Belarus Review by iSANS — September 21, 2026 

According to Ukrainian monitoring channels, 21 UAVs, including 14 Russian ones, were recorded in Belarusian airspace between 14 and 20 September 2026. On 19 September, the eRadar (єРадар) channel recorded a jet-powered UAV that entered Belarus from the Chornobyl zone and reached the Brahin area, while on the morning of 20 September monitoring channels reported reconnaissance drones flying from Belarusian territory towards the Vyshhorod district of Kyiv Region. Belarusian Air Force aircraft on combat duty, including both fighter jets and helicopters, were also recorded flying during the week. There were no reports of UAVs being destroyed or crashing on Belarusian territory.

On the night of 15 September, a UAV entered Lithuania from Belarusian airspace. Italian fighter jets of NATO’s air policing mission, scrambled from Šiauliai Air Base, shot down the aircraft, which, according to the Lithuanian defence authorities, was carrying explosives. Lithuanian President Gitanas Nausėda said that the downed drone was a Russian Gerbera intended for Ukraine that had been diverted from its course by Ukrainian electronic warfare systems. On 16 September, the Lithuanian Foreign Ministry presented a strong protest note to a representative of the Belarusian Embassy, demanding comprehensive explanations from Minsk and “effective control” over its territory and airspace.

A combat readiness inspection continued in the Belarusian Armed Forces under the supervision of the Security Council. According to the Defence Ministry, on 14 September, on the orders of State Secretary of the Security Council Aliaksandr Valfovich, the 130th Separate Tank Battalion (military unit 22092) of the 19th Mechanised Brigade was placed on alert. The relevant order was delivered at the General Staff command post by Deputy State Secretary Andrei Harbatsenka. The battalion marched to the Lepel training ground, where on 18 September it conducted, among other activities, night firing exercises with T-72B tanks.

The active phase of the inspection also continued in the 51st Artillery Brigade (military unit 12147), to which reserve officers had previously been called up and which had been placed at the highest level of combat readiness on 12 September. According to the Defence Ministry on 16 September, personnel and equipment reception points were operating in the brigade: reservists arriving to bring the unit up to strength received equipment and were assigned to their subunits, while vehicles were supplied by civilian enterprises. According to Andrei Harbatsenka, mobilisation resources were being delivered; once this process was completed, the brigade’s subunits would be considered formed and would proceed to individual training and unit cohesion exercises.

On 14 September, a two-week combat readiness inspection of the 7th Special Police Brigade (military unit 5524) of the Internal Troops was completed. According to the Interior Ministry, the inspection had been initiated by Lukashenka and was conducted in the presence of representatives of the State Secretariat of the Security Council. It began on 2 September, when Security Council State Secretary Aliaksandr Valfovich handed Interior Minister Ivan Kubrakou an order to place the brigade on combat readiness as part of an inspection of state bodies within the national security system. The brigade was brought to the highest level of combat readiness with reserve mobilisation “taking into account the transition to wartime conditions”. The servicemen practised responses to unexpected scenarios and operations involving mobilised personnel.

From 15 to 18 September, a command-and-staff exercise of the Western Operational Command was held at three training grounds and field locations in Brest and Hrodna regions under the theme “Command and control of Operational Command troops during a strategic operation of the Armed Forces”. The Belarusian Defence Ministry reported that the exercise was led by Chief of the General Staff Pavel Muraveika, who said that the number of troops involved remained below the notification thresholds established by the 2011 Vienna Document and that offensive operations were not being practised. Troops occupied concentration areas and practised protecting the state border, searching for and eliminating sabotage groups, and countering UAVs; the 557th Engineer Brigade (military unit 51171) established a ferry crossing over the Niaman River. On 17 September, the exercise was observed by military attachés accredited in Belarus, including representatives of five NATO countries — Bulgaria, Hungary, Türkiye, the United States and Czechia. Western Operational Command commander Major General Vadzim Surau presided over the closing ceremony on 18 September, and the following day the participating units began returning to their permanent bases.

