Belarus Review by iSANS — September 14, 2026 

According to Ukrainian monitoring channels, 17 drones were recorded in Belarusian airspace between 7 and 13 September 2026, including one Ukrainian drone. Most of the incursions occurred on 12 and 13 September. There were no reports of drones being destroyed or crashing on Belarusian territory, and Belarusian official sources did not comment on the incursions. Belarusian Air Force alert aircraft were deployed to intercept the drones. In addition, on the night of 13 September, Lithuanian military radars detected an unidentified flying object near Varėna which, according to a preliminary assessment, entered the country from Belarusian territory and flew into Russia’s Kaliningrad region around 20 minutes later.

Training activity in the Belarusian Armed Forces remained high during the week, consistent with the traditionally intensive September training cycle.

On 7 September, personnel of tank and motorised rifle units of the 19th Separate Guards Mechanised Brigade (military unit 71327), together with reinforcing assets, began loading military equipment onto railway transport in preparation for the strategic command-and-staff exercise “Centre 2026”, scheduled to take place in Russia from 28 September to 3 October. More than 10 military formations from foreign defence ministries are expected to participate in the multinational exercise. No further information on the Belarusian brigade’s participation was published during the week.

On 7 September, territorial defence reservists took the military oath in Homiel, according to the military information agency Vayar. Training assemblies were also held in other regions. On 8 September, military commissariats in the Minsk region reported training assemblies in the Chervien and Biarezina districts, including combat coordination of units. On 10 September, the Minsk military commissariat reported the formation of a territorial defence battalion in the capital’s Zavodski district, while on 12 September, a readiness review of a territorial defence district headquarters and rifle company was held in the Hrodna region.

On 7 September, Ukrainian military intelligence chief Oleh Ivashchenko said that units of Russia’s 101st Missile Brigade, equipped with the Oreshnik intermediate-range missile system, were deployed in Belarus, while the facility at Krychau airfield was formally designated as a joint Belarusian-Russian training and combat centre. He nevertheless assessed the military threat from Belarus as low and said there were no signs that Minsk was preparing to enter the war against Ukraine. Ivashchenko also said Belarus had allowed the deployment of radio-signal repeaters supporting Russian Shahed-type strike drones. According to him, if Belarus had not granted such permission, this would indicate that Minsk no longer controlled Russian activity on its own territory. On 11 September, Ivashchenko  told The Times that Ukrainian intelligence had identified six such facilities in southern Belarus along the Ukrainian border, allowing video feeds to be transmitted over long distances.

The joint tactical-special exercise “Forest Brotherhood 2026”, involving reconnaissance units of the Belarusian Special Operations Forces and Kazakhstan’s Air Assault Forces, continued last week at the Brestski training ground, according to the Belarusian Defence Ministry. Combined groups consisting of equal numbers of Belarusian and Kazakh personnel conducted coordination training and practised operating reconnaissance and strike drones. On 10 September, they moved into the mission area after covering around 40 kilometres through forested and marshy terrain in the Brest and Malaryta districts. On 11 September, the reconnaissance personnel practised destroying a simulated enemy with the deployment of an airborne search-and-assault group supported by a Mi-8MTV-5 helicopter, after which the exercise was closed.

The combat and mobilisation readiness inspection of the 51st Artillery Brigade (military unit 12147) in Asipovichy continued during the week. Reservists underwent training and assessments, while on 12 September the inspection entered its decisive phase: the brigade was ordered to move to the highest levels of combat readiness and prepare to receive additional reservists and equipment, followed by combat coordination of the newly formed units.

On 7 September, the 2nd and 3rd Separate Rifle Battalions of the 4th Police Brigade (military unit 7404) of the Internal Troops conducted training with instructors who had experience of participation in modern armed conflicts. This was reported by the Internal Troops press service.

