitments on fuel supplies, including diesel and petrol. This comes amid petrol shortages on the Russian market following shutdowns and reduced utilisation at several refineries as a result of Ukrainian strikes. According to Reuters, by late August Russia’s domestic petrol production covered around 70% of internal demand. In August, Russia imported approximately 220,000 tonnes of petrol, of which around 150,000 tonnes came from Belarus. Including imports, total market supply covered approximately 85% of demand. However, Belarus has limited capacity to increase supplies rapidly beyond current levels. According to Kommersant, current volumes have already approached the capacity limits of Belarus’s two refineries.

On 1 September, Lukashenka took part in the SCO summit in Bishkek. His speech broadly followed Minsk’s traditional rhetoric and Belarus’s previous priorities within the organisation: strengthening the SCO as an independent centre of power in Eurasia, developing alternative financial and transport infrastructure, expanding settlements in national currencies, countering sanctions, and building a new regional security architecture. Lukashenka supported the creation of an SCO Development Bank and cooperation in artificial intelligence, but at the same time called on the organisation’s leading states to take more active steps: “We have three of the most powerful states — the People’s Republic of China, India, the Russian Federation… We expect initiatives primarily from them. Unfortunately, there has been no such initiative so far.” A substantial part of the diplomatic programme took place on the sidelines. Lukashenka held informal talks with Vladimir Putin, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif. The agenda included Russia’s war against Ukraine and the situation in the Black Sea, where Türkiye is seeking to establish a mechanism for safe navigation. At a separate meeting with Sharif, Lukashenka noted an approximately 20% decline in bilateral trade and discussed agriculture, high technologies and personnel training. During talks with Lao leader Thongloun Sisoulith, Minsk was offered participation in mineral and gold extraction, including the joint construction of a processing facility. Lukashenka also discussed machinery supplies, joint production and the development of phosphate deposits with the leadership of Togo.

On 31 August, U.S. Special Envoy for Belarus John Coale said that he expected to return to Belarus around mid-September and secure the release of several hundred more political prisoners. According to Coale, around 700–800 people have already been released with his involvement, while the immediate goal is to bring the total to approximately 1,000. Coale also confirmed that negotiations with Minsk were continuing and covered a broader normalisation of relations. In parallel, he has been expanding consultations with countries in the region. On 26 August, Coale discussed the situation around Belarus, illegal migration and hybrid threats with Latvian Foreign Minister Baiba Braže. He also held talks with Moldova’s ambassador to the United States, following previous exchanges involving Moldovan citizens.

On 20 August, Lukashenka appointed Siarhei Syrankou, First Secretary of the Communist Party of Belarus, as a member of the Council of the Republic under his appointment quota. Syrankou thereby also became a member of the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly. The appointment is a reward for his role as a fully loyal candidate in the 2025 presidential “election”, when he supported Lukashenka’s political course and “received” 3.21% of the vote. In this case, membership of the Council of the Republic is primarily a status position and does not give Syrankou significant political weight. The Council of the Republic already includes Iryna Abelskaya, the mother of Mikalai Lukashenka, and Dzmitry Baskau, his former ice hockey coach. This personnel configuration indicates that the Council of the Republic remains one of the institutional platforms that Lukashenka can use in developing options for a future transfer of power.

From 10 August to 6 September, the Latvian direction remained the main focus of hybrid pressure by the Lukashenka regime. During this period, the Latvian State Border Guard recorded 1,191 attempted illegal border crossings, while Poland recorded 50, with zero cases registered on most days. On 11 August, Latvia launched the inter-agency operation Vilkatis, involving border guards, police, the armed forces and the National Guard. On 1 September, the operation was extended for another month. During its first three weeks, Latvian authorities reported more than 600 prevented crossings, four detained facilitators and two detected tunnels. Border guards and police are using ground-penetrating radar to search for underground structures. On 17 August, President Edgars Rinkēvičs, after visiting the border, said that the possible closure of the only operational border crossing at Pāternieki remained under consideration, while also pointing to a shortage of up to 200 personnel needed to make full use of the new technical infrastructure. On 31 August, Poland also extended its buffer zone until 29 November, explicitly noting that the main activity had shifted towards Lithuania and Latvia.