Combat training also continued in the North-Western Operational Command in parallel with the exercises. According to the Defence Ministry and military unit channels, from 15 to 19 September artillery units of the command conducted a tactical-special exercise at the Asipovichy training ground, including live firing from Msta-B howitzers using, among other ammunition, Krasnopol guided projectiles. On 16–17 September, a tactical-special exercise involving reconnaissance, electronic warfare, fire engagement and air defence forces and assets was held at training grounds in Minsk and Vitsebsk regions, with the participation of the 120th Mechanised Brigade (military unit 04147). According to Lepelski Krai, the exercise also covered Lepel District and was conducted in two stages: the first focused on disrupting the activities of sabotage and reconnaissance groups, and the second on their destruction using targeting data provided by UAV operators and reconnaissance groups. Electronic warfare systems, FPV drones and precision-guided munitions of Russian, Chinese and Belarusian manufacture were used. According to exercise commander Dzianis Navitski, the main emphasis was placed on automating command-and-control processes under conditions of active enemy electronic warfare and UAV operations.

Territorial defence activities also continued. On 14–16 September, according to military commissariats in Minsk Region, a command-and-staff exercise on the management of territorial defence forces was held in Chervien and Biarezina districts during the final stage of a territorial troops training assembly. In addition to territorial troops, the exercise involved law enforcement bodies, units of the Emergency Situations Ministry and Internal Troops, as well as people’s militia detachments. They practised protecting important facilities, enforcing martial law measures and countering sabotage groups. On 18–19 September, a command-and-staff exercise involving territorial defence forces was also held in Homiel Region: territorial troops operated at night, among other activities, while martial law measures and the formation of people’s militia detachments were practised jointly with the police.

From 15 to 17 September, Defence Minister Viktar Khrenin attended the 13th Xiangshan Forum on security in Beijing. In a speech on 16 September quoted by BELTA, he called for “stopping the world’s movement towards global confrontation”; meetings with senior defence officials from China, Azerbaijan and Iran were also held on the sidelines of the forum. On 17 September, Air Force and Air Defence Forces Commander Andrei Lukyanovich took part in a meeting of the Air Defence Coordinating Committee under the CIS Council of Defence Ministers in Kyrgyzstan, where countering UAVs was among the issues discussed.

The issue of relay stations for Russian drones on Belarusian territory continued to develop throughout the week. Ukrainian State Border Guard Service spokesperson Andrii Demchenko said that the activation of relay stations in Belarus had enabled Russia to carry out a drone attack on the Yahodyn crossing point on the Ukrainian-Polish border on 13 September. On 17 September, the Ukrainian monitoring channel eRadar (єРадар) reported the detection of four operating relay stations near the settlements of Khoiniki, Dzerbinka, Makhnavichy and Buda-Safieuka in Homiel Region; the information has not been officially confirmed. On 19 September, the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry said that its response to the operation of the relay stations would take place “in the non-public domain”.

The State Authority for Military Industry presented two air-defence-related developments during the week. On 16 September, the authority reported that KB Radar was developing the Rebus compact X-band radar station for short-range detection of small aerial targets, including UAVs operating under radio silence. The stated detection range for small UAVs is up to 5,000 metres, and the system is designed to operate in dense urban environments. On 18 September, the authority reported on the modernisation of the Osa surface-to-air missile system: ALEVKURP developed the SV-RT1 specialised computer, which replaces the computing device and around a dozen obsolete analogue units in the 9A33-2B combat vehicle, automating preparations for combat use and the generation of missile guidance commands.

The troops also received new equipment. On 15 September, according to the Defence Ministry, Special Operations Forces units received 19 Belarusian-made ATZ-6 and ATZ-12 fuel tankers.