From 7 to 11 September, an operational-special exercise of the signal troops was held under the direction of the Chief of Communications of the Armed Forces — Head of the Communications Directorate of the General Staff. On 11 September, Chief of the General Staff Pavel Muraveika said that the purpose of the exercise was to practise options for ensuring resilient command and control of the state’s military organisation through new approaches to communications based on the experience of modern conflicts. The exercise involved the 74th Separate Communications Regiment (military unit 41780) and the 127th Guards Communications Brigade (military unit 30677), which deployed field communications nodes.

On 8 September, State Secretary of the Security Council Aliaksandar Valfovich and Interior Minister Ivan Kubrakou observed a company-level tactical exercise of the 7th Police Brigade of the Internal Troops (military unit 5524) in Navapolatsk, according to the Interior Ministry. Service personnel and mobilised reservists practised four combat scenarios, including clearing trenches, preventing the seizure of a major local industrial enterprise and eliminating saboteurs in an urban environment, using Volat armoured vehicles, quad bikes and drones. According to Valfovich, the brigade’s surprise inspection was being conducted on Lukashenka’s orders. From 10 to 13 September, the formation also conducted assessment exercises in firearms training, physical fitness and hand-to-hand combat.

On 8 September, the Emergency Situations Ministry launched a combat and mobilisation readiness inspection of units in the Vitsebsk region, including their transition to operations under a special-period regime. The inspection followed Lukashenka’s 7 September meeting with Emergency Situations Minister Vadzim Siniauski on the ministry’s readiness to protect the population, economic facilities and critical infrastructure during emergencies and crises.

From 8 to 10 September, the second stage of an operational-tactical exercise involving branches of the Air Force and Air Defence Forces took place at the Ashuluk training ground in Russia, beginning with surface-to-air missile and radio-technical units assuming combat air defence duty. According to the Belarusian Defence Ministry on 10 September, air defence crews conducted live firing with S-300PS systems, while Yak-130 and Su-30SM crews engaged high-speed targets. Air Force and Air Defence Forces Commander Major General Andrei Lukyanovich said that the exercise had been under way since 25 August, with its first stage held in Belarus. A total of 22 aerial targets were destroyed; surface-to-air missile and radio-technical troops received a preliminary rating of “excellent”, while aviation was rated “good”. Mobile fire groups separately trained to destroy drones, while female cadets of the Military Academy served as part of one of the combat crews for the first time.

Exercises continued throughout the week in the Western Operational Command, with their progress reported by the Telegram channels of the command and military units. On 8 September, the 111th Artillery Brigade (military unit 11921) deployed to a training ground, where it practised concealed establishment of a command post, aerial reconnaissance using drones and counter-drone defence; the 48th Separate Electronic Warfare Battalion (military unit 97061) performed tasks as part of a tactical-special exercise; and on 11 September mortar crews used the Lektor automated artillery fire-control system. On 12–13 September, personnel of the 11th Mechanised Brigade (military unit 33933) practised checkpoint duties, camouflage using anti-thermal-imaging equipment, the establishment of decoy positions and counter-drone operations. During a command-and-staff exercise, tank units fired 9M119 guided missiles from modernised T-72BM2 tanks, including from indirect-fire positions, while Osa surface-to-air missile crews conducted live firing against aerial targets.

On 9 September, live firing with the Strela-10 surface-to-air missile system took place at the 174th Air Force and Air Defence Forces training ground. According to the State Authority for Military Industry on 10 September, the firing marked the final stage of inter-agency testing of surface-to-air guided missiles following experimental repairs, a capability being developed by the 2566 Radio-Electronic Armament Repair Plant under technical specifications issued by the Defence Ministry. The successful engagement of targets was described as confirmation of the quality of the repairs.

On 11 September, at the Abuz-Liasnouski training ground, Lukashenka inspected communications systems currently in service and new equipment developed by the Belarusian defence industry. The systems covered satellite, tropospheric, radio-relay and tactical communications, including VSAT terminals operating through the Belintersat-1 satellite, low-Earth-orbit terminals for communications on the move, and encrypted tactical radios. The State Authority for Military Industry said further development would combine modernisation of existing equipment with the introduction of new systems.