On the Lithuanian direction, the same period saw both strengthened defence measures and a noticeable reduction in the assessment of military risks and threats from Belarus. On 12 August, the Lithuanian government approved an expansion of the military counter-mobility line along the borders with Belarus and the Kaliningrad region. By the end of 2028, Lithuania plans to create a 20–150-metre-wide belt of engineering obstacles, increase the number of counter-mobility equipment parks to 50, and equip bridges with structures allowing them to be demolished if necessary. Part of the borderland wetlands is also expected to be restored by 2030. On 4 September, Chief National Security Adviser to the Lithuanian President Deividas Matulionis stated that Lithuanian intelligence had not detected an increase in the military threat from Belarus: there were no new manoeuvre units and no increase in the Russian military presence. In his assessment, Lukashenka is currently not interested in directly entering the war and is attempting to restore relations with the United States and the West. Similarly, Speaker of the Seimas Juozas Olekas called for maintaining technical and selected inter-ministerial contacts with Minsk while simultaneously strengthening sanctions. On 19 August, Lithuania additionally allocated more than EUR 0.6 million for legal defence in arbitration proceedings concerning Belarusian fertilisers. Belaruskali’s claims are estimated at EUR 11.8 billion.

According to Belstat, Belarus’s GDP grew by 2.1% year on year in January–July, compared with 1.5% in the first half of the year, reaching BYN 1805 billion (around USD 59 billion). The regime therefore managed to avoid the stagnation and contraction signs observed at the beginning of the year. However, a significant gap remains between production and domestic consumption dynamics. While industrial production remained virtually unchanged from the previous year (+0.1%) and manufacturing output declined (-1.2%), retail trade (+8.1%) and real disposable household incomes (+8%) grew markedly. The energy sector also supported positive growth (+7.9%). Weak investment activity is also evident in housing construction: in January–July, the total area of newly commissioned housing declined by 14% year on year, while housing built with state support fell by approximately 37%.

As of 1 September, Belarus’s international reserves reached USD 15.24 billion, increasing by more than USD 1 billion during August. The main factor was the rise in the value of monetary gold, which accounted for around USD 930 million of the increase. Foreign currency reserve assets grew much more modestly — by approximately USD 109 million.

On 3 September, Italy announced an investigation into the circumstances in which an Italian tourist visa was issued in Minsk to one of the suspects in an attempted act of sabotage at Leipzig Airport. The man, a Belarus-born Russian citizen, received the visa in late April and subsequently entered Germany. Investigators identified him through DNA found on a drone, a container with explosives and an antenna near the airport. The second suspect is a Russia-born Latvian citizen. On the night of 5 August, a drone carrying explosives was discovered near a Ukrainian An-124 transport aircraft at Leipzig Airport. German authorities have linked the attempted sabotage to Russian intelligence services and described the perpetrators as low-level agents. Italian Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani said: “All this confirms that countries are trying to carry out actions against the EU, even using people who may have no criminal record and are not under suspicion.”

On 14 August, the Ministry of Internal Affairs added four more people to the “List of citizens of the Republic of Belarus, foreign citizens or stateless persons involved in extremist activities”. On 21 August, the Ministry added five more people to the List. On 28 August, 12 more people were added to the List. Among them was 28-year-old Lithuanian citizen David Medvedev (Davidas Stanulavicius), who, as indicated, is serving a sentence for facilitating extremist activities. On 4 September, the Ministry added 52 more people to the List. There are now 6,887 names on it. Human rights defenders have noted a new trend – deceased persons were added to the list of extremists. Additionally, social media accounts of long-dead activists were recognised as extremist materials. Increased attention to “underage extremists” was also noted. In April 2026, the Mastouski district Prosecutor’s office held a special seminar for principals and classroom teachers to identify “extremism” among minors, human rights defenders reported. Similar seminars in educational institutions were held in Maladzetskaya, Babruisk, Lyubanski, Pastauski, Berastavitskaya, Kobryn, Cherykauskaya, Hrodna and Minsk in April 2026.

On 13 August, the KGB updated the list of “persons involved in terrorist activities”, adding seven more people to it. On 21 August, 2 more people were added to the list. As of 21 August, 1,477 people were on the list. Of these, 723 were Belarusians.

At the end of August, 889 political prisoners, including 124 women, were in prison, and 16 more people were recognised as political prisoners during August, “Viasna” Human Rights Centre reported. In addition, human rights defenders demanded the rehabilitation of 20 former political prisoners, information about whom only appeared after their release from prison. The number of former political prisoners has reached 3,953, including 779 women.