On 17 September, a ceremony was held in the 38th Air Assault Brigade to hand over 20 BTR-82A armoured personnel carriers — two company sets — according to the Vayar agency and state media. The vehicles entered service with the 383rd Separate Air Assault Battalion (military unit 92900). BTR-82As have been supplied to the brigade since January 2023, while in September 2024 Defence Minister Viktar Khrenin said that another 10 such vehicles had entered service with the army “over the previous several months”. Taking those vehicles into account, the delivery of two company sets appears to mean that the entire battalion has been re-equipped with BTR-82As. Within the Belarusian Armed Forces, the vehicles are also operated by the 6th and 120th Mechanised Brigades and the 72nd Joint Training Centre. In addition, BTR-82As have been entering service with the Interior Ministry’s Internal Troops since the beginning of 2026, while there are indications that the border service is also preparing to introduce the vehicles.

On 15–16 September, U.S. Presidential Special Envoy for Belarus John Coale held another round of talks with Lukashenka in Minsk — the first after a six-month pause. The regime was also represented by Prime Minister Aliaksandr Turchyn, KGB Chairman Ivan Tsertsel and Belarus’s Permanent Representative to the UN Valiantsin Rybakou. Following the talks, the regime released 25 prisoners, who were taken to Lithuania on 16 September. In return, the United States lifted sanctions on Lakokraska and Bellesbumprom. Another issue concerned $43–44 million which, according to Lukashenka, remains frozen at Citibank as proceeds from sales of Belarusian potash fertilisers. Coale said that the U.S. side was working to unblock the funds. Unlike the March round, when the regime released 250 people and Washington lifted sanctions on two Belarusian banks and the Finance Ministry, the September talks also extended to the return of frozen commercial funds. Coale said that he expected to return to Belarus in about a month and secure the release of hundreds more prisoners.

On 17 September, U.S. Presidential Special Envoy for Belarus John Coale outlined the main principles of Washington’s negotiating track with Minsk in an interview with Current Time. He confirmed a direct exchange of sanctions relief for the release of prisoners and said he expected to secure the release of more than 100 additional people in about a month. For the process to continue, the United States must, among other things, ensure that U.S. banks and companies put the already announced sanctions relief into practice. Coale rejected criticism of such arrangements: “If Lukashenka trades political prisoners for sanctions relief, I am fine with that”, saying that getting people released mattered more to him than “political issues that may concern people on the sidelines”. He also described the dispute over what to call political prisoners as secondary: “If he [Lukashenka] wants me to call them rabbits, as long as he agrees to release them, fine, I do not care.” Coale said the broader objective was the gradual reintegration of Belarus into the “community of nations”, the development of economic ties with the West and the institutionalisation of relations with the United States, including the resumption of operations by the U.S. Embassy. In his assessment, the process was moving “in the right direction”. Coale also suggested that Lukashenka could potentially play an intermediary role in contacts with Putin related to the war, given their long-standing relationship.

U.S. diplomatic mediation was the main development concerning Belarus’s immediate neighbours. Following his talks in Minsk, John Coale travelled to Vilnius, where he discussed prisoner releases, regional security and the possible transit of Belarusian potash. Coale said that the potash arrangement was at a “very good stage”. On 18 September, Lithuanian Foreign Minister Kęstutis Budrys acknowledged that the U.S. approach to sanctions relief was markedly softer than Lithuania’s, although consultations between the sides were continuing. On 17 September, Coale continued his consultations in Riga. Latvia welcomed the releases but argued for maintaining sanctions pressure, pointing to more than 11,000 attempted border crossings prevented since the start of the year.

Migration pressure at the border itself continued to decline. Between 14 and 20 September, Latvia recorded 210 attempted illegal crossings, compared with 377 a week earlier, while Poland recorded only two. The lower intensity coincided with deepening contacts between Minsk and Washington, although seasonal factors also contributed. On 15 September, a Russian Gerbera UAV that entered Lithuania from Belarus was shot down by NATO forces. Lithuanian President Gitanas Nausėda said there were no indications of a deliberate attack on Lithuania.

Thus, Washington is therefore involving Belarus’s neighbours in discussions on the practical conditions for further sanctions relief and potash transit, while Vilnius and Riga continue to maintain a tougher position.