At the same location, Lukashenka made a number of statements reported by the Belarusian Defence Ministry and Lukashenka’s press service. Explaining the reasons for combat readiness inspections, he pointed to external circumstances: “You can see and observe the aggressive rhetoric towards Belarus. Reconnaissance is being conducted quite openly, almost brazenly: we periodically record various kinds of provocations and airspace violations.” The following day, Vladimir Putin’s press secretary Dmitry Peskov, responding to a question about whether Minsk coordinated the Belarusian army’s combat-readiness inspection with Moscow, said that there were both joint and exclusively national activities. “There are joint activities, and there are national activities that are not coordinated. But overall, most of them are, of course, coordinated,” he said.

On 12 September, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya met in Warsaw with PACE rapporteur Agnieszka Pomaska, who is preparing a report on culture as a foundation for the democratisation of Belarus. The report is expected to examine the state of Belarusian culture inside the country and in exile, Russification and Russian propaganda, repression against cultural figures, the status of the Belarusian language, and transnational repression. A separate section will focus on Belarusians in Poland and relations between the historic Belarusian minority and the new diaspora. Tsikhanouskaya said: “Amid Russification and repression, supporting Belarusian culture and language is a matter of preserving national identity and an important condition for future democratic change.”

On 11 September, during a visit to the Abuz-Liasnouski training ground, Lukashenka made a number of statements on relations with the United States and other political issues. In particular, he said that he expected U.S. Special Envoy for Belarus John Coale to visit on 15 September, stressing that Minsk was ready for both a “small” and a “big deal” with Washington. Among the possible topics, he mentioned further sanctions relief, the restoration of full embassy operations, nuclear materials, and the release of political prisoners. Potash featured prominently. Lukashenka said that a vessel carrying Belarusian potash was already being loaded for shipment to the United States: “We will definitely finish loading tomorrow — come and take it”, while simultaneously demanding the release of USD 43–44 million frozen at Citibank. The report of a U.S. purchase of Belarusian potash followed the lifting of U.S. sanctions on Belaruskali in February this year. The overwhelming majority of Belarusian potash exports are shipped through the St Petersburg port corridor, including Bronka and Ust-Luga. Earlier, in May, the United States proposed that the Baltic states, Poland and Ukraine ease restrictions on the transit of Belarusian potash; its most traditional route has been through the port of Klaipėda in Lithuania. No decisions on restoring this route have been taken since, and the issue remains effectively unresolved.

Lukashenka also made a number of statements on economic policy and relations with neighbouring countries. In particular, he again ruled out large-scale privatisation, saying that there would be no “sweeping privatisation” in Belarus and that decisions on the sale of state assets would continue to be taken personally by him. At the same time, Lukashenka confirmed his readiness to attract private capital, referring to talks with Russian businessmen Vladimir Potanin and Dmitry Mazepin on new investment projects. Speaking about the economy, he acknowledged “minor problems” in industry but said that the authorities intended to “bring the remaining enterprises to their senses”. Lukashenka also said that he had received the results of a new survey by the Belarusian Institute for Strategic Research, according to which public sentiment remains favourable to the regime. Separately, he spoke about recruiting workers from Uzbekistan for the agricultural sector and described the process as controlled. Commenting on Latvia’s plans to impose a 300% tariff on grain from Belarus and Russia, as well as possible restrictions by Latvia and Lithuania on bus connections, Lukashenka said that Minsk did not see these measures as a significant threat. According to him, Belarus exports almost no grain to Latvia, while transport restrictions would merely redirect Belarusians towards travel to Russia.

On 8 September, Lukashenka met in Minsk with Russian businessman Vladimir Potanin, head of Interros and Nornickel, and proposed expanding his investment presence in Belarus. The main result was an agreement between Nornickel and BELAZ to develop a new generation of mining machinery. The sides plan to establish a joint venture and a full-service repair facility, develop unmanned machinery and new types of engines, and use artificial intelligence and big-data processing technologies. Among other possible areas, Lukashenka mentioned supplies of mining dump trucks and Belshina tyres, IT, and joint projects in Krasnoyarsk Krai. Potanin said that the sides were already moving from discussing opportunities to “concrete projects”. Humanitarian cooperation was discussed separately. Lukashenka agreed to extend to Belarus the Potanin Foundation scholarship programmes currently operating in Russia for students and university lecturers.