On 21 August, the Polish Catholic publication Gość Niedzielny was recognised as “extremist materials” in Belarus. The decision was made by the Leninsky district court of Hrodna. Facebook, Instagram, and YouTube accounts of the media were included in the list. The “Bot of the diaspora in Krakow”, the Threads account of opera singer Marharyta Leuchuk, the website and social networks of the Green Belarus Alliance, which unites organisations and initiatives that share environmental values and the “green future” of Belarus, and the website of Devby, the main resource for the Belarusian digital and IT community, were also recognised as “extremist”. Since 2008, Devby has been “bringing together people whose work is related to technology, products, business, education, and the creative industries,” according to the website. This resource publishes more than 300 materials monthly, and has more than 400,000 active users.

On the anniversary of the beginning of the women’s protests in 2020, the DissidentBy initiative summed up the results of repression against women. According to their data, at least 1,928 women were convicted in criminal cases. This figure includes both face-to-face and in absentia sentences. 9,216 women were subjected to administrative prosecution. Human rights defenders noted that the database of administrative sentences has not been updated for several years, so the real figure is much higher. 1,634 women were added to the “list of extremists”. 128 women were included in the “terrorist list”.

As of mid-August, at least 83 political prisoners had been convicted for “disobeying the requirements of the administration”. Under this charge, the colony administration can extend the prison term of a convict as many times as it wishes. As it became known to human rights defenders, Pavel Kabarchuk, a 33-year-old citizen of Ukraine, will be tried under this charge in the coming weeks. The trial will take place in Mahileu, and Kabarchuk faces up to two more years of imprisonment. Pavel and his father, 63-year-old Sergei Kabarchuk, were each sentenced to 20 years of imprisonment in 2023 for alleged “espionage activities” in favour of Ukraine, “illegal movement of weapons” and “preparation of a terrorist act”. Some political prisoners have already been convicted under the charge of “disobeying the requirements of the administration” several times. It has become one of the most cynical instruments of pressure on prisoners, human rights activists say, as people lose confidence in their release.

As of August 2026, about 1,325 public associations, 457 non-governmental institutions and 109 foundations were registered in Belarus, that is, less than 1,900 NGOs. From 2020 to the beginning of August 2026, at least 1,263 NGOs fell under compulsory liquidation, another 806 organisations took the decision to self-liquidate. Human rights, educational, cultural, social, environmental, research, charitable, youth, women’s and other NGOs were eliminated. Simply belonging to an independent civil society has become a risk factor. Since 2025, the mass liquidation campaign has noticeably slowed down, but not because the level of repression has decreased. It has turned into a targeted practice of eliminating undesirable ones. Other forms of repression of civil society include mass recognition of NGOs’ resources as “extremist” and imprisonment of dozens of NGOs’ employees, volunteers, program participants, and service recipients. As a result of repression, a significant part of the Belarusian civil society is now institutionally located outside the country. Some NGOs have completely refocused on solving the problems of countries of forced residence, others have focused on working with Belarusians abroad, others continue to work for target groups inside Belarus, and some combine these areas. NGO workers abroad face transnational repression, which has become widespread in recent years.

The checking of founders of non-profit organisations by the KGB will become a mandatory stage of the registration procedure from 1 July 2027, “Viasna” Human Rights Centre reported. This provision will apply to both individuals and legal entities, as well as associations and unions that decide to register a non-profit organisation. For the first time, the updated law openly introduces formal coordination with the security services for the purposes of NGO registration in Belarus.

The attack on religious freedoms continues. Another Polish priest, Janusz Pulit will be expelled from Belarus. He served for 32 years in the parishes of Ruzhan and Lyskava. Pulit became the third Polish priest of the Pinsk diocese who has not had his pastoral work permit extended since the beginning of 2026. On 26 August, the Vitsebsk Regional Court decided to liquidate the Religious Association of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Belarus, which had existed since 8 January 2001. The Commissioner for Religious and Ethnic Affairs filed an application for its liquidation due to the fact that it failed to re-register. According to one of the parishioners who was present at the hearing, the judge read out only the statement of the Commissioner, but did not announce the written objections of the leaders of the religious association, submitted in the Belarusian language.

The persecution of LGBTQ people by law enforcement agencies has recently increased. In the first half of 2026, 20 cases of pressure from law enforcement agencies (arbitrary detentions, phone checks, interrogations and searches of relatives of activists who had left) were recorded by TG House. Over the past three months, five cases of visits by security forces to family members of queer people who currently live in exile and three cases of attempts to recruit representatives of the LGBTQ community were documented. There were already cases of persecution under the new administrative Article 19.16 (“LGBT propaganda”), which entered into force on 19 June 2026.