On 14 September, Lukashenka scheduled the third session of the VII “All-Belarusian People’s Assembly” for 17–18 December in Minsk. The year 2026 also marks 30 years since the first Assembly held in 1996. A detailed agenda for the December session has not yet been presented. One of the expected items is Lukashenka’s address to the Belarusian people and the Assembly.

On 18 September, Lukashenka travelled to Shklou District for an inspection of an area that the authorities had intended to turn into a “model” for the agricultural sector. At a field belonging to Haviady-Agro, he found poorly harvested flax and sharply criticised Mahiliou Region Governor Anatol Isachanka and other officials. Lukashenka said that proper order was being maintained mainly along roads and in places he regularly visited, demanded inspections of remote areas and effectively ordered the region to be put “on a war footing”, threatening personnel decisions. The inspection followed the decision to liquidate the Kupalauskaye agricultural holding. In 2024, it was transferred to the Presidential Property Management Directorate and began to be merged with Aliaksandryiskaye in Lukashenka’s home village of Aliaksandryia and ASB-Agro Haradzets — a farm that Lukashenka managed in the 1980s. Around $65 million (Br200 million) was invested in the project, but problems with management, machinery and fodder persisted, while livestock mortality increased by 25%. The project was ultimately closed, with responsibility placed on the management of the farms.

In September, InfoSapiens, commissioned by the Political Sphere Institute for Political Studies, surveyed 1,000 Ukrainians about their attitudes towards Belarus. For the first time since 2022, positive attitudes towards Belarusians (44.5%) exceeded negative ones (36.1%). At the same time, 54.4% of respondents said that responsibility for Belarus’s participation in Russia’s aggression should rest primarily with the state and the authorities, while another 28.6% said Belarusian society also bore responsibility. A total of 75.9% did not consider Lukashenka the country’s legitimate leader, while 67.4% supported cooperation between the Ukrainian authorities and Belarusian democratic forces. Recognition of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya declined from 76.5% in 2022 to 58.9%.

On 19 September, a new package of Swiss sanctions against the Lukashenka regime entered into force. Bern aligned itself with the remaining part of the EU sanctions adopted in April. The measures expanded restrictions on exports to Belarus of goods and technologies that could strengthen its industrial and military-technological potential. Restrictions on transit and imports were also tightened. In the financial sector, transactions involving certain crypto-assets and central bank digital currencies, including the Belarusian digital rouble, were prohibited. The restrictions also apply to Belarusian crypto-asset service providers and decentralised platforms. Switzerland thus continued aligning its sanctions regime on Belarus with that of the EU.

On 15 September, journalist and former political prisoner Andrzej Poczobut returned to Poland after spending a week in Belarus. He crossed the border through Bruzgi–Kuźnica. During the visit, the security services did not publicly obstruct him. Poczobut met representatives of the Union of Poles in Belarus, which is not recognised by the authorities, as well as other acquaintances. During his stay, plans were also announced to open a new Polish-language teaching centre in Vaukavysk. Poczobut had arrived in Belarus on 8 September, shortly after his release from prison and forced departure for Poland.

On 17 September, Belstat reported that Belarus’s GDP grew by 1.9% year on year in January–August, reaching around $69.2 billion. A month earlier, growth had stood at 2.1%. The slowdown was partly linked to the convergence of the grain harvest timetable with last year’s schedule, as well as weak dynamics in industry and construction. Consumer demand nevertheless remained strong. Retail turnover increased by 8.4%, while real disposable household income rose by 8.1%. The rouble money supply also continued to expand rapidly. Cash in circulation reached around $5.9 billion as of 1 September, 23% more than at the beginning of the year. Economic growth is therefore becoming increasingly dependent on consumption, while industrial output is virtually stagnating. The Eurasian Development Bank estimates that, in the absence of new shocks, GDP growth could exceed 2% in 2026.