At the borders, Latvia remained the main direction of migration pressure, with 377 attempted illegal crossings recorded over the week, compared with 65 on the Polish section. At the same time, activity on the Latvian border has declined compared with May–July: instead of 500–600 attempts per week, the current level is around 250–400. This suggests that the present intensity is sufficient to maintain the crisis as a persistent irritant, but below the threshold that would trigger political escalation from Riga. On 8 September, head of Latvia’s Crisis Management Centre Arvis Zīle said that Belarusian border guards had moved away from the immediate border line and that a de facto “buffer zone” had formed between the inner Belarusian fence and the Latvian barrier, where migrants could remain and prepare for crossing but were not allowed to move back deeper into Belarus.

At the same time, Riga continued its policy of political and economic distancing. On 7 September, the Transport Ministry proposed completely ending scheduled and non-scheduled passenger bus services to Belarus and Russia from 2027. On the same day, the government announced plans to impose a 300% tariff on the transit of Belarusian and Russian grain and to seek a common Baltic position. It is worth noting that transit of Russian grain through Latvian ports rose by 56% year on year in August, while Russia is also the country of origin of more than 80% of grain imported from Belarus.

Lithuania, by contrast, is pursuing a more pragmatic line, combining a tough diplomatic position with assessments of specific risks when taking practical decisions. Following Deividas Matulionis’s statement on 4 September that there was no increase in the military threat from Belarus, Prime Minister Mindaugas Sinkevičius said that closing the border or restricting transport links with Belarus should be based not on political considerations but only on concrete security grounds. According to him, neither the State Security Department nor military intelligence currently recommend such measures. At the same time, presidential adviser Asta Skaisgirytė said that “fundamental changes” were necessary for a substantive dialogue with Minsk and that sanctions should be strengthened. Against this background, seven people, including three Lithuanian border guards, were detained on 8 September in a case involving the smuggling of Belarusian cigarettes. On 13 September, a false air-raid alert was triggered in the Vilnius district after radars mistook a flock of birds for drones.

On 10 September, the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine reiterated that a special border regime remains in force within a one-kilometre strip along the borders with Belarus and Russia for the duration of martial law. Unrestricted entry, presence, residence and movement of people within this zone are prohibited, as is any work unrelated to repelling aggression, defence or protection of the state border.

On 10 September, Lukashenka signed a decree establishing the Academy of Intellectual Technologies, which will begin teaching on 1 September 2027. The academy will train specialists in natural sciences, industrial and digital technologies. The decree provides for a model unusual for the Belarusian education system: instead of conventional admission procedures, applicants will compete with projects, while teaching will be based on modular and interdisciplinary approaches. Graduates whose education was funded by the state will be required to complete at least five years of mandatory job placement (Decree No. 310 of 10.09.2026).

On 8 September, journalist, activist of the Polish minority in Belarus and former political prisoner Andrzej Poczobut, who was released on 28 April after more than five years in prison, returned to Belarus through the Bobrowniki–Bierastavitsa border crossing. He will spend around a week in Hrodna, where he plans to meet his family and representatives of the Union of Poles in Belarus. Poczobut had earlier explained his return by saying that he wanted to support Poles who remained in the country: “These people need my presence.” The trip itself creates a new situation in Belarusian-Polish relations, in which one of the former political prisoners most sensitive for Warsaw has been able to return voluntarily and remain openly in Belarus.

Belarusian oil refineries achieved one of their best financial results in the past decade thanks to fuel shortages in Russia, Belneftekhim head Ilya Ikan said on 9 September. In July, supplies to Russia reached a record 212,000 tonnes of petrol and 162,000 tonnes of diesel. Over the first seven months of the year, petrol exports increased 25-fold year on year, while diesel exports rose almost sevenfold. The Russian shortage allowed Belarusian refineries to bring additional reserve capacity online and significantly increase processing volumes.