In April 2026, the Supreme Court of Belarus recognised the European Humanities University (EHU) as an “extremist organisation”. Since then, its students, former students and staff have been subjected to massive repression. Human rights defenders call the campaign against EHU unprecedented. Searches and interrogations are taking place all over Belarus as part of the “EHU case”. According to “Viasna” Human Rights Centre, more than 180 cases of persecution have been recorded. The security forces threaten even relatives of students with criminal liability. “Many students are in fear for their family. I know about ten people who dropped out or forged their expulsion documents in order to send them to the KGB, so that they would just leave them alone,” said one of the EHU students. Speaking on condition of anonymity out of concern for the safety of her family in Belarus, she said that during interrogation by the KGB she was threatened that she and all her relatives would be imprisoned if she did not cooperate.

On 12 August, it became known about another detention in the “Belarusian Hajun” case in Navapolatsk. Details about the detainee’s identity and the circumstances of the persecution have not yet been reported. Human rights defenders note that detentions in this case occur in different regions of Belarus. As of June 2026, at least 200 people were known to have been convicted in this case, but the real number of defendants is much higher.

57-year-old Mahileu journalist Yauhen Hlushkou was released after fully serving his sentence. Immediately after returning to Mahileu, Hlushkou was hospitalised with a trophic ulcer. He was also in hospital before his release. Hlushkou was detained on 5 January 2024. On 31 July 2024, he was sentenced to three years of imprisonment for the creation of an extremist formation or participation in it, as well as for participation in armed actions outside the country or preparation for them.

Political prisoner Maksim Urbanovich was released. Urbanovich was detained in April 2025 and sentenced to one and a half years of imprisonment for alleged participation in actions grossly violating public order in June 2025. Maksim Urbanovich is the brother of Dzyanis Urbanovich, a soldier of the “Volat” battalion, the Belarusian volunteer military formation, which is part of the Kastus Kalinouski Regiment in the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

The Investigative Committee launched special procedure against the founders of Dissidentby, which was recognised as an extremist group. Yauhen Razumko is accused of mass riots and attempted murder of an employee of the Department of Internal Affairs. Vyachaslau Kasinerau and Maryna Kasinerava are accused of creating an “extremist formation”, inciting hostility or discord, discrediting Belarus, insulting Lukashenka, and facilitating “extremist activities”.

On 20 August, the trial in absentia of five representatives of the Kalinouski Regiment began in the Minsk City Court. Mikalai Boika, Yury Makitau, Natallia Nikitsina, Krystsina Stankevich and Mikhail Chuprynski are charged with participating in a criminal organisation, conspiracy to seize power, participation in an extremist formation, participation in an armed formation or armed conflict on the territory of a foreign state, military operations, as well as recruiting or preparing persons for such participation, facilitating extremist activities, undergoing training to participate in extremist activities, and participation in a terrorist organisation.

Nobel Peace Prize laureate and the head of “Viasna” Human Rights Centre Ales Bialiatski, who had been expelled from Belarus after his release from prison, was put on the wanted list. It is indicated that the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Belarus is looking for him under a criminal charge, but it is not known which one. In 2023, Ales Bialiatski was sentenced to ten years of imprisonment. In December 2025, he was released and expelled from Belarus. In April 2026, the Belarusian authorities cancelled Bialiatski’s passport. Bialiatski commented that the initiation of a criminal case against him did not surprise him. “Among those against whom criminal cases have been initiated in absentia in Belarus, there are many activists, public figures and those who are not afraid to speak out openly. After my release, I actively commented to independent media on the catastrophic human rights situation in Belarus, spoke at international conferences, participated in meetings, and provided information about the state of civil and political freedoms in Belarus. Therefore, it is not surprising that I am also on this list,” he said. The name of Mikalai Dzyadok, another ex-political prisoner released and expelled from the country, also appeared on Russia’s wanted list, as well as the names of former Belarusian national football team players Mikalai Zolatau and Hennadz Tumilovich. Mikalai Zolatau was among the athletes who, after publicly criticising the Belarusian authorities and condemning the war in Ukraine, were effectively barred from competing in Belarus. In 2025, Zolatau stated that he regretted his previous statements. He is currently playing in a Moldovan club. A former goalkeeper of the national team Hennadz Tumilovich is known for his harsh statements about the situation in Belarusian football.