On 15 September, the KGB updated the list of persons “involved in terrorist activities”. Six more citizens of Belarus were included in it. As of last week, 1,476 people were on the «terrorist list». Of these, 725 were citizens of Belarus.

On 18 September, the Ministry of Internal Affairs added 11 more people to the “List of citizens of the Republic of Belarus, foreign citizens or stateless persons involved in extremist activities”. Among them was former KGB officer Aliaksei Khralovich. According to a propaganda film broadcast on the regime’s television in 2021, Khralovich obtained recordings of telephone conversations of Lukashenka’s press-secretary Natallia Eismant and transferred them to an opposition Telegram channel which later published them. In March 2022, he was sentenced to ten years of imprisonment in a high-security colony under the charge of high treason. He was also stripped of the rank of “lieutenant colonel”. There are now 6,917 names on the list.

At least 1,083 people, 252 of them women, have been convicted in Belarus under the charge of “facilitating extremist activities” since 2021. Over the past three months, 135 people have been added to the “list of extremists” for “facilitating extremist activities”. “Viasna” Human Rights Centre noted that over the past few years, the practice of applying this charge has gone far beyond the internationally accepted understanding of “promoting extremism”. People are being persecuted for interviews to independent media, conveying information to human rights defenders, helping political prisoners, cooperating with organisations recognised as “extremist formations”, and sending photos and videos of military equipment.

On 15 September, Belarusian human rights organisations published a statement recognising 11 more people as political prisoners. They were convicted under charges of inciting hatred, promoting extremism and other charges that are used in Belarus for politically motivated persecution. Some of them were also convicted of high treason and terrorism.

On 16 September, following talks between Aliaksandr Lukashenka and the U.S. President’s special envoy John Coale, the Belarusian authorities released 25 political prisoners in exchange for lifting sanctions against “Lakokraska” and “Bellesbumprom” state enterprises. Among those released were the founder of the symbal.by store Pavel Belavus, a member of the Torband music band Yauhen Burlo, director of TUT.by Lyudmila Chekina, director of BelaPAN Dzmitry Navazhylau, manager of BelaPAN Andrei Aliaksandrau and his wife Iryna Zlobina. The released political prisoners were forcibly expelled to Lithuania. 13 of them remained in Lithuania, ten went to Poland, and two more – to another country. Four political prisoners were expelled from Belarus without passports.

Wide-spread expectations were that many more political prisoners would be released this time, in the area of 200 people, but apparently some issues concerning partial lifting of U.S. sanctions were not resolved at this stage to the degree that suited Lukashenka. Apparently, negotitions continued until the very last moment. It is reported that on 15 September, relatives of some political prisoners received calls from the colonies, informing them that their relatives would be free on the morning of 16 September. However, these prisoners were not released and the circumstances of the incident were not explained to the relatives.

Following the talks in Minsk, the U.S. President’s special envoy John Coale said that the United States will continue to lift sanctions, and the Belarusian authorities will release more political prisoners. According to him, the parties have agreed on preliminary arrangements, and work will continue. Coale expects to visit Belarus again around one month from now, hoping to ⁠secure the release of hundreds more prisoners. In the course of talks, Aliaksandr Lukashenka once again denied the existence of political prisoners in Belarus. He also stressed that he has no need to put people in prison for political reasons, because all processes in the country “are under control”. At the same time, Lukashenka stated that he continues to imprison “those who violate the laws”. In this regard, human rights defenders reminded that after the major pardon of 250 political prisoners on 19 March 2026, 224 people were recognised as political prisoners, and another 138 people received this status after they had already been released. Thus, after the release of 250 political prisoners on 19 March, human rights defenders recorded and recognised the politically motivated imprisonment of 362 more people.

On 14 September, the verdict of political prisoners Siarhei Salash and Dzmitry Babitski, who were involved in the case of the art space Sklad Butylek, where various cultural events were held, was announced in Barysau. Salash and Babitski were sentenced to five years of imprisonment. They were also fined 800 basic units (36,000 roubles or approximately 10,320 Euro) each and ordered to compensate for “criminally obtained income” on a large scale. In December 2025, the KGB recognised the initiative of the Sklad Butylek as an “extremist” formation.