As of 1 September, Belarus’s international reserves reached USD 15.24 billion, increasing by USD 1.05 billion in August alone. Almost all of the increase came from gold, whose value rose by USD 933 million, while foreign currency assets increased by only USD 109 million. At the same time, households continue to provide foreign currency to the domestic market: in January–August, individuals sold USD 10.76 billion while purchasing USD 9.15 billion.

On 11 September, the Ministry of Internal Affairs added 19 more people to the “List of citizens of the Republic of Belarus, foreign citizens or stateless persons involved in extremist activities”. Among them was the vocalist of the Dymna Lotva music band Katsiaryna Mankevich. An in absentia criminal investigation was initiated against her in June 2026. She is accused of promoting terrorism, financing “terrorist activities”, facilitating “extremist activities”, insulting Lukashenka, and threatening violence against Lukashenka. There are now 6,906 names on the list.

“Viasna” Human Rights Centre has information about 234 confirmed convicts in the “Belarusian Hajun” case. The total number of defendants in this case is much higher. Detentions are still taking place all over Belarus. Trials take place literally every day –  since the beginning of the year, 526 people convicted of “promoting extremism” have been added to the Ministry of Internal Affairs’ “list of extremists”. According to “Viasna”, the vast majority of these people were involved in the “Belarusian Hajun” case. Most of the defendants in the case were sentenced to a restriction of freedom, but there were also cases where people were deprived of their freedom and put in custody.

The return of Andrzej Poczobut to Belarus prompted representatives of the democratic forces to warn against interpreting his case as evidence of an improvement in the human rights situation or of safer conditions for political exiles returning to the country. Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya said that “it is important not to conclude from this that something has changed for everyone in the country”, pointing to continuing detentions, criminal cases and pressure on relatives, and warning that returning remains dangerous for people at risk of persecution. Ales Bialiatski similarly rejected suggestions that Poczobut’s return indicated a “thaw” in Belarus and advised other political refugees against following his example: “I do not advise other political refugees to repeat what Andrzej did, so that later in prison they would not reproach themselves for their gullibility.”

People continue to be detained after returning to Belarus from abroad. One such case became known last week. “Viasna” Human Rights Centre noted that even a short-term trip to Belarus can result in detention, criminal proceedings and imprisonment for several months or years. The risk of persecution remains high, including for those who come to visit relatives, resolve personal issues, or pick up documents or belongings. “Before travelling to Belarus, it is important to take into account these risks and not perceive the absence of previous problems with the security forces as a guarantee of security,” “Viasna” underlined.

The Minsk City Court sentenced attorney Dzmitry Laeuski to three years of imprisonment on charges of facilitating extremist activities and discrediting Belarus. The grounds for the persecution were his interviews with independent Belarusian media. Laeuski defended the 2020 presidential candidate Viktar Babaryka and attorney Maksim Znak. In early July 2021 (immediately after Babaryka’s sentencing), Laeuski was expelled from the Minsk City Bar Association. He said that disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him due to the fact that during the judicial debate he “substantiated the innocence of the other defendants”. According to Laeuski, he asked for the acquittal of people whose “forced agreement with the prosecution” was used to unlawfully prosecute Babaryka. In August 2025, the Belarusian authorities recognised the Belarusian Association of Human Rights Lawyers as an “extremist group”. Laeuski, according to the law enforcement agencies of Belarus, was involved in this organisation. Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya commented on the verdict to Laeuski, saying that he always acted strictly in accordance with the law: “He stayed at home, in Belarus, because this is his country. Dzmitry has always acted strictly according to the law, down to the last letter, but in modern Belarus, unfortunately, the law no longer means anything to those who seized power.”

On 10 September, Belarusian human rights activists recognised Dzmitry Laeuski and 13 other people as political prisoners. As of this day, the number of political prisoners was 902.