“Viasna” human rights defender Uladzimir Labkovich, who was pardoned and forcibly expelled from Belarus in December 2025, and currently lives in Lithuania, was banned from leaving Belarus by the court’s decision. The documents were sent to Labkovich’s place of registration in Minsk. The reason for this decision was the non-payment by Labkovich of a fine in the criminal case of “Viasna”, in which he was sentenced to seven years of imprisonment and then pardoned and expelled from the country.

A police officer suggested to a former political prisoner that he go to fight against Ukraine. He fully served a five-year sentence and was released in the summer of 2026. After his release, he was registered with the police and was required to find a job. However, it turned out to be almost impossible to do this as he was on the “terrorist list”, he could not open a bank account, and his work record and military ID disappeared during the trial. A police inspector took him along with other recently released persons to a job fair. When he could not find a job there as well, the inspector suggested that he go to war against Ukraine. When the former political prisoner replied that he considered that participation in the war would make him a mercenary and that he feared criminal liability, the inspector assured him that in this case the issue could be considered individually and responsibility could be avoided. “Special commissions are gathering for this, so think about it,” he said.

During the New Belarus Conference held on 8-9 August in Warsaw, the report “Wanted by Dictator: Red Notice State”, prepared by Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya’s Office together with BELPOL with the assistance of Cyber Partisans and independent experts was presented. The report focused on the practice of transnational repression that the Lukashenka regime uses against its political opponents outside the country. The authors analysed the abuse of Interpol mechanisms, bilateral extradition agreements and the international legal assistance framework, as well as other methods of international persecution of Belarusians. The study examined real-life cases of arrests and threats of extradition in different countries and materials indicating attempts to conceal the political nature of criminal prosecution, and provided recommendations to Interpol, its member states, and international partners.

The International Committee for the Investigation of Torture in Belarus released the second part of the review “Political assassinations and deaths caused by the regime,” which recorded the deaths of at least 37 people due to political persecution. Authors analysed the mechanisms of the repressive system that lead to deaths both in and outside places of detention. The report recorded the practice of deliberately not providing medical care to seriously ill political prisoners, torturous conditions of detention and systemic pressure that destroys people’s health. Special attention was paid to the phenomenon of “delayed mortality” — when severe damage inflicted on the body in colonies and pre-trial detention centres leads to the death of a person shortly after release. Cases of suicide under the influence of incessant persecution, deaths at the hands of security forces and suspicious deaths under unclear circumstances were also covered by the review.

On 25 August, the European Union strongly condemned the decision of the Belarusian authorities to recognise the websites and social networks of EU-funded programmes as “extremist” materials. “The recent decision of the Lukashenka regime to designate the websites and social media of EUvsDisinfo, of the EU-supported SALT and “Education for Belarusians” programmes, and of Lithuania’s Central Project Management Agency (CPVA) as “extremist information sources” is yet another example of the regime’s systematic efforts to suppress critical thinking, restrict fundamental freedoms and shrink civic space. This unjustified decision seeks to restrict Belarusians’ access to independent information and educational opportunities. EUvsDisinfo works to raise awareness of disinformation and information manipulation, while the SALT and “Education for Belarusians” programmes have enabled Belarusian students and researchers to study and advance their work in Europe. These initiatives reflect the EU’s commitment to supporting the Belarusian people and maintaining people-to-people contacts”, the European External Action Service stated.

Belarusian journalist and media manager Andrei Alyaksandrau, who is now behind bars, became one of the laureates of the Free Media Awards 2026. The award was given to him “for courage and commitment to defending freedom of the press and freedom of speech in an increasingly repressive regime.” The prize is awarded annually by the Norwegian Fritt Ord Foundation and the German ZEIT-Stiftung to independent media and journalists from Eastern and Central Europe in recognition of their investigative work in emergency situations. Alyaksandrau was detained in January 2021, and, in early October 2022, sentenced to 14 years of imprisonment on charges of creating an “extremist formation”, high treason, tax evasion on a large scale, and training citizens to participate in riots.

Note from the editors: We do not provide links to publications in official and propagandistic sources belonging to the Lukashenka regime or affiliated with the regime. If you are interested in obtaining such a link for research or investigation purposes, please contact us at info@isans.org

Best regards, iSANS team