Dzmitry Zora, a former Belarusian soldier who is considered by the Belarusian security forces to be an analyst of Valery Sakhashchik’s team, has turned out to be in the KGB pre-trial detention centre. Zora left Belarus no later than April 2022 and settled in Poland. In 2022, he joined the team of Valery Sakhashchik, who was a member of the United Transitional Cabinet in charge of defense and national security matters at the time. He was engaged in information collection and analytics. In September 2022, Aliaksandr Lukashenka stripped Zora of the military rank of lieutenant colonel. In early 2026, Zora suddenly disappeared from Poland. Later it became known that he was kept in the KGB pre-trial detention centre and had faced torture. It is unknown exactly how Zora got to Belarus. The most likely version is his independent return.

In Mahilou, KGB officers searched the homes of people who had recently travelled to European Union countries. According to human rights activists, several such cases were recorded in the last two weeks of August. The security forces asked people if they had any contacts with representatives of the democratic movement. During the searches, KGB officers also checked equipment, primarily smartphones. The phones were inspected in the presence of the owners. There is no information about detentions after such checks.

Belarusian security forces continue to look for ways to reach people who have left the country and collect information on them, intimidate or threaten them as part of the ongoing campaign of transnational repressions. They contact the exiles directly or through their families, promise a safe return to their homeland, and want to receive in return information about specific organisations, events, or people. According to Uladzimir Zhihar, a representative of the Belpol association, working with exiles has become one of the priorities for the security services and has intensified over the past year and a half. “You should not communicate with them and think: I’m smarter, I’ll get something out of them, I’ll beat the field officer. You’re an amateur, but for him, it’s a job that he does professionally. Playing with the security services on their field is initially a very bad idea,” Zhihar warned. He underlined that cooperation with the Belarusian security forces may create legal problems for the emigrant in the country of residence. “You need to understand that working for the Belarusian security services can be a criminal offence in the EU countries, and it doesn’t matter if you get paid for it or not. Therefore, the safest option is not to start such communication at all.” What should be done if the security forces have already contacted the person? Experts believe that the most effective method is to make it public. “In most cases, after the contact was made public, the security officers lose interest in the person, because it is no longer possible to work with him secretly,” said Zhihar.

Participants of border chat rooms report almost daily about “conversations” with security officers at the border of Belarus. Over the past year, such mentions have appeared almost daily. At the same time, users wrote about phone and subscription checks in 2026 almost half as often than a year earlier. The number of mentions of “conversations” themselves was no fewer. Those who are planning a trip to Belarus are advised to check their accounts on social networks and messengers in advance and take into account the likelihood of additional questions at the border.

By the morning of 17 September, Belarusians fundraised 32,000 Euro for the recently released political prisoners in an emergency fundraising organised by the BYSOL foundation. The goal was to provide at least 1,000 Euro to each person. The fundraising will continue until 16 October, and all the collected money will go to support 25 people who were released on 16 September and expelled from the country. The former prisoners will need these funds to pay rent, medical care, document restoration and household expenses.

On 18 September, the UK and 37 other OSCE countries called for the release of all political prisoners and an end to repression of civil society, independent media and opposition voices. The signatories welcomed the release of several hundred political prisoners in 2025-2026, but noted they remain deeply concerned about the continued politically motivated arrests and prosecutions. “Release from prison does not necessarily bring an end to repression. Former political prisoners are facing expulsions, continued surveillance, restrictions and the risk of renewed prosecution, while repression increasingly extends to Belarusians in exile and their families. We remain deeply concerned by reports of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment in detention, including prolonged isolation and inadequate access to medical care. This continued cycle of imprisonment and persecution must end. We reiterate our call for the immediate and unconditional release and rehabilitation of all political prisoners and urge the Belarusian authorities to end their campaign of repression. Those responsible must be held to account,” the statement said.