Iryna Takarchuk, the mother of blogger Volha Takarchuk, was released. She was detained as part of a raid on the families of political prisoners related to the activities of the INeedHelpBY service for the support of those repressed. In August 2024, she was sentenced to three years of imprisonment on charges of “promoting extremism”. Iryna’s daughter, Volha Takarchuk, was sentenced to one and a half years of imprisonment on charges of insulting a judge, slander, and organising and preparing actions that grossly violate public order. She was released in 2022 and left Belarus. Political prisoner Anastasia Kukhta was also released. In 2022, she was sentenced to five years of imprisonment on charges of participation in actions grossly violating public order, calls for actions aimed at harming national security, and participation in an “extremist formation”. Her mother died in 2023, but she was not allowed to attend the funeral.

Political prisoner Yana Pinchuk, who was sentenced to 12 years of imprisonment, was sent to a punishment cell for 15 days in early September after a conversation with an employee of the Main Directorate for Combating Organised Crime and Corruption (GUBOPiK), a source reported to Mediazona. At the end of August, Artur Haiko, the head of the GUBOPIK department, came to the Homel women’s colony and summoned some political prisoners for “conversations”. Yana Pinchuk was among them. A week after the “conversation” with Haiko, reports began to be written against her, as a result of which she was deprived of a visitation, and was soon sent to a punishment cell. “The colony administration itself would not have initiated these reports, it is done by GUBOPiK. On 1 September, she was given 15 days in a punishment cell notwithstanding the fact that she has asthma. Then at some point she was absent from the colony. There is a possibility that she was in the hospital,” a source said. Pinchuk, who administered three protest Telegram channels, was detained in St. Petersburg, where she lived at the time, on 1 November 2021, and extradited to Belarus in August 2022, despite the ban on her extradition issued by the UN Human Rights Committee. On 6 June 2023, Pinchuk was sentenced to 12 years of imprisonment on charges of participation in an “extremist formation”, actions against national security, incitement to hostility and mass riots and the creation of a “terrorist organisation” or participation in it.

Unknown persons write to former political prisoners from the @dapamoga_pzk account and offer to fill out a form allegedly to receive support. According to human rights defenders, the account may be linked to Belarusian security forces. Unidentified persons can introduce themselves as employees of organisations and initiatives that provide assistance to political prisoners and former political prisoners. Human rights defenders urge not to share personal data with unknown persons and not to fill out suspicious forms. They also recommend checking accounts offering assistance through official websites and pages of relevant organisations.

Unknown people keep trying to get in touch with the delegates of the Coordination Council in messengers. One of the delegates received a Telegram message from an unknown contact under the nickname “Walter”. The interlocutor wrote in Ukrainian that he was in Ukraine, had been following the delegate’s political activities for a long time, and offered communication and friendship. “Walter” also suggested that communication could be in Russian if Ukrainian is not clear. The “Walter” account was registered in August 2025. Who is behind it is unknown. Earlier, political scientist Alina Kharisava faced a similar situation. A man who introduced himself as an officer of the Security Service of Ukraine was trying to convince her for several days to “establish contacts between Ukraine and the Belarusian democratic forces”. It turned out that the Belarusian KGB was behind this attempt to establish contact.

The U.S. President’s Special Envoy for Belarus, John Coale, will visit Belarus on 15 September. According to available information, Coale is seeking the release of the next group of political prisoners and hopes that the total number of those released will reach 1,000. The head of “Viasna” Human Rights Centre, Nobel Peace Prize laureate Ales Bialiatski met with John Coale on 8 September in Washington. “The meeting was held in a cordial atmosphere,” Bialiatski commented.

On 10 September, Ales Bialiatski was awarded the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) Medal for Service to Democracy. In this way, the Endowment celebrated decades of his work in the name of freedom, human rights and democracy in Belarus. In its decision, NED noted that Bialiatski had survived imprisonment and persecution for resisting authoritarianism, documenting abuses of the regime, and defending those whose fundamental rights had been violated. “We are proud to honour his extraordinary courage and unwavering commitment to the democratic future of Belarus,” the NED commentary said.

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Best regards, iSANS team