Reporters Without Borders (RSF) welcomed the release of media professionals Dzmitry Navazhylau, Andrei Aliaksandrau, Kiryl Pazniak, and Liudmila Chekina alongside other political prisoners. At the same time, the RSF denounced their forced expulsion and called on the Belarusian authorities to immediately and unconditionally release all journalists still detained in the country.

On 15 September, the UN Group of Independent Experts on the Situation of Human Rights in Belarus established by the Human Rights Council published its new report. Experts claimed Belarusian authorities are using the country’s criminal justice system as an instrument of repression, systematically targeting and persecuting individuals deemed to oppose the government. “What emerges is not a picture of isolated violations, but of a system in which state institutions have systematically been used to suppress dissent and fundamental freedoms,” said Karinna Moskalenko, Chair of the Group of Independent Experts. “Criminal justice processes are an integral part of a broader machinery of repression. Their impacts are felt not only by those arrested, prosecuted or imprisoned, but by an entire society being warned about the price of dissent,” she noted. The report stressed that state persecution does not cease upon release. Courts frequently impose intrusive preventive supervision regimes lasting up to two years, exposing former prisoners to night-time raids by security forces, invasive electronic checks, movement restrictions, and immediate re-arrest for minor schedule deviations. Consequently, many victims and their families have been forced to flee into exile. “Releases are important for those who regain their freedom, but they cannot be mistaken for an end to repression,” added expert Monika Płatek, “The underlying system that enabled these violations remains in place, and accountability is still urgently needed.” “Belarusian authorities should release all individuals held on politically motivated charges, respect and protect the human rights of all people in Belarus, promptly and effectively investigate allegations of human rights violations and prosecute those responsible, and provide full reparation to victims,” the Group concluded.

The report was presented on 18 September at the 63d session of the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva. In an oral update, Karinna Moskalenko welcomed the release of 275 Belarusian political prisoners in March and September 2026 as a result of talks between US Special Envoy for Belarus John Coale and Aliaksandr Lukashenka. At the same time, she noted that authorities continued to violate human rights by forcibly deporting many of those prisoners, with some of them deprived of their passports. Nineteen states, including the EU and the Council of Europe, responded to the Group’s report. The central theme of their statements was transnational repression against Belarusians in exile and the systemic nature of repressions. Larysa Bielskaja, Belarus’ permanent representative to the UN, dismissed the group’s reports as a “deliberate attempt to discredit” Belarusian authorities and give the “air of legitimacy” to sweeping sanctions against Belarus “aimed at strangling its economic development.” She described Group’s activities as “an integral part of a large-scale repressive machine launched against the Belarusian state and people” to create the “necessary backdrop for militarization and the escalation of military political tensions at Belarus’ western borders, and serves as a tool of disinformation about the situation in the country and the government’s policies.” “The human rights situation in the country continues to deteriorate as its people face systematic and unlawful restrictions on their fundamental freedoms,” retorted Karinna Moskalenko.

Two more countries are joining the International Humanitarian Fund, which provides support to Belarusians affected by repression. The total amount of their contribution will be about 200,000 Euro. This was reported in Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya’s Office. It was not specified which countries will join the fund, but eventually the total number of fund participants will reach 15. A number of states have made repeated contributions, for example, Iceland, Estonia and Norway. Negotiations are underway with Finland and Spain on the allocation of new funds. In 2024-2026, more than three million Euro have been allocated to the fund. Most of the assets received earlier have already been used to help people affected by repression, including political prisoners released over the past year.

The budget of the International Criminal Court for 2027 provides for financing the work of the Prosecutor’s Office to investigate the “Belarusian situation” and carry out investigative actions that may lead to judicial actions by the Pre-Trial Chamber, including a decision to issue arrest warrants. The joint investigation team and the department for work with victims and witnesses are also funded for the “Belarusian situation”. The submitted budget has yet to be approved by the Assembly at its meeting, which will be held in December.

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